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George Linsley Pattison 
Kierkegaard's Theory and Critique of Art; I t s Theological Significance 
Abstract 
The thesis starts by arguing that Kierkegaard's emphasis on 
the tension between the aesthetic imagination and religious experi-
ence deserves attention in the context of contemporary discussions 
of rel igion, imagination and axt. After discussing some of the main 
relevant aspects of the l i terary and philosophical background the 
thesis presents an exposition of Kierkegaard's own philosophy of art. 
This provides a theoretical account of aesthetic experience, estab-
l ishes principles of aesthetic crit icism and offers a critique of 
aesthetic experience. A comprehensive acco\int of the f i r s t form of 
this philosophy of art in the early Papirer i s given. Kierkegaard de-
scribes art as developing through a sequence of dialectical stages 
unti l i t touches upon themes and questions which require a religious 
or existential , not an aesthetic, approach. The use to which Kierke-
gaard put this understanding of art in his mature work i s examined 
with particular reference to his works of aesthetic criticism and to 
his 'novels'. His work as a c r i t i c shows how art approximates to 
religious and existential concerns, without being able to give ade-
quate expression to them, but i t i s in his 'novels' that he delin-
eates most f inely the boundary between the aesthetic and the re l ig -
ious. His account of this boxmdary i s seen to be closely connected 
with his concept of angst. Though he emphasizes the difference be-
tween the aesthetic and the religious he does allow art a proper 
autonomy. His stress on the priority of the religious may even be 
construed as beneficial to art in an age when art i s threatened by 
a pervasive nihilism which only religion can decisively challenge. 
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By 
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Introduction 
In the following text references to S^ren Kierkegaard's pub-
lished work wi l l be given in brackets in the text. References wi l l 
be to the third danish edition of the Samlede Vaerker (1962), and 
wi l l give volume and page numbers. These references may be correl-
ated with English translations by reference to Alastair Mackinn«n, 
The Kierkegaard Indices. Volume 1; Kierkegaard in Translation 
(1970). The translations of SLLI passages thus cited are the 
author's own, althoiigh in many cases he has rel ied heavily on stan-
dard translations. A l i s t of English versions of works by Kierke-
gaard referred to in the text i s given in the Bibliography. 
References to Kierkegaard's Joijrnals are also given in brack-
ets in the text and, in part, follow the customary mode of refer-
ence in the standard Danish edition: P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. 
Torsting (eds.) Soren Kierkeggiards Papirer 2nd ed. I - XI i i i (20 
vo l s . ) . The references wi l l give vol\ime, section and entry niimber, 
thus: IV B 17. Where possible, however, the translations have been 
taken from Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (eds. and trans.) S^ren 
Kierkegaards Journals and Papers, vols. 1 - 6 , (1967 - 78). The 
numeration of entries in the Hong translation runs through the six 
volumes, and their translation i s thus referred to by i t s number 
(rather than by vol. and page niimbers), which follows the Danish 
number. Thus ( l l A 487/1579) wi l l refer to entry IIA 487 in the 
Danish edition and entry 1579 in the Hong translation. Where an 
entry i s not translated by the Hongs the author's own translation 
i s given, together with a reference to the Danish edition. Page 
references have only been given in ttie case of extracts from very 
long entries. Where the author has used his own translation in 
preference to the Hongs' the reference number to the Hongs' trans-
lation i s given in brackets, thus: ( l l A 487(1579)). 
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Works of Kierkegaard referred to in the text are referred to 
by their English t i t l e . A l l other works in other languages are 
referred to by their t i t l e in the original language, except where 
a translation has been used. Al l translations from foreign-
langua.ge t i t l e s are the author's own unless an English translation 
i s specif ical ly referred to. 
In the case of authors other than Kierkegaard references are 
to footnotes at the back of the thesis,- except in the case of J . L . 
Heiberg's play Fata Morgana, references to which are given in brack-
ets in the text, giving act and scene numbers. Details of the edit-
ion used are given in the footnote to the f i r s t quotation from the 
play. 
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Chapter One; Kierkegaard and the Quest for Imagination 
( A ) From Coleridge to Kierkegaard 
The attempt to establish some kind of l ink between aesthetic 
and religious experience, to highlight or to seek out the imagin-
ative bases of both faith and theology has become a recurrent motif 
in contemporary theology and in the study of religion in general. ( l ) 
At one level this i s simply rooted in the practical, pedagog-
ica l concern that the presentation of the christian messa.ge should 
not be overly abstract or intel lectual , thereby alienating the so-
called 'ordinary man-in-the-pew' who, i t i s argued, needs something 
more concrete than an intellectual argument, something more l ike an 
image or a story. 
At another level however we are dealing with a more profound 
reflection on the nature and content of the message concerned, a 
reflection which would see an intrinsic connection between the re-
ligious message or experience and such aesthetic categories as 
'image' or 'story'. I t i s at this level that John Coulson claims 
that ' . . .what we hold in faith i s most frequently expressed in 
metaphor, symbol and story and, as such, prior to and as a condit-
ion of i t s verif icat ion, i t requires an imaginative assent compar-
able to that given to poems and novels'. (2) I t i s at this level 
too that the question acquires a real theological interest. 
The contemporary literat\ire consistently honours i t s debt to 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 - 1834) and thereby indirectly to 
the formulations of german romanticism which played a v i ta l part in 
shaping his theory of imagination. (5) The theologian may well 
pause for reflection on the fate of this latter movement before 
uncri t ical ly adopting i t s principles. For though a certain reading 
of romanticism would see in i t nothing more than a reaction to the 
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Enlightenment and to the conditions of modern technological society 
(4) » romanticism too carried forward some of the secularizing tend-
encies of the Enlightenment. I t could easily promote the cause of 
art in such a way that art became a substitute for rel igion, a tend-
ency summed up in Wagner's dictum that 'Man's supreme purpose i s art ' . 
(5) Art coiild thus easily serve as an ' a r t i f i c i a l religion for the 
educated middle-classes'. (6) 
The proximity of religion and aesthetics in romantic theory did 
not, of covocse, always lead to the utter confusion of the two in some 
new pseudo-religion (as at Bayreuth). I t could also serve as a cha-
llenge to engage in a sustained and disciplined reflection on the ex-
act measure of convergence between the two. Such was the case with 
Coleridge and, as we shall see, with Kierkegaard. 
The relationship between Coleridge and Kierkegaard has been 
summed up by Herbert Read as follows: 
I t was l e f t for Kierkegaard to pronounce the absolute Either/ 
or - either the aesthetical or the ethical. The f inal beauty, 
for Coleridge and Schelling no less than for Kierkegaard, was 
the beauty of holiness, but i t was l e f t to Kierkegaard to 
point out eloquently, loquaciously, that beauty in man (as dis-
tinct from beauty in the work of art) requires a certain per-
spective, movement, history; and in such a condition . . we 
have "passed beyond the spheres of nature and of art and are in 
the sphere of freedom, of the ethical." 
(7) 
Although the details of Read's statement are not beyond quest-
ion the general picture which he gives can serve to locate Kierke-
gaard in the context of the contemporary quest for imagination. I f 
Coleridge i s taken as the representative of the convergence of r e l -
igion and imagination, Kierkegaard may be taken as the representat-
ive of their divergence. Both men used, while creatively recasting, 
the resources of transcendental idealism and early romanticism. 
Both saw imagination not merely as operating within a pirrely aesth-
etic horizon but more fundamentally as providing a key to the basic 
dynamics of the mind. Within this wider perspective art has a 
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special place. The ar t i s t reveals, or re-reveals, a vision of the 
world which we a l l , art i s ts and non-artists al ike, can have or have 
had. Aesthetic experience i s f t i l f i l l ed in but i s not confined to 
fine art . 
In this perspective imagination and art are interpreted in the 
l ight of their overall humanistic significance. I t i s in this 
broad evaluation that the chief differences emerge. Kierkegaard 
does not see the poet as the visionary seer who reveals l i f e ' s mys-
teries to lesser men, he sees him more as the representative of un-
redeemed h-uman existence. The aesthetic attitude thus becomes the 
basis of Kierkegaard's characterization of what later generations 
of existential thinkers would ca l l inauthenticity or bad faith. (8) 
And therefore man loves the poet above a l l , because the poet 
i s the most dangerous thing for him; for this indeed belongs 
to a sickness, that the sick man desires most vehemently, and 
loves precisely that which i s most damaging to him. But spir-
i tual ly understood, man in his natural condition i s sick, he 
i s in a delusion, a self-deceit , and therefore desires most of 
a l l to be deceived, so that he can get permission not merely to 
continue in the delusion, but to make himself at home in the 
self-deceit. And a deceiver, suitable for this task, i s pre-
cisely: the poet. Therefore man loves him above a l l . 
(SV 19 p. 215 •) 
In such a passage Kierkegaard accepts the romantic identi f ic-
ation of the poet as the virtuoso of the imagination; what he re-
jects i s the value to be placed upon i t . 
Kierkegaard's critique of the romantic position was influenced 
by his encounter with hegelianism. Hegel's interpretation of rom-
anticism had tried to show how even within an idealist view of l i f e 
aesthetic experience pointed beyond i t s e l f and required i t s own 
supersession in religion and philosophy. Such an interpretation 
implies that the aesthetic i s not to be regarded as wrong so much 
as inadequate, incapable of giving definitive expression to the 
freedom of Sp ir i t , which i s the absolute goal of the l i f e of the 
mind. I t also means that, within certain l imits , aesthetic 
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experience, and that wi l l above a l l mean art , has a quite proper 
validity. Hegel's philosophy of art was thus both a theory and a 
critique of art. I t i s the argument of this thesis that the same 
can be said for Kierkegaard's analysis of the aesthetic, that i t 
contains both positive and negative moments, and that the interact-
ion of these serves to qualify i t s precise dialectical structure. 
I t w i l l be argued that, with due allowance for the unusual nature of 
his philosophical methods, Kierkegaard had what can properly be called 
a philosophy of ar t , and the fact that this philosophy of art was 
ultimately subordinate to his existential and religious concerns in 
no way deprives i t of i t s character as philosophy. (9) 
( B ) Poet or Thinker? 
Apart from the anglo-saxon tendency to deny existentialism in 
general the right to the t i t l e of 'philosophy' there are particular 
reasons why the claim that Kierkegaard had a philosophy of art , or 
indeed a philosophy of anything, might be greeted with scepticism. 
Nor are these reasons confined to a reiteration of the anti-ration-
al elements of Kierkegaard's tho\ight, elements particularly obvious 
in his doctrine of the paradox. 
For Kierkegaard, i t i s sometimes claimed, i s to be treated not 
as a philosopher but as a creative writer, not as a thinker but as 
a poet. 'No great poet - except perhaps Shakespeare - has had more 
to endure from pedestrian exegesis', wrote Raymond Cook. (IO) From 
such a position any attempt to read Kierkegaard philosophically wi l l 
always appear to run the r i sk of producing just such pedestrian exeg-
esis . But the poetic elements in Kierkegaard's work should not blind 
us totally to the intellectual thrust of the works in which such ele-
ments axe embedded. Indeed I hope to show that even Kierkegaard's 
most l i terary work betrays a philosophical as well as a religious 
- 1 2 -
intention. 
There are two ways of treating Kierkegaard as a poet. The f i r s t 
seeks merely to draw attention to or to analyse those aspects of his 
work which locate him as a figure of l i terary history as well as of 
philosophical and theological history. ( l l ) I t wotild be perverse to 
deny the existence of such elements and indeed we shall be giving 
considerable attention to the way in which Kierkegaard used l i terary 
forms. Moreover, the presence of such elements means that a serious 
st'adent ' ®f Kierkegaard's work must be prepared to use the methods 
of l i terary crit icism as well as those of philosophical and theolog-
ica l analysis. Inevitably the cross-currents of these different ways 
of approaching the texts wi l l not lead to the production of tidy sum-
maries. Such tintidiness i s however the price to pay for loyalty to 
the texts. 
A second approach however would make this poetic element the key 
to a total interpretation of Kierkegaard's work. Although i t must be 
conceded that those interpretations which take this l ine include some 
of the more exciting works in the secondary l i terature, the principle 
i t s e l f i s highly questionable. A fundamental defect of such works i s 
that they do not take into accoimt Kierkegaard's own theory of art. 
Consequently they apply a concept of 'poetry' to Kierkegaard's work 
which may have l i t t l e or nothing to do with his understanding of 
poetry and art. This i s a recipe for confusion. We shall look 
brief ly at three such interpretations. 
Ma,rtin Ihust's substantial work Soeren Kierkegaard, Per Dichter 
des Religittsen develops an intriguing theory of the kierkegaardian 
book as a kind of spiritual puppet-theatre in which the characters 
. . . so l l en lediglich bestimmten Geisteshaltungen und Entwick-
lungsstufen des innersten Selbst versinnbildlichen. Es sind 
eine Art geistige Marionetten, . . . durch keine aussere Situ-
ation, durch kein Milieu charakterisiert: leiblos, schatten-
haft , gespensterartig sind sie lediglich die Geschttpfe des 
Dichters, der sie sich zu dem einen Zweck ausgedacht hat, dass 
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sie bestimmte Bewegmgen des Geistes mit absoluter Prazis-
ion vollziehen und veranschaiilichen. 
(12) 
Kierkegaard's work and in particular his pseudonymous author-
ship, comes to be seen as involving a special concept of the book as 
a 'stage for the Spir i t ' (13)» and the emphasis i s on the appropriat-
eness of the aesthetic fonn in relation to the content which Kierke-
gaard i s trying to communicate. I f however we look at Kierkegaard's 
own concept of aesthetic and religious communication, we shall see 
that i t i s precisely the tension between the aesthetic form and the 
more-than-aesthetic content which he intends to evoke in his pseud-
onymous works. (14) 
Similarly Louis Mackey argues that Kierkegaard's writing, even 
the most ostensibly theoretical i s not syllogistic but f igural. The 
unity and consistency of his thoiight, not at a l l apparent to logical 
scrutiny, i s a metaphoric unity. (I5) Mackey bases his argument on 
a conventional analysis of the sign-nattire of language. A sign i s 
both i t s e l f a thing and a significance. Poetry emphasizes the 'thing' 
aspect of language, that i s to say, words are themselves the objects 
of poetry. Philosophy emphasized the task of language as signifying. 
(16) This distinction echoes Sartre's argument in What i s Literature?. 
(17) but whereas Sartre therefore rejects poetry as a proper medium for 
engaged literature^Mackey argues the opposite case, that i t i s precise-
ly poetry's lack of reference to anything external to i t s e l f that 
makes i t an adequate mirror of subjective interest and a challenge to 
committed action. ( I 8 ) 'A Poem,' he says 'ca l l s . . . not for admir-
ation but for personal appropriation.' (19) 
While he i s undoubtedly correct in saying that 'the c l in ica l 
objectivity of Prufrock conveys an intensity of feeling and a con-
viction of real i ty that are only dissipated and attenuated by the 
rhetorical ragings of Allen Ginsberg,' (20) i t by no means follows 
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that the response we make to such c l in ica l objectivity i s personal 
appropriation in the sense of appropriation by action which i s the 
sort of appropriation with which Sartre and Kierkegaard are concer-
ned. Moreover, such claims on behalf of poetry are antithetical to 
Kierkegaard's own aesthetics, for, as we shall see, Kierkegaard re-
serves personal appropriation for a different kind of communication. 
(21) 
Kierkegaard's own aesthetics are taken far more seriously by 
Nelly Viallaneix in her book Ecoute, Kierkegaard. She sets out three 
theses. F i r s t l y , that 'Kierkegaard se declare "po"ete et non philo-
sophe"'. (22) Secondly, that 'Kierkegaard se declare "poete du 
religievLx" et non theologien'. (23) Thirdly, that 'La structure 
chretienne de l a totalite de I'oeuvre et de 1'existence de Kierke-
gaard ne peut done manquer d'etre sonore'. (24) I t i s this f inal 
point which Ms. Viallaneix makes the guiding thread of her study of 
the totality of Kierkegaard's work. Picking up the great emphasis 
given to music and to sonority in romantic theory, she i s attentive 
to the 'musical' or 'sonorous' dimension of Kierkegaard's work, and 
by doing so undoubtedly contributes to a richer understanding of i t . 
The question i s , does she push her central image of Kierkegaard as 
a poet motivated by the ideals of romantic harmony too far? She 
even extends this image to his properly religious writings, which 
she sees as the work of a poet, whose poetry i s a testimony to 
Chris t , echoing the ineffable song of divine love. Kierkegaard's 
work, in i t s total i ty, i s seen, or rather heard, as a single, grand 
opera a l a Mozart. (25) 
There are two points to be made about this. F ir s t ly i t leads to 
a view of the dark side of Kierkegaard's l i f e and work as being just 
the necessary discord and dissonance which complements the f inal har-
mony of the whole. Against this one may well set John Hick's res-
ervations about the 'aesthetic theme' in augustinian theodicy: does 
- 15 -
i t r e a l l y do jus t ice to the personal anguish and pain which Kierke-
gaard so palpably experienced and wrote about? (26) 
Secondly, i t again pays too l i t t l e a t tent ion to Kierkegaard's 
own aesthetics, i n pa r t i cu la r to h i s concept of the r e l a t i on of a r t 
to s u f f e r i n g . I n connection wi th th i s i t must also be stressed 
that music d id not func t ion f o r Kierkegaard as the ult imate dimens-
ion of aesthetic expression. 
Pedestrian i t may be, but i f we are to t a lk about Kierkegaard 
as a ' k ind of poet' we must be clear what exactly we mean by 'k ind 
o f , which i s i n i t s e l f an extremely vague expression. We need to 
hear Theodor Adorno's warning that 'wann immer man die Schrif ten von 
Philosophen als Dichtimgen zu begreifen t rachtete , hat man ihren 
Wahrheitsgehalt v e r f e h l t ' . (2?) 
An appreciation of the poetic dimension of Kierkegaard's auth-
orship i s an essential part of any serious in te rpre ta t ion of i t -
but i t i s not the key to the inner sanctuary. 
(C) The Course of This Enquiry 
The aim of th i s enquiry i s c h i e f l y to give an exposition of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy of a r t i n i t s double-aspect of a theory and 
a c r i t i q u e of a r t . This w i l l i t s e l f cont inual ly touch upon points of 
theological i n t e re s t , although a f i n a l judgement concerning i t s theo-
l o g i c a l s tructure w i l l not be given u n t i l the concluding chapter. 
I t must however be noted that from the perspective which i s 
opened up by the focus of t h i s study the r e l i g ious in tent of Kierke-
gaard' s philosophy of a r t i s c h i e f l y found wi th in an anthropological 
horizon. Kierkegaard's philosophy of a r t does not lead to any con-
clusions about the object of theology i n the s t r i c t sense of the 
word. I t does lead to cer ta in r e f l e c t i ons on the s i tua t ion of man 
'before God', to use one of Kierkegaard's own expressions. Perhaps 
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i t scarcely needs to be added that there i s l i t t l e or nothing said 
about man i n Kierkegaard's authorship which does not have some bear-
ing on the r e l ig ious dimension of existence, which does not serve 
the purpose of showing that the God-relationship i s an inescapable 
dimension of human existence. (28) 
The course of the enquiry i s accordingly ( to use a rather hack-
neyed phrase) ' f rom below.' I t i s concerned,- f i r s t l y , to give an 
account of Kierkegaard's theory of a r t , a theory which i s largely con-
f i n e d to aesthetics i n the narrow sense; then, secondly,- to examine 
h is c r i t i q u e of a r t , a c r i t i q u e which raises the question of the l i m -
i t s of a r t , and thus the fu r the r question of what l i e s beyond those 
l i m i t s . I t w i l l be argued that these two parts of Kierkegaard's p h i l -
osophy of a r t are i n f a c t interdependent, and that we are impelled by 
the movement issuing from the i r in t e rac t ion , to see that the theory 
as wel l as the c r i t i q u e i s theological ly loaded. 
To some extent t h i s movement from aesthetics to r e l i g i o n i s r e -
f l e c t e d i n the development of Kierkegaard's authorship, which- i n the 
beginning shows a greater preoccupation with purely aesthetic matters, 
and which l a t e r turns to a more exclusive concern with re l ig ious 
issues. However, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not absolute, and when we come 
to analyse the theory of a r t i n the early Papirer we shall f i n d that 
the r e l i g i o u s dimension i s already present. 
The greater number of Kierkegaard texts wi th which th i s thesis 
w i l l be concerned stem from the ea r l i e r period of his authorship, 
from the period terminating wi th the publ icat ion of Stages on L i f e ' s 
Way i n 1845. This work undoubtedly marks the end of a certain phase 
i n the development of Kierkegaard's concept of the aesthetic. There-
a f t e r h i s use of the term i s more and more dominated by i t s equation 
wi th the concept of ' the aesthetic ' i n the sense of the inauthentic. 
(29) The use of textual material i s however determined by content 
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rather than by a s t r i c t per iodizat ion. This content w i l l be dealt 
with under three main headings. F i r s t l y , we shall attempt a recon-
s t ruc t ion of Kierkegaard's ea r l i es t philosophy of a r t , as i t i s 
evidenced i n the Papirer. This early philosophy of a r t contains 
both theoret ica l and c r i t i c a l elements, and i s the basis of Kierke-
gaard's wr i t ings on aesthetics i n h is mature authorship. Secondly, 
we sha l l elucidate the theory of a r t i n t h i s mature authorship by 
focussing on those texts which reveal Kierkegaard as an aesthetic-
ian and a l i t e r a r y c r i t i c . Th i rd ly , we shal l examine Kierkegaard's 
c r i t i q u e of a r t as i t i s embodied i n h is three major 'novels ' : Ei ther-
Or, Repet i t ion , and Stages on L i f e ' s Way. We shall not be dealing 
wi th everything which Kierkegaard wrote on th i s topic , but the texts 
to be examined are, i t i s believed, genuinely representative, and w i l l 
s u f f i c e to show both that Kierkegaard had a philosophy of a r t and what 
the central structure of that philosophy of a r t was. 
Before turning to Kierkegaard, however, we shall look at some 
of the forces moulding the i n t e l l e c t u a l landscape wi th in which h is 
philosophy of a r t was formed. A complete description of t h i s land-
scape would, of course, be nothing less than a complete l i t e r a r y and 
philosophical h i s to ry of Scandinavian and german culture from the 
1790s through to the 1850s. We can, however, pick out a number of 
dominant moments. We shall look , f i r s t l y , at some of the leading 
ideas of early romanticism, taking in to accovmt both the i r ph i lo -
sophical basis and the i r deployment i n aesthetics; and,secondly, 
at hegelian aesthetics, looking both at the hegelian c r i t i que of 
romanticism and at the constructive aspects of hegelian theory. I n 
both cases we shal l have to look at these movements i n t h i r danish, 
as wel l as i n the i r german forms, and par t icu lar a t tent ion w i l l be 
given to the aesthetics of danish hegelianism, a point which, i t w i l l 
be argued, i s c ruc ia l in-understanding Kierkegaard's own development. 
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but which i s la rge ly unknown t e r r i t o r y to the english-speaking 
reader. 
I n addit ion to romanticism and hegelianism i t i s necessary to 
take in to account the impact of the reaction against both by the an-
gry young men of the Young Germaay movement. I t i s i n t h i s context 
that Poul M i l l e r i s discussed, a f i gu re who i s hard to categorize 
nea t ly , but who had a s i gn i f i can t influence on Kierkegaard. A l -
though M i l l e r ' s r e l a t i o n to Kierkegaard has received no l i t t l e a t t -
ention i n the secondary l i t e r a t u r e (30) , the par t icular impact of 
h i s wr i t i ngs on aesthetics has not been dealt with at any length. 
These three forces: romanticism, hegelianism and the post- and 
anti-romantic-and hegelian movement const i tute the three main p i l l -
ars of Kierkegaard's background - at least i n respect of aesthetics. 
Each of these movements w i l l be dealt with i n d i v i d u a l l y , and Kierke-
gaard's response to them w i l l be dealt wi th only when a l l three have 
been brought in to focus. 
Even th i s l i m i t a t i o n of the f i e l d leaves us confronted by ' b i g ' 
movements r a i s i n g ' b i g ' questions and one cannot skip l i g h t l y across 
such a minef ie ld of controversy without r i s k . I t i s however i n no 
way my in ten t ion to claim that romanticism, etc. , i s dealt;.' wi th i n 
i t s f i i lness . I t i s a question merely of saying enough to make 
Kierkegaard's own concerns comprehensible. I n th i s respect i t i s 
possible that too much rather than too l i t t l e at tention i s devoted 
to the backgro\ind. 
I t wo\ald, however, have been possible to go fu r ther a f i e l d than 
t h i s , f o r Kierkegaard formed and defended h i s posi t ion i n the l i g h t 
of a continuing engagement wi th the t r a d i t i o n , bringing his reading 
of such diverse wr i te rs as Plato , A r i s t o t l e , Boethius, Lessing and 
Hamann to bear on issues r e l a t i n g to a r t and r e l i g i o n . His approach 
to the t r a d i t i o n was however i n the l i g h t of h is contemporary s i tua t ion . 
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and i t i s to th i s contemporary s i tua t ion we must turn i n order to 
see the main routes by which Kierkegaard approached questions of 
a r t and f a i t h . Mention of other influences, e.g. A r i s t o t l e , w i l l 
be made wherever such reference i s relevant to the exegesis of par-
t i c u l a r Kierkegaard texts . 
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Chapter Two: Romanticism 
( A ) Germany: Early Romanticism 
( A ) ( i ) J . G. Fichte 
The expression ' ea r ly romanticism' corresponds to the german 
term 'Prlihromantik' . This i s a quite speci f ic term i n l i t e r a r y 
h i s to ry r e f e r r i n g to the c i r c l e of wr i te rs and thinkers centred on 
Fr iedr ich and A. W. Schlegel and including such f igures as Fr iedr ich 
von Haxdenberg (Noval i s ) , Ludwig Tieck, W. H. Wackenroder and E. T. A . 
Hoffmann. Although t h i s movement, along with romanticism i n a wider 
sense, i s of ten dismissed as being merely i r r a t i o n a l the early 
romantics themselves were concerned to a f f i l i a t e the i r v i s ion of the 
nature and o f f i c e of a r t to one of the most demanding forms of con-
temporary philosophy, namely the transcendental idealism of Johann 
Got t l ieb Fichte (1762 - I 8 I 4 ) . 
I n the h is tory of philosophy Fichte appears as the f igure who 
transgressed the kantian l i m i t a t i o n s on knowledge of the t h i n g - i n -
i t s e l f , and who thus led german idealism back towards the f u l l -
blooded metaphysics of Hegel. (2) Certainly Fichte believed that 
h i s philosophy gave an adequate and ejdiaustive account of knowledge 
'wi thout remainder' , although the exact status which he assigned to 
t h i s account i s not en t i r e ly clear. I s i t intended as a descript-
ion or an explanation of the construction of consciousness or i s i t 
both? 'both a phenomenology of consciousness and an i dea l i s t meta-
physics'? (3) 
From the point of view of h i s influence on romanticism the 
most relevant aspects of Fichte 's philosophy are (a) h is state-
ment of the inadequacy of sense-experience; (b) h is account of the 
productive imagination; (c) h i s emphasis on the primacy of prac t ica l 
reason; (d) h is analysis of f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e selfhood; (e) h is 
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account of the i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n . 
( A ) ( i ) (a) The inadequacy of sense-experience 
The task of philosophy, according to Fichte , i s ' t o fu rn i sh 
the grounds of a l l experience, (4) but , he argues, sense-experience 
cannot i t s e l f be i t s own ground. His clearest accomt of the i n -
adequacy of sense-experience (and of many other points of h i s o f t -
en obsc-ure philosophy) i s i n h is popularizing work The Vocation of 
Man. Here he argues that our ordinary, everyday experience of the 
world i s not the naive sense-experience i t makes i t s e l f out to be, 
but i n f a c t involves the projec t ion of raw sense-data on to a s t ru -
cture which i s not i n i t s e l f sensed. We do not actually see any 
'ob jec t s ' at a l l , we see only, e.g. , red, a red impression, which i s 
present i n consciousness only as a mere point . However the mind s\ir-
r e p t i t i o u s l y conjoins t h i s red point to a manifold of other red poin-
ts thereby creating the appearance of a red surface. This i s not a l l , 
f o r the mind projects t h i s red surface on to an imaigined space which 
i s not i t s e l f seen, thus creating the appearance of an 'ob jec t ' ex-
i s t i n g i n three-dimensional space. This unseen space i s thus the 
bearer of the a t t r ibu tes of the 'seen' object , i . e . the red thing 
which we see 'out there' can exis t f o r us only by v i r tue of the post-
u l a t i o n of an unseen ground which i s perceived as being red. The pro-
j e c t i o n or postula t ion of such an unseen object i s , according to 
Pichte, a spontaneous funct ion of the p r inc ip le of causal i ty, the 
p r i n c i p l e that everything must have a foundation or cause. I n the 
l i g h t of t h i s analysis Fichte distinguishes two levels of knowledge: 
l i . : ' : , . ' ' . . ! ''-immediate' knowledge, which i s l i m i t e d to sensation, and 'mediate' 
knowledge which, by means of the p r inc ip le of causali-ty^ gets behind 
the 'seen' surface, and enquires as to the basis of what 'appears' i n 
sense-experience. Over against such 'mediate' knowledge the 'immed-
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ia te i s seen as d e f i c i e n t . Naive sense-experience does not provide 
a foundation f o r , or explain, knowledge, but i t s e l f stands i n need 
of an adequate grounding i n terms of a higher p r inc ip le . (5) 
( A ) ( i ) (b) The productive imagination 
I n the analysis of the project ion of appearances on to unseen 
objects , construed as the ground or cause of these appearances, the 
concept of the productive imagination has already been anticipated. 
Fichte claims more f o r the productive imagination than that i t mere-
l y projects sense-impressions on to a space which i s i n some way 
'given'c I t produces a world of appearances i n a s t i l l more fund-
amental way, f o r the p r inc ip le of causality by v i r tue of which th i s 
p ro jec t ion i s set i n motion i s i t s e l f a postiilate of the mind. The 
space, which acts as the foimdation, and i n th i s sense 'cause', of 
the objects that are seen, i s i t s e l f a project ion of the: mind. I t 
i s the fundamental form, posited by the mind, by which the mind i n -
t u i t s . Space i s the form of consciousness i t s e l f : 'consciousness i s 
. . . a pro jec t ion of myself out of myself by means of the only mode of 
act ion which i s properly mine - i n t u i t i v e consciousness (Schauen)'. 
(6) 'Space - i l lumina ted , transparent, palpable, penetrable space -
the purest image of my knowledge, i s not seen, but i s i n t u i t e d . And 
i n i t my seeing i t s e l f i s i n t u i t e d . The l i g h t i s not outside of me, 
i t i s w i t h i n me, and I myself am the l i g h t . ' (7) 
Consequently i n 'seeing' an object I am r e a l l y only seeing an 
extension of the mind i t s e l f , d i f f e r e n t i a t e d as subject and object i n 
accordance wi th the s p a t i a l i t y of i t s basic form. Both subject and 
object ( ' i n here' and 'out there ' ) are aspects of the same mind, 
which i s the deeper ' subject ' of consciousness. 
This i s the basic dynamism of ' the wonderful power of productive 
imagination . . . without which nothing at a l l i n the human mind i s 
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capable of explanation - and on which the ent i re mechanism of that 
mind may very well be based.' (s) 
( A ) ( i ) (c) The primacy of prac t ica l reason 
Fichte does not stop here. The world produced i n th i s way i s , 
f o r him, Tiltimately a meaningless, pointless world. 'Pictures are: 
they are the only things which ex i s t , and they know of themselves 
a f t e r the fashion of pictures; pictures which f l o a t past without 
there being anything past which they f l o a t . . . I myself am one of 
these pictures; nay I am not even t h i s , but merely a confused p ic -
ture o f the p i c tu res . ' (9) 
Such an imagined world u l t imate ly lacks in te res t , i t i s the 
world of a d is interes ted, theoret ical knowledge, but reason 
(V.emunft) has an higher in teres t than t h i s : the interest provid-
ed by the p r a c t i c a l , e th ica l reason. So 'We act not because we 
know, but we know because we are cal led upon to act: the pract ical 
reason i s the root of a l l reason. The laws of action f o r ra t iona l 
beings are immediately cer ta in; the i r world i s certain only through 
the f a c t that they are c e r t a i n ' . (IO) I t i s because the moral sense, 
conscience, requires that the persons with whom I have to do are to 
be treated as r e a l , existent persons (and not theoret ical constructs) 
that we axe bo-und - l i t e r a l l y conscience-bound - to regard the world 
which appears to consciousness as a rea l world. ' I t i s only from the 
command of conscience to f o l l o w a cer ta in course of action that there 
arises our conception of a cer ta in purpose i n th i s act ion, and from 
t h i s our whole i n t u i t i v e perception of a world of sense.' ( I I ) 
( A ) ( i ) (d) F i n i t e and i n f i n i t e selfhood 
I n h i s accoimt of the productive imagination and of the prac t ic -
a l reason Pichte makes i t clear that consciousness spontaneously 
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manifests i t s e l f d u a l i s t i c a l l y , as subject and object , as se l f and 
no t - s e l f . But i t i s also clear that Fichte seeks to unite these 
p o l a r i t i e s i n a single Absolute s e l f , which w i l l 'contain ' or be the 
basis of both: 'The opposites to be u n i f i e d l i e i n the sel f as con-
sciousness . . . Both se l f and no t - se l f are a l ike products of the o r i g -
i n a l acts of the s e l f , and consciousness i t s e l f i s s imi la r ly a prod-
uct of the s e l f ' s f i r s t o r i g ina l act , i t s own posi t ing of i t s e l f . ' (12) 
The se l f i s thus i n t r i n s i c a l l y two-dimensional. I t exists ab-
so lu te ly , i n a mode i n which no opposition ex is t s , and i t exists r e l -
a t i v e l y , i n a mode i n which i t exists only i n a complex of r e l a t i o n -
ships to other objects which l i m i t i t s f ree being. 
The prac t ica l reason represents essential ly an i n f i n i t e ac t iv -
i t y . I t i s not conditioned by anything outside i t s e l f . I n becom-
ing conscious of the prac t ica l reason which i s my s e l f , I am consci-
ous that ' I am wholly my own creation . . . I resolve to be a work not 
of Nature but of myself, and I have become so by means of th is reso l -
u t i o n . ' (13) But by v i r t u e of the very dynamic by which i t posits 
i t s e l f as a se l f the p rac t i ca l reason becomes f i n i t e , r e s t r i c t e d , 
conditioned. Thus i n a l l i t s i n t u i t i o n s the se l f exists as f i n i t e , 
bound by the r ec ip roc i ty of i t s relatedness to a world of 'seen' ob-
j ec t s . Conversely the se l f i s also always at work annulling and 
transcending the pa r t i cu la r spec i f ica t ion of f i n i t u d e i n which i t 
f i nds i t s e l f , and aspir ing to express i t s e l f i n i t s proper i n f i n i t u d e . 
( A ) ( i ) (e) I n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n 
I f the human mind i s always enmeshed i n the m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
appearances i n which i t exists as a f i n i t e se l f how does i t become 
aware of the absolute self? 
I t does so by means of what Fichte ca l l s the ' i n t e l l e c t u a l 
i n t u i t i o n ' . As an i n t u i t i o n i t has the immediacy which attaches to 
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a l l i n t u i t i o n : 'We cannot prove from concepts that t h i s power of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n ex is t s , nor evolve from them what i t may be. 
Everyone must discover i t immediately i n himself , or he w i l l never 
make i t s acquaintance.' (14) 
As sensory i n t u i t i o n i s the awareness of an object (apparent-
l y ) opposed to the se l f so the i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n i s an aware-
ness of the primordial a c t i v i t y of the se l f . I n the f i r s t instance 
t h i s i s w i t h i n the context of the subject-object r e l a t i on i n which 
the s e l f , as f i n i t e , ex i s t s , accompanying the sensory i n t u i t i o n , 
but the philosopher i s able to dis t inguish i t i n i t s pur i ty as the 
key to consciousness. ' I n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n i s the only f i r m 
standpoint f o r a l l philosophy. From thence we can explain every-
thing that occurs i n consciousness; and, moreover, only from thence'. 
(15) I n the i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n the se l f sees i t s own absolute 
nature, sees that i t i s possessed of 'an absolute a c t i v i t y founded 
only on i t s e l f and i n nothing else whatever . . . ' ( I6) I t i s the 
' i n t u i t i o n of s e l f - a c t i v i t y and freedom.' ( I7 ) 
The i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n thus becomes the means by which the 
sensible and i n t e l l i g i b l e worlds which Kant had separated are l inked 
together. 
( A ) ( i i ) Fichte and the early romantics 
The impact of Fichte on the early romantics i s indicated by the 
fo l lowing words of Fr iedr ich Schlegel: 'Die FranzOsische Revolution, 
Fichtes Wissenschaf tslehre land Goethes Meister sind die grttssten 
Tendenzen des Z e i t a l t e r s . ' ( I 8 ) Schlegel himself was one o f , i f not 
the seminal f i gu re i n the early romantic movement. The esteem i n 
which Schlegel and h i s f e l low romantics held Fichte does not mean 
that they were s t r i c t l y l oya l d isc ip les . They used Pichte f o r the i r 
own piorposes, which were fundamentally quite d i f f e r e n t . For Fichte 
i t was the e th ica l which was the decisive f ac to r , i t was f o r the 
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sake of the moral, active se l f that his whole system was construct-
ed, though the early romantics d id not share Fichte 's e thical vigour. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n i s pinpointed by Walter Benjamin i n h is study 
of the theory of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m held by the early romantics. 
He says that 'Die Unendlichkeit der Reflexion i s t fUr Schlegel und 
Novalis i n erster L i n i e n ich t eine Unendlichkeit des Fortgangs, son-
dern eine Unendlichkeit des Zusammenhanges.' (19) That i s to say 
that f o r the romantics the absolute se l f does not transcend i t s e l f 
i n and f o r the sake of purposive moral ac t ion , but i t s self-transcend-
ence i s interpreted more as a kind of i n f i n i t e game, a play of the 
se l f wi th i t s se l f . 
Both the proximity and the distance between the romantic v is ion 
and f ich tean idealism can be seen i n the fo l lowing statement by 
F. Schlegel: 
A l l e Gedanken sind nur gebrochene Farbenbilder dieses 
inneren Lichtes . I n jedem Gedanke i s t das Ich das ver-
borgene L i c h t , i n jedem f i n d e t man sich; man denkt immer 
nur sich oder den I c h , f r e i l i c h n ich t das gemeine, abge-
l e i t e t e Sich, . . . sondern i i i seiner hoheren Bedeutung.' (20) 
Here we can see Fichte ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between the two dimensions 
of selfhood - the 'common' s e l f , and the se l f i n i t s 'higher meaning', 
but f o r Schlegel t h i s higher se l f i s commensurable with thought, i t 
i s essent ia l ly contemplative, whereas f o r Fichte we can only know i t 
throTogh our drive towards ethical action. (21) A similar development 
of F ichte ' s thought i s to be found i n Novalis: 
His fimdamental formulation reads "the world must be roman-
t i c i z e d . In t h i s way one rediscovers i t s o r ig ina l meaning. 
Romanticizing i s nothing but a qua l i t a t ive ra i s ing to a high-
er power. I n t h i s operation the lower se l f becomes i d e n t i f -
ied wi th a higher se l f . Just as we ourselves are such a 
qua l i t a t ive exponential series. This operation i s s t i l l wholly 
unknown". Novalis used the verb "to romanticize" to character-
ize an act of the imagination . . . Romanticizing i s a "qua l i t -
a t ive r a i s ing to a higher power", which i s the very thing 
Noval is , i n the sense of Fichte , marked as the highest miss-
ion of se l f development to become "the ego of one's own ego". 
(22) 
The most phi losophical ly d i sc ip l ined fus ion of f ichtean idealism 
- 27 -
wi th the aspirations of early romanticism i s to be found i n the 
work of P. J. W. Schelling (1775 - 1854). Schelling takes up Fichte 's 
philosophical problematic, namely: given the spontaneous s p l i t t i n g of 
consciousness in to subject and object , se l f and no t - se l f , how i s i t 
possible to f i n d a pos i t ion from which both aspects can be seen i n 
the i r essential -unity? 
Following Fichte , Schelling believes that transcendental phi los-
ophy takes the path of 'proceeding from the subjective as primary 
and absolute, and having the object ive arise from t h i s . ' (23) The 
philosopher therefore d i rec ts h i s a t tent ion to the inner sense, which 
as wi th Pichte, he can only do by means of an i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n 
i n which the essential a c t i v i t y of the se l f i s i n t u i t e d , so that 
'one always remains at the same time both the i n t u i t e d (the produc-
er) and tfee i n t u i t a n t . ' (24) 
Nonetheless, Schelling diverges from Fichte i n the emphasis he 
gives to the re la t ionship of philosophy and a r t . He claims -that: 
Philosophy depends as much as a r t does on the productive 
Capacity, and the di f ference between them rests merely on 
the d i f f e r e n t d i r ec t ion taken by the productive force . 
For whereas i n a r t the production i s directed outwards, 
so as to r e f l e c t the unknown by means of products, p h i l -
osophical production i s directed immediately inwards, so 
as to r e f l e c t i t ' i n i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n . The proper 
sense by which t h i s type of philosophy must be apprehend-
ed i s thus the aesthetic sense, and that i s why the p h i l -
osophy of a r t i s the true organ of philosophy. (25) 
I n the aesthetic i n t u i t i o n , according to Schell ing, the mind i s 
at one and the same time productive (and therefore conscious, sub-
j e c t , s e l f ) and product (and therefore unconscious, object , not-
s e l f ) . I n t h i s i n t u i t i o n the mind i n t u i t s the iden t i ty of the con-
scious and the unconscious i n the s e l f , and consciousness of th i s 
i d e n t i t y . The product of t h i s i n t u i t i o n w i l l therefore verge on 
the one side upon the product of nature, and on the other upon the 
product of freedom, and must unite i t s e l f i n the characteris t ics of 
both. (26) 
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I t i s above a l l the a r t i s t i c genius i n whose c r e a t i v i t y th i s 
union occurs, the product of which i s the work of a r t which he 
creates. The productive i n t u i t i o n which i s the non-dualist ic base 
of consciousness i s thus, according to Schell ing, the same thing 
as the poetic g i f t . (2?) I t i s the imagination which, i n the imm-
ediacy of the aesthetic i n t u i t i o n , simultaneously apprehends the 
absolute ' immediately ' , together w i t h , or under the form o f , the 
sensuous immediacy of phenomenal being. 
The romantic imagination i s thus an ideal a c t i v i t y . Althovigh 
there are differences i n vocabulary, Jean Paul a r t icu la tes the same 
basic v i s ion as Schelling when he wri tes that 
Einbi ldungskraft i s t die Prose der Bildungskraft oder 
Phantasie. Sie i s t n ichts als eine potenziierte h e l l -
farbigere Erinnerung, welche auch die Thiere haben . . . 
Aber etwas HBheres i s t die Phantasie oder Bi ldungskraf t , 
sie i s t die Welt-Seele der Seele und der Elementargeiste 
der llbrigen Kra f t e . . . Die Phantasie macht a l l e Theile 
zu ganzen . . . und a l l e Welt thei le zu V/elten . . . 
(28) 
This 'Phantasie' i s exercised above a l l by the active or high-
est type of genius, who duplicates himself , according to Jean Paul, 
i n the form of a se l f and i t s kingdom - i n true f ichtean manner.(29) 
The a r t i s t of t h i s type does not imita te Nature i n the sense of mere-
l y copying i t - on the contrary i t i s through the operation of h i s 
imagination tha^t the given appearances of nature, of the external , 
phenomenal world , are i r rad ia ted wi th the l i g h t of i d e a l i t y and are 
bestowed wi th meaning and in te res t . This process Jean Paul re fers 
to as the transubstantiat ion of Nature, 'diese Brodverwandlung ins 
GBt t l i che . ' (30) 
The t r \ i l y creative nature of genius i s a recurrent theme am-
ongst the early romantics. F. Schlegel could go so f a r as to say 
that the a r t i s t can be absolutely creative - 'Das Dichten . . . 
e r scha f f t gewissermassen seinen S to f f se lbst . ' (31) That i s to 
say that the a r t i s t does not merely imbue given material with ideal 
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form, but ac tual ly creates the material out of h is ideal conscious-
ness. 
The romantic concern wi th nature i s therefore f a r from being 
an i n f a tua t i on with the external forms of nattu?e. I t i s nature as 
revelatory o f , as a medium f o r , or as an image o f , an higher, ideal 
world which interes ts the romantic. Schelling wrote : 
What we speak of as Nature i s a poem l y i n g pent up i n a 
mysterious and wonderful s c r ip t . Yet the r i dd l e could 
reveal i t s e l f were we to recognize i n i t the odyssey of 
the s p i r i t , which marvelously deluded, seeks i t s e l f , and 
i n seeking f l i e s from i t s e l f ; f o r through the world of 
sense there glimmers, as i f through words the meaning, 
as i f through mists the land of fantasy, of which we are •. 
i n search . . . Nature to the a r t i s t i s nothing more than 
i t i s to the philosopher, being simply the ideal world 
appearing mder permanent r e s t r i c t i o n s , or merely the 
imperfect r e f l e c t i o n of a world ex i s t ing , not outside 
him but wi th in him. (32) 
There i s thus a cer ta in ambiguity i n romantic philosophy con-
cerning the exact ontological status of the world of externally ex-
i s t en t things. Are they regarded as merely uninteresting or actual-
l y non-existent i f considered apart from the i dea l i z ing , romantic-
i z ing consciousness? Does the mind imprint i t s ideal meanings on 
to a given receptive matter, or does i t i t s e l f create matter? The 
concentration of the romantics on the special case of the poetic 
genius does not r e a l l y help , and nature i s l e f t i n the ambiguous 
pos i t ion of being at once exalted and n u l l i f i e d . 
We have already seen how Fichte discarded the world of empir-
i c a l sense-experience as incapable of providing a foundation f o r 
philosophy, and a s imilar a t t i tude underlies much of the romantics' 
wr i t ings about nature. They could easily s l ide from the g l o r i f i c -
a t ion of the natural world as the image or symbol of the ideal to 
i t s derogation as a 'mere' image or symbol. Consequently i t was 
not d i f f i c u l t f o r the romantics to s l i p from rapturous contemplat-
ion of the harmony of a l l things to a r ad i ca l ly dua l i s t i c view, and 
i t was precisely t h i s charge of dualism that lay at the base of 
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Hegel's (and to some extent of Kierkegaard's) c r i t i que of romantic-
ism. (33) 
The romantic hero v/as as l i k e l y to experience the world as be-
ing untrue or d e c e i t f u l as he was to f i n d i t a souce of entrancing 
wonder or overwhelming beauty. Wackenroder's Joseph Berglinger i s 
t yp i ca l of t h i s dua l i s t i c tendency: 
Er dachte: "Lieber Gott.' i s t denn das die Welt wie sie i s t ? 
Und i s t es denn dein W i l l e , dass ich mich so unter das Ge-
drSlnge des Ha\ifens mischen und an den gemeinen Elend Ante i l 
nehmen soil? Und doch sieht es so aus, vnd mein Vater pre-
d ig t es immer, dass es die P f l i c h t und Bestimmung des Men-
schen se i , sich darunter zu mischen und Rat und Almosen zu 
geben, und ekelhafte Wunden zu verbinden und hSssliche Krank-
hei ten zu he i len j Und doch vvSt mir wieder eine innere 
Stimme ganz l a u t zu: NeinJ neinl du b i s t zu einem hOheren, 
edleren Z ie l geborenj" (34) 
This higher goal turns out, i n Joseph's case to be h is vocation as 
a musician. 
This dualism characterizes many of the concepts and motifs of 
romantic l i t e r a t v i r e . I t can be seen i n the importance g ivo i to 
such concepts as'premonition (Ahnung) and longing, i n the character-
i z a t i on of modern poetry, and i n the ro l e given to irony and humour 
i n a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y . 
Jean Paul summed up the romantic doctrine of premonition when 
he wrote that 'Ein mauslBsliches GeftJhl s t e l l e t i n uns etwas 
Dunkles, was n ich t \mser GeschOpf, sondern unser SchHpfer i s t . . . 
so t re ten w i r , wie es Gott auf Sina^ befah l , vor ihn mit einer Decke 
ttber den Augen . . . ' (35) This premonition of 'something dark' i s 
i n f a c t the an t ic ipa t ion of the v is ion of existence as an organic 
whole, i t i s dark because i t i s the 'angel of death' to the world-
l y , i . e . f i n i t e , l i m i t e d l i f e , but i t i s also the ' super terres t r ia l 
angel of the inner l i f e . ' (36) 
This premonition can also manifest i t s e l f as homesickness f o r 
the higher l i f e , a recurrent motif i n romantic l i t e r a t u r e , thoxigh 
nowhere more concisely expressed than by Novalis i n 'Heinrich von 
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Ofterdingen, ' when Heinrich asks of the Beatrice-type fig\are who i s 
guiding him on h is pilgrimaige; '"Wo gehn wir denn hin? '" and receives 
the reply ' "Immer nach Hause.'" (57) I t i s of course not the phys-
i c a l , spa t i a l l y situated home which i s meant, hut the mansion of the 
e te rna l , ideal s p i r i t . 
Dualism i s also apparent i n the d i s t i n c t i o n made by the roman-
tics between class ical and modern poetry. F. Schlegel pioneered th i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n i n h i s early ph i lo log ica l studies. (38) His basic con-
tent ion was that whereas c lass ical a r t based i t s e l f upon an ideal of 
beauty, the production and contemplation of which was dis interested, 
modem poetry, by which he meant the poetry of the ch r i s t i an , mediev-
a l and post-medieval world, sought out the in te res t ing , i t had an 
in t e re s t i n the r e a l i t y of i t s i dea l . For Schlegel the terms 'rom-
an t i c ' , 'modern' and ' i n t e r e s t i n g ' were e f f e c t i v e l y synonymous. (39) 
The in te res t ing i s ' subjekt ive asthetische K r a f t . ' (40) 
Schell ing developed the d i s t i n c t i o n i n h is Philosophie Der Kunst. 
(41) Here he argued that the Greeks inhabited an enclosed mytholog-
i c a l wor ld , i n which the Idea manifested i t s e l f i n Being i n a s ta t ic 
manner, under the forms of nature. I t was a world i n which there 
was con t inu i ty between the Ideal and the Real, a world i n vriiich the 
Ideal was r e f l e c t e d i n primordial images (the gods of greek mythol-
ogy), i i icarnated i n nat-ural forms. However, i n the chr i s t i an era 
t h i s s t a t i c w o r l d - t o t a l i t y i s broken up, and his tory becomes the 
primary context of existence. Here the Idea must manifest i t s e l f i n 
act ion rather than i n Being. Change dissolves the supposedly immut-
able natural forms, and o r i g i n a l i t y supplants l o y a l t y to primordial 
images as an a r t i s t i c i dea l . Schelling ca l l s the a r t of the classic-
a l world ' symbol ic ' , and that of the c h r i s t i a n , romantic, modern 
world ' a l l e g o r i c a l ' , meaning thereby to dis t inguish the unbroken 
re la t ionsh ip which I d e a l i t y has to Real i ty i n the former type of 
- 52 -
a r t from the discontinuous, broken, external re la t ionship of i d e a l i t y 
to r e a l i t y i n the l a t t e r . Whereas i n symbolic a r t the par t icular _is 
the universal which i t symbolizes, i n the l a t t e r the par t icular only 
indicates the universal of which i t i s the a l legor ica l representation. 
Although Schelling looks to a coming uni ty of nature and h i s to ry , of 
primordial image and o r i g i n a l i t y , he nonetheless recognizes i n 'mod-
e m ' a r t a moment of dualism, i n which the subjective, the p a r t i c u l -
ar, i s torn out of the organic whole. (42) 
The same tension between par t icu la r and universal , f i n i t e and 
i n f i n i t e , r e l a t i v e and absolute^is found i n the concepts of irony 
and humour. 'For Schlegel ' , wrote Rene Wellek, ' i rony i s the struggle 
between the absolute and the r e l a t i v e , the simultaneous consciousness 
of the imposs ib i l i ty and the necessity of a f u l l account of r e a l i t y . 
The w r i t e r must thus f e e l ambivalent towards his work: he stands ab-
ove and apart from i t and manipulates i t almost p l a y f u l l y . ' (45) ' I i " -
ony to Schlegel i s o b j e c t i v i t y , complete super ior i ty , detachment, 
manifpulat ion of the subject matter . ' (44) And w r i t i n g of Solger, 
Wellek says that ' I rony means the a r t i s t ' s consciousness that h is 
work i s Symbol, that he i s aware of the Divine and at the same time 
aware of our own nothingness.' (45) 
E. T. A. Hoffmann, himself an eminent h-umorist, formulates the 
concept of humour as ' tha t ra re , wonderful mood which i s generated 
from a deep perception of l i f e i n a l l i t s aspects and from the con-
f l i c t of hos t i l e p r i n c i p l e s . ' (46) As with i rony, t h i s involves the 
super io r i ty or detachment of the humorist. 
I n a l l these ways the central ambiguity of the romantic under-
standing of the re la t ionship of the ideal and the real manifests 
i t s e l f , an ambiguity which can be traced back to the tension la ten t 
i n Fichte ' s concept of the se l f as being a dynamic, self-transcend-
ing fo rce , at once f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e , at once bound by the mani-
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f o l d of appearances and at the same time i n f i n i t e l y elevated above 
appearance i n i t s absolute uni ty with i t s e l f . We shall see that 
Kierkegaard was a t ten t ive to a l l these aspects of romantic dualism. 
(47) 
Much of what has already been said w i l l have indicated some-
thing of the romantics' concept of a r t i s t i c p roduc t iv i ty , and the 
nature of the art-work. The i r o n i c , romantic a r t i s t - l i k e the 
f ich tean philosopher - i s at one and the same time conscious of 
the union of f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e i n h i s a c t i v i t y and yet aware of 
the l i m i t e d and condit ional nature of the work of a r t which he pro-
duces. Although a r t springs from the absolute i t has an inescap-
able element of r e l a t i v i t y . I n Novalis ' expression the art-work 
i s to a r t as the c i t i z e n i s to the king. (48) But the r e l a t i v i t y , 
the p a r t i c u l a r , f i n i t e form consti tuted by a work of a r t i s f r e e l y 
chosen by the a r t i s t , and h is consciousness of the limitedness of 
the work i s i t s e l f a sign that he i s conscious of the i n f i n i t u d e of 
the creative s p i r i t which as produced the work. In a famous f r a g -
ment F. Schlegel wrote that 'Die romantische Dichtar t i s t noch im 
Werden; j a das i s t i h r eigentliches Wesen, dass sie ewig nur werden, 
n ie vollendet seinkann.' (49) Commenting on t h i s fragment, Klaus 
Peter wrote that 
Da sie a l les mit allem zu verbinden t rachte t , i s t sie nie 
vol lendet , stets i n Bewegung, ihrem Wesen nach imendlich 
und deshalb immer "Fragment". Auf diese Weise in te rp re t -
i e r t e Schlegel den Fichteschen Imperativ, dass das I c h , 
das seinem Wesen nach absolut, d.h. unendlich ist^es auch 
empirisch sein so l le . (50) 
Consequently the romantics refused to define any par t icular 
aesthetic form as the romantic a r t - form. The a r t i s t i s thus f ree 
to play as he l i k e s with forms and genres - and he can do th i s 
even i n the context of a single work i f i t sui ts him. Thus the 
romantic novel i dea l ly comprised a manifold of genres: narrat ive 
prose, l y r i c a l verse, s a t i r e , etc. The romantic novel i s t played 
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wi th l i t e r a r y devices such as pseudonymity and the book wi th in the 
book - anything which suited the par t icu lar expression of the idea 
which he chose. We shal l be looking more closely at t h i s aspect 
of romantic w r i t i n g when we come to look at the question of Kierke-
gaard's 'novels ' . (51) 
Because of t h i s freedom v i s -a -v i s i t s form a work cannot 
therefore be judged by a predetermined standard of a r t i s t i c form. 
The task of reader and c r i t i c i s thus f i r s t l y to l i s t e n , to seek 
out the idea which moves i n the work, i t i s 'verstehen und erklSbren' , 
(52) and c r i t i c i s m i s the completion (Vollendung) rather than the 
judgement (Beurteilung) of the work. (53) That i s to say that 
c r i t i c i s m develops and a r t icu la tes the idea which i s l a ten t i n the 
work, and the very f a c t that a work can be c r i t i c i z e d means that 
i t has an ' i d e a ' , and t h i s already implies a posi t ive evaluation 
of i t . (54) 
Through h is reading of the in terplay of forms which the work 
contains the c r i t i c - or the rec ip ien t of the work i n general, 
whether he i s or i s not 'a c r i t i c ' - attunes himself to the idea 
of the work. In a sense he romanticizes together with the a r t i s t , 
and establishes himself i n commimion with the a r t i s t ' i n ' the idea 
from which the work proceeds. This attunement i s not an a rb i t ra ry 
and i r r a t i o n a l enthusiasm, but , at least i n p r i n c i p l e , was to be 
the f r u i t of clear-headedness, or 'NUchternheit' rather than of 
the Platonic ^«v/o( (55) > of carefully-balanced irony rather than 
of a sudden (so-called) romantic rapture, although i t possesses 
the qua l i ty of immediacy. I t i s a concrete form of the aesthetic 
i n t u i t i o n . This notion of the attunement i n which a r t i s t , work 
and rec ip ien t a l l tune i n to a common idea i s essential not only 
to romantic theory but , as w i l l be shown, to Kierkegaard's c r i t -
ique of romanticism. 
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( B ) Romanticism i n Denmark 
( B ) ( i ) Henrik Steffens and the beginnings of romanticism i n Denmark 
Cul tura l l i n k s between Germany and Denmark i n the early nine-
teenth century were very close, and the b i r t h of the romantic move-
ment i n Denmark involved a f i gu re who belonged almost equally to 
Scandinavia and to Germany. This was Henrik Steffens (1773 - I845), 
a norwegian-born geologist and philosopher, a self-avowed disc iple 
of Schel l ing, and a sometime member of the Jena c i r c l e i n which 
many of the leading f igures of early romanticism moved. 
I n 1802 -5 Steffens delivered a series of lectures i n Copenhagen. 
These had a profound e f f e c t on many of h i s hearers, but most notab-
l y on the young poet Adam ^i^hlenslaeger, who was inspired by these 
lec tures , and by h i s ta lks wi th Steffens, to wr i te the ' f i r s t ' rom-
antic poem i n danish l i t e r a t u r e , The Golden Horns (Guldhomene), a 
poem which not only bears the imprint of Steffens' thought, but which 
echoes h i s vocabulary, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the second lecture . (56) 
Steffens intended these lectures to be preparatory to a series 
of more technical philosophical lectures. Philosophy he understood 
to be the knowledge of the eternal Idea i n which f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e 
are fused, (57) i n which the par t icvi lar , ind iv idua l th ing , maintain-
ed i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y by i t s egoistic drive i s nonetheless held i n 
harmony wi th the whole (Det Hele) , which exerts an universal , u n i f y -
ing d r ive . These two basic drives - to p a r t i c u l a r i t y and to univers-
a l i t y - produce the whole phenomenal manifestation of l i f e by the i r 
i n t e r a c t i o n , and philosophy i s the knowledge of the two i n the i r dyn-
amic u n i t y . (58) I t i s thus d i s t i n c t from the particialar sciences 
which accumulate fac t s and data but cannot reach the standpoint 
from which the i n f i n i t e harmony of a l l things can be seen. 
Steffens attached a par t icu la r importance to premonition (Ahnelse) 
which he saw as leading the mind which has not been philosophically 
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t rained to an i n t u i t i o n of the i n f i n i t e harmony, which i s the ob-
jec t of philosophical knowledge. He claimed that 
Nobody i s ever en t i r e ly devoid of th i s premonition. I t slimi-
bers deep i n the soul of even the most l i m i t e d of us. I t 
connects us to the whole of nature. I t gives everything . . . 
an higher, a nobler s ignif icance. I t i s that which, with the 
dawning of the day, opens up the radiance and l i f e of nature 
to every soul , as i f an inward sun involuntaridly followed the 
c e l e s t i a l ; i t raises the i n f i n i t e multitude of forms (Gest-
a l t e r ) from universal darkness; by i t Nature's eternal l i f e 
speaks to our s p i r i t , as i f through a mystical cipher which 
inwardly we understand. (59) 
Premonition not only reveals the uni ty of nature, but the uni ty 
of h i s t o ry too. And i t i s the poet, above a l l others, who has the 
power to evoke t h i s premonition of an higher l i f e . 
This premonition l ikewise l i n k s us to h i s to ry . By i t s oper-
at ion times whose habits of thought, whose ways of l i f e , 
possessed character is t ics quite other than our own become 
comprehensible to us. I f we surrender to i t and renounce 
that common posture of the understanding which makes our 
age and our way of th inking in to an universal norm, then i t 
w i l l endow us wi th a sense f o r those times which l i e hidden 
i n the past. I t wakens the warriors from the i r graves, gods 
and goddesses come among us, every sound from long-vanish-
ed ages resounds wi th i t s own unique resonance. I t con-
jures the most advanced epochs back in to the most obscure. 
I t i s as i f the germ of every epoch of h i s to ry slumbered i n 
each. This premonition, whose object i s always i n f i n i t e , 
when i t i s revealed v i t a l l y and creat ively i n an exalted 
soul (Gemyt) i s cal led - Poesy. No man i s u t t e r l y devoid 
of poesy. No age, not even the coarsest, has ever en t i re -
l y l o s t i t . I t i s as i f nature's own eternal product iv i ty 
awoke wi th the poet. Noble and exalted forms (Gestalter) 
issue f o r t h , a d iv ine , a golden age, i l luminated by an eter-
nal sun, arises before our eyes, suddenly, as i f by magic. 
An i n f i n i t e meaning seems to be concealed behind every form 
and myst ica l ly shines out towards us. We are environed by 
an exalted and glorious radiance; a deep longing (Laeng-
sel) awakens i n our inmost being,a.and i r r e s i s t i b l y draws us 
to t h i s wonderful and magical world . . . (60) 
The poet communicates ' ho ly , radiant images of the e te rna l . ' 
(61) Poetic genius i s the most immediate revelat ion of the 
eternal i t s e l f i n the f i n i t e . (62) I t i s the revelat ion i n our 
inmost being of a 'mysterious centre, a d i v i n i t y i n whose image 
we are made.' (63) However though Steffens l a t e r became an av-
owed Chr is t ian h is god-talk at t h i s stage i s cer ta in ly not intended 
i n a s p e c i f i c a l l y ch r i s t i an sense. Indeed there was a d e f i n i t e 
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'pagan' f e e l about much of the poetry which took i t s lead from 
Steffens. 
This i s apparent i n ^hlenslaeger's Guldhornene. This poem i s 
based on the h i s t o r i c a l story of the discovery of two golden horns 
at Gallehus i n Jut land, one i n 1659> the other i n 1754- These horns 
were from the pre-chr is t ian era and were inscribed wi th runic sym-
bols. However, i n 1802 the horns vanished mysteriously and were 
never found again - presumably they had been stolen and melted down. 
The poem in terpre ts the horns as g i f t s from the gods, bestowed on 
the present prosaic age -
Mystic sacredness enshrines 
Ancient signs and old insc r ip t ions , 
Forth god's glory trembling shines 
From these, e t e rn i ty ' s productions. 
(64) 
But the g i f t i s taken back by the gods, since the age can only 
see i n them the i r material value, not the higher meaning which they 
would disclose to those who had eyes to see. (65) I n accordance 
wi th Steffens ' doctrine i t i s l e f t to the poet to read the eternal 
message hidden in these memorials of a forgot ten age, and to reveal 
t h i s message to h i s contemporaries. 
Via Steffens the romantic movement i n Denmark took over a 
theory of a r t which was essent ial ly rooted i n the account of con-
sciousness given by the transcendental i dea l i s t s . 
Nonetheless the typ ica l emphasis or mood of danish romantic-
ism i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from that of early romanticism i n Germany. 
I t i s more pos i t i ve , less d u a l i s t i c . As R. S\jmmers puts i t , 'The 
f i r s t phase of Danish Romanticism had given expression to a view of 
l i f e characterized by l i f e - a f f i r m a t i o n and optimism and found i t s 
ideal i n German Classicism and Goethe - though i t was a Goethe 
without h i s darker sides that the Danes admired.' (66) 
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( B ) ( i i ) F. C. Sibbern 
The philosopher Frederik C. Sibbem (1785 - 1872) was one of 
those who reached i n t e l l e c t u a l maturity under the spell of th i s 
f i r s t phase of danish romanticism. He i s of importance i n the 
study of Kierkegaard's background, not least because he was one of 
the f i r s t thinkers i n Denmark to o f f e r a philosophical c r i t i que of 
some of the key concepts of hegelianism. (67) However i t i s also 
wise to remember Himmelstrup's contention tha t , as thinkers, Kierke-
gaard and Sibbern had nothing i n common, and that apparent s imi lar -
i t i e s usual ly turn out to be deceptive. Sibbern's main interests 
were i n the area of empirical science, which was of l i t t l e in teres t 
to Kierkegaard. (68) 
Sibbern also lectured on aesthetics - lectures which Kierke-
gaard attended (69) - and he wrote a 'romantic' novel Ef ter ladte 
Breve af Gabriel is which recounts the essential ly autobigraphical 
story of a young man r e c o i l i n g from an unhappy l o v e - a f f a i r ( i n 
r e a l i t y Sibbem's passion f o r 0hlenslaeger' s wife Sophie), who seeks 
to f i n d himself again by returning to the v i l l a g e where he had at-
tended school. The Kierkegaard scholar H. Fenger has recently 
drawn a t ten t ion to t h i s book i n connection wi th some of the best-
known passages from Kierkegaard's early Papirer, which Fenger i n t e r -
prets as attempts to wr i t e a novel on the same l i ne s as Gabriel is . 
Sibbern's I 8 3 4 lectures on aesthetics were published i n that 
year as Volume 1 of what was eventually to be a 3-volume work, 
Om Poesie og Konst, although Volume 2 was not published f o r a f u r -
ther twenty years. These I 8 3 4 lectures are described by Fenger as 
'a co l l e c t i ve expression of the taste and ideals which the f i r s t 
romantic generation possessed, "the men of I 8 O 3 " , ' (71) that i s ^ 
the men of the Steffens/0hlenslaeger school. 
I n these lectures Sibbern argued that a r t had two d i s t i n c t 
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roots . On the one hand i t was reproductive, mimetic, proceeding 
by i m i t a t i n g nature, although th i s did not mean merely copying, 
but br inging about the r e b i r t h of natxoce i n the medium of i d e a l i t y . 
On the other hand, a r t i s expressive (udtalende), i t proceeds from 
the a r t i s t ' s own inner being. These two sources can be united i n 
an higher un i ty . 
This basic d i s t i n c t i o n between two types of a r t was re f lec ted 
f o r Sibbern i n the two words wi th which he e n t i t l e d his lectures: 
Poetry and A r t . ' A r t ' (Konst), re lates to that aspect of a r t 
which i s reproductive, i n which the sensuous, external element pre-
dominates ,* poetry'(poesie) to that aspect of a r t which i s f r e e l y 
creat ive and productive. (72) 
When a r t imitates external natvire i t i s akin to ' the simple 
apprehension of things v i a the senses', (73) but t h i s simple 
i m i t a t i o n i s always led by an higher, ideal in te res t , which seeks 
out the inner being of i t s object. 'The poet and the a r t i s t must 
have an eye f o r t h i s " inner" being of things, f o r th is proper and 
essential nature, i f he i s to represent nature as i t i s i n t r u t h . 
I t i s to t h i s that the seer's eye must penetrate, and from th i s 
too that the recreating representation must proceed, and therefore 
we say that i t i s an ideal r e b i r t h . ' (74) This l a s t expression^ 
'an ideal reb i r th '^ recurs again and again throughout the lectures. 
The a r t i s t does not merely imita te the outer shell of nature, 
he i s moved by sympathy f o r the universal idea present throughout 
nature, and throughout humanity.' The poet ' i s i n sympathy with a l l 
of nati ire. Everywhere i n nature he sees that which i s related to 
h i s own s p i r i t (Aand), h is own inner being, and he sees i t as much 
i n the res t of nature as i n the world of men.' (75) This idea of 
sympathy i s also used by Sibbern i n h i s philosophy of natiore, as 
i s the not ion of the i n t u i t i v e apprehension of ' the whole' of 
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nature, an idea which reca l l s Steffens ' concept of the essential 
task of philosophy. I t i s t h i s sympathy which makes possible the 
'poetic v i s ion of the inner being of the t h i n g , ' (76) and which 
makes possible the elevation of the object i n to the medium of idea-
l i t y both i n the a r t i s t ' s own idea l i z ing c r e a t i v i t y and i n the con-
sciousness of the rec ip ien t of the work. (77) 
I n the other, the productive, type of a r t , the poet i s essent-
i a l l y l y r i c a l and musical - the poet sang, before he narrated 
i n song.' (78) Such a r t issues from inner c r e a t i v i t y , althoiigh i t 
must at some point take up the materials provided by imi ta t ive a r t -
Sibbem would not accept Schlegel's idea of the absolute c r e a t i v i t y 
of the a r t i s t , he was too much of an empir ic is t . 
True a r t i s a fus ion of these two modes. Thus the true a r t i s t 
must at one and the same time remain true to nature and represent 
things i n an higher, ideal medi-um, as they could be, not jus t as 
they are. (79) His eye i s guided by a v i s ion of the eternal ideas 
on which the phenomena of the external world are modelled - Sibbem 
s p e c i f i c a l l y invokes the platonic doctrine of the ideas to argue 
against Plato that poetry and a r t ' j u s t as completely as philosophy, 
shal l mount to those primordial ideas (Ur-Ideer) of th ings . ' (8O) 
A r t however - as opposed to philosophy - always represents i t s 
objects i n d i v i d u a l l y and concretely, ' i n a r t . . . the universal i s 
u n i f i e d wi th the concrete i n an mdivided i n t u i t i o n or f e e l i n g . ' (81) 
Here we see that deeper content (Gehalt) of l i f e and of 
humanity, which science makes the object of i t s invest-
iga t ions , appear i n the form of i t s rea l presence i n l i f e 
. . . But the work i t s e l f i s not to be a summation of i n -
vest igat ion and r e f l e c t i o n , of s c i e n t i f i c development and 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , but i t i s to br ing the object i t s e l f before 
us i n the t o t a l i t y of i t s concrete a c tua l i t y , but i n i d -
eal r e b i r t h , i n an ideal representation (Gjenbil lede) . (82) 
Philosophy cannot therefore be considered to be 'higher' than a r t . 
As wel l as dealing wi th the r e l a t i o n of a r t to philosophy 
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Sibbern also discussed the di f ference between the aesthetic way of 
experiencing andcthe way i n which v/e would l i s t e n to a sermon or 
use s p i r i t u a l music. (83) He had made a s imilar point i n the 
Gabriel is novel , where he contrasted the B ib le ' s teaching with the 
methods of philosophy and ar t : 
I n a l l those other noble and profovmd thoughts and images 
there may move a deep philosophy, there may be developed 
a r i c h and penetrating view of l i f e , there may l i v e an i n -
f i n i t e l y noble soul (Gemyt) and heart. But i n the words 
of scripture there moves an holy God; these words come 
s t ra igh t from the holy centre of the v /o r ld - sp i r i t , and en-
gage the soul i n i t s innermost centre. They w i l l not 
teach us, remind us, or i l luminate us concerning th i s or 
tha t , but concerning the one thing which i s needful . . . 
I n those other realms, i n Philosophy or Poetry, there i s 
a profundi ty i n ideas, but i n these words the; S p i r i t of 
the Lord i s s t i r r i n g ; those are begotten of genius and 
p ro fund i ty , but these are spoken as by Him who has 
author i ty . . . (84) 
However, i n h i s own t a lk of the w o r l d - s p i r i t Sibbern seems to 
imper i l the d i s t i n c t i o n which he i s t r y ing to make. I n reviewing 
Om Poesie og Konst Provost E. Tryde contended that Sibbem had not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasized the d i s t i n c t i o n between the higher idea l -
i t y expressed i n a r t and the divine being of God. (85) This i s 
another way of saying that f o r a l l h is empiricism and s c i e n t i f i c 
in teres ts Sibbem remained wi th in the i n t e l l e c t u a l horizon d e f i n -
ed by Fichte , i n which philosophical idealism and chr i s t i an person-
alism might conclude a truce - but never wi th comfort. 
This inev i tab ly supe r f i c i a l s\irvey of some of the cardinal 
points of romantic philosophy i n Germany and Denmark i s not in ten-
ded to give a f u l l pictinre of th i s r i c h , v i t a l and revolutionary 
movement. What i t attempts to make clear i s that the romantics 
a f f i l i a t e d the i r view of l i f e to the i d e a l i s t philosophy repres-
ented by Fichte , and tha t , f o r them, the production and reception 
of a r t was an ideal a c t i v i t y , i n which a r t i s t and rec ip ient 
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united i n a sympathetic attunement to the idea incarnated i n , or 
intended by, the work of a r t i t s e l f , and that t h i s aesthetic ex-
perience was at the same time an experience of the absolute idea 
i t s e l f , an overcoming of the dualism which, as the romantics be-
l i e v e d , characterized experience of the phenomenal world and which 
was manifest i n the ra t ional ism of the Ihlightenment. Although 
they would defend themselves against the charge that i n the i r 
characterizat ion of the absolute they confused the divine and the 
human there i s l i t t l e doubt that the experience of a r t acquired a 
r e l i g i o u s qua l i ty i n romantic theory, and, as i n Steffens' l e c t -
ures, the poet could be charged with the mission of communicating 
divine things to mortal men. 
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Chapter Three; Hegelianism 
(A) Hegel 
( A ) ( i ) A r t and d ia l ec t i c s 
The exact s ignif icance of Kierkegaard's c r i t i que of hegelian-
ism and the measure of common ground l e f t a f t e r taking the i r d i f -
ferences in to account continue to be points of discussion i n Kierke-
gaard scholarship. 
( l ) Here we are confining ourselves to the f i e l d of aesthetics and 
though much that i s said w i l l have implications f o r any overal l 
assessment i t cannot be assumed i n advance that the Kierkegaard/ 
Hegel axis moves at exactly the same angle through a l l the f i e l d s of 
philosophy. 
G. W. F. Hegel (1770 - I831) worked with many of the assump-
t ions of h i s immediate philosophical predecessors, Fichte and 
Schell ing. He shares wi th them a v is ion of the s e l f , or S p i r i t , as 
essent ia l ly ac t ive , producing the world of f i n i t e appearances out 
of i t s own f ree a c t i v i t y . He d i f f e r e d from them above a l l i n the 
emphasis he placed on h i s to ry and on social order, and i n h i s eval-
uation of the nature and scope of log ic i n philosophy. 
Hegel's name i s p a r t i c u l a r l y associated with the concept of 
d i a l e c t i c s , and, i n order to get some idea of the scope of h is aesth-
e t i c s , i t w i l l be h e l p f u l to s ta r t t h i s section by looking at cer t -
ain aspects of Hegel's d i a l ec t i c s . As with Pichte and Schelling the 
d i a l ec t i c i s fundamentally rooted i n the dua l i ty of the s e l f , which 
can be conceived ei ther according to i t s absolute nature as i n f i n -
i t e l y f r ee or according to i t s bondage to the f i n i t e forms by which 
i t s appearance i s conditioned. The aim of the d ia lec t i c i s to show 
the rootedness of f i n i t e selfhood i n the i n f i n i t e freedom of the 
absolute. 
From one angle the movement of the d ia lec t i c i s a movement of 
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negation; i t i s the cont inual ly repeated negation of the element of 
immediacy i n knowledge, which aims to set a f u l l y a r t icu la ted account 
of the way i n which things have come to be as they are i n the place 
of the immediate apprehension of things. He polemicizes against 
the dependence of Fichte and Schelling on the immediacy of the i n t e l -
l ec tua l i n t u i t i o n . Science i s not a matter of i n t u i t i o n but the 
'product of a widespread upheaval i n various forms of cul ture , the 
pr ize at he end of a complicated, tortuous path . ' (2) I t s method 
can 'be regarded as the pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the 
way of despair , ' (3) rather than of naive t rus t i n whatever i s y i e l d -
ed by our i n t u i t i o n . Hegel plays here on the etymological connect-
ion between 'Zweifel '=doubt and 'Verzweifelung'=despair to make his 
point that knowledge requires the d i sc ip l ine of scepticism to reach 
i t s goal. 
This movement from the immediate to the absolute i s also seen 
by Hegel as a process of enrichment. The S p i r i t does not simply d i s -
card the forms which i t negates, i t keeps them, they become i t s h i s t -
ory, and i t i s the exposition of t h i s h i s tory i n i t s t o t a l i t y , as a 
whole, which consti tutes the int roduct ion to philosophy. (4) I n th i s 
perspective the movement of knowledge i s from the mere abstract 
statement of what Hegel c a l l s 'immediate sense-certainty' , which can 
only say of i t s object ' t h a t ' i t i s , to the posi t ion of science which 
can say 'what' i t s object i s i n every aspect of i t s being. (5) 
This movement i s also seen by Hegel as a process of i n t e rna l -
i z a t i o n , a movement away from seeing merely the external appearances 
of things to a concern f o r the i r inner re la t ions . Hegel plays on 
the ambiguity of the term 'Erinnerung' which means both i n t e r n a l i z -
a t ion i n t h i s sense and also remembrance or r eco l l ec t ion . The pro-
cess of 'Erinnerung' i s thus a process which leads from sense to 
thought, and a process which cxilminates i n a retrospective r e c o i l -
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ection of the t o t a l i t y of the process i t s e l f . I t i s i n th i s l a t t e r 
sense that Hegel says that philosophy 'appears only when ac tua l i ty 
i s cut and dried a f t e r i t s process of formation has been completed 
. . . the owl of Minerva spreads i t s wings only with the f a l l i n g of 
the dusk.' (6) We shal l see an example of Hegel's exploi ta t ion of 
the concept of 'Erinnerimg' i n his account of the ro le of the bard, 
(7) and we shall see Kierkegaard using the cognate danish term i n a 
s imi lar way. ( 8 ) 
The process of i n t e m a l i z a t i o n i f also a movement from empir-
i c a l knowledge to l o g i c . In sense-experience the meaning or idea i s 
always at a distance from the form or appearance. In logic^hov/ever, 
content .and form coincide. The laws of thoiight are themselves the 
content of l o g i c a l thought. Thinking i s at one with i t s e l f , a l l 
dualism i s overcome, not i n the 'rapturous haze' (9) of the i n t e l l e c t -
ual i n t u i t i o n but i n the d i sc ip l ined exposition of the system of l o g -
i c by which the whole d i a l e c t i c a l process i s govemed. (IO) 
We can now turn to the question of the place of a r t i n Hegel's 
overa l l system. He himself defines the need from which a r t arises 
i n a key passage from the int roduct ion to h is Aesthetics. 
Things i n nature are only immediate and s ingle , while man as 
S p i r i t (Geist) duplicates himself i n that ( i ) he i_s as things 
i n nature are but ( i i ) he i s ju s t as much f o r himself , repres-
ents himself to himself , th inks , and only on the. strength of 
t h i s active placing himself before himself i s he S p i r i t . . . 
This aim he achieves by a l t e r i ng external things whereon he 
impresses the seal of h is inner being, and i n which he now 
f i n d s again h i s own character is t ics . Man does t h i s i n order, 
as a f ree subject, to s t r i p the external world of i t s i n f l e x -
i b l e foreignness and to enjoy i n the shape of things only an 
external r ea l i za t i on of himself. ^^^^ 
Hegel f i nds an example of t h i s need i n the c h i l d ' s spontaneous 
de l igh t i n producing patterns i n water by throwing stones in to i t , 
and i t i s the same need which l i e s behind the work of a r t : the 
bestowal of a human, and f o r Hegel that means a meaningful or an 
i d e a l , content on something which exists external ly. Such a work 
of a r t i s higher than the realm of external things which merely are. 
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Thus, 'owing to the f e e l i n g and ins ight whereby a landscape has been 
represented i n pa in t ing , t h i s work of the S p i r i t acquires a higher 
rank than the mere natural landscape.' (12) 
A r t transcends nature, but i t does not , unl ike l o g i c , t u m 
away from 'sensuous i n d i v i d u a l i t y and immediate determinateness . . . 
the work of a r t stands i n the middle between immediate sensuousness 
and ideal thought. I t i s not yet pure thought, but , despite i t s 
sensuousness, i s no longer a purely material existent e i ther , l i k e 
stones, plants and organic l i f e . ' (13) Ar t uses sensuous things 
f o r non-sensuous ends, With a s p i r i t u a l in te res t . The sensuous i n 
a r t i s merely sensuous, i t has been reduced to mere instrumental i ty , 
to being merely the mode i n which the supersensuous i s to shine 
f o r t h . The ul t imate end of a r t i s the same as the ul t imate end of 
pure thought: i t i s the s e l f ' s (the S p i r i t ' s ) r econc i l i a t ion wi th 
i t s e l f . Thus the vocation of a r t i s to unveil the t ru th i n sensuous 
form, to a r t i cu l a t e an i n t u i t e d \mi ty and reconc i l i a t ion of subject-
ive freedom and object ive subs tan t ia l i ty . (14) A r t i s the Idea i n 
the form o f ex te rna l i ty - that i s not i n i t s own proper form, but 
nonetheless i t i s the Idea. 
Thus, though Hegel's description of the locus and funct ion of 
a r t coincides to some extent with that given by Schelling (the imm-
ediate i n t u i t i o n of the absolute), the differences are jus t as s t r i -
k ing . For Hegel, a r t i s only the immediate form of the absolute, 
because, f o r Hegel, immediacy and i n t u i t i o n arenas we have seen, 
always only provis ional . 
Hegel develops h i s concept of a r t i n a majestic h i s t o r i c a l and 
ana ly t i ca l panorama. He uses two fmdamental schemata by which to 
order th i s v i s i o n . The one i s the d iv i s ion of a r t in to the categ-
ories of Symbolic, Classical and Romantic; the other i s the order-
ing of the forms of a r t , i . e . architectiare, sculpture, pa in t ing . 
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music and poetry. In each case the categories are arranged in a 
scale of ascent towards "the absolute. 
(A ) ( i i ) Symbolic, c lass ical and romantic art . 
The definition of symbolic art i s approached by means of a dis-
tinction between a conventional sign and the special sort of sign 
which i s a symbol. A symbol in some way carries i t s meaning within 
i t s e l f , e.g. 'the l ion . . . as a symbol of magnanimity, the fox of 
cunning, the c irc le of eternity, the triangle for the Trin i ty . ' (15) 
Nevertheless, Hegel argues, symbols are generally ambiguous -
a l ion could equally be a symbol of strength, but then so coiild a 
bul l . Symbolic art i s therefore limited to expressing meaning in 
'an equivocal and obscure fashion. Instead of beauty and regular-
i ty these works of art represent a bizarre, grandiose, fantastic 
aspect.' (16) 
The historical context of such symbolic art i s the east in 
general, more speci f ical ly , the religious cultures of ancient 
Persia, Indi'a and Egypt. In Egypt the problematic nat\ire of the 
symbol becomes more and more obvious. This process i s manifest in 
such a figure as that of the Sphinx in whom 'out of the dull 
strength of the animal the human spir i t tries to push i t se l f for-
ward, without coming to a perfect portrayal of i t s own freedom and 
animate shape, because i t must s t i l l remain confused and associated 
with what i s other than i t s e l f . ' ( l ? ) But the riddle of the Sphinx 
i s resolved in the emergent ciJLture of the greek city-state, and 
the answer i s : man. 
Art now enters i t s c lass ical phase in which the absolute i s 
s t i l l represented sensuously, but the particular sensuous form 
which i t ut i l i zes - the hxmian figure - i s a more appropriate medium 
for the supersensuous, for ' . . . the human exterior i s not only 
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l iv ing and natural, as the animal i s , but i s the bodily jpTOsence 
which i t s e l f mirrors the S p i r i t . ' (18) Here the inner can reveal 
i t s e l f in the outer, at least in the idealized form which this art 
gives to the body, casting aside everything in appearance which 
does not correspond with the concept, for • . . . only by this pro-
cess does the Ideal exist in externality, self-enclosed, free, 
s e l f - re l iant , as sensuously blissed in i t s e l f , enjoying and delight-
ing in i t s own self . The ring of this b l i s s resounds throughout 
the entire appearance of the Ideal ' . (19) 
This stage of art i s represented in the scxilpture of ancient 
Greece. Because of the harmonious fusion of sense and Sp ir i t , 
outer and inner, c lass ical art corresponds more closely than any 
other form of art to the Idea of art as such. Art, for Hegel, i s 
never more beautiful than i t was in Greece. But 'what shall l ive 
undyingly in song must pass away in l i f e . ' (20) The synthesis 
which constitutes and i s expressed in this form of art contains 
the seeds of i t s own dissolution. 'The sublimest works of sculp-
tured art are sightless. Their subtle inner being does not beam 
forth from them, as a self-knowing intemal i ty , in that spiritual 
concentration of vtoich the eye gives intelligence . . . ' (21 ) There 
i s a whole realm of inwardness which c lass ical art i s unable to 
open up and make available for consciousness. This task i s l e f t to 
romantic ar t , which ut i l i zes the media of painting, music and 
language. 
In place of the stone pantheon of c lass ical statuary a new 
pantheon i s developed whose 'element and habitation' (Element und 
Behausiing) (22) i s language. This new element i s the epic poem. 
But even though the epic poem represents an advance in inwardness 
over against the world of statuary, there i s s t i l l a division 
between the actual individuality of the bard and the represented 
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individuality of the epic gods and heroes. I t i s the bard 'who as 
the subject of the epic world produces and carries i t . His pathos 
i s Mnemosyne, meditation and developed inwardness, the internaliz-
ation of what was previously immediate essence.' (23) The bard 
both 'remembers' the hero's mighty acts, and, by reciting them in 
verse, translates them into the spiritual dimension of ideality. 
But the hero i s s t i l l figured as something external; he i s spoken 
of, he does not speak. A higher language i s required which wi l l 
overcome this duality. This i s the language of tragedy in which 
'the hero i s himself the speaker';; (24) 
Though tragedy achieves a truer representation of the dialect-
ic of substance and consciousness, outer and inner, the tragic hero 
i s s t i l l shown as constrained and subjected to the power of extern-
a l i ty embodied in the figures of the gods. The next step must there-
fore be the demythologizing of the divine powers which constrain the 
hero. The f ru i t of greek tragedy i s thus, for Hegel, the depopul-
j.ation of heaven, and out of tragedy the comedy i s bom in which the 
gods are relat iv ized, and the drama i s revealed as an human concern 
in which the actors step out from behind their masks. (25) But 
although the external, or substantial, has thus been stripped of 
i t s power the end of this particular movement i s not the f inal self-
reconciliation of S p i r i t , i t i s the empty scepticism, in vdiich sub-
ject iv i ty denies and questions a l l received values, without having 
anything to put in their place. This empty subjectivity cries out 
for the bestowal of a new content, which wi l l at one and the same 
time give i t substantiality, yet without doing violence to i t s in -
sight into subjective freedom. I t i s to this situation that the 
revelation of the incarnate God, the Christ , addresses i t se l f . 
Here i t i s revealed that the divine power 'external' to human 
consciousness, i s , in truth, not external to man. Substance i s 
- 50 -
not opposed to subjectivity. I t i s subjectivity. (26) Thus, for 
Hegel, the dissolution of greek art i s as much - perhaps more - a 
preparatio evangelii as the Old Testament. 
The revelation of the incarnate God ends the dissolution of 
c lass ica l art at one l eve l , but i t does not end the development of 
art . On the contrary i t gives art a new content, a new theme. I t 
throws open to art the whole realm of suffering, passionate, human 
act ivity . Art i s elevated to the realm of inwardness, to dealing 
with feeling, with the heart, instead of with tie external acts of 
gods and heroes. This new 'inner l i f e i s indifferent to the way in 
which the immediate world i s configurated, because immediacy i s un-
worthy of the soul's inner b l i s s . ' (2?) 
Whilst romantic ar t , as this new phase of art i s called, sta-
r t s by taking up into art the stories of Christ; of the Holy Family, 
of the apostles, martyrs, saints, etc . , because of the complete re-
lat iv izat ion of external real i ty in the inwardness of the Christ-
event, any and every external phenomenon i s equally available for 
treatment by romantic art . Art's subject-matter i s widened to 'a 
multiplicity without bounds.' (28) 
Romantic art thus involves an utter disjunction between the 
absoluteness of i t s essential content and the accidental external-
i ty of i t s form. This i s implicit in the fact that this art takes 
i t s content not from the idea of art - as c lass ical sculpture per-
fectly expressed the beautiful ideal of ar t , the balance of inner and 
outer - but from an essentially non-aesthetic event, the Incarnation. 
The content of romantic art i s in fact Tiltimately incapable of 
aesthetic representation. Romantic art points to that vAiich l i e s 
beyond art - to religion. Art i s no longer a home for the Spir i t . 
Now, at i t s highest stage 'art . . . transcends i t s e l f , in that i t 
forsakes the element of a reconciled embodiment of the Spirit in 
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in sensuous form and passes over from the poetry of imagination to 
the prose of thought.' (29) 
Art i s as such only the immediate form of the absolute, i t i s 
the absolute in external form, and Hegel goes on to distinguish two 
further forms: rel igion, which he ca l l s pictorial thinking, and 
philosophy, in which tho\ight i s f inal ly at home with i t se l f . (30) 
Art i s therefore transcended in religion and philosophy. 
I f the sitz-im-leben of romantic art was the Middle Ages the 
transition to an higher level occ\ars in the Reformation, in which 
'religious ideas were drawn away from their wrapping in sense' (31) 
and so 'no matter how excellent we find the statues of the greek 
gods, no matter how we see God the Father, the Christ and Mary so 
estimably and perfectly portrayed: i t i s no help; we bow the knee 
no longer.• (32) 
Art i s relativized both his tor ica l ly , as a stage of Spirit 
which has been passed through, and structurally, as showing i t s e l f 
inadequate according to the requirements of the Idea. Both these 
elements are present when Hegel says that 'the peculiar nature of 
a r t i s t i c production and of works of art no longer f i l l s our high-
est need . . . Thought and reflection have spread their wings above 
fine a r t . ' (33) ' . . . a r t , considered in i t s highest vocation, i s 
and remains for us a thing of the past . . . the philosophy of art 
i s therefore a greater need in our day than i t was in the days when 
art by i t s e l f as art yielded f\all satisfaction. Art invites us to 
intel lectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creat-
ing art a^ain, but for knowing philosophically what art i s . ' (34) 
(A ) ( i i i ) Hegel on poetry 
In addition to the dialectic of symbolic, c lass ical and roman-
t i c art Hegel saw the dialectics of art worked out in terms of the 
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forms of ar t , moving from architecture and sculpture to painting, 
music and poetry. As the culmination of the dialectic of art Hegel's 
accoimt of poetry has a particular interest. 
Poetry has a peculiar proximity to specxilative thinking in that 
i t thinks i t s object as a meaningful whole, but whereas in speculat-
ion 'thinking i s only a reconciliation between real ity and truth 
within thinking i t s e l f . . . poetic creation and formation i s a recon-
c i l ia t ion in the form of a real phenomenon i t s e l f , even i f this form 
be presented only sp ir i tua l ly . ' (35) 
Though poetry deals in figures and images i t presents these 
figures and images not in their external form as such but in the 
spiri tual medium of language. Language i s intr ins ical ly a negation 
of the immediate, in which the perceptual, external element of the 
image which clings to the products of the imagination i s destroyed. 
(36) Language i s rational. I t i s a system of signs, not of symbols. 
The world of poetry recapitulates the whole previous history of 
the forms of art , since i t i s the intemalization/recollection of 
previous art . Thus the most primitive form of poetry i s s t i l l laden 
with externality providing 'sculptural picttires for our imagination.' 
(37) This i s the world of epic poetry. I f epic poetry i s absorbed 
in the external appearance l y r i c a l poetry recollects the musical 
form of art . I t s 'content i s not the object but the subject.' (38) 
This 'content' i s 'the individual person . . . with a l l the details of 
his situation and concerns, as well as the way in which his mind 
with i t s subjective judgement, i t s joy, admiration, grief , and, in 
short, i t s feeling come to consciousness of i t s e l f . . . ' (39) The 
his tor ica l appearance of these two modes of poetry i s , for Hegel, 
conditioned by the prevailing social and cultural conditions. Epic 
and l y r i c poetry are united in drama, and just as poetry in general 
recapitulates a l l other forms of art , so drama recapitulates the 
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world of poetry. Thus tragedy echoes the epic, comedy the l y r i c 
element, and what Hegel ca l l s drama in a general sense xinites the 
two. (40) 
The internalizing process by which art transcends i t s e l f i s 
not simply a process of turning away from real i ty . I t i s intend-
ed to be a process of concretion, a process in which the 'higher' 
forms are r icher, possessing more facets, less abstract (in Hegel's 
sense) than the lower forms. The internalizing of the world i s 
also the taking up of the world in i t s concreteness into the dimen-
sion of thought, i t i s the discovery of the rationality of the rea l , 
(4'1.).)" seeing the r e a l , but seeing i t in the light of the universal-
i ty of the categories of systematic thought, seeing the interconnect-
ion and coherence of what, to the immediate consciousness, just 
'happens' to be. 
Thus the higher development of poetry i s in a sense dependent 
on the development o& social l i f e , as Hegel makes especially clear 
in his account of the relationship of l yr i ca l to epic poetry. (42) 
The more organized and shaped the external world i s , the more the 
poetic production wi l l be able to be i t s e l f a coherent 'world', 
rather than a mere saga of heroic deeds, or a mere outpouring of 
inner feelings. Poetry, l ike speculation, strives towards univers-
a l i t y , towards the structuring of experience into a formed, rational 
world. But, as wi l l be clear, the husks of sensuous immediacy, which 
s t i l l enc\amber the poetic imagination, mean that poetry must at the 
end of the day hand over to speculative thought i f we are to attain 
to a f ina l definitive account of the world. 
Hegel's restrictions on the scope of art are specifically a 
rebuttal of the claims made for art by the romantic movement, and 
an attack on the medievalism of that movement. However his concept 
of the way in which we experience axt in no way involves denying the 
- 54 -
basic structure of aesthetic attunement. I t i s not that there i s no 
idea in art . There i s , and the recipient of the work of art i s to 
t\me himself in to i t , to find himself in i t and reproduce i t in his 
own consciousness. His reflection wil l however show him that ultim-
ately a higher form i s required for this idea. He looks at art only 
from the outside. Art i s only one note in the threefold chord of 
the absolute. 
( B ) Hegelianism in Denmark 
(B) ( i ) J . L . Heiberg 
( B ) ( i ) (a) Heiberg's philosophical position 
The introduction of hegelianism to Denmark was largely due to 
Johann Ludvig Heiberg (l791 - 1860). Heiberg had 'discovered' Hegel 
whilst teaching in K i e l , at that time a part of Denmark. Later in 
Berlin he actually met Hegel. Stopping over in Hamburg on the way 
back from this trip he 'was gripped by a moment of inner vision, 
l ike a f lash of lightning' (43) in which the mysteries of the system 
were revealed to him. This was in the summer of 1824 and by December 
of that year he f e l t confident enough to publish an hegelian treatise 
Om Menneskelige Frihed, which he offered as a contribution to a debate 
on the nature of freedom then raging in danish philosophical c irc les . 
(44) 
Following not only Hegel but the idealist consensus Heiberg dis-
tinguished between the realms of subject and object, self and not-self, 
intelligence and nature. Spirit and matter. (45) Sp ir i t , he argued, 
asserts i t s inf ini te freedom only under the conditions of duality, 
consequently as a striving to achieve the freedom which, absolutely, i t 
i s . (46) Thus the eternal Idea sp i l l s over into the realm of succession, 
manifesting i t s intensity of being in extension, in externality. (4?) 
The process set in course by this basic dialectical law takes the 
form of a gradual transition from the lowest forms of nat\aral l i f e to 
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the realm of intelligence: from mechanics thro-ugh chemistry, through 
crystal l izat ion, through organic l i f e , through the vegetable realm, 
through the animal realm where 'the higher animals eat the lower, and 
relate to these as subject to object . . . man asserts the same subject-
might over the whole of the objective world, even indeed, in almost 
\mrecognizable gradations, over his own kind.' (48) But at the ap-
ex of this pyramid, in bourgeois society, nature i s again given i t s 
r ight , and in natural science the crude opposition of mahi and nature 
i s broken down, for i t comes to be seen that i t i s the same Idea 
which i s the one dynamic ground of each. 
Heiberg proceeds from this summary of transcendental philosophy 
to argue that the debate about freedom i s a debate about words, for 
although we can speak about the human subject being determined at a 
certain level of i t s being, this dimension of determinateness, the 
external realm of nature, of matter, i s i t s e l f a product of the free 
Idea. Speculative philosophy overcomes the one-sidedness of preced-
ing philosophies with i t s method of mediating the contradictions and 
antinomies thrown up by an inadequate consciousness of the nature of 
the Idea. (49) 
Heiberg develops his ideas further in Om Philosophiens Betydning 
(50) He asserts that the present age i s an age of c r i s i s , of trans-
i t ion , in which rel igion, art and poetry have a l l lost the power of 
conveying 'immediate certainty concerning the divine and eternal.'(.51) 
I t i s only philosophy which can bring an end to this chaos. Art and 
religion contain truth, and therefore also philosophy, indeed phi l -
osophy i s their real substance, but this truth i s hidden under the 
accidental nature of their form. (52) 
Heiberg recognizes, however, a genuinely speculative type of 
a r t i s t , and he twins Goethe with Hegel as the highest contemporary 
representatives of human consciousness. Other speculative poets 
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include Dante and Calderon, though he does not share the enthusiasm 
for Shakespeare common l » t h t« the romantics and to Hegel. 
Om Philosophiens Betydning i s a slight book, intended merely 
as an introductory note to a series of lectures. Heiberg's ful lest 
philosophical account of Hegelianism was Grundtraek t i l Philosoph-
iens Philosophie el ler en Speculative Logik. (53) This i s in many 
ways merely a popularizing reworking of Hegel's own Lesser Logic (54) 
but i t presents an useful statement of Heiberg's concept of philo-
sophy and of his dialect ical method, which was the foundation for 
his aesthetic theories. The aim of philosophy, he stated, i s to 
lead thought from the realm of representation (Forestil l ing) to 
that of conceptuality (Begreb). (55) The need for philosophy i s 
deduced from the assertion that the various particular scientif ic 
disciplines are ultimately incapable of providing an explanation of 
their conceptual basis. They do not themselves explain the categor-
ies they use, nor can they produce the absolute Idea which they pre-
suppose . But philosophy i s absolute, i t has no presuppositions,' 
' . . . Philosophy can be regarded as a presuppositionless science. I t 
must therefore begin with nothing.' (56) 
The basic part of philosophy i s logic, vdiich takes thought i t -
self for i t s object - thought understood not as a psychological 
phenomenon, but as the common basis of nature and Spiri t . I t i s the 
thought of the creator, of God. Speculative Logic, as the study of 
this thought, i s both metaphysics and logic, i t i s philosophy as 
such, i t i s the 'philosophy's philosophy' of the t i t l e . (57) 
Philosophy's method 'consists in developing every concept 
through three stages such that through the las t term i t returns to 
the f i r s t . ' (58) 
The f i r s t step i s the immediate, a spontaneous tmity . . . 
The second step i s the negation of the f i r s t , a difference 
i s asserted . . . The third step i s the negation of the neg-
ation, thus, the positive, but no longer merely immediate 
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as i t was in the f i r s t step, but contrariwise a result 
of the preceding movement, an unity which has been pro-
duced from the preceding difference. (59) 
Immediate knowledge thus 'knows' i t s object merely in i t s specific-
i ty , abstracted from the context of the network of relationships in 
which i t actually exists. Knowledge of the second order i s called 
'd ia lect ica l ' or 'ref lexive' , i t 'knows' i t s object by distinguish-
ing i t into parts, into essence and appearance, ground and consequ-
ence. Knowledge of the third order i s conceptual knowledge. 'The 
concept i s reflection's return to immediacy.' I t i s 'the regaining 
of immediacy'. (6o) 
According to Heiberg whatever i s to be known must be known 
through the triple lens of this triadic formula. 
( B ) ( i ) (b) Heiberg's aesthetics 
Heiberg made this logical theory the basis of his philosophical 
aesthetics and of his l i terary crit icism. Indeed i t i s as a l i terary 
figure that Heiberg was best known and i s best remembered. From 1828 
he was writer-in-residence at the Theatre Royal in Copenhagen, and 
later became i t s manager. His speciality as a writer was in the 
f i e ld of l ight comedy. He gave his comedy the name 'vaudeville', 
and he used hegelian logic to just i fy the l i terary status of this 
genre, and to propomd a theory of l iterature which had wider i^nplic-
ations, and which had a specific polemical reference to the romantic 
movement, represented above a l l in the person of Adam 0hlenslaeger. 
Against romantic enthusiasm Heiberg cultivated a poise of polished 
and urbane nonchalance and aristocratic aloofness, from which he sur-
veyed the l i terary f i e ld with a cool, c r i t i c a l glance. 
His f i r s t major c r i t i c a l work was published in 1826 and ent i t l -
ed Om Vaudeville. (6l) Here he so\aght to show that vaudeville was 
not just an amorphous jumble of comedy and song, but a rigorously 
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structured and defined art-form. The distinction of the various of 
genres of poetic art i s the key to his argument. He asserts that i t 
i s a sign of dilettantism to ignore the boundaries of l i terary genr-
es, for within each genre content and form are related to each other 
in a specif ic mode. Thus someone who has seen the play The Barber of 
Sevil le cannot say that he knows what the opera The Marriage of Figaro 
i s about, for the content i s i t s e l f changed by virtue of the new form 
which i t acquires. (62) On the same principle supernatural elements 
which might be in place in an epic poem have no place in the theatre, 
for'the theatre's material actuality and sensuous real ity make every 
spectator . . . into a s c e p t i c ' (63) 
Heiberg^fairly conventionally, divided art in general into the 
plastic and the musical, the former being objectified in space, the 
lat ter in time. (64) Each side however has an element of the other, 
and this interaction i s above a l l true in poetry, which unites the 
two elements and i s 'art ' s art' - as logic i s 'philosophy's philo-
sophy.' In i t s original musical form poetry i s l y r i c a l , in i t s 
plastic form, i t i s epic. Drama \mifies the two and i s thus 'poet-
ry ' s poetry.' (65) Within drama the l y r i c a l , musical element i s 
present in character, the epic, plastic element in situation. Char-
acter develops in time, but situation i s extra-temporal for 'every 
situation i s momentary, at least at i t s highest point.' (66) These 
two elements, character and situation, unite in the action. But 
within the unity of a l l these elements which a l l drama possesses, 
tragedy and opera relate more to character, comedy to situation. 
Heiberg claimed that vaudeville reflected this structure, taking 
the ijusical element in i t up into the sphere of situation, in which 
respect i t was unlimited. (67) 
The knowledge of the place which a poetic genre has in the 
aesthetic system i s essential for the c r i t i c , for i t i s the basis 
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of heibergian crit icism that 'every work which answers to the re-
quirements of the genre to which i s must be assigned, i s good, and 
i f i t answers perfectly to i t s concept, then i t i s a masterpiece . . . ' 
(68) This principle i s not only the key to Heiberg's own criticism 
- i t i s also the key to Kierkegaard's c r i t i c a l practice. (69) 
By clearly enunciating this principle and by spelling out the 
schema of poetic genres Heiberg hoped to contribute to the develop-
ment of taste. Taste, for him, i s not mere subjective feeling, but 
'consists in . . . the acknowledgement of the objective element of art , 
and in the individual's subordination to the sceptre of this power.' 
(70) And he hoped that the State would set i t s seal on the object-
ive claims of this comic drama by establishing a national theatre 
for comedy, for the State i s reason in objective form and 'every-
thing which wi l l count as rational must come to existence in and by 
means of the State.' (71) 
Heiberg's %hema of poetic genres i s further developed in the 
course of a c r i t i c a l debate with 0hlenslaeger, a debate launched by 
Heiberg, when he attacked 0hlenslaeger's play The Vikings in Byzantium. 
(72) In particular he cr i t ic ized 0hlenslaeger's use of monologue, 
cal l ing i t an undeveloped l y r i c a l element which had not been adapt-
ed to the requirements of dramatic poetry. (73) 0hlenslaeger's gen-
ius , Heiberg asserted, i s not in dramatic but in l yr i ca l productivity. 
As a dramatist his best pieces are those which Heiberg assigned to the 
genre of 'immediate or abstract drama.' (74) 
This judgement i s not h i s , Heiberg's, subjective opinion, but i s 
a question of taste, in the sense Heiberg attached to the word. I t 
comes down to a technical question, i t i s not a question to be solved 
by the immediacy of intuition or by our immediate reactions to a 
piece. This distinction between the immediate and the technical i s 
again one of the fundamental points of Heiberg's aesthetic theory. (75) 
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When 0hlenslaeger says "' Let us not therefore coldly hold to the 
form, but to the Spir i t in a poem," he must be told that i t i s pre-
cisely the form by which we come to know the Spir i t . . . and the 
Spir i t which does not ref lect i t s e l f in some form does not exist 
from ovir perspective.' (76) When 0hlenslaeger says that 'immedi-
ate grief and laiighter teach us more than an hundred cold demonstra-
tions' Heiberg te l l s him that this i s what a poet must say - biat a 
c r i t i c cannot allow this truth to pass i t s e l f off as a cr i t i ca l 
argument. (77) 
0hlenslaeger i s a genius, but his genius i s without reflection 
and i s 'entirely to be located in the immediacy of existence.' (78) 
I t 'stands on the level of immediacy, and has thus s t i l l not awoken 
to that strxiggle with the external world which i s called ref lect ion. ' 
(79) 0hlenslaeger might, however, have found consolation in the 
thought that Heiberg also assigned Shakespeare to this level of 
drama. In Shakespeare, and indeed in modem tragedy generally, tra^ 
gedy i s based on the comic principle, modem tragedy i s ' i t s e l f only 
a flower on comedy's great tree.' (8O) For modem tragedy presup-
poses irony. Irony, unlike genius, i s 'an acquired good.' (81) 
This irony i s a consciousness of the limitations which the manifold 
of contradictory or dialect ical elements in a work impose upon each 
other. Irony i s in fact very close to what Heiberg cal ls taste. 
In his dissection of 0hlenslaeger's genius Heiberg i s driven 
into a contorted analysis of the different levels of genius, dis-
tinguishing the lyric-epic type of poet (which 0hlenslaeger i s ) 
from the l y r i c genius proper. (82) In doing so he strains the 
credibi l i ty of his own schema, which, i t can scarcely be doubted, 
was in many points highly a r t i f i c i a l . (Although Heiberg would not 
perhaps have seen that as a f a u l t ) . . 
Althoiigh Heiberg's schematic formalism i s alien to our way of 
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approaching l iterature his views were profoundly influential in 
Denmark from the 1820s through to the 1840s. He i s described by one 
historian of danish l i terature as the 'Pontifex Maximus of Danish 
l i terature' in this period. ( 8 3 ) Kierkegaard too referred .toL:him 
as 'he who possesses absolute aesthetic authority' ( 8 4 ) - although 
this reference has to be seen in the l i ^ t of Kierkegaard's total 
relationship to Heiberg, which wi l l be discussed below. ( 8 5 ) 
Influential in his own right, Heiberg was also the centre of 
a b r i l l i a n t c i rc le which included his mother, Thomasine Gyllembourg, 
a novelist of some repute, and his wife, Johanne Luise Heiberg, a 
leading actress. 
( B ) ( i ) (c) Speculative Comedy 
At the summit of Heiberg's table of l i terary genres stood, not 
vaudeville, but 'speculative drama.' Poetry, for Heiberg, ' i s in i t s 
highest development speculative (86) He himself attempted to 
provide examples of such speculative drama in his speculative comedy 
Fata Morgana ( I 8 3 8 ) , which proved a 'fiasco' in the theatre ( 8 7 ) and 
in his Nye Digte ( I 8 4 1 ) , the centrepiece of which was a dramatic poem 
En Sjael Efter D^den which, though-presented as a poem to be read, 
was, eventually, in 1891; produced theatrically. I t i s worth looking 
at these two pieces in more detai l , since they provide considerable 
insight into the project of fusing hegelian philosophy and poetic 
practice, a project which was to have considerable significance in 
moulding Kierkegaard's aesthetic theory. 
At f i r s t glance Fata Morgana i s an \mlikely candidate for the 
high office of 'speculative comedy.' I t hinges on the interaction 
between the vengeful passion of a pair of fa iry-s is ters and the 
rags-to-riches story of a king's son, who, lost as a baby, i s raised 
by humble f isher-folk. The story has a loose connection to the cycle 
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of heroic poems by Ariosto - but the point i s of course, what Heiberg 
does with i t . 
The play opens with the fishermen's wives anxiously watching 
for the return of their menfolk. They are alarmed by the appearance 
in the sky of a mirage of the distant city of Palermo, a mirage they 
ascribe to the power of the fairy Fata Morgana, who represents the 
power of i l lus ion . This vision has a particular impact on one 
Clotaldo, who, alone of the men, does not take part in the coral-
diving by which the community l ives . He i s not at home in the every-
day world, but feels himself called to poetry. He has, in fact , 
when the play opens, already been to Provence where he lived as a 
troubadour and where he f e l l in love with Margarita, the daughter of 
Dionisio, Duke of Palermo, in whose f i e f the village of the f isher-
folk l i e s . 'Fata Morgana.' are you merely deception?' he asks as he 
looks at the celest ial miragie, 
and i s my inner vision i t s e l f no more than this? But i s there 
not such a thing as a beautiful deception? And is not Beauty 
i t s e l f a deception? And i s a beautiful deception not worth 
more than that which the world foolishly ca l l s truth? Ohi 
He who only grasps after actuality - he i s deceived by a 
false appearance. The Eternal i s the beautiful image which 
has neither f lesh , nor blood, neither marrow nor bone, but 
i s the light thought of the heavy world, dark actuality's 
clear vision in the sky. ( l , l ) (88) 
Clotaldo i s , in short, a romantic, s t i l l tinder the influence of 
a world of i l lusion - in a suitably noble manner. The story of the 
play could be summed up as the story of his conversion to hegelianism. 
When the men return Clotaldo's adopted father reveals that he has 
foxand corals of exceptional value which he wants Clotaldo to take to 
MargaJita, the Duke's daughter, as a wedding present, in order to win 
the Duke's favour. He does not, of coiorse, know of Clotaldo's love 
for her. Clotaldo i s at once uplifted at the thought of seeing 
Margarita again and downcast at the news that she i s to be married, 
especially since her husband-to-be i s a rather unpleasant Cotint, 
- 65 -
Coimt Alonzo, a vassal of the Duke'sj 
The second act takes us to the fa i ry - i s l e to which Fata Morgana 
has gone to meet her sister Alcina. Alcina has sworn revenge on the 
royal l ine from which Clotaldo i s descended, and Fata Morgana i s 
moved to ass is t her sister carry out this revenge, especially as 
she has learnt that one of this l ine wi l l one day destroy her realm 
of magical i l lus ion. Fata Morgana explains to her sister that hm-
anity i s under the spell of the web of i l lusions which she weaves, 
i l lusions as varied as knightly glory, sensuous enjoyment and the 
struggle for daily bread - a l l forms of the pursuit of what i s trans-
itory and i l lusory. She fears nothing from Clotaldo. 'He', she 
t e l l s her s i s ter , ' l ives only for love and poetry. But among a l l 
the blossoms of i l lus ion which grow in the heaven of dreams there 
are surely none which fade so easily and quickly as these two.' 
(11,5) She also t e l l s Alcina how Clotaldo, en route to Palermo, has 
been overpowered by robbers and had his corals taken from him. In 
their place she herself gives him a pearl, possessed of magical 
properties, and this pearl i s to trap him in new i l lusions. 
Act Three opens with Clotaldo duly admiring the pearl, which i s 
of rare beauty. As he looks he sees in i t s depths a vision of Marggr-
i t a . But then Margarita herself real ly appears. His powers of poet-
ry fade in the real presence of the object of his love, and he rea l -
izes that the magical pearl i s i t s e l f nothing in comparison with her 
rea l i ty . What i t shows ' i s only an image,' he says, but 'he who 
sees the true object praises the image no more, even i f i t i s repres-
ented as accurately as i t i s here . . . my dreaming nature was chain-
ed to the image in the pearl . . . I feel myself set free in sp i r i t , 
when I offer i l lus ion's phantasm for the true appearance.' ( i l l , 2 ) 
Fata Morgana's sylphs, who have been watching this scene, are diily 
dismayed and rush off to t e l l their mistress what has occurred. I t 
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almost goes without saying that Clotaldo's love i s reciprocated by 
Margarita in the best fa iry-ta le manner. 
We are next introduced to two burlesque characters who, nonethe-
less , serve Heiberg's speculative aim. The one, Arlecchino, i s the 
superintendent of the arts in the duchy of Palermo, the other, Pier-
rot , i s president of i t s sc ient i f ic society. Arlecchino represents 
the ideality of the self which spurns a l l contact with external rea l -
i ty , Pierrot the coarse realism of empirical science. Heiberg uses 
them to make clear that speculation i s more than the simple addition 
of these two parts: 
Arlecchino: There i s no third position. We two are 
everything. That i s to say we would be i f one were 
to put us together. 
Pierrot: What a noble thought! We two are everything. 
Let me embrace you. 
Arlecchino: With pleasurel Let ideality kiss real i ty . 
Now we are the absolute. 
Pierrot: One moment, Signer Arlecchinoi Do not le t 
your fantasy overshoot your understanding! The ab-
solute can never be realized by f in i t e , earthly beings; 
one can only approach i t by an eternally maintained 
progress towards the unobtainable perfection. Consid-
er, that however tightly we may hold each other, we 
wi l l nonetheless never fuse into one being. We wi l l 
never become a single grey figure, despite the fact 
that you are black and I am white. 
(111,5) 
But for Heiberg there i s just such a third position as that den-
ied by Arlecchino and Pierrot, the position, namely, of speculation. 
These figures are caught fast in the second moment of consciousness, 
in vhich the parts of consciousness are seen only in their \anrecon-
c i led opposition. 
Meanwhile the pearl has been brought to the Duke. He brings i t 
to Arlecchino and Pierrot who give their one-sided explanations of i t . 
Arlecehino can only reiterate the exclamation that i t i s beautiful, 
while Pierrot delivers a pedantic lecture on whether the formation of 
pearls i s a sickness or a part of the natural cycle of the oyster. 
Clotaldo i s knighted by the Duke as a reward for the g i f t , and, 
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taking the sword which he has been given,he proclaims 'With this 
sword shall I be reminded of the struggle which i s to be carried 
out on behalf of actuality; and the poet shall not be himself 
ensnared in his realm of images, but shall struggle for the actual 
truth. ' ( i l l , 7 ) 
The pearl turns out to have the peculiar property that every-
one sees in i t a golden image of his or her deepest wish. The Duke 
sees golden ducats, Margarita sees the troubadour's ( i . e . Clotaldo's) 
golden harp, Alonzo, her o f f i c i a l fiance, sees the ducal crown he 
covets, Arlecchino sees himself, and Pierrot sees an archimedean 
screw. The I>uke and Alonzo quarrel over possession of the pearl, 
a quarrel which ends in the Duke denying Margarita's hand to Alonzo 
- to the delight of Clotaldo and Margarita. Alonzo vows to seize 
both the throne and the pearl, and storms off. 
The pearl i s placed in the custody of Arlecchino and Pierrot. 
While they are being visited by Clotaldo, one of Alonzo's noblemen 
bxirsts in and te l l s them that Alonzo has taken the city and that the 
Duke and Margarita, have f led. On the arrival of Alonzo, Arlecchino 
and Pierrot transfer their allegiance to him with almost indecent 
haste, and they are l e f t in charge of Clotaldo, who now faces ex-
ecution. Clotaldo sees that a l l this trouble has come about through 
the pearl and he again contrasts the true beauty of Margarita with 
the fa l se , banefiil beauty of the pearl. '0 Margarita,' he exclaims, 
what longing s t i r s my happy heart. For you, to possess 
you, I would have fought for and won you, you pearl of 
pearls, you impress of the soul, phenomenon of truth, 
you image of the S p i r i t , whose radiance i s not false, 
not a play of the dark forces of nature, as i s this 
false image, this pearl, which has only earthly value 
and yet manages to awaken hatred and dissent. (IV ,5) 
Taking his sword, he strikes and shatters the pearl. Where the 
pearl had been a rose bush now sprouts, the image of truth' which 
has no mere external beauty but whose sp ir i t i s in i t s ( invisible) 
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scent.' ( IV,6) Out of the rose bush appears a sylph, the sp ir i t 
of the pearl, who explains to Clotaldo the truth about his royal 
ancestry and adds that Margarita has been taken by Fata Morgana to 
her fairy-palace in the sky. 
Thus Clotaldo has f ina l ly broken through the web of i l lusion 
in which he and the other figures of the drama have been ensnared, 
and the denouement can begin. He resolves to joTimey to Fata Mor-
gana's sky-palace, and three winged figures, Troche, Iamb and Mol-
ossos come to his aid - representing the technical undergirding of 
poetic art . And so Clotaldo, knowing the truth about himself, 
about the pearl, and having at his disposal not merely the romantic 
charisma of his troubadour days, but a technical command of aesthet-
ic form, sets out to rescue Margarita, the image of truth, from 
Fata Morgana, mistress of the realm of il lusory images. 
The f ina l encounter takes place on a bridge which joins the 
two wings of the sky-palace. Clotaldo has already taken Margarita 
and has her in his arms when he encounters Fata Morgana. 
Fata Morgana: 
What does this defiance mean? What superiority do you 
have? 
Clotaldo: 
This: that I can now encounter the false delusion with 
contempt. You are queen of i l lusion; therein l i e s your 
strength - i s i t not so? And since I was bound heart and 
soul to i l lus ion's world - because love had entrapped me 
by i t s power, as had poetry too - you believe that I am 
yours eternally and can never free myself. But yo\ir 
thought i s mistaken; your tinderstanding does not under-
stand that over against the false there stands the true, 
the divine, appearance. Your visions borrow their truth 
from earthly natvre, from the transient being which l i e s 
behind the wall of actuality; mine take their truth from 
the Sp ir i t , which has impressed i t s image in the clay in 
order to lead i t back to the light in which i t was. Love 
i s no delusion, though i t goes in a robe of clay; poetry 
consists of truth, even i f i t consists of images. 
(V.3) 
Morgana plays her las t card. She causes the bridge on which 
Clotaldo stands to collapse: but he remains standing, upheld by 
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his invisible winged servants. Morgana's palace collapses, the 
clouds divide and separate and the scene i s transformed to an earth-
ly scene. The crowds gather around hero and heroine, the Duke arriv-
es with Clotaldo's adoptive parents. We learn that Alonzo's rebel l -
ion has been crushed and the play ends with the promise of c ivic 
peace. 
The play was premiered on the occasion of the King's birthday 
in January 1838 and l ike other of Heiberg's plays i t i s a celebrat-
ion and a vindication of the actual, earthly monarchy, of the concrete 
c iv ic order over against the fairy kings and queens of romantic imag-
ination. The union of truth and appearance, of reason and actual-
i ty which Clotaldo affirms, i s not just an event in his private 
consciousness but an affirmation very much in the mould of Hegel's 
statement that the real i s the rational and the rational the real . 
(89) That i s to say i t i s a tribute to the status quo. 
Both the main thread of the plot and the comic interludes feat-
uring Arlecchino and Pierrot serve the purpose of a sustained polemic 
against the romantic theory of art as Heiberg understood i t , against 
the troubadour-ideal, the self-absorption, the fairy-world, the one-
sidedness, the indulgence in imagery for the sake of imagery which 
romanticism represented for him. In i t s place Heiberg does not de-
mand a stripping of the a l tars , a denial of images, but the poetic 
image must serve the purpose of expressing a rational, and that sim-
ultaneously means r e a l , actual truth. I f i t does this then poetry 
can indeed - though not in the way intended by the romantics -
function as an image of the true, a divine appearance. 
En Sjael Efter D^den deservedly achieved greater popularity 
than Fata Morgana. I t i s a genuinely comic, clever and cutting 
piece of sat ire , and i s commonly reckoned amongst Heiberg's major 
l i terary achievements. (90) The 'soul' of the t i t l e i s a Copen-
hagen petit-bourgeois who has just died. Realizing he i s dead he 
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makes his way, as his surviving family and friends are sure he w i l l , 
to heaven's gate. However a l l does not turn out as expected. He i s 
duly met by St. Peter, who demands that the soul go on a purgatorial 
pilgrimage, following the l i f e of Christ by vis i t ing a l l the sites 
named in the gospel narrative. The soul considers this a bit much. 
He wo\ild rather go to America i f he had to go anywhere, and anyway, 
he cannot remember a l l the places concerned. Surely, he says, the 
important thing i s not to have memorized such details but to under-
stand the Spir i t of the scriptures. St. Peter then asks him to ex-
plain what that Spirit i s . But again the soul .demurs, 'for the 
Spir i t does not l e t i t s e l f be grasped in words. St. Peter:'And yet 
the word was God.' (91) The soul t e l l s Peter that this statement 
i s allegorical for 'the Spir i t can be fe l t but not uttered, for 
Spir i t and letter are in ceaseless conflict . St. Peter: 'That i s 
so among you - unfortunately - but not in Paradise, in the presence 
of the Lord. The more clear the Spir i t i s , so much the less does 
i t economize on the word. He who cannot express his thought in 
words does not enter heaven.' (92) The soul i s astounded at this 
information. A\ l east , he protests, he had done his duty to God 
and to his neighbour. 
Peter: But you have set aside your duty to God: you have 
not sought to know Him. 
So\il: He i s incomprehensible: that i s what everyone who 
seeks to know Him has learnt, 
Peter: What do you want here? Tell me, why do you not 
spare yourself the way to God, i f He, after a l l , 
does not reveal himself? 
(93) 
In other words, what i s the point of saying that one i s seeking God 
i f one does not and never can know who He is? what i s the point of 
seeking Heaven i f one can know nothing of the God whose Kingdom i t i s? 
Eventually St. Peter sends the soul off to Elysium, but here too 
he i s challenged - this time by the figure of Aristophanes. Again 
Heiberg indulges in a l i t t l e bit of malicious fun at 0hlenslaeger's 
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expense, {^fhlenslaeger having written a play which involved a recon-
c i l ia t ion between Socrates and Aristophanes. But the so\al lacks 
c lass ica l cultoore, just as he had previously lacked bibl ical learn-
ing. Again he f a i l s to gain admittance. 
At las t he comes, without knowing where i t i s , to the gates of 
Hel l . Here he i s greeted by Mephistopheles, and i s relieved to be 
told that anyone can enter - although none can leave. No knowledge 
i s required for admittance - indeed Mephistopheles congratulates the 
soul on having possessed no knowledge beyond the knowledge of the 
most recent and most t r i v i a l events. For 'here i s surface but no 
depth . . . Here there i s no distinction between coal and chalk, here 
freedom and conformity are ready-made, here everything i s as new, 
nothing, however much i t hurries forward gets away from the begin-
ning, because the brief , single moment . . . severs i t s e l f from the 
moment before . . . and begins i t s eternal A from which no B ever 
proceeds.' (94) This i s why no one can ever leave, because Hell 
i s an eternal beginning, with no before and no after, nothing can 
ever turn back, just as nothing ever goes forward. Hell has no 
history, i t i s the immediate, without reflection, without develop-
ment. Mephistopheles himself offers this truly hegelian picture of 
Hell: 'Our realm i s immediacy, which no eternity can resolve, be-
cause there i s no ground in i t , because, since i t has no prius i t 
becomes eternally only what i t was . . . My friend, you don't need to 
delve into a l l this. I t i s something no-one can understand. ' (95) 
Precisely. Because immediacy and understanding stand in inverse 
relation to each other. Where one i s the other i s not. There i s 
nothing in immediacy for the mind to grasp. 
Heiberg here develops in dramatic form the insight with which 
he had accredited Dante in Cm Philosophiens Betydning; 'Hell i s for 
him precisely that self-sufficiency based on immediacy, which i s 
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merely isolation from everything, neither i t s e l f moving towards 
anything, nor i t s e l f necessary for anything else.' (96) Hell i s 
an eternity of isolated, incomprehensible moments. 
In the context of his account of Hel l , Heiberg introduces a 
poet and an actor, each of whom serve as further material in the 
polemic against romanticism. Heiberg cr i t i c izes the unethical nat-
ure of the romantic ideal of the poet, when, through Mephistopheles 
he says that 'only goodness bestows personality, but a l l the rest 
of the sphere of genius, what a poet creates, a thinker knows, the 
beautifii l , the true, whatever one ca l l s i t , i s estranged effort, 
by which one f a l l s up to the neck in pantheism.' (97) And so the 
poet enters, a l iv ing (? at least a walking) example of this truth: 
I f I had not locked myself 
Out from goodness and from piety, 
Then my song would not have had the sound of longing, 
Then I would not have sving so beautifully 
Of the soul's craving for God, 
With a voice l ike that of an imprisoned bird 
I f my unbelief had not been so strong 
That i t tore me from the church's breast 
And cast me out of the nest. 
Then my poetic work would not have resounded 
With the tone of longing in my voice. 
With the sighing after communion. 
The opinion i s quite groundless 
That yonder in the paradise of the Lord 
One hears a choir of blessed ones; 
No, Blessedness has no mouth; 
Purely in thought, in a silent way. 
I t moves in i t s own orbit. 
But he, who must stand outside. 
With premonitions of heaven's joy. 
Only he can sing of paradise; 
What he does not have, but only looks for. 
That i s what he interprets with the echo of his strings. 
And what he lacks trembles on his tongue. 
(98) 
The poet repeats in a more l y r i c a l form the basic misconception 
of religion which we have already seen expressed by the soul, that 
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i t i s a matter of incoherent and inexpressible feeling. Via the 
poet, Heiberg i s also hitting at that element in the romantic con-
cept of the poet which makes the poet solely an instrument, a chan-
nel for the mystic revelation which he articulates. No, says Hei-
berg, the poet must have a clear concept of what i t i s he i s doing. 
Mephistopheles takes the soul back to earth to witness Death 
cal l ing upon an actor. Again Heiberg inveighs against an approach 
to art which holds art apart from the real world, which uses art as 
an excuse for not understanding the real world, and which consequent-
ly also f a i l s to penetrate to the essence of the art-work i t se l f . 
Death: I think you are talking about yovir stage-roles, 
but that i s not what matters here; only that 
which you yourself hold to be true, can bring you 
either to God or to the Devil. 
Actor: My dear Death! How can you imagine that in the 
theatre one has time and quiet to think for one-
se l f , to work out one's own opinion? One says 
what the poet has commanded . . . one does not know 
i f i t i s true or crazy. 
Death: But what one does not see in a single part, one 
easily sees in the whole. A poet lets good and 
bad, impudence and piety, each speak; but the 
opinion which he himself has, which side he i s on, 
must be made clear in the work as a whole. 
Actor: My dear Death! How can you imagine that in the 
theatre one has time and quiet to occupy oneself 
with the work as a whole? Truly such a require-
ment i s much too much. I t i s rare that one rea l -
ly knows one's part; to know another's i s much 
too much. 
(99) 
The actor i s thus pi l loried by Heiberg as a bad practitioner 
of his c ra f t , who never bothers to penetrate or in any way concern 
himself with the idea of the works he i s involved in presenting. 
Death warns him that ' i f you are only an instrument on which, at 
a l l kinds of f e s t iv i t i e s , now a humbler now a master,plays his song, 
then things look bad, concerning your salvation.' (lOO) 
When the soul asks Mephistopheles what place i t i s he has come 
to Mephistopheles, consistently, t e l l s him that the name doesn't 
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matter. I t i s only a name, only a sound without any meaning - for 
this indeed i s what the language of h e l l , of immediacy, must be. 
But Mephistopheles i s forced by the soul to utter this meaningless 
sound. The soul i s disagreeably surprised. Mephistopheles, how-
ever, explains to him that he has in fact spent a l l his petit-
bourgeois earthly existence in Hell'only people are not so accustom-
ed to c § l l that flabby phlegmatic earthly existence which puts a l l 
i t s trust in real i ty and doesn't get the slightest glimmering of.van 
Idea.' (101) Hell i s real ly the same as such a l i f e , such a l i f e i s 
real ly He l l , and i t i s in such a l i f e that the sould feels himself 
most at home. He i s persuaded by Mephistopheles that Hell really i s 
the best place for him - so much of his familiar Copenhagen i s to be 
found here, including his favourite papers, the works ofV-F. C. Sib-
bem and of H. C. Andersen, and he i s assured that there i s l i t t l e 
doubt but 'that his wife wi l l in due course join him. So he happily 
joins in the common task of Hel l , which i s to f i l l a bottomless 
barrel with water, a paradigm of ceaseless, purposeless activity; 
for the inhabitant of Hell can say with Heiberg's Mephistopheles, 
' I am so busy with so many things,' (102) but for a l l his busyness 
he gets nowhere and remains in the superficial immediacy vAiere he 
started. 
( B ) ( i ) (d) How hegelian was Heiberg? 
Kierkegaard lampooned Heiberg's conversion to hegelianism, 
pointing out that 'by a miracle . . . he became an adherent of the 
hegelian philosophy which assumes that there are no miracles.' 
(SV 9 pp. 155-4) There are indeed questions to be raised about 
how genuinely hegelian Heiberg's idealist philosophy was. 
He certainly saw himself as an hegelian, linking himself with 
Hegel in an attack on romanticism, asserting that dialectical logic 
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was the way in which the absolute i s made available to conscious-
ness, rather than intuition, and he certainly modelled his logic 
on, not to say cribbed i t from, Hegel's own logic. But there are 
significant differences. These appear above a l l in Heiberg's 
aesthetic theories, and concern the basic nature of the relation-
ship of philosophy and art . Hegel's aim, as we have seen, was to 
give a philosophy of ar t , to see art from the heights of philosophy, 
to understand the idea which moved in ar t , and to follow that idea 
as i t moved beyond art . But Hegel specifically eschewed the attempt 
to lay down laws of taste or to supply rules for the practising 
ar t i s t , (103) His concern was to look at art philosophically. 
But Heiberg's aim was specif ically to contribute to the develop-
ment of taste, and he i s prepared, in his speculative drama, to 
make the philosophical theory of art the basis of ar t i s t i c pract-
ice. The basic movement of Heiberg's aesthetic theory i s thus 
virtual ly the reverse of Hegel's, 
Moreover the very idea of speculative drama i s alien to Hegel's 
basic aesthetic concepts, for i t involves raising art to the status 
of philosophy and that i s something which Hegel does not allow, des-
pite his acknowledgement that art ultimately points to the same 
truth as philosophy. The concept of speculative drama implies an a l -
most romantic conception of the office of art , for a l l the dif fer-
ences which Heiberg wishes to draw between himself and the romantics;; 
Likewise his concept of the fxmction of irony has a strong romantic 
tinge. 
Not only does the spec\ilative drama infringe the boundary be-
tween art and philosophy which Hegel i s so careful to draw, but 
Heiberg's presentation of i t also leaves out any account, or any sig-
nif icant account, of the place of religion in the development of the 
absolute. For a l l practical purposes he deals only with art and 
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philosophy. 
To be f a i r to Heiberg his aesthetic theories were not intend-
ed as an interpretation of Hegel's Aesthetics, which were not pub-
lished unt i l after Heiberg's position had become well-established. 
Rather, they were intended to be an application of hegelian logic 
to aesthetic questions. However the fact that such different re-
sults were achieved does suggest something about Heiberg's grasp of 
Kegelianism. 
Heiberg's concept of speculative drama reveals the basically 
ahistorical nature of his thought in comparison with Hegel's, for i t 
i s a concept that has been arrived at by the over-consistent devel-
opment of his schema of the genres of art. The great strength of 
Hegel's Aesthetics however i s the historical range of Hegel's thought, 
for he had a much broader grasp than Heiberg not only of the history 
of ar t , but of history in general. Hegel i s , infact, prepared to 
sacr i f ice formal neatness to historical and factual considerations. 
Heiberg on the other hand employs the triadic logical formula of 
immediacy, reflection and concept far more rigidly. 
As well as the question of speculative drama this difference 
can also be seen in the ways in which they ordered the genres of 
poetry. For Heiberg the scale runs from l y r i c (=immediate) through 
epic (=reflection) to drama. For Hegel the series rims: epic, l y r i c , 
drama. Heiberg's arrangement i s determined by his concept of the log-
ica l movement as being from the subjective to the objective to the 
higher tinity. But for Hegel subjectivity, the absolute self in i t s 
freedom, i s the motor-force of the whole dynamic of the world-process. 
The dialect ical process i s the process of the emergence of Spirit 
in i t s subjective freedom. The f i r s t , immediate forms of conscious-
ness are those which are submerged in externality; the second stage 
of consciousness i s the passing over of these immediate, external 
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forms to the forms of empty and arbitrary subjectivity. This can 
be clearly seen in Hegel's account of the development of greek art, 
(104) In this perspective the process of mind i s a process of the 
emergence of free subjectivity, a process recapitulated in the int-
eriorizing forms of ar t , religion and philosophy. But Heiberg's 
arrangement of the lyric-epic forms of poetry shows that his vision 
of hegelianism i s limited by the overemphasis he gives to narrow 
logical formulae. The weakness of these formulae was moreover 
shown in the debate with ^hlenslaeger when Heiberg was forced to in-
vent new genres such as the epic- lyr ic , \Aiich in fact functioned as 
the stage below the l y r i c a l stage, and which was characterized as an 
immediate objective stage, a sta^e of immersion in the external. 
But this concession made nonsense of the triadic formula on which 
the whole schema of genres was meant to be built . (105) 
Hegel's pattern also shows a respect for the historical devel-
opment of poetry, as that was understood at the time, and he connec-
ts the different stages with their socio-cultural settings in the 
history of the ancient world, Heiberg's formulations on the other 
hand sprang from the less scholarly requirements of his practice as 
a poet and as a l i terary polemicist. 
For a l l their weaknesses, however, Heiberg's theories did, to 
some extent, achieve what they were intended to achieve : to pro-
vide an intellectual foundation for l i terary crit icism. The Heiberg 
school of cr i t ic i sm, though not unchallenged, dominated the danish 
l i t erary scene unti l the advent of Ibsen and Brandes, (IO6) 
As with the other ideal ist theorists of art Heiberg's concept 
of the experience of art can be said to rest on the notion of attun-
ement. Whereas for the romantics this meant some kind of immediate 
intuit ion, and whereas for Hegel i t meant seeing the idea in art 
philosophically, from the outside, for Heiberg i t was somehow both. 
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In the higher forms of ar t , f i l tered as they are through art i s t i c 
irony, the Idea i s transparently and self-consciously present, and 
i s known, not intuit ively, but by the reflective consciousness which 
has ' taste ' , which knows the laws which regulate the forms of art , 
which understands tie relation of idea and form proper to each genre, 
which perceives the 'technical' element of the work. 
(B) ( i i ) H. L . Martensen 
One of those who responded to Heiberg's promul^ gation of the new 
philosophy was the young theologian Hans Lassen Martensen (1808 - 8 4 ) , 
who was to become Bishop of Sjaelland and primate of Denmark. His 
f i r s t major contribution to the idea of speculative poetry was a 
lengthy review of the dramatic poem Faust by Nicholaus Lenau. This 
review was published in Heiberg's Perseus - a Jo\3rnal for the Spec-
ulative Idea, in June I 8 5 7 . ( I O 7 ) That i s after Heiberg had 
floated the idea of speculative drama but before he had actually 
written Fata Morgana and En Sjael Efter D^den. 
Martensen begins by observing that to write a Faust after 
Goethe i s a bit l ike trying to write an I l i a d after Homer. But, he 
argues, we have to ask whether Goethe's Faust i s truly the f inal ex-
pression of the Faust-idea. What then i s the Faust-idea? 
The legend of Faust, he says, i s rooted in the christian world-
view, in the idea that there i s no salvation outside faith. But 
alongside the blessedness which Christianity sees awaiting 'faith' 
in heaven are set the horrors of damnation which await imbelief. 
However by setting good and evil in an essential relation to fa i th , 
Christianity establishes evil as something belonging to the realm of 
Spir i t (Aand) rather than seeing i t as a power belonging to the 
realm of nature. Because i t i s a spiritual real ity the opposition 
of good and evil occurs at a l l levels of spiritual l i f e , including 
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the level which Martensen regards as the highest level of a l l - the 
theoretical. I t i s the opposition of good and evil in the theoret-
i ca l sphere which provides the basis of the idea of Faust. 
Although historical ly the idea of Faust originated in the Middle 
Ages, the medieval consciousness, which was essentially a conscious-
ness oriented towards the external, could not deal with the idea con-
tained in the legend, and i t was l e f t to the protestant world to de-
velop the idea in i t s speculative and poetic depth. 'Speculative 
poetry knows no higher tragic object, for the content i s here self -
conscious freedom, the thinking Spirit (Aand); the scene . . . i s not 
the tumultuous stage of events in the outer world, but the quiet 
realm of thought.' (lOS) In this intellectual realm Faust .'repre-
sents the striving of the human race to establish a Kingdom of the 
inte l lect without God,' (IO9) 
Within the general category of 'speculative poetry' Faust be-
longs to what Martensen ca l l s 'apocalyptic poetry.' 'The symbolism 
of apocalyptic poetry . . . portrays a whole worldly l i f e in relation 
to rel igion's absolute Idea . . . In that i t portrays religion as the 
absolute power in world-history triumphing over the worldly princ-
ip le , in that i t reveals the nothingness of the f in i te and the vanity 
of the world, i t i s an anticipation of the day of judgement.' (IIO) 
But such poetry i s not altogether in the clouds. I t must have 
historic form. Martensen provides a brief history of apocalyptic 
poetry. His f i r s t example i s the Book of Revelation, which 'poet-
i ca l l y ' portrays Christ ianity's triumph over Paganism and Judaism. 
His second example i s Dante's 'Divine Comedy'. Here, because 'judge-
ment i s pronounced on a world which does not stand outside Christ-
ianity , but within i t s orbit , ' ( I I I ) the interest of the poem i s 
not in the confl ict of the great, substantial powers of Christian-
i t y , Judaism and Paganism, but in the details of the individual l i f e , 
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'the abstract-symbolic standpoint i s l e f t behind, and the represent-
ation becomes more individual, more v is ib le , more picture-like (inal-
e r i s k ) . ' (112) This poem 'contains the substantial kernel of the 
whole Middle Ages,' (113) i t i s the xiltimate expression of Cathol-
icism. I t i s however tied to the external, to the interpretation of 
the divine in terms of the spatial imagery of h e l l , purgatory and 
paradise. 
The imagination presupposes these spheres as given, i t 
regards them as established in their own right, and seeks 
only to apprehend their content; but their own presuppos-
i t ion , their common mid-point, which i s the ground and 
possibil ity of such 'regions', remains concealed from i t s 
gaze. This midpoint in fact i s nothing other than free-
dom i tse l f ; for h e l l , purgatory and paradise are them-
selves only forms of the revelation of the great, univers-
al kingdom of freedom and self-conscious thought. (114) 
A third form of apocalyptic poetry i s thus called for in which 
the action i s transposed to the sphere of inwardness - and this 
stage i s reached with the idea of Faust. Here 'self-consciousness i s 
i t s own symbol.' ( I I 5 ) 'Faust i s the expression of thinking self-
consciousness, which turns from faith to doubt, and through doubt, 
which has become the principle of thinking, i s brought to despair.' 
(116) 
Martensen interprets this doubt as an essential moment in thej 
development of genuinely free self-consciousness. 'Doubt i s thus the 
medi-um which the believing intel lect must pass through in order to 
give a foundation to i t s freedom.' (117) Referring to Franz von 
Baader, Martensen ca l l s this moment the moment of 'periculum vitae, 
for here l i f e and freedom are themselves at stake.' ( I I 8 ) In this 
moment Faust, of course, succumbs. Doubt, which in i t s e l f i s neu-
t r a l , becomes the means by which he i s damned, and so 'Faust who 
does not wish to be dependent on fa i th , has become dependent on 
Mephistopheles.' (119) 
Faust i s a protestant phenomenon, for'with protestantism emerg-
ed that great moment in the history of the human race when self-
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consciousness turned i t s gaze into i t s own depths, when i t discover-
ed i t s own power, and had to survive that great t r i a l of freedom.'(120) 
Faust i s the 'counter-image' of Luther. 
Martensen draws an analogy with Christ's temptation i n the wild-
erness. The temptation to turn stones into bread i s the temptation 
of one-sided materialism - Faust resi s t s t h i s . The temptation to 
cast himself o f f from the temple i s the temptation of one-sided 
idealism - Faust r e s i s t s t h i s . But Faust succmbs to the t h i r d 
temptation, for he does not acknowledge the commandment to serve and 
to worship God alone. His mind i s not constrained by a due acknow-
ledgement of his creatureliness, he does not acknowledge that he can 
no more create his own power of thought than he can create his own 
being. (121) 
Despite his admiration f o r Goethe Martensen decides that Goethe 
has not grasped the i n t e l l e c t u a l core of the Faust-idea - and i n 
t h i s respect Lenau has gone further. (122) Nonetheless a close 
examination of Lenau's poem reveals that he too has f a i l e d to under-
stand the theoretical nature of the point at issue. He concludes that 
The real poetic portrayal of the Christian myth of Faust .., 
must therefore s t i l l be awaited. This w i l l f i r s t be able to 
be produced when the impetus to t h i s higher union of r e l i g i o n 
and a r t emerges more clearly i n the consciousness of the age; 
when the protestant poet, whose gaze does not merely turn out-
wards towards nature and history but spontaneously tioms to-
wards the i n t e l l e c t u a l world i t s e l f , completely grasps t h i s 
' a t t r a i t ' of his genius, when with clear self-consciousness 
he feels his prophetic c a l l , his art's \miversality. (123) 
Was i t possibly t h i s summons which s t i r r e d Heiberg to attempt 
such a work i n Fata Morgana? In any case Martensen found t h i s work 
an exemplification of his idea, and responded with due adulation. 
I n h i s review of the play he developed further h i s theory of spec-
u l a t i v e poetry. 
Poetry, l i k e philosophy, i s of an i d e a l i s t i c nature; i t 
idealizes actuality; i t continually leads r e a l i t y back 
to''ideality, and the poetic consciousness i s the actual 
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consciousness's higher t r u t h . But precisely because 
poetry, l i k e philosophy, i s actuality transfigured 
into i d e a l i t y , precisely because i t always stands one 
degree higher than consciousness of a c t u a l i t y , i t 
always has the actual consciousness for i t s basis and 
presupposition. (124) 
Poetry and the consciousness of the age are interdependent. 
For whilst poetry expresses i n a higher form what i s i m p l i c i t i n 
the consciousness of the age, i t i s also dependent on the content 
provided f o r i t by the consciousness of the age, by contemporary 
thought. 
Martensen argues that the present age has i n fact acquired '.a 
new content (Gehalt)' (125) which poetry has not yet found a way 
of expressing. The present age has developed an unique degree of 
self-consciousness, the age i s i t s e l f i d e a l i s t i c , the age i s i t s e l f 
systematic, ' i t i s the period of systems, not only i n the more s t r i c t 
sense of philosophical and s c i e n t i f i c systems, but of re l i g i o u s , 
poetic, p o l i t i c a l , yes, even i n d u s t r i a l and mercantile systems,'(I26) 
and Martensen says t h i s without a trace of the irony we would suspect 
i f we found such a sentence i n Kierkegaard's work. Consequently 
... the world, whose [^indwelling3 thought the educated person 
now seeks to grasp, i s i t s e l f a world of c o n f l i c t i n g ideas, 
which as such have established t h e i r v a l i d i t y and are recog-
nized as such, and the idea which i s sought i s therefore the 
central idea i n a l l the others, i.e. the speculative Idea. 
To make t h i s v i s i b l e to us - as far as th i s i s at a l l possible 
for a r t - i s poetry's highest task. Only speculative poetry 
can be the poetry i n which we would be able to f i n d , more than 
a p a r t i a l , a t o t a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , because not only i s i t , l i k e 
a l l poetry, a mirror which r e f l e c t s the diverse ideal s t r i v -
ings and expressions of the human race, but i t r e f l e c t s too 
the Ideas and Ideals which govern l i f e ... In contradiction 
to peripheral poetry, which only yields a glimpse of the Idea, 
speculative poetry i s trioly i l l u m i n a t i n g , i t kindles an i n f i n -
i t y of bright points i n the soul, which form themselves into 
one harmonious, transparent image, which transfigures the 
daxkness of l i f e . (12?) 
I t i s , he i n s i s t s , the task of the age to articvilate the spec-
u l a t i v e idea i n poetry. The poet who i s to achieve this task must 
have both visionary genius and technical command. In romanticism 
the f i r s t side i s present, whereas we can see the l a t t e r i n Goethe. 
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These two aspects constitute the equation which w i l l produce the 
speculative r e s u l t . 
Such speculative poetry w i l l not be a l l e g o r i c a l , i t w i l l be 
symbolic. For 'every form i s certainly the image of an idea, but 
the idea has here concentrated i t s e l f to an individual form ... i t 
i s image and a c t u a l i t y at one and the same time.' (128) Like 
ancient mythology speculative poetry w i l l have an absolute substant-
i a l content, but t h i s content i s produced out of the s p i r i t u a l ex-
istence i t s e l f , instead of apprehended i n the forms of natural 
powers. I t s symbols w i l l constitute a 'realm of imagination (Phan-
t a s i e ) , which has i t s o r i g i n solely i n the depths of the S p i r i t 
i t s e l f ... i t i s , so to say, a p r i o r i , but although i t forms a 
world of appearances i t i s no delusion, no i l l u s i o n . This world of 
appearances i s , on the contrary, the eternal essence which actual-
i t y conceals within i t s s h e l l . ' (129) 
The work of the imagination i n producing such a realm of true 
appearances i f fundamental not only to the poetic task confronting 
the contemporary writer but i s also important for r e l i g i o n and p h i l -
osophy. A l l three of these forms of the S p i r i t are formed out of 
the s t u f f (Grundstoff) of imagination (Phantasie). (150) 
Martensen agrees with Heiberg that the carrying out of t h i s 
task must be i n the medium of comedy. (15I) Tragedy i s tied to the 
'external' d i s t i n c t i o n of good and e v i l , but comedy distinguishes 
between essence and phenomenon, r e a l i t y and appearance. (132) 
'Comedy rests on the contrast between the true and the inverted 
world, which l a t t e r i n a l l seriousness believes i n i t s own r e a l i t y , 
but when i t i s held up against the l i g h t of the Idea i t i s dissolved 
and evaporates £being seen3 as [^merel phenomenon.' (l55) 
A l l t h i s Martensen finds exemplified i n Fata Morgana thovigh, 
alas, he has to acknowledge that the public has not yet realized 
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i t s deep poetic content. (154) The c o n f l i c t of the play, he re-
minds us, i s between true and false appearance. FataMorgana repres-
ents the false i d e a l i t y which leads to disappointment with i d e a l i t y 
as such, though t h i s false i d e a l i t y i s i t s e l f a (unconscious) pro-
duct of human freedom i t s e l f , so that 'one can say that every man 
himself creates his own Fata Morgana.' (135) I n fact one of Marten-
sen's few cri t i c i s m s of the play i s that i t i s not made clear enough 
that Clotaldo's struggle i s with himself. (I36) 
Martensen returns again to the theme of speculative poetry i n 
reviewing Heiberg's Nye Digte which included En Sjael Efter D^den. 
(157) He notes the appropriateness of the epithet 'new'. ' I t i s i n 
fact the S p i r i t of the new age under whose guidance :.these poems are 
composed ... what philosophy has long since whispered i n the ears of 
i t s d i sciples, poetry now begins to preach from the roof-tops.' 
The centre of the c o l l e c t i o n , Martensen states, i s En S.iael 
Efter D^den. He defends poetry's r i g h t to treat religious themes. 
Because r e l i g i o n i s the form of a t o t a l world-consciousness i t must 
penetrate every aspect of l i f e , and, since i t must be ' i n ' a l l 
aspects of l i f e i t must be able to be ' i n ' poetry too. And indeed 
poetry can add i t s witness to the trut h of r e l i g i o n , so he states -
perhaps surprisingly f o r a lutheran theologian - ' ... that h e l l , 
p u r g a t o r y a n d paradise actually exist, we are assured not only 
by r e l i g i o n but also by poetry and philosophy.' 
These dimensions of the S p i r i t are both here and beyond, they 
are not s p a t i a l l y located. Physically two men can stand next to 
each other, and one may be i n h e l l , the other i n heaven. The i n t e r -
action between this-worldly and other-worldly elements i s essential 
to speculative comedy. Just as Dante discovered large chunks of his 
f a m i l i a r Florence i n h e l l , j u s t as Swedenborg wrote of finding Paris 
and London i n the other world, so here Heiberg has translated coritemp-
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orary Copenhagen into the apocalyptic sphere. This world and the 
next become transparent to each other. 
The Copenhagen which i s revealed i n t h i s mini-apocalypse i s one 
i n which t r i v i a l i t y holds sway. Thfplay i s indeed 'a contribution 
to the metaphysics of t r i v i a l i t y . ' The t r i v i a l i s the one-dimension-
al , the non-dialectical, whereas 
True science and poetry, l i k e f a i t h , see a l l objects i n a 
double perspective, they see them at one and the same time 
i n the form of eternity and i n the form of temporality. 
T r i v i a l i t y has no copiila with which to l i n k f i n i t e and i n -
f i n i t e , natural and supernatural, thought and experience, 
a p r i o r i and a p o s t e r i o r i . 
Martensen proceeds to contrast Heiberg favourably with Dante. 
Dante's Comedy, he says, i s not perfectly 'divine' because i t has the 
tragic and not the comic. Dante sees the figures who populate h e l l 
i n moral and r e l i g i o u s , but not i n metaphysical categories. He 
therefore f a i l s to penetrate to the divine of essence and appearance, 
t r u t h and falsehood i n which comedy i s at home. Likewise his heaven 
lacks a t r u l y c h r i s t i a n humovir. In an humorous heaven 
There they w i l l as blessed s p i r i t s play with the pheno-
mena of t h e i r temporal consciousness which, i n a l l the 
d e t a i l of i t s empirical r e a l i t y , i n a l l i t s i n f i r m i t y 
and transience, they w i l l have with them i n heaven, be-
cause i t must serve them as poetic material by means of 
which their s p i r i t w i l l lay on f o r i t s e l f the enjoyments 
of i t s i n f i n i t e freedom and blessedness. Their tempor-
al , c h i l d l i k e concerns w i l l now play the part of accidentiae 
i n the substance of blessedness. 
The souls i n paradise w i l l f i n d not only God, they w i l l also f i n d 
the world again. The eternity of paradise w i l l be a phenomenal 
eternity. The comic aspect of t h i s vision i s essential; for trag-
edy belongs to t h i s world only, whereas the comic w i l l survive t h i s 
world's passing away. The tragic vision culminates i n the image of 
divine judgement, but comedy can go on to affirm the good ending, 
when God w i l l be a l l i n a l l . He predicts that the di a l e c t i c of 
comedy and tragedy w i l l come to rest i n the concept of the hvimorous 
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which i s not only negatively but pos i t i v e l y comic, Cit i s 3 
the speculative comedy, which relates i t s e l f to irony as 
profimdity i s related to sharp-mindedness. The 'humorous' 
which belongs exclusively to Christianity includes not on-
l y the whole of irony, the poetic nemesis on the f a l l e n 
world, but also the fiilness of love and reconciliation. I t 
comprises the pain of the whole world, but overcome i n a 
r i c h depth of joy. 
I n the following issue he gives a resume of the plot of En Sjael 
Efter Dg(den and gives some discussion of the other theological and 
philosophical poems i n the collection. He gives particular emphasis 
to the d i s t i n c t i o n between catholic and protestant approaches to nat-
ure. He finds the protestant concept of nature superior because i t 
distinguishes between the ideal of nature as a r e f l e c t i o n or image of 
the Idea, and i t s phenomenal being. The S p i r i t i s not externally man-
i f e s t i n nature, i t i s i n v i s i b l e , i t i s a s t r i v i n g for the ideal. 
Thus nature i s not merely an image of the ideal as, according to Mar-
tensen, Catholicism and Paganism portray i t . He therefore concludes 
that 'not only i s the S p i r i t protestant, but through the vhole of 
nature i t s e l f there runs a profound Protestantism.' (l38) 
Martensen's review of En Sjael Efter DMen was taken up by Pro-
vost E. Tryde, who, despite a more conservative, more personalist, 
more moralistic approach to a r t than either Heiberg or Martensen, 
was able to go a long way with Martensen i n his interpretation of 
'speculative comedy.' Tryde remarked that 
i f the poet had merely given himself over to an arbitrary 
play of the imagination ... then he would ... not have 
l e t us see more than we already know, and the poem would 
not have deserved the very significant name which, as i t 
i s , i t bears by r i g h t . For i t i s an actual Apocalypse, 
an actual insight into the condition into which souls en-
ter after death ... and everything here shows i t s e l f to 
us i n such a l i v i n g , clear and'natural manner, that a l l 
feel themselves grasped by the t r u t h of this v ision, feel 
that i t i s more than poetry ... (139) 
Nonetheless he continues to draw the d i s t i n c t i o n he had made 
i n reviewing Sibbern's Om Poesie og Konst between God's absolute 
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personality and man's r e l a t i v e personality, nor does he agree with 
Martensen that the whole of the phenomenal world i n a l l i t s conting-
ency w i l l be found again i n heaven. Though he accepts Martensen's 
idea of the humorous he argues that there i s a certain element i n 
empirical r e a l i t y , namely 'the t r i v i a l ' , the i r r a t i o n a l , which has 
no place i n heaven. He takes as an example the involimtaxy gest-
ures and exclamations of a lunatic. 
We cannot see how that which i s absolutely uninformed by 
S p i r i t can become i t s object, nor i n any way provide mat-
e r i a l for a true s p i r i t u a l enjoyment. Can the madman who 
has been healed be reminded of his undeserved insanity with-
out deep sadness - certainly never with pleasure; even i f 
i t were possible f o r him to have a recollection of t h i s con-
d i t i o n , which I doubt, does i t not seem l i k e l y that he, who 
not without f a u l t , l o s t himself i n f i n i t u d e , i s even less 
aMe to think back on his l o s t l i f e with pleasiire? (140) 
For Tryde the voice of God speaks to us through conscience, and 
i t i s always only by our own f a u l t 'that we allow t h i s natural r e l -
igious consciousness to be obscured, and that we enter into the 
realm of the t r i v i a l . ' ( I 4 I ) 
The case of Martensen, and indeed of Tryde, clearly indicates 
that the l i n e dividing hegelianism from other forms of idealism was 
not always meticulously drawn i n the danish context. Vftiatever Hegel 
would have made of Martensen's use of e.g. Swedenborg, he would not 
have seen i n i t a true r e f l e c t i o n of his own thought. 
Martensen places a much greater emphasis on r e l i g i o n than does 
Heiberg. However his writings on speculative comedy show a clear 
tendency to confound r e l i g i o n , philosophy and a r t , despite formal 
disclaimers concerning the independence of revelation. Tryde's 
eulogy over En Sjael Efter D^den shows that within the i d e a l i s t 
compass i t was possible to hold a more markedly personalist view-
point and yet to allow to .poetry the property of genuinely extend-
ing our knowledge of the other world. 
Tryde did not see himself as a hegelian, Martensen saw himself 
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as a hegelian who had 'gone beyond' Hegel. In fact Martensen's 
position i s a strange blend of romantic and hegelian elements. 
Although his approach to a r t was i n intention more i n t e l l e c t u a l -
i s t i c than that of the 'men of 1803', concentrating on a r t more 
as a way of communicating knowledge than as a way of provoking 
i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t , he nonetheless shared with them a strong 
emphasis on the convergence between the content of a r t and the 
content of philosophy, and even the content of revealed r e l i g i o n . 
Before dealing with Kierkegaard's response to hegelian 
aesthetics i n i t s various forms we turn to look at another im-
portant element i n his background which conditioned that response. 
- 87 
Chapter Fovoc: Beyond Idealism 
(A) Dissonance 
The romantic movement i n Denmark, as represented by the 'men 
of 1803' J held, as we have seen, to an ideal of l i f e and ar t which 
stressed the harmony and unity of the whole realm of human exper-
ience. But i n the 1820s and 1830s th i s ideal came under increasing 
st r a i n . A new mood surfaced i n the l i t e r a r y and cultur a l world, a 
mood which found i t s models i n Byron and Heine and the rather loose 
movement known as 'young Germany'. 
R. M. S-ummers writes that ' ... a new movement arose i n Danish 
l i t e r a t v i r e which took up the themes of disappointment, f r u s t r a t i o n 
and despair expressed by contemporary European youth.' ( l ) The 
danish c r i t i c Uffe Andreasen distinguishes between the optimistic, 
harmonizing aspect of the romantic movement and a more pessimistic 
form of romanticism. (2) This second form represents what we shall 
here c a l l n i h i l i s t i c or d u a l i s t i c romanticism. 
In the introduction to his anthology of writings from the era 
of 'Romantismen' Andreasen writes that 'Around I83O the understanding 
of a r t i s changed at certain points. The new generation no longer 
understood the a r t i s t as an harmonious man ... but as. a divided, 
discordant creature.' (3) 
The harmony of ideal and real which the romantics of the f i r s t 
wave had cherished broke down. In t h i s situation i t became possible 
for either side of the synthesis to be taken up and emphasized to the 
exclusion of the other. This new l i t e r a r y generation consequently 
o s c i l l a t e d between an overstrained, unrealistic idealism and a 
coarse materialism, which substituted p o l i t i c s f o r a r t as i t s f i e l d 
of ultimate concern. 
But despite the obvious differences between t h i s generation 
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and the f i r s t romantic generation there i s also a measure of contin-
u i t y . Despite Byron's attack on the Lake Poets i n Don Juan (4) and 
Heine's annihilating polemics (5) i t i s nonetheless possible to 
trace t i e s of kinship l i n k i n g the two generations. I t can be seen as 
very much a case of the sons attacking the fathers, and much of their 
c r i t i c i s m i s directed at the f a i l u r e of the romantics to carry through 
the emancipatory elements of their thought, and their conversion to 
establishment p o l i t i c s and establishment r e l i g i o n . (6) Indeed, as 
we have already seen, although the f i r s t v/ave of the romantic move-
ment i n Denmark could be described as optimistic, the theme of dis-
sonance, of discord between ideal and r e a l , l\irked i n the concept-
ual structure of early romantic thought i n Germany (7) and i t was 
indeed f o r i t s one-sided, d u a l i s t i c character that Hegel c r i t i c i z e d 
i t . (s) This continuity can be seen i n such small details as the 
re-edition i n 1855 of Schleiermacher's Vertraute Briefe Uber Schlegels 
Lucinde by Karl Gutzkow, one of the 'young Germany' writers. Gutzkow 
found, i n t h i s early romantic book a prototype of the ideal of sexual 
emancipation which h i s generation shared. Thus Kierkegaard could say 
that Lucinde 'became "young Germany's" gospel, i t s blueprint for the 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the flesh.' (SV I p.29?) 
As well as i t s attack on the romantics, the 'young Germany' 
movement also turned i t s attention to Hegel. There was, i n f a c t , 
substantial overlap between the l e f t hegelians and the 'young Germ-
ans', and such figures as David Friedrich Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach 
and the yomg Karl Marx can be seen as representatives of some of i t s 
tendencies. 
'Young Germany' was never as clearly focussed a movement as 
early romanticism had been. I t was more the expression of an i l l -
defined but recognizable mood, reminiscent of the student movement 
of the 1960s. Central motifs however were the attack on idealism 
- 89 -
and the reje c t i o n of harmony. But apart from the change of key, and 
the emphasis on p o l i t i c s as a l i t e r a r y theme i t cannot be said that 
t h i s generation clearly broke with the i d e a l i s t theory of art . I t 
represents more the end of the i d e a l i s t t r a i l than the actual trans-
i t i o n to realism. 
(B) P. M. M^ll er 
The d i f f i c \ i l t i e s of periodization and categorization are per-
haps nowhere more apparent than i n the case of Poul Martin M i l l e r 
(1794 - I838). In many ways he i s to be counted with the'men of I8O3.' 
He shared t h e i r ideals of harmony, and, with Sibbern, he had a pref-
erence f o r the i n d i v i d u a l , the personal, the psychological, rather 
than the abstract (as he saw them) formulae of ontology. 
On the other hand he worked out his mature thoxight i n dialogue 
with Hegel, whom he both respected and rejected, and he took serious-
l y the mood of pessimism and materialism which characterized the 
phase of n i h i l i s t i c romanticism. He i s both a 'romantic' figure and 
a key figure i n the c r i t i q u e of hegelianism which he and Sibbern i n -
i t i a t e d and which Kierkegaard completed. I t i s perhaps already to 
have f a l l e n victim to an hegelian way of looking at things to say 
' f i r s t came romanticism, then hegelianism, then existentialism, e t c ' 
fo r i n r e a l i t y i t was not as t i d y as that. A l l the movements ment-
ioned here arose within a period of f i f t y years: many of those i n 
the early romantic movement survived to take account of and, i n some 
cases, to develop a constructive c r i t i q u e of l a t e r movements. Con-
versely, those who nailed t h e i r banners to the masts of hegelianism 
or materialism had, often enough, themselves passed through a per-
iod of youthful romanticism. 
The strength of such categorizations i s rooted i n the unity of 
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the i n t e l l e c t u a l milieu i n which both the early romantics and Hegel 
were situated. In the early years of the nineteenth century the 
debate i s a debate between men who, for the most part, knew each 
other and shared a common eultural horizon? But as we move away 
from t h i s point both i n time and space the issues become more tang-
led. We shall see t h i s i n Poul Mj^ller and, perhaps, even more so 
when we come to deal d i r e c t l y with Kierkegaard. 
Like Heiberg, M i l l e r was a man of both philosophical and l i t -
erary interests. Lecturer i n philosophy at Christiana (Oslo) 
University and (from I831) at Copenhagen, he was also a respected 
poet and c r i t i c . Uffe Andreasen stresses the importance of the de-
velopment of n i h i l i s t i c romanticism for a proper assessment of M i l l e r ' s 
work. (9) As well as the l i t e r a r y expression of t h i s mod, M i l l e r 
took issue with i t as he found i t represented philosophically i n the 
work of Arthur Schopenhauer. (IO) 
Mjz^ller's philosophical position could be described as i d e a l i s t -
i c personalism. He repeatedly stressed the importance of the form-
ation of an harmonious 'life-view' (Livs-Anskuelse) or world-view 
(Verdensanskuelse). These are, i n M i l l e r ' s hands, precise technic-
al terms which are also of considerable importance for Kierkegaard. 
The elements of such a l i f e - v i e w are ( i ) conformity of the personal-
i t y to a realm of higher, ideal experience, ( i i ) the grounding of the 
personality i n the realm of ordinary, empirical experience, and ( i i i ) 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the h i s t o r i c t r a d i t i o n of Christianity. 
His emphasis on the essential role played by such a life-view i n 
the formation of personality led him to c r i t i c i z e Hegel on a number of 
grounds. Fundamentally he did not believe that Hegel gave s u f f i c i e n t 
emphasis to the empirical element. Wliereas Hegel proposed a mode of 
philosophizing which would be free from presuppositions and which 
would develop i t s own content out of the essence of conceptuality 
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i t s e l f nailer argued that 
i f anyone w i l l now say that true science, or the pure 
concept i n i t s immanent movement, has nothing to do 
with the realm of experience, then we w i l l . . . assert 
that such pure science - as they c a l l i t - i s a one-
sided form of knowledge, and can only become true 
knowledge i f i t be permeated by l i v i n g experience. ( l l ) 
Hegel's neglect of the personal, of such questions as personal 
immortality^ also clashes il^ith the t h i r d element i n a 'life-view', 
namely the 'age-old' t r a d i t i o n of Christianity. Hegel's philo-
sophy therefore cannot possibly provide the basis for a genuine 
l i f e - v i e w , and for M i l l e r t h i s means that i t cannot be an authentic 
philosophy. 
His basis c r i t i c i s m of Hegel i s reflected i n his view of the way 
i n which philosophy should be done. Whereas Hegel attempted to pre-
sent philosophy ' s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ' , and 'systematically' M i l l e r demand-
ed that the presentation of philosophy be 'individual', that the p h i l -
osopher shoTild not shy away from allowing his own personality to app-
ear i n what he says. ' ... such an inhumanly l o g i c a l presentation 
[]as Hegel's] absolutely cannot constitute a perfectly classical 
work.' (12) Philosophy can, on p r i n c i p l e , never be completed but 
can only be represented by a succession of individual viewpoints. I t 
was the exemplification of t h i s method i n their practice that M i l l e r 
admired i n the greek philosophers. 
His own practice r e f l e c t s his theory. He was extremely unsystem-
a t i c . Most of his surviving v/ork i s 'occasional' , much of i t i s un-
finished, and was unpublished i n his l i f e t i m e . He wrote a consider-
able number of philosophical aphorisms which he called 'Str^tanker' 
- straw-thoughts. The most complete exposition of his philosophical 
position i s i n a lengthy essay e n t i t l e d Om Muligheden af Beviser for 
Menneskets lld;j$delighed (IB37), published only a few months before his 
death. (13) But even here Mjziller lightened the rigorous philosophic-
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al tone by introducing a rather light-hearted anecdote at a crucial 
point i n the argument. (I4) 
I n t h i s essay M i l l e r contends that t r a d i t i o n a l arguments fo r 
immortality have clearly l o s t their power i n the present age. The 
cause of t h i s he sees i n the development of science, and i n p a r t i c -
ular the division of philosophy into two opposed streams, the one 
stressing the ideal and the free, the other the real and the neces-
sary, and he sees these tendencies exemplified respectively i n theism 
and spinozism. (15) 
He distinguishes between the realm of ontology, which i s the 
realm of a p r i o r i knowledge, and the realm of the concrete and the 
organic i n which knowledge can only ever be a posteriori. (16) But 
since a p r i o r i knowledge cannot prove the actual existence of any 
pa r t i c u l a r thing i t certainly cannot prove the immortal existence of 
any p a r t i c u l a r thing - or person. 
'The chief thing here,' he says, ' i s a concrete world-view, the 
v a l i d i t y of which cannot be demonstrated otherwise than by i t s f u l l 
exposition.' (17) This i s because such a world-view participates i n 
both realms, both i n the dimension of the ideal/free, and i n the dim-
ension of the real/necessary. Both sides have to be represented i n 
the philosophical exposition of their ultimate unity. 
The key difference between Mj^ller's approach and that of the 
german i d e a l i s t s , which might at f i r s t glance appear to be somewhat 
simil a r , i s that the transcendentalists sought to establish the un-
i t y of the two realms i n the a c t i v i t y of the absolute, free s e l f , 
whilst M i l l e r asserts no other unity other than the always provis-
ional unity which can be exemplified i n empirical r e a l i t y . There i s 
no philosophical vantage-point such as the i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n 
which can once-for-all provide the foundation of philosophical 
knowledge. 'Every adequate world-view has two aspects: i t i s rooted 
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p a r t l y i n the world of experience, and partly i t disappears i n the 
supersensuous,' (18) says n^llev, and i t i s t e l l i n g thgt he implies 
that there may be a number of equally v a l i d world-views. Knowledge 
of the supersensuous i s not given by transcendental analyses but by 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a c h r i s t i a n society. 
Purely on his own, as a single individual, no-one would 
come to consciousness of re l i g i o u s concepts: he who be-
lieves that he has put aside external authority and sole-
l y by free s e l f - a c t i v i t y of thought has gained a new re-
s u l t , which i s his purely personal possession has never-
theless ... always received a s i g n i f i c a n t impetus from 
the t r a d i t i o n , without which his thought woiild have l o s t 
i t s e l f i n subjective, f r u i t l e s s fancy. 
(19) 
But to these two elements - the element of empirical experience and 
the element of education by means of the t r a d i t i o n - M i l l e r adds a 
t h i r d : the personal appropriation of the supersensuous. I t i s nec-
essary f o r the f u l l maturation of a world-view to know 'the presence 
of the supersensuous i n the sensuous, when i t becomes the object of 
an experience of an higher kind.' (20) 
What i s such an 'experience of an higher kind?' In part i t i s 
an echo of the romantic i n t u i t i o n of cosmic harmony such as Schelling 
or Steffens might have affiarmed. But there are notable differences. 
For M i l l e r the content of the experience i s already given by or must 
conform to the ch r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , although he emphasizes that this 
must not be understood i n the sense of an external or ecclesiastical 
authority. ( 2 l ) I t i s perhaps a blending of the christian t r a d i t i o n 
i n a narrower, ecclesiastical sense with the wider t r a d i t i o n of f a i t h 
given by the consensus gentium; i t i s 'christian culture'. 
I believe we can f i n d an excellent example of the sort of exper-
ience which M i l l e r i s tal k i n g about not i n his own w r i t i n g , but i n 
a novel by Thomasine Gyllembourg, Heiberg's mother and a personal 
f r i e n d of f i / ^ l l e r ' s . (22) The novel i s Extrememe. Mj^ller review-
ed t h i s novel, and i n his review acknowledged that the author was a 
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person possessed of a genuine world-view, which i s reflected i n the 
novel i t s e l f . (23) 
The ch r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n i s present i n the novel not merely i n 
the external sense that the climax involves a police r a i d on a v i l -
lage church, but a r e l i g i o u s , indeed a sp e c i f i c a l l y c h r i s t i a n , theme 
i s woven into the very fabric of the novel. The way this i s done 
not only illuminates the concept of 'experience of an higher kind' 
i n a general sense, but i t also makes clear the relevance of th i s to 
aesthetics. 
The a l t a r f r o n t a l of the church raided by the police had been 
painted i n his younger days by an eccentric aristocrat called Palmer, 
who, having abandoned the conventions of his upbringing, had devot-
ed his l i f e to a r t . Though not so young, he continues to l i v e free-
l y , wandering through the forests by day and by night and lapsing 
into occasional drinking bouts. 
The hero of the novel i s a sceptical, but noble-hearted, young 
doctor called Rudolph Hermes, and i t i s to Hermes that Palmer des-
cribes how he came to paint the f r o n t a l : 
" I had often reflected on the circumstance that the great 
masters who had treated the scenes from the l i f e of Jesus 
had so often chosen to portray Him i n His death and suffer-
ing. I could quite easily see that there might be a beaut-
i f u l idea concealed i n the spectacle of the humanity per-
ishing as the d i v i n i t y tears i t s e l f loose, yet s t i l l shines 
f o r t h i n the expression of the sufferer. But at the same 
time i t seemed to me that the c o n f l i c t between the divine 
and the human was not the r i g h t moment for art; not these 
sufferings, before which nature withdraws a-tremble, and 
before which the soul cannot feel i t s e l f u p l i f t e d . The 
tritffliph r my emphasis - G.P.3 of the divine over the 
world, of l i f e over death - th i s seemed to me to be the 
correct standpoint. Art has indeed on many occasions 
handled the resurrection; and the highly poetic scenes 
which followed the resurrection have always spoken to me 
and ri v e t e d me. I therefore chose as the subject of my 
pict\ire that passage of the holy scriptures where the 
apostle narrates that the disciples, after the death of 
th e i r Lord and Master, forsaken and discouraged, persec-
uted by the Jews, met quietly and secretly behind locked 
doors, when He whom they mourned stood suddenly among 
them and said: 'Peace be with you.' " (24) 
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But the execution of the work, i n particular the portrayal of the 
ethereal character of the risen body, causes him great d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
He leaves i t for a whole year. When, after that time, he returns 
to i t he experiences a great sorrow. 
"Having looked at the picture for some minutes I folded 
my hands i n humble meditation and prayed quietly: 0 my 
Lord and Master, whose transfigured features I wished to 
display to the world") presumptuously confident i n my a r t -
not, as you know, through pride, but through love of you 
and of that a r t f o r which I had abandoned everything. I f 
I , sinner that I am, by cause of th i s love, am not cast 
o f f from your grace, quicken my smken s p i r i t , and l e t 
ju s t one ray of your l i g h t illuminate the darkness which 
broods over my soul. In t h i s moment my thoughts tvccn to 
the great Raphael, to whom, i t i s said, the Madonna ap-
peared i n a dream. Humanly speaking he was a sinner, as 
I am, but i n a r t he was a saint. 
I f e l t deeply my smallness, my l i f e seemed to me 
wasted, but at the same time I f e l t an inward compassion 
towards myself and a sort of peace i n my conscience. I 
wept long and h e a r t i l y , as I have never known myself to 
weep before or since. Finally I went to bed, but I could 
not sleep. Nevertheless I rested, with my eyes closed, 
and a quiet peace, a comfort, refreshed me - I myself do 
not know how.. In t h i s state I fixed my thoughts on my 
painting, on the scene I had wanted to depict. I had a 
most l i v e l y feeling of the longing, the love, which anim-
ated thejdisciples who had followed Jesus and who had 
been loved by Him. 
Then i t seemed that His form became clear to me; i n 
my imagination i t appeared to me as i f I saw Him draw 
near from afar, followed by a crowd of people, and go 
past the place where I was standing under a tree, hiding 
myself behind the trunk. He went by, but as He stepped 
l i g h t l y by, He threw a glance at me which penetrated my 
inmost being, and which w i l l never leave i t . His robe 
was of a colo\ir l i k e the sky, as i t i s sometimes i n the 
rosy dawn. I stretched out my hand to grasp the fringe 
and press i t to my l i p s , but I drew back, thinking, no I 
am not worthy so much as to touch t h i s garment. But I did 
see the imprint of his foot i n the sand, and I threw my-
self down and pressed my face to the holy spot. The joy 
which I experienced i n that moment was beyond words, too 
great f o r a mortal breast - my senses abandoned me and I 
f e l l into a deep sleep which lasted nigh on twelve hours. 
But f o r me t h i s was a divine revelation, which has brought 
an abiding peace to my heart. I have often sought to re-
c a l l that f e e l i n g , that picture, but i n vain. Neverthe-
less, I have a sxixe hope that i n the hour of my death I 
shall see i t again; t h i s glance w i l l awaken me from sleep; 
I w i l l take hold of the fringe of my Lord's robe, and by 
i t haul myself up into His Kingdom ..." (25) 
Needless to say Palmer can now complete his painting, though he 
knows that he can never perfectly portray the image of Christ as 
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i t appeared i n his vi s i o n , i n his 'experience of an higher kind.' 
Rudolph Hermes, despite his own m a t e r i a l i s t i c outlook i s s t i r r e d by-
Palmer's account, although i t does not make him abandon his agnost-
i c position. In the course of the novel he f a l l s i n love with 
Palmer's niece, Gabriele, whose brother Jbritz, a revolutionary stud-
ent a c t i v i s t , i s the object of the police search. After the police 
have ransacked the church and found nothing 
the whole party now l e f t the chiurch. Gabriele came l a s t , 
and Hermes, who followed her every movement, saw that she 
hurriedly turned back as she was coming through the church 
door. Unnoticed he slipped i n after her, and now saw the 
pious g i r l , who believed herself alone, hasten to the a l t -
ar. Here she knelt and l i f t e d her folded hands and her rad-
iant eyes i n thanksgiving towards the high-altarpiece. The 
great l i g h t i n f r o n t of i t , contrasting with the otherwise 
gloomy l i g h t i n g i n the church threw a remarkable, magical 
glow on the painting. Led to i t by Gabriele's look, Hermes 
saw t h i s poetic work of a r t for the f i r s t time. In the 
exalted state he was i n , following a l l that had jus t happen-
ed, i t s effect on him waj indescribable. I t seemed as i f he 
saw with his own eyes the risen one appear; he imagined him-
self among the astonished and ecstatic disciples, and without 
himself being aware of i t , he knelt behind his prayerful 
loved one, and, as he stretched out his arms towards the 
transfigured form which shone out of the picture, he called 
out, l i k e the doubting, but now i n glad certainty, r e j o i c -
ing Thomas: "My Lord and my God.'" Gabriele turned her head 
i n f r i g h t , but before she could move. Hermes knelt at her 
side, took her hand and said: "My GabrieleJ Forgive meJ 
Before t h i s holy picture, whose l i g h t streams with healing 
power into my soul, I assure you of my f a i t h . I avow quiet 
patience and b e l i e f . Satisfied with your love I shall re-
nounce my turbulent wishes. I shall not leave you. I 
shall S'tay here and shelter you as a brother, without self-
ish demands, I shall l i v e for you and for my old father, 
humbly and lovingly. Oh Godi I have never f e l t v/hat I 
now feel i n t h i s moment. I t i s as i f the undying one has 
appeared to me; even I have received a share of the peace 
which so-unds from those radiant l i p s . " (26) 
This l i t t l e scene i s observed by Palmer himself, who praises 
God that He has used t h i s work as a medixim of revelation. The c i r c l e 
i s completed. Art issuing from religious experience i s i t s e l f , by 
God's grace, capable of becoming a means to awaken that experience 
i n others. In Palmer's and i n Hermes' visions we see what M i l l e r 
means by 'experience of an higher kind:' the personal vision of the 
ideal i n a tangible form, u n i t i n g the subject of the experience to 
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the prevailing t r a d i t i o n of b e l i e f , and enabling him to resolve the 
crises of his earthly l i f e , i n Palmer's case the c r i s i s of a r t i s t -
ic c a p a b i l i t y , i n Hermes' case the personal c r i s i s of his r e l a t i o n -
ship to Gabriele. And, moreover, t h i s a l l r e f l e c t s the world-view 
achieved and l i v e d out by the author herself. 
I t i s the blending of these components which make up a sound 
world-view. 
The c h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , empirical experience, as well as -
the higher experience i n which the supersensuous encount-
ers us i n a real form at particular times and places give 
the discrete points which must have th e i r place i n a prop-
er world-view, and the systematic, philosophic exposition 
only expresses with formal perfection that knowledge which 
i s f i r s t present i n an immediate way and i n an i n a r t i c u l -
ate form. (27) 
The present c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n , according to M i l l e r , i s one i n 
which the two dimensions which must be united are generally dism-
i t e d . This i n turn encourages n i h i l i s m . Nihilism manifests i t s e l f 
i n the laok of proper self-respect, (28) the breakdown of communal 
l i f e , (29) the loss of interest i n science, (30) and the end of 
r e l i g i o n . (31) Also, and most pertinent to the present enquiry, i t 
destroys the foimdations of ar t . For'true a r t can only be based on 
an harmonious world-view. 
True a r t i s an anticipation of blessedness. The perfect 
harmony of universality and i n d i v i d u a l i t y which occurs i n 
the a r t i s t ' s consciousness, when he produces a true work 
of a r t , or i n the consciousness of one, who with true re-
c e p t i v i t y receives such a work, i s an image of that perf-
ectly transfigured blessedness, i n which the individual 
l i f e without resistance i s f i l l e d by the w i l l of the 
eternal. (32) 
Such a consummation of aesthetic experience can only come to one 
who has an harmonious world-view, but 'he, who feels himself i n dis-
cord with himself and with existence, cannot possibly be. a genuine 
poet.' (33) Although t h i s theory bestows on a r t no small dignity 
there are several pOints which distinguish i t from the exaltation 
of a r t i n early romanticism or i n Heiberg's aesthetic theory. 
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I t i s clear that f o r M i l l e r i t i s the formation and possession 
of the world-view i n personal experience which matters much more 
than i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n i n philosophical or aesthetic form. Art i s 
an anticipation of blessedness, but i t i s only an anticipation. (54) 
Art i s transcended i n the r e a l i t y of the personal l i f e . This ent-
a i l s a r e l a t i v i z a t i o n of aesthetic form - M i l l e r has no scale of 
aesthetic genres comparable to Heiberg's, there i s no specially re-
l i g i o u s form of a r t . 
Moreover the apparent - almost naive - optimism of Mji(ller's pos-
i t i o n , as i t has been portrayed so f a r , i s misleading. For his 
f a i t h i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of the formation of a sound life-view has to 
be set against his account of the concept and the h i s t o r i c a l role of 
ni h i l i s m . Nihilism i s rooted, according to M i l l e r , i n the separg,t-
ion of the ideal and the r e a l . He saw Schopenhauer as i t s princip-
al philosophical exponent, and saw Schopenhauer's concept of nirvana 
as a consequence of his general philosophical position, i n contrast 
to the notion of personal immortality, which he himself sought to af-
fi r m . But n i h i l i s m was not j u s t a stance which the individual could 
leave or take up at w i l l . I t belonged, i n a certain sense, to the 
age. In introducing the Immortality essay he vnrote 
But I w i l l not deny that I nurture a doubt as to whether 
the basic- view, for whose defence these pages give a pro-
visional contribution, can, by any amount of e f f o r t be vin -
dicated i n the present time. I t i s very possible that neg-
ation n i h i l i s m J has s t i l l not reached the point which 
must be reached, so that i t can be made apparent that the 
desolation i t brings with i t i s not the sphere i n which the 
human s p i r i t i s at home. But i t i s something: those who 
do not share the peculiar passion for destruction, may 
nevertheless seek to b u i l d themselves an ark in which they 
can establish themselves i n the hope of better times. (35) 
In t h i s , i n many ways remarkable, passage, M^iller anticipates some of 
the themes of the twentieth-century discussion of nihilism. (56) His 
assertion tha,t his contemporaries must continue for some time yet i n 
the wilderness adds a sober note to be set against his more optimistic 
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tones. 
In an unfinished essay on irony he traces n i h i l i s m to the p h i l -
osophy of Pichte and i t s interpretation by F. Schlegel. '...irony 
i s a consequent development of the f r u i t l e s s struggle, to construct 
a self-enclosed ethical system from the standpoint of the individual. 
This method must necessarily end with the loss of a l l content, with 
moral n i h i l i s m . ' (57) 
Mj^ller depicts the state of n i h i l i s m i n a small collection of 
aphorisms e n t i t l e d Ahasverus. 'Ahasverus' i s the name of the Wand-
ering Jew cursed to an eternal, rootless existence on earth, and he 
i s used by M i l l e r as a representative of n i h i l i s m . The connection of 
these aphorisms with aspects of Kierkegaard's person and work i s a 
point much discussed i n Kierkegaard scholarship. (38) 
Two of these aphorisms w i l l perhaps be s u f f i c i e n t to convey the 
tenor of Mjz^ller's conception: 
"Your ignorant priests believe that there i s an absolute 
difference between good and e v i l , but they do not observe 
that I stand precisely at the zero-point on l i f e ' s 
thermometer." (39) 
Ahasverus w i l l s nothing. He regards himself as i n f i n i t e l y 
higher than those who v / i l l anything. (40) 
The formation of a sound world-view therefore i s not something 
to be had f o r the asking, i t i s not a spontaneous i r r u p t i o n of gen-
i a l c r e a t i v i t y i n the consciousness of the poet, i t i s , i n the pres-
ent age, something which must run the gamut of n i h i l i s m , something 
to be fought for. 
As well as seeing n i h i l i s m exemplified i n such an i n d i v i d u a l i s t -
i c form as that of Ahasverus, M i l l e r also sees i t i n some of the pol-
i t i c a l tendencies of the age. This i s sharply expressed i n some of 
hi s poems. In the poem Kunstneren Mellem OprjZ^rerne he t e l l s the 
story of a sculptor whose house and studio are invaded by an insur-
r e c t i o n i s t mob. \Vhen he refuses to j o i n the rebellion they destroy 
the studio, wrecking his work, and accusing him of cowardice. When 
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he sees the devastation they have caused he goes berserk, seizes a 
bludgeon and lays about him. He plays a leading role i n quelling the 
disturbances and i s personally congratulated by the monarch. But he 
can see nothing to congratulate himself on. 
I am at home i n my a r t / As a master i n his trade; 
I would rather forget/ My bloody v/ork to-day. 
I t s remembrance w i l l darken/ The radiance of my world of images 
And cast a loathsome hindrance/ In place of my visions' dance. 
In my studio, that place of s t i l l n e s s / I say "farewell" to the 
world, 
And I w i l l never act the judge/ Nor slay my fellow-men. 
On the blackboard of memory/ This day's deeds 
W i l l be scrawled, spectre-like/ In a hateful hand. 
(41) 
In the face of n i h i l i s m the a r t i s t i s forced to retreat into the inner 
world of his studio. Even his lo y a l t y to his earthly l o r d , which had 
been a source of pride to him-has been soured. I t would be tempt-
ing f o r the retreat to be more radical s t i l l , for the a r t i s t to re-
nounce his a r t altogether. Such a p o s s i b i l i t y i s raised i n another 
poem. 
In melancholy hours I often bewail 
You, you nineteenth-century rational man. 
Poetry's flower has withered i n your f i e l d s . 
You seek the promised land i n a wilderness. 
Your c h i l d i s an old man who never jokes. 
His music the ringing of the chimes of rebellion; 
He i s pale with wrath. 
And murder i s his game. 
The small cannibals with bloody fingers 
Only dance when the pipes of rebellion s t r i d e n t l y sound. 
You are r i g h t : i t i s a l l up f o r my poetry. 
Now I overturn Art's despised a l t a r . 
And yet - what i s l i f e , i f the a r t i s t s f l e e , 
I f only seriousness remains, dwelling beneath a roof of ice? 
A pitch-dark house, without l i g h t or lamp, 
And the lime-tree before the door with i t s coal-black branches. 
(42) 
M i l l e r ' s affirmation of harmony i s thus tempered by the force 
with which he feels the weight of the n i h i l i s t i c wave of romanticism. 
Although, i n aesthetics, he remains within a broad i d e a l i s t consensus. 
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seeing aesthetic experience as the experience of the i n f i n i t e i n , 
with and under the f i n i t e , a fusion of the universal and'partic\ilar, 
a transfigured idealization of r e a l i t y , t h i s vision of a r t i s con-
ditioned both by his personalist, ethical emphasis and by the weight 
he gives to n i h i l i s m . His account of the way i n which a life-view 
or world-view i s structured, shows how the aesthetic synthesis re-
f l e c t s the prior personal synthesis. His reflections on n i h i l i s m 
raise the question whether such a synthesis i s possible, either i n 
the personal l i f e or i n a r t . This question i s to prove decisive i n 
Kierkegaard's account of the l i m i t s of a r t . 
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Chapter Five; Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Art i n Context 
(A) Introduction 
I t i s now time to turn to Kierkegaard himself and f i r s t l y , to 
set his theory ahd c r i t i q u e of a r t i n the context established by the 
preceding chapters. I t i s time to ask how Kierkegaard responded to 
the romantic and hegelian forces which had moulded the i n t e l l e c t i i a l 
landscape within which his own thought matured. 
As we have already seen there were considerable strains within 
each of these movements. We cannot therefore resolve the question 
by l a b e l l i n g Kierkegaard 'a romantic' or 'an hegelian.' We have to 
determine i n what ways he reacted to romanticism, to hegelianism; 
what he accepted, what he rejected from each movement; how his 
course was influenced by the specific colouring given to these move-
ments by particular thinkers. And so we ask: what was Kierkegaard's 
r e l a t i o n to Heiberg, to M i l l e r , etc.? I t must further be borne i n 
mind that t h i s inquiry does not seek to answer the vast question 
of Kierkegaard's r e l a t i o n to romanticism or to hegelianism i n gener-
a l , but focusses on one particular aspect of t h i s relationship, name-
l y , the philosophy of ar t . At the same time i t has to be acknowledg-
ed that what i s said here does have implications for a broader i n -
quiry directed to the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the overall relationship of 
Kierkegaard's thought to these great i n t e l l e c t u a l forces, and to some 
extent involves the consideration of wider issues, issues which take 
us to the heart of Kierkegaard's philosophical problematic. Indeed 
i t may well be argued that romanticism at least stands or f a l l s 
with i t s philosophy of a r t , that, insofar as i t i s a philosophy at 
a l l , i t i s a philosophy of a r t , a philosophy i n which a r t i s the su-
preme value, indeed the key to unlocking the relationship of man to 
his world. I n t h i s sense romantic a r t i s romantic philosophy and 
- 103 -
vice versa, or as Gerhard Niedermeyer put i t , speaking of romantic 
thought: 'sie i s t Poesie im Gewande der Philosophie.' ( l ) The im-
p l i c a t i o n of this i s that the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Kierkegaard's posit-
ion vis-a-vis romanticism and hegelianism w i l l lead to the deter-
mination of the sense in which Kierkegaard had a philosophy of a r t . 
Was i t a philosophy of a r t i n t h i s romantic sense, such that his 
l i t e r a r y c r e a t i v i t y i s i t s e l f his philosophy? or was i t a philo-
sophy of a r t i n a sense more akin to Hegel's concept of a philo-
sophy of a r t , that i s , a philosophical view of a r t from a standpoint 
which i s claimed to be 'beyond a r t ' , which looks on art as, i n a cer-
tai n sense, superseded or r e l a t i v i z e d i n the l i g h t of some new stage 
of s p i r i t u a l existence? And i f t h i s l a t t e r i s the case then what i s 
the standpoint from which Kierkegaard looks at a r t , and how does i t 
rel a t e to the hegelians' standpoint? 
I n order to tackle these questions we shall follow a procedure 
similar to that adopted i n the previous chapters. For i n order to 
understand the scope of Kierkegaard's theory of a r t i t i s necessary 
to c l a r i f y his philosophical position i n general. Such a procedure 
inevitably rmis the r i s k either of stating the obvious, of saying 
what everybody already knows about Kierkegaard, or of raising issues 
which are so controversial as to throw doubt on the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
getting any clear pi c t i i r e of Kierkegaard's thought at a l l , leaving 
us l o s t i n a gallery of alternative Kierkegaards. Nonetheless some 
preliminary orientation i n Kierkegaard's thought as a whole i s v i t a l 
i f we are to achieve a f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n of what he i s trying to say 
with his theory of a r t . 
(B) Kierkegaard's Thought 
(B) ( i ) Philosophy and psychology 
What do we mean by 'Kierkegaard's thought'? What sort of 'thought' 
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was i t ? Such questions seem almost inevitable when once we have 
experienced the impact of some of Kierkegaard's more v i o l e n t l y 
anti-hegelian, a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l polemics. I s i t a basic mistake 
to think of Kierkegaard as having a position at a l l ? Insofar as we 
do approach him as a thinker, i s i t not as a socratic thinker, a 
questioner, a creator of problems rather than as someone with a 
teaching, a philosophy, an anthropology? 
Granted that i t would be grossly insensitive to t r y to f i t 
Kierkegaard's thoiight into a systematic niche; granted that i t i s 
his power of puzzling us rather than his power of enlightening us 
which makes him such a fascinating thinker (2); granted that i n any 
case such philosophy as h i s work contains i s ultimately pressed into 
the service of the re l i g i o u s ; granting a l l t h i s and more, i t rem-
ains the case that there are complexes of consistent and coherent 
conceptual thought which recur throughout his work and which estab-
l i s h him, at least i n certain respects, as being within the i n t e l l e c t -
ual horizon of the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . 
One such complex i s that which i s concerned with the structure 
of selfhood. Although, as we shall see, Kierkegaard defines the de-
l i n e a t i o n of the structures of selfhood as the essential task of 
psychology his concern with t h i s task provides a l i n k with the ideal-
i s t s , i n pa r t i c u l a r with Fichte, Hegel and t h e i r disciples. 
As we have seen, both Fichte and Hegel constructed their p h i l -
osophies around a related, i f not quite an i d e n t i c a l , vision of the 
self as the dynamic, practical reason which achieves i d e n t i t y with 
i t s e l f by passing through a succession of stages i n which i t mani-
fests i t s e l f under the conditions of d u a l i t y , of self and not-self, 
•until these d u a l i t i e s are grounded, or come to be seen to be groimd-
ed, i n absolute selfhood, i n which the self both i s , and i s conscious 
of i t s e l f as creator of the world of appearances, achieves the freedom 
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of knowing i t s e l f i n i t s 'other-being', i t s alienated, du a l i s t i c 
form. (5) I t i s t h i s dynamic, creative and self-knowing self which 
Hegel c a l l s S p i r i t (Geist). 
I n the beginning of The Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard writes 
man i s S p i r i t (dan. Aand= ger. Geist). But what i s Spirit? 
S p i r i t i s the self. But what i s the self? The self i s a 
relationship, which relates i t s e l f to i t s e l f , or i s that 
which, i n the relationship, makes the relationship relate 
i t s e l f to i t s e l f ; the self i s not the relationship, but 
that by v i r t u e of which the relationship relates i t s e l f to 
i t s e l f . (SV XV p. 73) 
Although Kierkegaard puts these de f i n i t i o n s to a use quite unfore-
seen by the i d e a l i s t philosophers the basic structure of the self 
which he i s proposing parallels what they had previously said. 
What then are the differences? F i r s t l y , Kierkegaard regards 
the consummation of the process by which the self i s to f i n d i t s e l f 
i n and through i t s alienation from i t s e l f as impossible without the 
(at least) co-operative action of divine grace. Secondly, Kierke-
gaard defines the locus of t h i s process almost exclusively i n terms 
of the i n d i v i d u a l , existing s e l f , rather than i n terms of a philosoph-
i c a l construct or the coll e c t i v e S p i r i t of world-history. Both of 
these points are essentially interdependent: i t i s because Kierke-
gaard takes seriously the predicament of the existing individual who 
suffers anguish, despair and pain, who i s confronted by the demand to 
choose, that he affirms the need fo r grace - i t i s because he holds 
fundamentally to the need fo r grace that he denies any objective, 
l o g i c a l , or h i s t o r i c a l solution to the dialectics of the se l f , and 
i s led back to the always unresolved situation of the existing 
i n d i v i d u a l . 
Kierkegaard's d i a l e c t i c s of selfhood therefore acquire the 
form of I'psychology' i n the hegelian sense of the word, as the expo-
s i t i o n of the realm of subjective S p i r i t . I t might be said - put-
t i n g to one side the socratic dimension of his philosophy - that 
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Kierkegaard's philosophy i s i n his psychological writings. Such 
psychological works are pre-eminently The Concept of Angst and The 
Sickness Unto Death, but i n fact his psychological concern shows 
i t s e l f throughout the whole range of his writings, including his 
re l i g i o u s works and his 'novels': Either-Or, Repetition and Stages 
On Li f e ' s Way. 
As the quotation from The Sickness Unto Death suggests there are 
three basic elements i n Kierkegaard's psychology as there are for his 
i d e a l i s t predecessors. There are the two r e l a t i v e forms of self -
hood v/hich exist only \jnder the conditions of dual i t y , these being 
the elements of sensuous immediacy and (one-sided) i d e a l i t y or re-
f l e c t i o n . There i s also the absolute form of the self which has 
found and established i t s e l f i n i t s freedom, t h i s being the self as 
freedom. What then i s the r e l a t i o n to each other of these three 
elements of the self? We shall answer th i s question i n the l i g h t of 
three concepts: freedom, suffering and self-knowledge. 
(B) ( i i ) Selfhood: Freedom, Suffering, Self-Knowledge 
(B) ( i i ) (a) Freedom 
Fichte and Hegel each emphasized the achievement of i n f i n i t e 
freedom as being both the goal and the ground of the process of the 
self's becoming. Kierkegaard c r i t i c i z e d the emptiness of Fichte's 
concept, of freedom on the grounds that i t abstracted from the con-
crete, the p a r t i c u l a r , the empirical, the sensuous. (SV I pp.285 f f • ) 
To some extent Kierkegaard a l l i e d himself with Hegel against Fichte 
at t h i s point, although he was to bring the same charge against 
Hegel himself. 
Kierkegaard too upheld the transcendence of the self over the 
realm of the 'merely' sensuous, and was concerned to emphasize the 
radical freedom of the self i n choosing i t s e l f as a self. At the 
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same time however he did not wish to cut human freedom loose from 
i t s anchorage i n the divinely given order of creation. His close-
ness to as well as his distance from Fichte at t h i s point i s evid-
ent i n the following quotation from Either-Or, which describes the 
act of choice by which the self establishes i t s e l f as a self: 
I n that I choose absolutely, I choose despair, and i n despair 
I choose the absolute, for I am myself the absolute, I posit 
the absolute and am myself the absolute; but I must add, as 
altogether identical with t h i s : I choose the absolute, which 
chooses me, I posit the absolute, which posits me ... But 
what i s i t then I choose, i s i t t h i s thing or that thing? 
No, f o r I choose absolutely, and I choose absolutely pre-
cisely i n t h i s , that I have not chosen t h i s thing or that 
thing. I choose the absolute, and what i s the absolute? I t 
i s myself i n my eternal v a l i d i t y . I can never choose anything 
other than myself as the absolute, f o r i f I choose anything 
else, then I choose i t as something f i n i t e and thus I do not 
choose absolutely. (SV I I I pp.198f.) 
Kierkegaard i s clearly t r y i n g to vindicate the scope of human free-
dom i n the task of se l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , for he goes so::far as to say, 
with Fichte, that the self posits i t s e l f , and yet, at the same time, 
he wants to give due scope to divir? sovereignty. 
In emphasizing the fact that the self which i s chosen i s a 
self posited by divine action, Kierkegaard i s also asserting that 
the p a r t i c u l a r , empirical situation i n which the self exists i s to be 
accepted and chosen i n the context of the t o t a l act of self-choice. 
The self does not choose i t s e l f i n a vacuum, alone with God, but i t 
chooses i t s e l f as t h i s pgrticular s e l f , existing i n t h i s time, i n 
th i s place. The p a r t i c u l a r i t y of time and space, of i t s situation, 
i s not i t s e l f the object of the self's choice, but i s a consequence 
of the fa c t that the absolute self which i s chosen i s a self posit-
ed by the divine creator who i s also creator of space and time, who 
has set the self at t h i s particular point i n the world-order. That 
which the self encounters i n the act of self-choice i s both the 
givenness of the divine ground of i t s being and the givenness of 
of the empirical and human world i n which i t comes to consciousness 
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of i t s e l f . I t i s t h i s dimension of givenness, perhaps especial-
l y i n the aspect of the givenness of the empirical realm which 
serves to distinguish what Kierkegaard i s saying from a fichtean 
position. Emanuel Hirsch's comment on the concept of self-choice i n 
uEither-Or makes just t h i s point: 
Wenn Fich'te i n dem entsc||eidungshaften Augenblick der Geburt 
des Ethischen das Ich sich als Ich ergreifen lasst (als Ich, 
das durch diesen Akt, ebenso wie bei Kierkegaard, zugleich 
entseht und schon zuvor da sich versteht), so i s t das damit 
Bejahte das reine geistige Wesen ichhafter Freiheit; das 
Konkret-Individuelle findet sich gleichsam nur hinzu als die 
einschrahkende Situation, die dieser Freiheit zur Aufgabe 
wird. Bei Kierkegaard hingegen e r g r e i f t sich das individuum 
eben i n seiner Konkretion als ichhafter Freiheit. Daher wird 
Kierkegaard i n einem von Fichte nicht erreichten Sinne Indiv-
idual i tat sphilo soph. (4) 
Kierkegaard's wrestling with the problem of the proper relationship 
between divine and human freedom can be traced back to the earliest 
strata of the Papirer, (5) and continues throughout his authorship. 
He gives the problem an imaginative expression i n the following pas-
sage from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript which clearly shows 
the two-edged nature of the position he i s try i n g to maintain: 
In fables and f a i r y - t a l e s one has a lamp, which i s called 
'wonderful'; when one rubs i t , then the s p i r i t of the 
lamp appears. This i s of course just a b i t of funi But 
freedom - i t i s the wonderful lamp; when a man rubs i t 
with ethical passion: then God comes into existence 
( b l i v e r t i l ) f o r him. And behold, the s p i r i t of the 
lamp i s a slave (then wish f o r i t , i f your s p i r i t l i v e s 
for i t s wishes); but he, who rubs the wonderful lamp 
of freedom, he becomes a slave - the S p i r i t i s the Lord. 
(SV IX p.115) 
He i s not of co\irse saying that God only acquires being i n a 
general sense through the self-activation of human freedom, he i s 
saying that God only comes to exist e x i s t e n t i a l l y , only comes to 
exist f o r the in d i v i d u a l , i n Luther's sense of 'for us' (6) inso-
far as we choose the project of freedom, of becoming the freedom we 
are. The transcendence of God over Man, the Lordship of the S p i r i t , 
the submission of Man,iitself appears only i n the l i g h t of the choice 
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of freedom by Man. This passage from the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript screws the tension present i n the concept of choice to a 
new level of in t e n s i t y - some might say to breaking-point. The 
situa t i o n i s , as Kierkegaard himself might say, 'thoroughly dialect-
i c a l ' . Each side only comes into existence throiigh the other. 
The problem i s not made any easier when we pass on to the con-
sideration that the self i s not i n fact capable of establishing i t -
s elf i n the project of freedom. This i s the basic theme of The 
Sickness Unto Death (cf. SV XV p.81) and i s the message of the 
Upbuilding Discourses where, as i n the discourse To Need God i s Man's 
Highest Perfection he argues that the continued experience by man of 
his incapacity to establish his own being, that by himself he i s and 
can achieve 'nothing' , i s at the same time the locus of the exper-
ience of divine c r e a t i v i t y , ( cf. SV IV pp. 282 f f . ) 
Apart from grace i t i s as much the case for Kierkegaard p-s i t 
i s f o r Sartre that man exists both as freedom and as the continual 
f a i l u r e to barrycthrough the project of freedom. (7) Yet even i n his 
f a i l u r e to be the freedom he i s , man transcends both the crude det-
ermination of his being by merely sensuous l i f e and the i n s u f f i c -
i e n t l y e t h i c a l , . i n s u f f i c i e n t l y e x i s t e n t i a l determinations of i d e a l i t y . 
I t i s important i n t h i s l a s t respect to distinguish between d i f -
ferent meanings of the term 'Idea'. Kierkegaard speaks persistently 
about the human enterprise as the project of ' l i v i n g for the Idea. ' 
( B ) For him, as for Pichte, the romantics, and Hegel, th i s Idea i s 
in:.an absolute sense nothing other than human freedom i t s e l f , t h i s i s 
the Idea, the telos of human existence, to exist i n freedom. But Man 
does not carry out t h i s project, he does not l i v e according to his 
Idea, essence and existence are divided i n Man, therefore the free-
dom which i s not freedom slip s through the net of the ide a l , j u s t as, 
at another l e v e l , the realm of the sensuous i s beyond the scope of the 
ideal. 
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(B) ( i i ) (b) Suffering 
Siiffering f o r Kierkegaard has a range of meanings extending 
from that of the physical stiffering to which a l l flesh i s heir, to 
that of the freely chosen suffering of the martyrs. V/e are not con-
cerned here to trace a l l the gradations of his use of the term, but 
to see how i t i s integrated into the three-fold schematization of 
selfhood. 
In a certain technical sense 'suffering' i n danish, as i n other 
major european languages, i s by d e f i n i t i o n v i r t u a l l y the opposite of 
se l f - a c t i v a t i n g freedom, i n the sense that i t means that which i s 
acted upon, that which i s conditioned by what exists outside i t , 
whether or not i t experiences t h i s conditioning as 'painful'. I n 
t h i s sense suffering means 'not-free', and i n t h i s sense the dimens-
ion of sensuousness i s the seat of suffering, for i n oiir. existence 
as sensuous, animal beings we are always only acted upon. Thus the 
whole of human l i f e on earth considered as a purely biological pheno-
menon i s suffering. We should recognize t h i s f o m a l , philosophical 
dimension i n a statement such as the following which i t i s other-
wise a l l too easy to ascribe merely to kierkegaardian morbidity: 
'Listen to the newborn infant's cry i n the hour of b i r t h - see the 
death-struggle i n the f i n a l howc - and then declare whether what 
begins and ends i n t h i s way can be intended to be enjoyment.' (Pap. 
XI i i A 199/729) Yet there i s that i n human selfhood which r e s i s t s , 
which i s i n opposition to i t s being-determined, and the mutual pres-
sure of these two poles of existence serves to increase suffering. 
I n a sense, raw, inchoate animal stiffering i s , i n man at least, a l -
ways to be considered i n r e l a t i o n to freedom. 
The development of freedom does not for Kierkegaard mean the 
overcoming of suffering, but, insofar as freedom exists i n man as 
a f a i l e d project, as requiring, but not being able to achieve, the 
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e s t a b l i s h i n g of the s e l f i n i t s selfhood, freedom e n t a i l s the i n -
t e n s i f i c a t i o n of s u f f e r i n g . The more freedom i s conscious of i t -
s e l f the more i t i s conscious of i t s f a i l u r e , conscious t h a t i t i s 
not f r e e , t h a t i t i s co n d i t i o n e d , t h a t i t s u f f e r s . I n t h i s -way the 
development of freedom i n t e n s i f i e s s u f f e r i n g by drawing s u f f e r i n g 
i n t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the s e l f . For Kierkegaard the s u f f e r i n g 
t h a t r e a l l y matters i s not simply the s u f f e r i n g which derives from 
the f a c t t h a t man as a f r e e S p i r i t comes i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h extern-
a l f o r c e s which l i m i t h i s freedom, which cause him physical s u f f e r -
i n g , but t h a t the c o n f l i c t between freedom and unfreedom belongs i n -
t r i n s i c a l l y to the s i t u a t i o n of the s e l f . The s e l f i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y 
d i v i d e d , t o r n a p a r t , the elements of i t s being do not cohere but war 
against each other: i n T i l l i c h ' s expression they become ' structiares 
of d e s t r u c t i o n . ' (9) 
I n a s s e r t i n g i t s freedom, i n choosing i t s e l f as f r e e the s e l f 
must t h e r e f o r e also take upon i t s e l f the burden of s u f f e r i n g which 
derives from the oppo s i t i o n of freedom and determinateness. To 
choose freedom i s also to choose s u f f e r i n g . This i s indeed i m p l i -
ed i n the analysis of choice i n Either-Or which, as we have seen, 
i n v o l v e s a synthesis of the absolute s e l f i n i t s freedom w i t h a 
given, p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , given and p a r t i c u l a r i z e d by God's 
p r o v i d e n t i a l governance. I n t h i s perspective i t i s the task of 
freedom to humble i t s e l f under s u f f e r i n g , not to t r y and escape or 
suppress i t . (IO) 
But i f freedom thus involves an accepting a f f i r m a t i o n of s i i f f e r -
i n g then i d e a l i t y or r e f l e c t i o n , must always deny or soften s u f f e r i n g . 
I n t h a t the hallmarks of i d e a l i t y are harmony, u n i t y , u n i v e r s a l i t y , 
the i d e a l cannot express the clash between l e v e l s of being i n which 
s u f f e r i n g resides. The law of i d e a l i t y i s ' l i k e i s known by l i k e ' , 
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i t allows only such d i f f e r e n c e s as can be resolved i n an higher 
i d e n t i t y . I t i s the r e c i p r o c i t y of subject and o b j e c t , the m i f -
i c a t i o n of a l l phenomena i n a common ground which d e l i g h t s the 
i d e a l i s t i c i m a gination, not the d i v i s i o n of the subject from him-
s e l f , which i s the theme t h a t engages Kierkegaard. I t i s harmony 
and not dissonance. 
(B) ( i i ) ( c ) Self-Knowledge 
I t i s , according to Kierkegaard, a fundamental concern of the 
s e l f t o achieve self-knowledge, or to use an expression which rec-
urs throughout h i s w r i t i n g s , 'to become transparent' to i t s e l f . ( l l ) 
I t might also be described as the attempt to achieve an adequate r e -
f l e c t i o n of the being of the s e l f i n the m i r r o r of i d e a l i t y . 
The quest f o r self-knowledge hangs together w i t h the e x i s t e n t -
i a l p r o j e c t of freedom. For i f i t i s only i n f r e e self-choice t h a t 
the s e l f f i r s t becomes a s e l f , then self-knowledge depends on t h i s 
f r e e a c t , f o r otherwise there i s no s e l f to which the s e l f can be 
transparent. However as we have seen, the p r o j e c t of freedom i s i n 
f a c t a c o n t i n u a l f a i l u r e - apart from grace. Consequently s e l f -
knowledge too i s -unobtainable - apart from grace. 
This means t h a t the s e l f experiences i t s dividedness from i t -
s e l f not only as s u f f e r i n g but also as an opaque presence i n the 
h e a r t of i t s own being. I t i s important to note t h a t t h i s obsc\ar-
i t y does n o t simply l i e i n the sensuousness of one p a r t of the s t r u c -
t u r e o f the s e l f , but res-ults from the f a i l u r e of freedom to estab-
l i s h i t s e l f and to b r i n g about the i n t e g r a t i o n of the elements of 
i d e a l r e f l e c t i o n and sensuous immediacy. Ignorance of s e l f r e s u l t s 
from the f a i l u r e of freedom to achieve freedom; i t does not r e s i i l t 
from the m a t e r i a l , non-ideal nature of sensuous being. But i n the 
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s i t u a t i o n of the d i v i d e d s e l f the sensuous, the m a t e r i a l , .becomes 
opaque, becomes a source of o b s c i i r i t y , becomes a dimension of non-
s e l f , i n which the s e l f cannot f i n d or recognize i t s e l f . 
Although the sensuous i s thus experienced as a source of i g -
norance knowledge cannot be found by simply t i i m i n g to the i d e a l . 
For although i d e a l i t y may f i m c t i o n as the medi-um i n which knowledge 
i s expressed, may f u n c t i o n , i n Fichte's phrase, as the 'pure space' 
(12) i n which t h a t which i s known 'appears' or i s r e f l e c t e d , may 
f u n c t i o n as the transparency through which what i s to be known i s 
seen, i t does not i t s e l f provide the content of knowledge. This 
can only come from a dimension which transcends i d e a l i t y , t h a t i s 
to say, i t must come e i t h e r from the realm of the sensuous or from 
the realm of f r e e selfhood. 
W i t h i n the context of psychology the p o s s i b i l i t y of the i d e a l 
r e f l e c t i n g the sensuous i s i n f a c t dependent on the p r i o r p o s t i i l a t -
i o n o f the f r e e s e l f , which i s t h a t by which the s e l f becomes a 
s e l f i n i t s t h r e e - f o l d coherence, and by which alone the sensuous -
t h i s body, t h i s sensation - becomes mine, becomes p a r t of a t o t a l 
and i n t e g r a t e d experience of selfhood. The f u r t h e r consequences of 
t h i s can be seen by reference to the phenomenological concept of i n -
t e n t i o n a l i t y . According t o t h i s concept consciousness i s never pure, 
i t i s always consciousness ' o f something, i t always intends some 
obj e c t . However t h i s i n t e n t i o n i s , i n a sense, double. When 
someone looks at a piano, h i s consciousness intends the piano as 
the o b j e c t of h i s l o o k i n g , but he a l s o , altho\igh perhaps l e s s ob-
v i o u s l y , intends or c a r r i e s a reference t o , h i m s e l f , as the support-
i n g subject o f the t o t a l act of consciousness. What concerns Kierke-
gaard i s the problematic nature of e s t a b l i s h i n g himself as a subject 
i n the f u l l sense o f the word, and y e t , on t h i s a n a l y s i s , unless the 
transcendental subject of knowledge i s known, n e i t h e r a f u l l nor 
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even an adequate knowledge of the world oau be achieved, (13) 
(C) Kierkegaard's Philosophy of A r t 
We now t u r n to Kierkegaard's theory of a r t and apply the i n -
s i g h t s gained from t h i s detour through h i s psychological thought 
to the question of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p to romanticism and hegelianism 
i n t h e i r various forms. The aim of t h i s section i s merely to pro-
vide a general p i c t u r e of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p : the v i n d i c a t i o n of 
the p o s i t i o n taken here and i t s e a r t h i n g i n the exegesis of what 
Kierkegaard a c t u a l l y wrote w i l l be the task of the f o l l o w i n g sect-
ion of the chapter, and of succeeding chapters. 
F i r s t l y i t can be stated q u i t e c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t Kierkegaard 
shared the basic i d e a l i s t premisses of both h i s romantic and h i s 
hegelian predecessors concerning the essence of a r t . 
The basic i d e a l i s t p o s i t i o n was t h a t a r t i s a synthesis of the 
i d e a l and the r e a l , of the u n i v e r s a l and the p a r t i c u l a r , e t c . , an 
embodiment of the idea i n sensuous form, a f u s i o n of conscious and 
unconscious, a l i f t i n g - u p or r e b i r t h or t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n of the r e a l 
i n the realm of i d e a l i t y . A l l t h i s Kierkegaard could a f f i r m : the 
question i s what s t a t u s , what place i n the o v e r a l l c onstruction of 
mental l i f e i s t h i s a e s t h e t i c synthesis to be accorded? 
Already w i t h i n the i d e a l i s t , consensus there were, as we have 
seen, a v a r i e t y of p o s i t i o n s . I s the aesthetic synthesis i n some way 
u l t i m a t e , as the romantics claimed? I s i t merely p r o v i s i o n a l , an 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of the complete i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of idea and content 
achieved i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought, as Hegel argued? I s i t an im-
p o s s i b l e dream, v/hich promises but does not f u l f i l i t s promise, as 
the n i h i l i s t i c strand of romanticism maintained? 
I f the account which has been given of Kierkegaard's n o t i o n of 
selfhood i s c o r r e c t then i t i s c l e a r t h a t he could not regard the 
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a e s t h e t i c synthesis of i d e a l i t y and r e a l i t y (understanding r e a l i t y 
to be sensuous r e a l i t y ) as i t s e l f absolute unless i t i s brought i n -
to r e l a t i o n t o the transcendent p r o j e c t of freedom i n which selfhood 
i s rooted. Unless t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s given then the aesthetic syn-
t h e s i s must p o i n t beyond i t s e l f . I t 'intends' more than i t i s able 
to make manifest, f o r along w i t h the concrete, f i n i s h e d work of a r t 
i t also intends the f r e e subject who i s i t s r e a l , e x i s t e n t i a l sub-
j e c t , but who also transcends the form which the work of a r t must 
take. • This i s equally the case whether we t h i n k of t h i s subject as 
the c r e a t o r or as the r e c i p i e n t of the work of a r t . The s t r u c t u r e 
of the a e s t h e t i c synthesis i s imable to contain the freedom which i s 
and which must be the u l t i m a t e concern of both creator and r e c i p i e n t , 
i t i s n ot transparent to i t s r e a l subject, unless t h a t subject i s 
given i n some other, non-aesthetic way. 
This p o i n t was made by one of Kierkegaard's f i r s t reviewers, 
w r i t i n g i n the paper Faedrelandet, when he described the concept of 
the a e s t h e t i c presupposed i n Either-Or; 
The a e s t h e t i c r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s an a n t i c i p a t i o n of the r e a l , 
i n f i n i t e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ; what the f i n i t e l i f e must f i r s t 
a t t a i n through t o i l and t r o u b l e i s what a r t portrays as a 
r e a l i t y which has already been a t t a i n e d ; the busy r e s t l e s s 
l i f e i s wholly m i r r o r e d i n beauty's heaven j £ where i t ap-
pears J not i n i t s everyday grime, but cleansed i n the r e -
generating bath of i d e a l i t y and dressed i n i t s Sunday best. 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t the contemplation of works of 
beauty i s such a r i c h source of pleasure and of s p i r i t u a l 
j o y , and f u r t h e r so u p l i f t i n g and l i b e r a t i n g : as one sees 
the t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n of the f i n i t e i n the magical m i r r o r of 
i l l u s i o n , one i s oneself l i f t e d up i n t o another world, i n 
which one again f i n d s oneself, f r e e d of the bonds, which 
here below h o l d the i n f i n i t e psyche i n t h r a l l . (14) 
But he goes on to p o i n t out t h a t a r t i s p r e c i s e l y f o r t h i s reason 
a b s t r a c t , because i t a b s t r a c t s from the d i f f i c u l t i e s and d e f i c i e n -
c i e s of a c t u a l l i f e . A r t does achieve a c e r t a i n c l a r i f i c a t i o n or 
t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n of l i f e , but what i t o f f e r s i s only p r o v i s i o n a l , 
only an a n t i c i p a t i o n . 
What then i s the s e l f to which a r t i n d i r e c t l y r e f e r s , which i s 
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i t s t r u e , but non-expressed, subject? How does Kierkegaard's con-
cept of selfhood r e l a t e to the personalism of Poul Miller, or to the 
S p i r i t o f Hegel's philosophy? 
Kierkegaard's r e l a t i o n s h i p to Mjzdler i s a matter of continual 
i n t e r e s t i n Kierkegaard scholarship, i f only because of the fragment-
ary nature o f Mj^ller's l i t e r a r y remains, which t e a s i n g l y promise so 
much.; That the personal r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two v/as close i s 
beyond disputes ( I 5 ) The question i s how f a r d i d nailer*s thought 
i n f l u e n c e Kierkegaard? For us t h i s question focusses on the r e l a t -
i o n s h i p between the concept of selfhood and the dimension of aesth-
e t i c experience. 
We may r e c a l l t h a t M i l l e r argued t h a t the harmonious develop-
ment of the s e l f , and the i n t e g r a t i o n of the l e v e l s of i d e a l i t y , of 
em p i r i c a l being and of ' t r a d i t i o n ' on the basis of an experience of 
an higher k i n d , c o n s t i t u t e s the sine qua non of the production and 
ap p r e c i a t i o n of genuine works of a r t . 
That Kierkegaard admired t h i s p o i n t of view and himself adopt-
ed i t t o a c e r t a i n degree i s t e s t i f i e d to by h i s l i t e r a r y reviews, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s e a r l y work From The Papers of One S t i l l L i v i n g , 
i n p a r t s o f The Concept of Irony and i n h i s review of Madame Gyllem-
boTirg's novel Two Ages, as w e l l as i n the general a t t i t u d e to a r t -
s p e l t out i n the second p a r t of Either-Or. These t e x t s w i l l be 
studied i n t h e i r appropriate contexts i n l a t e r chapters and t h e i r 
connection w i t h Mji^ller w i l l then be defined more close l y . ( I 6 ) 
However, as we have seen, the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of selfhood i n the 
completed p r o j e c t of freedom i s , f o r Kierkegaard, always i n quest-
i o n . The s e l f f a i l s i n i t s attempt to be a s e l f . This undermines 
the s t r u c t u r e of the l i f e - v i e w and the i d e a l of harmonious s e l f -
development proclaimed by Miller. Indeed as we have seen, M i l l e r 
h i m s e l f was aware of the d i f f i c u l t y of c a r r y i n g out the const r u c t -
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ion of an harmonious l i f e - v i e w i n the context of what he regarded as 
the n i h i l i s m of contemporary thought. But Kierkegaard stresses the 
problematic nature of the achievement of selfhood to a much greater 
degree than M j Z^ller d i d . I f Kj^ller faced the prospect of a coming 
age of n i h i l i s m , Kierkegaard found himself a c h i l d of t h a t age. He 
was one o f those who stood i n the wilderness of n i h i l i s m and at the 
same time made the discovery t h a t t h i s was no abiding home f o r the 
human S p i r i t . This i s not to say t h a t Kierkegaard d i d not believe 
i n the achievement of harmony, o f a ' l i f e - v i e w ' . He believed i n i t , 
but he could only b e l i e v e i n i t , because i t could, as he thought, be 
estab l i s h e d only on the ground of d i v i n e grace. 
Despite h i s admiration f o r the'men of 1805'and h i s desire to 
v i n d i c a t e t h e i r i d e a l s of harmony, of c o n t i n u i t y between the d i v i n e 
and the human, Kierkegaard suffered^ the s t r a i n s of dissonance and 
di s c o r d too severely to be one of them. The p r o j e c t of freedom can 
only be achieved by passing through the experience of discord, by 
experiencing the otherness, the transcendence of the f r e e s e l f over 
against the realms of sensuousness and of i d e a l i t y . The 'men of 
1805* d i d not give t h i s note ©f- discord i t s due. Consequently t h e i r 
i d e a l of harmony was an i d e a l which masked the r e a l i t y of the s u f f e r -
i n g o f the f r e e s e l f , and they were mable to i n t e g r a t e s u f f e r i n g 
i n t o t h e i r v i s i o n of cosmic u n i t y . I n t h i s sense both t h e i r con-
cept of a x t , and the a r t which they produced, concealed both the 
tr u e freedom of the s e l f and i t s s u f f e r i n g . 
Though Kierkegaard may the r e f o r e be said to have belonged to 
the generation of n i h i l i s t i c romanticism he chose to t u r n against 
the n i h i l i s t i c stream, and i n h i s own understanding of i t h i s work 
was an attempt to block t h i s stream a t source. That source he 
found i n the philosophy of e a r l y romanticism, i n Fichte and Schlegel, 
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and i n t h e i r separation of selfhood from the realm of concrete 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y . 
This too was c l e a r enough t o h i s f i r s t readers. Not only were 
the avowedly anti-romantic polemics of From the Papers of One S t i l l 
L i v i n g , and The Concept of I r o n y seen as ' r e p l i e s ' to the s p i r i t of 
n i h i l i s m , but Either-Or, the Upbuilding Discourses, and Fear and 
Trembling, were also received i n t h i s context. Kierkegaard was per-
ceived as a w r i t e r who had grasped the n e t t l e o f the mood of pessim-
ism and s e l f - l a c e r a t i o n and who pointed to an u l t i m a t e overcoming of 
t h i s mood. (17) This i s not to deny t h a t h i s l a t e r works were to 
lead h i s readers i n t o such depths of both l i t e r a r y and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
complexity t h a t many e r s t w h i l e admirers dropped awayl Nor can i t be 
denied t h a t many of h i s w r i t i n g s show only too c l e a r l y how deeply he 
hi m s e l f had experienced the mood of despair, and t h a t one r e s u l t of 
h i s work had been to provide a source f o r p r e c i s e l y the k i n d of n i -
h i l i s m he sought to r e f u t e . 
Kierkegaard's answer to n i h i l i s m i s not an 'answer' i n a formal 
sense; h i s procedure i s r a t h e r to show the consequences which f l o w 
from developing t h a t p o s i t i o n to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, to show 
t h a t u l t i m a t e l y i t demands i t s own supersession. Such a procedure 
immediately evokes the image of Hegel's concept of d i a l e c t i c s . How 
f a r then i s Kierkegaard's method of overcoming n i h i l i s m an a p p l i c a t -
io n o f hegelian d i a l e c t i c s ? 
Before attempting to answer t h i s question we need to look a t the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between Kierkegaard's and Hegel's concepts of selfhood. 
For Kierkegaard, as we have seen, the f r e e s e l f , which i s both the 
gro-und and aim of psychic existence, i s defined i n i n d i v i d u a l terms, 
by reference to psychological categories. As we have also seen, t h i s 
emphasis i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o h i s v i s i o n of the problematic 
nature of the p r o j e c t of f r e e selfhood. The process has a c l e a r 
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s t r u c t u r e which p a r a l l e l s the s t r u c t u r e of S p i r i t i n i d e a l i s t writing^, 
but t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s e l f w i l l achieve the f u l f i l m e n t o f 
t h i s s t r u c t u r e i s p r e c i s e l y what i s i n question, and which cannot be 
resolved other than i n the sphere of i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - c h o i c e ' i n fear 
and t r e m b l i n g before God'. This i n t u r n leads t o an emphasis on suf-
f e r i n g and on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving self-knowledge. 
For Hegel, on the other hand, the s e l f acquired an o b j e c t i v e 
s t r u c t u r e i n the processes of w o r l d - h i s t o r y , and i n the concrete man-
i f e s t a t i o n s o f s o c i e t y , o f a r t , of r e l i g i o n and of philosophy. The 
c o n t i n u i t y between the s e l f i n i t s absolute freedom and the s e l f i n 
i t s merely p r o v i s i o n a l ' a l i e n ' forms i s what i s emphasized. 
These d i f f e r e n c e s can be summed up by saying t h a t f o r Hegel 
the process o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n had as i t s goal the i n t e r i o r i t y o f 
pure l o g i c a l thought, whereas f o r Kierkegaard i t ctilminated i n the 
i n t e r i o r i t y o f r a d i c a l l y f r e e s e l f - c h o i c e . Their u l t i m a t e purposes 
d i f f e r t o t o caelo, and no formal s i m i l a r i t i e s of d i a l e c t i c s or of 
vocabulary should mislead us here. I n t h i s respect one i s l a r g e l y 
compelled t o agree w i t h N. Thulstrup vhen he proposes as the main 
t h e s i s o f h i s c a r e f u l l y documented research on Kierkegaard's Relat-
ion t o Hegel t h a t ' ...Hegel and Kierkegaard have i n the main nothing 
i n common as t h i n k e r s , n e i t h e r as regards o b j e c t , purpose or method, 
nor as regards whgt each considered t o be in d i s p u t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s . ' ( i S ) 
I f there i s anything to question i n t h i s statement i t i s the i n c l u s -
ion o f method. At l e a s t as regards aesthetics there are s t r i k i n g 
s i m i l a r i t i e s which have t o be taken i n t o acco-unt. 
Kierkegaard and Hegel are able to enter i n t o an a l l i a n c e i n s o f a r 
as they both seek t o show t h a t the aesthe t i c synthesis i s unable to 
give absolute expression t o f r e e selfhood, t h a t a r t i s r a d i c a l l y 
incapable of showing the subject i t u l t i m a t e l y intends, altho\igh i t 
i s able t o achieve a degree o f i n s i g h t i n t o i t s own i n a b i l i t y to do 
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t h i s w i t h i n the confines of the a e s t h e t i c , and thus to p o i n t the way 
to i t s own supersession. For both t h i n k e r s t h i s occurs h i s t o r i c a l l y 
i n the romantic consciousness. Both understand romanticism as a form 
of the a l i e n a t i o n o f the s e l f from i t s e l f , a form of the s e l f ' s dual-
i s t i c being, and i n the l i g h t of t h i s understanding Kierkegaard i s 
able t o see i n the n i h i l i s t i c romanticism of 'young Germany' and i t s 
danish i m i t a t o r s the l o g i c a l outcome o t the theories of early romant-
icism. The a s s e r t i o n of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the aesthetic synthesis 
( o t h e r than as an i l l u s o r y dream), which appears as a consequence of 
the d i v i d e d s e l f of n i h i l i s m , i s i t s e l f a sig n a l t h a t a new, non-
a e s t h e t i c dimension must be introduced i f i n t e g r a t i o n i s to be ach-
ieved. The transcendence o f a r t i s thus demanded on two grounds. 
F i r s t l y , i t i s demanded on s t r u c t u r a l grounds, because the aesthet-
i c synthesis i s by d e f i n i t i o n unable to give expression to the ab-
so l u t e s e l f . Secondly, i t i s demanded on h i s t o r i c a l grounds, i n the 
sense t h a t i t has now, a t t h i s p o i n t of h i s t o r y , become apparent t h a t 
a r t transcends i t s e l f and t h a t a new stage of s p i r i t u a l existence i s 
re q u i r e d . 
The Kierkegaardian, as w e l l as the hegelian, c r i t i q u e of a r t i s 
grounded i n a view of romanticism as a philosophy of a r t , i n the 
sense o f a philosophy which assigns t o a r t , to a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y 
and t o a e s t h e t i c experience, a uniquely p r i v i l e g e d place i n the s t r u c -
t u r e of l i f e , but i t . sees i n the d u a l i s t i c dimension of romanticism 
a secret testimony t o the inadequacy of a r t , of aesthetic experience. 
By focussing on t h i s d u a l i s t i c aspect',: Kierkegaard hopes to undermine 
and t o r e l a t i v i z e both a r t and romanticism (as the u l t i m a t e ' p h i l o s -
ophy' of a r t ) . The f a i l u r e of romanticism p o i n t s to the u l t i m a t e 
l i m i t a t i o n o f a r t as a sphere of s p i r i t u a l existence. 
I t can t h e r e f o r e be said t h a t Kierkegaard had a philosophy of 
a r t i n a sense a k i n to t h a t of Hegel's n o t i o n of a philosophy of a r t : 
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an understanding of a r t which seeks to place a r t i n the context of 
a conceptually elaborated accoiint of human being and which seeks to 
define the inadequacy o f a r t i n terms of i t s i n a b i l i t y to a r t i c u l a t e 
the e s s e n t i a l freedom of hman existence. But although t h i s f r e e -
dom i s f o r Kierkegaaxd as w e l l as f o r Hegel, something which i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y ' i n t e r i o r ' t h e i r perceptions of t h i s i n t e r i o r freedom 
are worlds apart. 
I t i s thus possible to a f f i r m the u l t i m a t e d i f f e r e n c e of Kierke-
gaard's thought over against Hegel's thought, as N. Thulstrup does, 
but also t o say w i t h S. C r i t e s t h a t 'Kierkegaard was, broadly speak-
i n g , a Hegelian i n a e s t h e t i c theory.' (19) However, we have to be 
more c a r e f u l when C r i t e s goes on to say t h a t ' ...he drew h e a v i l y on 
Heiberg and other Hegelian w r i t e r s , and even more h e a v i l y on Hegel's 
own A e s t h e t i k ...' (20) Did he i n f a c t draw on Hegel more than on 
Heiberg - or was i t the other way round? As we have seen, there are 
s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between Hegel and Heiberg (and Martensen, who 
must a t t h i s p o i n t be counted w i t h Heiberg). To whom does Kierke-
gaard owe the hegelian elements of h i s aesthetics? To answer t h i s 
question we must now t u r n t o look a t Kierkegaard's r e l a t i o n to Heiberg. 
(D) Kierkegaard and Heiberg 
Althoiigh i t i s basic to the approach of t h i s t h e s i s t h a t Kierke-
gaard be t r e a t e d as a philosopher, and h i s w r i t i n g s be examined i n 
terms o f t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l content, i t w i l l be h e l p f u l at t h i s p o i n t 
to look a t b i o g r a p h i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l evidence which establishes the 
l i n k between Kierkegaard and Heiberg. 
Henning Fenger c i t e s the witness of several of Kierkegaard's 
contemporaries i n order to demonstrate Kierkegaard's a f f i l i a t i o n 
to the hegelian f a c t i o n i n Denmark. 'One cannot brush aside three 
separate witnesses such as Sibbem, Hoist and Brj^chner, when they 
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assert t h a t Kierkegaard was i n t e l l e c t u a l l y dependent upon Hegel and 
Heiberg i n h i s youth'. (21) We can, however, draw on more evidence 
than t h i s . Kierkegaard's f i r s t published works consisted of an 
a r t i c l e a t t a c k i n g women's emancipation ( l834) followed by a series 
of three polemical a r t i c l e s d i r e c t e d against the l i b e r a l movement i n 
contemporary p o l i t i c s . (22) A l l of these were published by Heiberg 
i n h i s newspaper K(/benhavns Flyvende Post. I n h i s recent e d i t i o n of 
these a r t i c l e s Teddy Petersen suggests t h a t one of Kierkegaard's 
basic aims i n w r i t i n g them was'to demonstrate h i s l i t e r a r y and p o l -
emical a b i l i t i e s to Heiberg.' (25) Heiberg was a t t i a t time a comman-
ding f i g u r e on the l i t e r a r y scene - to have h i s seal of approval was 
to have 'made i t ' as a man o f l e t t e r s . 
Petersen also draws a t t e n t i o n to Kierkegaard's g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
t h a t both another newspaper and Poul M i l l e r thought t h a t the f i r s t 
of the a n t i - l i b e r a l a r t i c l e s was a c t u a l l y b^ Heiberg. (24) Moreover 
the close l i n k which others perceived between Kierkegaard and Heib-
erg a t t h i s time i s suggested by a series of three anonymously pub-
l i s h e d broadsheets, Humoristiske I n t e l l i g e n s b l a d e , which poked fun a t 
the K i e r k e g a a r d - l i b e r a l debate, and which c a r i c a t t i r e d Kierkegaard as 
Heiberg's 'amanuensis'. (25) 
S t i l l w i t h i n the f i e l d o f journalism Kierkegaard noted i n the 
Papirer t h a t one of Heiberg's l i t e r a r y opponents, George Carstensen, 
the founder of the T i v o l i Gardens, had o f f e r e d him a l o t of money 
f o r an a r t i c l e against Heiberg, ( o f . Pap. X i i i A99/6624) but 
Kierkegaard not only refused, he took Heiberg's side against Carsten-
sen i n one o f h i s own a r t i c l e s , although t h i s was not the maiii. p o i n t 
of the a r t i c l e , ( c f . SV X V I I I p .13) 
The d e d i c a t i o n of two of h i s works of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m t o 
members o f the Heiberg household, to Heiberg's mother, Madame Gyllem-
bourg, and t o Heiberg's w i f e , also t e s t i f y , i f i n d i r e c t l y , to Kierke-
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gaard's respect f o r Heiberg, e s p e c i a l l y since these were both pub-
l i s h e d a f t e r the breach w i t h Heiberg which we s h a l l examine s h o r t l y . 
(26) What was i t t h a t made Kierkegaard a l i g n h i m s e l f w i t h Heiberg? 
The s i t u a t i o n i s w e l l summed up by F r i t h i o f Brandt, whose testimony 
i s doubly weighty i n t h a t he does not on the whole regard Kierke-
gaard as i n any way an hegelian. He w r i t e s 
As an a e s t h e t i c i a n Kierkegaard was s p i r i t u a l l y akin to 
Heiberg i n the highest degree and understood how to 
appreciate h i s work as few others d i d . He found i n 
Heiberg a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y supported theory of c r i t i c -
ism, which understood the genres of a r t and t h e i r l o g -
i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Furthermore he found i n Heiberg's 
person t h a t elegant and w i t t y u r b a n i t y which was h i s 
i d e a l i n h i s a e s t h e t i c y o u t h f u l years; he found, i n 
general, t h a t h i g h l y c u l t i i r e d s p i r i t u a l a r i s t o c r a c y 
which was h i s own. (27) 
I t was as an a e s t h e t i c i a n t h a t Kierkegaard valued Heiberg, and^one 
might add, as a p r a c t i t i o n e r of dramatic a r t . I n The Concept of 
Ir o n y he w r i t e s of Heiberg as d i s p l a y i n g a s i m i l a r mastery of a r t 
to t h a t possessed by Goethe: 
As a poet Professor Heiberg occupies the same standpoint 
C as Goethe "J , and while n e a r l y every speech he has 
w r i t t e n can provide an example of irony's inner economy 
i n the p l a y , there also manifests i t s e l f through a l l h i s 
plays a self-conscious s t r i v i n g , which assigns each p a r t 
i t s place i n the whole. 
(SV I pp.327 f . ) 
Here Kierkegaard praises Heiberg f o r a mastery of ir o n y i n almost 
e x a c t l y the same terms as Heiberg had himself defined ir o n y . (28) 
Nonetheless, i f Kierkegaard valued Heiberg as an a e s t h e t i c i a n , he 
very soon became aware t h a t outside the l i m i t s of the aesthetic 
Heiberg could not be r e l i e d on as a guide, and t h a t Heiberg himself 
d i d n o t always recognize the due l i m i t s o f a r t . 
Although the sketch of Kierkegaard's psychology i n section B 
of t h i s chapter r e f l e c t s h i s mature thought, i t may be regarded as 
a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f a p o s i t i o n he had adopted much e a r l i e r . That he 
was conscious of the fundamental discrepancy between hegelianism and 
h i s own thought a t a very e a r l y stage i n h i s development i s i n d i c a t e d 
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by a number o f e n t r i e s i n the P a p i r e r , not l e a s t i n the fragment of 
a s a t i r i c a l play which poked a great deal of fun a t the hegelians. (29) 
His acquaintance w i t h Poul M^^ller would also have put him on 
the t r a i l which l e d t o the discovery of the d i f f e r e n c e between a 
genuinely p e r s o n a l i s t philosophy and the l o g i c a l ontology of hegel-
ianism. Apart from M i l l e r ' s essay on I m m o r t a l i t y which appeared i n 
1858 Kierkegaard would i n the same year have read F. C. Sibbem's 
a t t a c k on hegelianism, which, r e f e r r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y to Heiberg, made 
the p o i n t t h a t Heiberg's a e s t h e t i c theories had only scratched the 
surface of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l problematic presented i n Hegel's work. 
... indeed we see him Heiberg 3 t r e a t the whole matter 
r a t h e r l i g h t l y , i n t h a t he r h a p s o d i c a l l y moves around 
c e r t a i n of the more e a s i l y approachable and pleasant 
Parts o f the hegelian realm of ideas; indeed, jT so t h a t 
I may J put the matter i n a word, he shows himself to 
be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i l e t t a n t e . (50) 
To c a l l Heiberg a d i l e t t a n t e was the supreme i n s u l t : i t was to 
f t i r t h e r the r o u t o f d i l e t t a n t i s m i n a e s t h e t i c s t h a t Heiberg had pro-
pounded h i s d o c t r i n e o f t a s t e and h i s philosophically-based theory 
of c r i t i c i s m . D i l e t t a n t i s m was Heiberg's supreme an t i - v a l u e . Sibb-
em also came to the defence of Poul M i l l e r , who had been seen by 
Heiberg as a 'deserter' from the hegelian ranks. Heiberg had claim-
ed t h a t M i l l e r was l i k e someone who goes away from the stream i n order 
to f i n d water. Sibbem argues t h a t the question i s p r e c i s e l y whether 
the hegelian philosophy _is the stream which contains the r e a l , the 
water of l i f e , which must be the source of an authentic c h r i s t i a n 
philosophy. (51) I n the same year Kierkegaard would also have 
known about ( i f he d i d not a c t u a l l y see) Fata Morgana and would have 
read Mgxtensen's review of i t , which woiild have given him f u r t h e r 
grounds f o r doubt. 
The next chapter w i l l show how the basic s t r u c t u r e of Kierke-
gaard's thought i n the period of the e a r l y Papirer p o i n t s t o a 
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r e l i g i o u s p o s i t i o n fundamentally a t odds w i t h hegelian conceptions. 
What i s being argued here i s t h a t i t would have been possible f o r him 
to d i s t i n g u i s h between Heiberg the a e s t h e t i c i a n and Heiberg the p h i l -
osopher, and t h a t consequently w i t h i n the sphere of aesthetics i t 
would have been possible f o r him to deploy heibergian categories and 
methods w h i l s t remaining s c e p t i c a l about t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y outside 
t h a t sphere. The next two chapters w i l l show how and to what extent 
he d i d operate as a member, however i l l - d i s c i p l i n e d , o f the'Heiberg 
school' o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m . 
We t u r n now t o Kierkegaard's attack on Heiberg i n the period of 
h i s mature authorship where we w i l l see t h a t even i n the midst of 
h i s a t t a c k , Kierkegaard draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between the sphere of 
a e s t h e t i c s and whatever i t i s t h a t l i e s beyond a e s t h e t i c s , so t h a t 
i n even h i s most b i t t e r polemics there rem&,ins a r e s i d u a l respect 
and an acknowledgement of Heiberg's p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s - both to 
l i t e r a t u r e i n general and t o h i s , Kierkegaard's, own development as a 
w r i t e r and t h i n k e r . 
These polemics were provoked by Heiberg's haughty and uncompre-
hending review of Either-Or. (32) I n the e n t r i e s i n h i s Papirer 
w r i t t e n i n response t o t h i s review, Kierkegaard j o t t e d down a v e r i t -
able arsenal of anti-Heiberg barbs. (Pap. IV B 25-29). Heiberg's 
assumed a u t h o r i t y i n l i t e r a t u r e i s attacked a n ^ r i d i c u l e d : 'Prof-
essor Heiberg i s also accustomed to "preside a t the Day of Judge-
ment" i n l i t e r a t u r e . Have you f o r g o t t e n what happened t o Xerxes? 
he had even taken w i t h him the scribes who were to record h i s v i c -
t o r y over l i t t l e Greece.' (IV B 41) Heiberg's concern w i t h the 
requirements of the a^e i s p i l l o r i e d : 'For some years now Prof. 
Heiberg has sat, a l l dolled-up, i n thfi window of l i t e r a t u r e and 
waved t o those going by, e s p e c i a l l y i f i t was a dressed-up man 
and he heard a small "Hurrah" from the next s t r e e t ' . ( I V B 49) 
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Kierkegaard regards h i m s e l f as a ' w i l d young horse' i n c o n t r a s t to 
the 'less l i v e l y ' Heiberg, who i s merely a 'paradeur'. ( I V B 57) 
Kierkegaard traces Heiberg's ' f a l l ' to the hubris of the enter-
p r i s e o f s p e c i i l a t i v e l i t e r a t u r e . He w r i t e s 
I t may now be j u s t about two years ago t h a t Herr Prof-
essor, from being the w i t t y , j o c u l a r , h i l a r i o u s poet of 
v a u d e v i l l e , who sometimes seemed to be a b i t xmorthodox 
i n matters of f a i t h , the triumphal p o l e m i c i s t , the aesth-
ete o f well-measured step, became Denmark's Dante, the 
brooding genius, who, i n h i s apocalyptic poem, gazed i n t o 
the secrets of e t e m a l l i f e , became the obedient son of 
the church, from whom the reverend diocesan clergy ex-
pected everything t h a t would serve the best i n t e r e s t s of 
the church. ( I V B 46) 
The reference i s of coiarse t o the poem En Sjael E f t e r Dj^den 
and t o i t s e n t h u s i a s t i c r e c e p t i o n by the theologian Martensen and 
the churchman Provost Tryde. 
Heiberg was to damn himse l f s t i l l f u r t h e r i n Kierkegaard's eyes 
by an equally condescending and uncomprehending reference to R e p e t i t -
io n . (55) This again provoked Kierkegaard to a f r e n e t i c bout of 
w r i t i n g (Pap. IV B 100-124) which gradually formed i t s e l f i n t o the 
l i t t l e book Forewords which - u i i u s u a l l y , i f not tmiquely, i n h i s 
pseudonymous works - names Heiberg as the b u t t of i t s s a t i r e . I n 
the Papirer e n t r i e s and i n Forewords i t i s again made cle a r t h a t 
Heiberg has offended by transgressing the proper l i m i t s of h i s genius. 
Kierkegaard takes p a r t i c u l a r d e l i g h t i n mocking Heiberg's newly dev-
eloped i n t e r e s t i n astronomy and again voices doubts as to Heiberg's 
s u i t a b i l i t y f o r the p a r t o f Denmark's Dante. 
I already began to be a f r a i d , when, a few years ago. Prof. 
Heiberg unveiled heaven's secrets i n h i s apocalyptic poem, 
and a serviceable c r i t i c , an o f f i c i o u s o p i n i o n , l e t i t none 
too obscurely be understood t h a t Heiberg had now become 
Dante. He, who a t t h a t time was among the more c a r e f u l ob-
servers of our t r i f l i n g circumstances w i l l . c e r t a i n l y not de-
ny t h a t sometimes symptoms were manifested which seemed to 
presage the f e a r f u l event t h a t the Professor, who had more-
over always been a philosopher, should suddenly undergo a 
new metamorphosis and reveal himself as the one who was to 
make c l e a r the r i d d l e s of theology. 
(Pap.IV B 119;cf.SV V pp .217f) 
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I n a nutshell then, Heiberg had f a i l e d to r e a l i z e that i n the 
r e l i g i o u s a r t comes up against an absolute l i m i t . 'Perhaps Prof-
essor Heiberg believes that C h r i s t i a n i t y i s a subject for vaudeville', 
(Pap. IV A 105) wrote Kierkegaard scathingly - and indeed Heiberg's 
theory and practice of speculative comedy bore t h i s comment out. 
An example of Kierkegaard's ambiguous attitude to Heiberg i s to 
be found i n Stages on L i f e ' s Way where he develops h i s own analysis 
of the present age as an age of r e f l e c t i o n in which the immediacy 
appropriate to poetry has been \andermined, and i n which comedy must 
emerge as the most appropriate form of a r t - a l l t h i s i s i n the 
true heibergian mould. But Kierkegaard twists t h i s analysis and 
puts i t to unexpected use; 
A comic poet w i l l lack a public, since not even the public 
can be in two places at once - in their seats and in the 
play. Moreover the comic poet has h i s stronghold i n a path-
os which l i e s outside the play, and he proves by h i s e x i s t -
ence that the age of poetry i s past. He who wo\ild set h i s 
hope upon a speculative drama serves poetiy only insofar as 
he serves the comic. I f a wizard or a sorcerer were to 
bring such a thing to pass, i f by the assistance of a spec-
u l a t i v e thaumatiirge (for a dramaturge would not suffice) i t 
were to s a t i s f y the requirement of the age as a poetic work, 
t h i s event would indeed be a good motif for a comedy. 
(SV V I I I p.211) 
Again the point i s that there i s a l i m i t to vAiat a dramaturge can 
achieve, and there i s of course no such thing as a thaumaturge for 
Kierkegaard. Consequently the whole concept of speculative comedy 
pushes the aesthetic beyond i t s proper l i m i t s . 
Kierkega^d returns to the theme of speculative comedy in the 
Concluding U n s c i e n t i f i c Postscript where he writes 
I have read prof. Heiberg's S.jael E f t e r D^den, indeed I have 
read i t together with the commentary by Provost Tryde. I 
wish I had not done so, for in reading a poetic work one en-
joys oneself a e s t h e t i c a l l y and does not demand the uttermost 
d i a l e c t i c a l accuracy, which i s appropriate to a reader who 
seeks to order h i s l i f e i n accordance with such guidance. I f 
a commentator compels one to seek such a thing in a poem, 
then he has not helped the poem. j.^ p ^^^^ 
Although Kierkegaard's scorn i s directed in t h i s case at the comment-
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ator rather than a t the poem, there can be l i t t l e doubt, on the 
basis of h i s other remarks on th i s theme, that he regarded the 
whole project of speculative"comedy with a wary eye. And i f Heib-
erg, by virtue of h i s poetic genius, managed to skate across the 
thin i c e , h i s commentators crashed through into the icy depths 
below. There are two points to make about t h i s anti-heiberg polemic. 
F i r s t l y , the terms of Kierkegaard's c r i t i c i s m themselves owe 
something to Heiberg. For i t was precisely Heiberg's chief princ-
i p l e that each genius was suited to production within the sphere of 
a p a r t i c u l a r genre. By becoming metaphysical Heiberg had, accord-
ing to Kierkegaard, ignored t h i s basic rule of aesthetics. In other 
words Kierkegaard's c r i t i c i s m of Heiberg p a r a l l e l s Heiberg's c r i t i c -
ism of 0hlenslaeger. ( 3 4 ) 
Secondly, Kierkegaard i s dissenting from the Heiberg orthodoxy 
at a point where a more orthodox h e g e l i a n woTild a l s o have had to 
draw breath. For as we have seen, Heiberg's concept of speculative 
drama i s not at a l l i n the s p i r i t of Hegel's aesthetics. Hegel 
would have agreed with Kierkegaard that a clear d i s t i n c t i o n would 
need to be made between the aesthetic and the r e l i g i o u s , despite 
the differences in thei r understanding of vdiat the religious i s . 
( E ) Conclusions 
Was Kierkega^d a romantic? Was he an hegelian? As regards 
aesthetic theory such questions cannot be answered by a simple neg-
ative or a simple affirmative. 
Kierkegaard experienced i n himself and gave artic u l a t i o n to 
the consciousness of the divided s e l f of n i h i l i s t i c romanticism. 
On t h i s b a s i s , and understanding 'romanticism' as the expression of 
t h i s unhappy consciouness, i t i s possible to see the point made by 
A. Vetter when he writes that 
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I n B i l d e m von sprachgewaltiger und witziger Einpragsamkeit 
hat Kierkegaard das haltlose Umschlagen und Vermischen der 
Geflihlgegensatze anscha\ilieh.. gemacht. Er hat damit ein 
Selbstbekenntnis der Romantik geschaffen, wie es schonungs-
loser kaum vorgestellt werden kann. ( 5 5 ) 
At the same time Kierkegaard did not simply give expression to, he 
was also seeking a way out of, the wilderness of nihilism. Thus we 
can also affirm with Walter Rehm that 'Kierkegaard's s c h r i f t s t e l l e r -
isches Werk le b t von diesem ihn innerlich bedrangenden, ohnmachtigen 
Kampf gegen die Romantik' ( 3 6 ) 
In what sense however can we say that i t was 'powerless'? Not 
in the.sense that he saw no way out. He did. But the way out he 
saw was not an option which man, unaided, had i t in his power to 
choose. The freedom in which nihilis m was to be transcended was not 
solely a human work, but though a f u l l y human freedom i t was to be 
rooted in divine c r e a t i v i t y . 
In t h i s struggle against n i h i l i s m Kierkegaard was, in pairt, 
seeking to re-affirm the ideal of harmony treasured by the 'men of 
1803', amonst whom Kierkegaard's teachers, F. G. Sibbem and, with 
due q u a l i f i c a t i o n , Poul M i l l e r , are to be counted. Nonetheless I 
cannot agree with Ms. V i a l l a n e i x when she states that Kierkegaard was 
a romantic, whose thought was characterized in i t s t o t a l i t y by the 
sonority of an achieved harmony. (3?) There i s too much st r i v i n g and 
too l i t t l e achieving for that. I t i s important however to bear in 
mind that Kierkegaard was s t i r r e d by that ideal and was particular-
l y influenced by the emphasis on harmony in the personal l i f e , which 
i s to be associated with Poul Miller. 
We encounter a similar complexity when we turn to hegelianism, 
where i t i s tempting to agree with Jean Wahl in h i s assertion that in 
the early Papirer (though the point could be made in respect of a 
wide range of Kierkegaard's wr i t i n g s ) , 'Hegelianisme et anti-hegelian-
isme sont unis dans plusieurs passages d'une fa^on i n e x t r i c a b l e . ' ( 3 8 ) 
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Nor i s the situation made any easier by the v a r i e t i e s of hegelian-
ism, and p a r t i c u l a r l y by the fact that the hegelians whom Kierke-
gaard actually knew, such as Heiberg and Martensen, were not entire-
l y l o y a l d i s c i p l e s of the master. We can, however, make a number of 
points. 
F i r s t l y , Kierkegaard did take from Heiberg certain key elements 
of aesthetic theory, and found in Heiberg a model of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c -
ism. There i s thus an heibergian dimension to Kierkegaard's theory 
of a r t and h i s own practice as a l i t e r a r y c r i t i c . 
Secondly, even at the point where he disagreed with Heiberg 
concerning the commensurability of aesthetic form and the absolute 
idea of i n f i n i t e freedom, the way in which he saw art pointing to-
wards i t s own supersession has an hegelian quality. Indeed i t i s 
tempting to say that at th i s point Kierkegaard was closer to Hegel 
than Heiberg was. Nonetheless h i s vision of what i t was that was to 
be found beyond the aesthetic owed more to the interaction between 
n i h i l i s t i c romanticism and Poul M i l l e r ' s personalism, as well as to 
the p i e t i s t i c r e l i g i o n of h i s upbringing, (39)> than i t did to Hegel. 
Thirdly, in addition to the hegelian/heibergian elements in 
Kierkegaard's writing on a r t there i s also a definite impress of the 
ideas of Potil M;^ller, especially i n the way in which the require-
ment of an individual l i f e - v i e w i s brought into play in the practice 
of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m . 
Kierkega^d was neither a romantic nor an hegelian. He used 
elements of both and discarded elements of both. He was not, how-
ever, merely e c l e c t i c . The selection and rejection were guided by 
h i s own vi s i o n of what a r t was about, and h i s own understanding of 
the place of r e l i g i o n i n human l i f e and of the office of philosophy. 
His philosophy of ar t however was a philosophy of ar t more in the 
hegelian than in the romantic sense. I t looked on art from the 
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perspective of a position which, he assumed, was 'beyond' that of 
art. Prom t h i s position i t would also be seen that the world of 
aesthetic forms possessed a s p e c i f i c d i a l e c t i c a l structure which 
pointed towards t h i s 'beyond'. 
The fleshing out of these conclusions w i l l be the task of the 
following chapters of t h i s t h e s i s , as we turn f i r s t to the theory 
and c r i t i q u e of a r t in the early Papirer. 
- 132 -
Chapter Six; The Theory and Critique of Art in the Early Papirer 
(A) The Nature of the Sources 
The e a r l i e r volumes of Kierkegaard's Papirer contain a proport-
ionately greater amount of 'aesthetic' material than the l a t e r vol-
umes, although such material never entirely vanishes. The aesthetic 
material i s p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e n t i f u l i n the f i r s t three volumes of the 
Papirer which cover a period from 1834 when Kierkegaard was twenty-
one to 1842 when he wrote Either-Or, h i s f i r s t major work. For the 
purposes of t h i s chapter we s h a l l also include the section of 
Aesthetic.a in volme IV of the Papirer which i s dated 1842-3; 
The interpretation of these early Papirer i s beset with d i f f i c -
u l t i e s . The terms 'Journals' and 'Diaries' which are sometimes used 
in english translations are themselves potentially misleading, for 
these 'papers' do not constitute a day by day diary of external or 
psychological events. What we are dealing with i s a mass of note-
books and loose papers. To add to the confusion, some of the note-
books are written with pagination running both from front to back, 
and from back to front. Nor i s the type of entry ty p i c a l l y 'diar-
i s t i c ' . I t i s in f a c t an extraordinarily diffuse collection of 
written material. We are faced with lect\ire notes, translation ex-
e r c i s e s , excerpts from books (sometimes very lengthy), reading l i s t s 
(although we do not always know i f Kierkegaard actually read the 
books contained i n these l i s t s ) ^ projected plays, novels, lectures, 
sermons, essays, newspaper a r t i c l e s , speeches, as well as odd thoughts 
jotted down i n fragmentary form, thoughts whimsical and momentary as 
well as the deeply passionate and personal thoughts which might most 
usually be associated with 'Kierkegaard's Diaries'. Some of the ent-
r i e s are not even f u l l sentences whilst others run into many pages. 
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Even when the entries have been categorized many problems remain. 
These can be focussed on the twin issues of chronology and autobio-
graphical reference. 
These issues have a di r e c t bearing on the interpretation of 
those entries which r e l a t e to aesthetics because many commentators 
have seen these Papirer primarily as the first-person testimony of a 
romantically wayward youth. To some extent the issue here i s akin 
to that which was discussed i n the f i r s t chapter under the heading 
'Poet or Thinker'. ( l ) Do these entries represent a personal con-
fession or are they contributions to a theory of a r t , a theory of 
romanticism? Moreover, i f we have here the outlines of a theory of 
romanticism, i s th i s theory written from a romantic standpoint, or 
from an hegelian or some other position? Our answers to these ques-
tions have already been anticipated in the previous chapter, where 
i t was argued that though Kierkegaard f e l t the force of certain rom-
antic conceptions and experiences, h i s writing witnesses to h i s at-
tempt to construct a c r i t i c a l theory of romanticism, a theory which 
incorporated both hegelian and personalist elements derived chi e f l y 
from Heiberg and Mill e r respectively. 
I t may, however, be retorted that t h i s position was argued for 
by r e f e r r i n g to Kierkegaard's matiire psychological theory which was 
made the pattern for h i s treatment of ar t and that I t i s therefore 
s t i l l possible that Kierkegaard did at some point have a 'romantic' 
period, i n r e l a t i o n to which h i s l a t e r c r i t i q u e of romanticism and of 
ar t i n general i s as much the theoretical j u s t i f i c a t i o n ex post facto 
of a personal conversion as i t i s the outworking of a consistent phil-
osophical approach to the matter i n hand. 
Nelly V i a l l a n e i x , for instance, writes of the period 1835-38 
that 'Ce court intermede constitue ce qu'on peut appeler l a periode 
A 
romantique de Kierkegaard. Au cours de sa jeunesse i l ne fut sans 
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jamais hegelien. Mais i l fut romantique et, dans une certaine mes-
ure, i l l e resta.' ( 2 ) Similarly S^ren Holm asserts that ' ... he 
embraced romanticism with a passion', ( 3 ) 'S.K. experienced romantic-
ism; he read the romantic poets of Germany and Denmark, and was so 
much influenced by them that he was able to describe the aesthetic 
stage as one who had himself been an aesthete.' ( 4 ) Gerhard vom Hofe 
also claims that 'Kierkegaard begann wie Hegel a l s leidenschaftlicher 
Romantiker, und diese Tatsache erklSxt u.a. die Intensitat seines 
spateren Kampf es gegen romantische SpekTilation, Ironie, Aesthetik und 
Poetik, gegen die Symptome romantischer Geisteshaltmg und Existenz'. ( 5 ) 
While not denying that Kierkegaard did fe e l in himself certain 
'symptoms' of romanticism the question remains whether these symptoms 
are s u f f i c i e n t for us to diagnose the whole body of h i s early Papirer 
as 'romantic*J- There are in fact a number of considerations which 
weigh against such a conclusion. 
F i r s t l y , i f the thesis that the positive aspects of Kierkegaard's 
r e l a t i o n to Heiberg need to be given more attention than has often 
been the case in Kierkegaard studies, i t must be imderlined that the 
period of Kierkegaard's closest association with Heiberg (the a n t i -
romantic polemicist), the period of h i s contributions to Heiberg's 
papers, the period when he was lampooned as Heiberg's amanuensis, 
f a l l s r i g h t in the middle of h i s so-called romantic period. ( 6 ) There 
i s moreover the evidence of the texts themselves that in t h i s period 
Kierkegaard was at the very least- experimenting with the application 
of heibergian/hegelian categories and methods to aesthetic questions. 
In the presentation of the material I s h a l l in fact argue that i t per-
mits a much stronger 'hegeliah' interpretation thgn t h i s . 
Secondly, there i s the evidence that in h i s approach to romantic-
ism Kierkegaard had an ultimately theological interest. R. Summers writes: 
There was a serious purpose behind h i s interest in Romanticism, 
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which f a r from being a rejectio n of or escape from Christian-
i t y could have been motivated by i t . For having once recog-
nized that C h r i s t i a n i t y was a particular view of l i f e and that 
there was a problem of i t s r e l a t i o n to other views of l i f e , 
Kierkegaard was compelled, as a matter of personal urgency, 
to come to grips with the dominant trends of the age, as ex-
pressed i n l i t e r a t u r e and s e n s i b i l i t y , some of which were 
ce r t a i n l y not favourable to Chr i s t i a n i t y . (7) 
Gerhard vom Hofe, who, as we have seen, does to some extent subscr-
ibe to the view that Kierkegaard had a romantic phase also acknow-
ledges that ' ... schon die frUhen Tagebticher: zeigen" ein bemerkens-
wertes Widerspiel von r e f l e k t i e r t e r Romantik-Aneignung und k r i t i s c h e r 
Infragestellung romantischer Poesie und Philosophie', ( 8 ) and he 
argues further that over against l i t e r a r y and h i s t o r i c a l speculation 
...entwirft Kierkegaard i n den frtOien Tageblichem gl e i c h z e i t i g 
eine theologische Deutuhg des Romantischen - ein Versuch, das 
romantische Stadium in einen heilsgeschichtlichen Rhythmus ein-
zuordnen und die Punktion des Romantischen innerhalb der trans-
historischen Teleologie der ch r i s t l i c h e n Heilsgeschichte zu 
bestimmen. (9) 
This emerges with pa r t i c i i l a r c l a r i t y in Kierkegaard's deployment of 
the category of humour and h i s use of h i s reading of Hamann which 
dates from I 8 5 6 . (IO) 
L a s t l y there i s the overall pattern of Kierkegaard's writings in 
the Papirer on ar t a^ on romanticism, for these writings tend,to..see 
romanticism from the outside, to look at i t from a non-romantic stand-
point. To interpret these Papirer as the writings of a romantic in 
fact foreshortens the perspective, so that we see only a selection of 
the material. I t i s contended here that the presentation of these 
writings as writings about romanticism from a stanpoint beyond rom-
anticism actually permits the most coherent and total reading of the 
available texts. In t h i s sense the actual exposition of Kierkegaard's 
theory of a r t on the basis of h i s own writings i s the best argument 
against a 'romantic Kierkegaard'. 
Closely connected with the question of whether Kierkegaard had a 
youthful dalliance with romanticism i s the question of how far we can 
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read the early Papirer as having an ultimately autobiographical r e f -
erence. Emanuel Hirsch suggested that many entries which might ap-
pear to lend themselves to an autobiographical reading are in fact 
notes for or fragments of a projected epistolary novel, which Hirsch 
c a l l s the'Faustian Let t e r s ' . ( l l ) I f this i s accepted, then many of 
the best-known entries, entries which evoke the mood of n i h i l i s t i c 
melancholy - a mood which has become v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the 
name 'Kierkegaard' - would not represent Kierkegaard's own position, 
h i s own life-mood, but could be seen as written with a larger aim in 
view, namely as a contribution to a critique of j u s t such a position 
of n i h i l i s t i c melancholy. 
The issues can be concretized by reference to a particular 
entry. 
I have j u s t now come from a gathering where I was the l i f e 
and soiil lof the party; witticism flowed from my mouth, 
everybody laughed, admired me - but I l e f t , yes, the dash 
sought to be as long as the r a d i i of the earth's orbit — 
and wanted to shoot myself. ( l A I 6 I / 5 I 4 I ) 
F r i t h i o f Brandt, followed by Lowrie, sees here a straightforward 
autobiographical statement. He even believes that he can specify the 
date (the entry i s undated) as June 4th I 8 3 6 , the occasion as a fare-
well party at the Heibergs, and the cause of Kierkegaard's sudden 
despairing departure as a dressing-down from Poul Miller. ( l 2 ) 
Hirsch however sees i t as a part of the Faustian L e t t e r s , in which 
case we would not be j u s t i f i e d i n seeing in i t a direct statement of 
Kierkegaard concerning himself, although we would equally not be j u s t -
i f i e d i n assuming that he did not have such experiences. ( 1 3 ) 
Hirsch's hypothesis has been taken up with polemical b r i l l i a n c e 
by Henning Fenger who has brought h i s acquaintance with danish l i t e r -
ature to bear on the question and who has shown that certain appar-
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ently autobiographical episodes cannot possibly be such because 
they contain gross internal contradictions and/or descriptive ele-
ments which clash with empirical, e.g. geographical , facts and he 
has argued that these episodes are best seen as attempts to emulate 
certain contemporary writers. (I4) 
The more the autobiographical l i n k i s weakened the harder i t 
becomes to maintain the hypothesis of Kierkegaard's romantic youth, 
and one s t a r t s to suspect that the reason why these Papirer have 
been read in t h i s way i s not because the texts themselves require 
such a reading, but because of the l i t e r a r y principles of the f i r s t 
generations of Kierkegaard scholars, who worked in the shadow of 
Georg Brandes and h i s demand that l i t e r a t u r e be read with reference 
to the l i f e , the psychology and the social situation of the author. (15) 
But i f the writings in the early Papirer which deal with art do 
not represent the self-consciousness of a romantic poet, what do 
they represent? 
No interpreters have erred so much as to maintain that a l l the 
material i s autobiographical, and i t has long been accepted that 
Kierkegaard was engaged on some sort of project which had something 
to do with l i t e r a t u r e and a r t in t h i s early period. Can we say vdiat 
sort of project i t was? 
The editors of the standard danish edition of the Papirer, who 
in general, worked with the 'autobiographical' model of interpretat-
ion, describe i t , somewhat ponderously, as a 
contribution to the characterization of the s p i r i t of the 
Middle Ages by means of a broad h i s t o r i c a l study of the 
phenomena peculiar to the period, with reference to a l l 
areas of c u l t u r a l l i f e - l i t e r a t u r e , a r t , r e l i g i o n , science 
and s o c i a l relationships - concentrating on a more exhaust-
ive concrete study of the medieval Volkgeist'-s manifestat-
ion i n poetry, saga, t a l e s and legends, and particularly 
the representative ideas of Don Juan, Faust and the Wander-
ing Jew which had sprung from the popular medieval con-
sciousness ... (16) 
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Walter Lowrie sees i t in similar terms: 
He had i n mind a grandiose plan, a history of the Middle 
Ages illuminated by i t s secular ideals as they are ex-
hi b i t e d in the predominant interests of the common people 
... The plan he had in mind must have been singularly 
a t t r a c t i v e to t h i s v e r s a t i l e young man because i t combin-
ed history, l i t e r a t u r e , aesthetics, and philosophy. For 
i t was to have been a philosophical work in the manner 
of Hegel ... (17) 
Certainly the scope of the project was wide, probably too wide, but 
did i t have a primary focus, and i f so what was i t ? Was i t the 
Middle Ages as the editors of the Papirer and Lowrie sxiggest, or 
was i t something else? 
R. M. Summers a^gT^es that 'Kierkegaard's interest in the Mid-
dle Ages was limited, however. Medievalism was only an aspect of 
Romanticism ...' ( I 8 ) and the present writer would agree with that 
judgement. I t does more j u s t i c e to the general scope of these notes 
and to the wording of particular entries to regard the interest in 
romanticism as primary and the i n t e r e s t i n things medieval as sec-
ondary rather than vice versa. Kierkegaard, following the romantics 
themselves and their c r i t i c s , saw an i n t r i n s i c connection between 
romanticism and the Middle Ages, as we sh a l l see. ( 1 9 ) In the l i g h t 
of t h i s connection i t i s easy to see the root of possible confusion 
concerning the primary focus of these studies. 
I f Kierkegaard's primary interest was at that time the study of 
romanticism t h i s also means that questions of aesthetics woizld never 
have been far from the forefront of h i s thinking, for, as we have 
seen, romanticism was in certain essential respects a:.philosophy of 
ar t . In f a c t i t could be argued that the texts are better seen as 
contributions to a theory and critique of art . tkan i as contribut-
ions to a theory of romanticism. In a certain sense this i s v i r t u -
a l l y saying the same thing in different words, given the aesthetic 
nature and ideals of romanticism. However i t does point to the more 
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general philosophical and theological significance of what Kierke-
gaard was trying to do, for by seeing these writings i n terms of 
their reference to ar t as such, we can see that Kierkegaard was 
simply taking up one of the perennial problematics of i d e a l i s t 
thought, namely, the relationship between the good, the beautiful, 
and the true, or, in other words, between r e l i g i o n , art and philo-
sophy. Kierkegaard's v i s i o n of romanticism was conditioned by a . 
philosophical perspective which was wider than that required for a 
mere reaction to a pa r t i c u l a r , contemporary cultural movement. In 
romanticism he saw the contemporary manifestation of a recurrent 
human dilemma, a dilemma which could be elucidated philosophical-
ly,and resolved r e l i g i o u s l y 
I f we therefore regard the project of these early Papirer as 
an attempt to frome a c h r i s t i a n philosophy of art the question a r i s -
es as to how far t h i s project i s 'aesthetic' in a narrower sense. 
G. Vom Hofe argues that Kierkegaard's critique of romanticism 
was b a s i c a l l y philosophical and only secondarily based on consider-
ations a r i s i n g out of art-theory more narrowly understood. 
Aesthetische K r i t e r i e n begegnen bei Kierkegaard nur selten, 
s i e spielen keine entscheidende Rolle ... Kierkegaard hat 
keine Aesthetik (im Sinne einer Kunstlehre oder Poetik), 
gleichwohl aber eine Theorie des Aesthetischen in seiner 
Stadienlehre entwickelt. Die c h r i s t l i c h begrWndete An-
thropologie bestimmt die Intention des Gesamtwerks. (20) 
As we have seen, such a di s t i n c t i o n between art-theory and p h i l -
osophy of a r t i s made by Hegel in h i s Aesthetik , but on the other 
hand Heiberg i s prepared to use philosophical form\ilae in construct-
ing what i s very much a theory of taste, a theory of ar t i n a more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y aesthetic sense. (21) I t might also be argued that •, 
owing to the nature of the subject^, Hegel' s r e s t r i c t i o n s on a philo-
sophy of a r t do not hold in practice, and he himself constantly d i -
gresses into concrete exemplifications and spices the l o g i c a l base 
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with a vast range of aesthetic analyses and judgements - a l l of 
which have contributed to the success and r e l a t i v e popularity of 
hi s Aesthetics. (22) 
There i s then the p o s s i b i l i t y of a sl i d i n g scale running from 
the pureXdetachment of a philosophy of a r t i n the sense which Hegel 
proclaims but does not practise, through Hegel's own practice, to 
Heiberg's philosophically-based theory of a r t , down to aesthetic 
c r i t i c i s m conducted on an ad hoc basis, such as Heiberg would have 
C a l l e d dilettantism. Where on th i s scale i s Kierkegaard's philo-
sophy of a r t to be found? 
Although Kierkegaard sees a r t in a philosophical perspective 
( a perspective i t s e l f limited and determined by h i s ultimate r e l i g -
ious concerns), he has at the same time a keen interest in the appli-
cation of aesthetic principles to the evaluation and judgement of 
works of a r t . This i s , of course, most c l e a r l y evidenced in his 
own practice as a l i t e r a r y c r i t i c , (23) by the notes on l i t e r a t u r e 
and, a l b e i t to a l e s s e r extent, on the other a r t s , which we find in 
the Papirer. The philosophy hastto mesh in with, to be applicable 
to, the actual production and reception of works of art. Kierke-
gaard's philosophy of a r t , therefore, i s not only about the delimit-
ation of the sphere of a r t in a general way, but also provides sign-
posts to help the reader find h i s way about within the aesthetic 
sphere i t s e l f . 
Conversely, Kierkegaard's ultimate concern i s not aesthetic but 
r e l i g i o u s , and i t i s in the drawing of the boundary between these 
spheres that the philosophical character of Kierkegaard's theory of 
ar t emerges. His writings on romanticism and on art thus contain 
elements both of art-theory in the narrower sense and of philosoph-
i c a l aesthetics. This i s true of the authorship as a whole as well 
as of the early Papirer. Kierkegaard's philosophy of art i s both a 
141 -
theory and a c r i t i q u e of art. This theory and critique of a r t , as 
i t i s sketched in the early Papirer, w i l l be dealt with under three 
headings: 'Art and I d e a l i t y ' ; 'The Representative Figures'; 'The 
D i a l e c t i c s of Romanticism'. A fourth section w i l l deal with the 
notes on aesthetics i n Papirer IV. 
(B) Art and I d e a l i t y 
In one of the e a r l i e s t entries in the Papirer, Kierkegaard 
s p e l l s out the basic connection which he sees as holding between 
a r t and the ideal. 
The reason I cannot r e a l l y say that I positively enjoy nature 
i s that I do not quite r e a l i z e what i t i s that I enjoy. A 
work of a r t , on the other hand, I can grasp, I can - i f I may 
put i t t h i s way - find that Archimedean point, and as soon as 
I have found i t , everything i s readily clear for me. Then I 
am able to pursue t h i s one main idea and see how a l l the de-
t a i l s serve to illuminate i t . I see the author's whole indiv-
i d u a l i t y as i f i t were the sea, in which every single de t a i l 
i s r e f l e c t e d . The author's s p i r i t i s kindred to me; he i s 
very probably far superior to me, I am siire, but yet he i s 
limited as I am. The works of the deity are too great for me; 
I always get l o s t in the d e t a i l s . ( l A 8 / I I 7 ) 
In t h i s entry Kierkegaard i s describing the ideal attunement which 
we have observed to be of the essence of the i d e a l i s t - whether 
romantic or hegelian - concept of the aesthetic experience. The 
work of a r t i s constituted as such on the basis of 'one main idea' 
which m i t e s a r t i s t , work and recipient. 
In the same entry Kierkegaard goes on to consider the s i g n i f -
icance of the figiire of the blind bard, such as Homer or Ossian. 
The f a c t that genius in such figures i s a l l i e d to blindness indic-
ates to Kierkegaard that the true a r t i s t does not copy the beauty 
of natiire in a merely external sense but receives h i s poetic vision 
in an 'inward intuition'? The idea, not the sensuous form i s the-
basiscof a r t i s t i c beauty, and i t i s on t h i s basis that the extern-
a l form i s constructed. Kierkegaard then mentions the case of 
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Francois Hubert, a writer on bees, which suggests that he might 
have been prepared to apply the same principle, at l e a s t at t h i s 
early stage of h i s development, to the nat-ural sciences. The r e f -
erence to the bard evokes Hegel's description ( i n the Phenomenology) 
of the bard whose 'pathos i s Mnemosyne', and although i t does not 
follow that Kierkegaard knew t h i s passage at that time the similar-
i t y of t h e i r interpretation of the bard i s suggestive of a s i g n i f -
icant overlap in their conceptions of art. (24) 
The approach to a r t indicated by this passage not only l i n k s 
Kierkegaard to the mainstream of i d e a l i s t aesthetics but also points 
to a connection between h i s concern for art and the other problems 
with which he occupied himself in the early Papirer. Again and 
again we find him wrestling with the task of finding unity in divers-
i t y , of attaining the archimedean point, the intuition of the whole in 
which r e l a t i v i t y i s mastered. 
We can see such a struggle taking place in h i s thoxights on the 
relationship of predestination and human freedom v i s - a ^ v i s the prob-
lem of e v i l . For, as Kierkegaard sees i t , t h i s problem turns on the 
question whether there i s one single power directing the manifold of 
phenomena or whether, as in Manichaeanism, there i s an \iltimate dual-
ism, i n which case there i s no way out of r e l a t i v i t y . (25) 
The question rec\irs with regard to the natural sciences, and the 
inadequacy of merely accumtilating data. Though he emphasizes the 
d i f f i c T i l t i e s involved, Kierkegaard thinks that, in principle at l e a s t , 
natural science can r a i s e i t s e l f to the l e v e l at which intuition of 
the ideal unity of the manifold i s possible. There are some s c i e n t i f -
i c researchers 
...•who through the i r r e f l e c t i o n have found or are trying to 
find that Archimedean point which i s nowhere in the world 
and from that point have surveyed the whole and have seen 
the d e t a i l s in theirpproper l i g h t . As far as they are con-
cerned, I do not deny that they have had a very salutary 
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e f f e c t on me. One rarely finds t r a n q u i l i t y , harmony 
and joy such as theirs. ^ ^2/5092) 
For most men however, science i s merely the accumulation of 
fac t s , not the achievement of such a speculative standpoint. 
( I I A 29/1182) 
The same tension i s present, but with a more exist e n t i a l slant 
when i t comes to facing and choosing between the many p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
which l i f e offers. Kierkegaard - or the faustian l e t t e r - w r i t e r -
states that ' the crucial thing i s to f i n d a t r u t h which i s t r u t h for 
me, to f i n d the idea for which I am w i l l i n g to l i v e and die' (lA 75/5100) 
The task of finding t h i s idea i s the 'inward action of man', the 'God-
side of man' , and i t i s t h i s 'which i s decisive, not a mass of data, 
for the l a t t e r w i l l no doubt follow and w i l l not then appear as ac-
cidental aggregates or as a succession of d e t a i l s , one after the oth-
er, without a system, without a focal point.' ( i b i d . ) To f i n d t h i s 
'idea' i s also, he says, 'to f i n d myself.' ( i b i d . ) 
In a l l t h i s Kierkegaard i s only saying what could have been said 
by any romantic i d e a l i s t . The postulate of the unity of the manifold 
being found i n an ideal ' i n t u i t i o n ' provides a clear l i n k to Steffens' 
lectures, and to those such as Sibbem who were inspired by them.(26) 
On the other hand his emphasis on despair as the motive power i n t h i s 
quest f o r unity ( l l A 29/5092) r e c a l l s Hegel's d e f i n i t i o n of philoso-
phical method as a'highway of despair'. (2?) Nor does the ethical 
emphasis which emerges i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the 'idea' as the 
self involve a break with the i d e a l i s t consensus i n which the 'idea' 
and the self i n i t s absolute, productive, o r i g i n a l nature are one and 
the same. 
In a l l these cases, i n theology, i n natural science and i n the 
si t u a t i o n of ex i s t e n t i a l i r r e s o l u t i o n , Kierkegaard emphasizes the 
problematic nat\ire of the attainment of the id e a l , integrating i n -
t u i t i o n . A rt however i s an exception. In the encounter with the 
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work of a r t we can have an experience of wholeness, because we can 
experience an ideal attuaement with the ideal focal point which i n -
dwells the work of a r t - since, as we have seen, th i s idea i s posit-
ed by a s p i r i t u a l subject who i s s p i r i t u a l l y on the same level as 
we are - and communion i s thus possible. 
Not every human production, however, has t h i s characteristic 
which belongs only to a true work of a r t , nor indeed i s every work 
which claims the status of a r t t r u l y a r t , t r u l y a product of i d e a l i t y . 
Only the genuine work of a r t i s able to constitute an 'organic whole' 
i n which the individual parts, while remaining independent, are co-
ordinated with each other i n the context of the whole. ( l A 32/5O63) 
He commented on Samuel Warren's Passages from the Diary of a Late 
Physician th a t , despite the'piquant and interesting' situations des-
cribed i n i t , the book lacks a genuinely poetic vision. The reader 
i s overwhelmed by the mass of material instead of being granted 
that 'harmonious joy' which i s the highest aesthetic experience. 
( I C 125/5199) (28) 
A novel, for instance, must conta,in and communicate a 'result-
ant t o t a l i t y , given through the presentation of the manifold of 
discrete parts', and when t h i s balance of whole and parts i s achiev-
ed i t exemplifies the r u l e that 'what i s sown i s perishable, what i s 
raised i s imperishable'. ( l l A 512(/536l)) That i s to say that what 
Sibbem had described as the 'ideal r e b i r t h ' of r e a l i t y i n the aesth-
eti c experience i s achieved: the ideally integrated t o t a l i t y stands 
out of the f l u x of transiency i n which everything that exists i n mere 
p a r t i c ^ l l a r i t y i s dissolved. I t i s t h i s unity and t o t a l i t y which 
Kierkegaard, l i k e Schlegel, finds i n Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. In 
t h i s work he discerns a 'well-balanced guidance which pervades the 
whole,' ( l C 73(/ l455)) not only i n that the guiding hand of the 
author i s at a l l times f i r m l y i n control, but also i n the way that 
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the hero himself i s led to take up the world-view, the 'fichtean 
moral world-order,' as Kierkegaard c a l l s i t , which the author him-
self presupposes. The novel ' i s t r u l y the whole world seen i n a 
mirror, a true microcosm.' ( l C 73 (/1455)) He also finds such a 
'f'ichtean moral world-order' i n F. M. Von Klinger's Der Faust der 
Morgeniander. ( l C 5O/II86) 
The 'ideal' novel gives the reader the p o s s i b i l i t y of a sort of 
experience comparable to the i n t u i t i o n which would harmonize and ex-
plain the t o t a l i t y of the phenomena of the natural world, leaving 
aside the question as to how f a r Kierkegaard conceived of that i n -
t u i t i o n as s c i e n t i f i c or e x i s t e n t i a l . The novel i s not just a slice 
of l i f e , i t i s a whole world, constructed on the basis of^or i n the 
medium of, the ideal. I d e a l i t y may however be embodied i n d i f f e r e n t 
ways i n the production of works of a r t . The Idea (or absolute) i s 
refracted i n t o a manifold of 'ideas', and only i n t h i s way does 
i d e a l i t y become serviceable f o r the a r t i s t . Every true a r t i s t has a 
particular genius, and he must f i n d that idea which most suits his 
genius. Many of these 'ideas' come down to us from the past. Ex-
amples of t h i s are the ideas of Don Juan, of Faust, of the Wandering 
Jew. The a r t i s t ' s choice of 'idea' i s to some extent determined by 
the age he l i v e s i n , by his h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n , (IC 
61/511) and even an old idea w i l l be handled i n accordance with the 
presuppositions of the a r t i s t ' s contemporary age.(l A 88/II77) As 
we have j u s t seen Kierkegaard considers there to be a specific cor-
r e l a t i o n between the novels of Goethe and von Klinger and the contemp-
orary fichtean philosophy, and i t i s not l i k e l y that he would have 
regarded the synchronicity of the novels and the philosophy as mere-
l y accidental, although he did not go as far as Martensen i n seeking a 
formal correlation between philosophy and a r t . (29) 
Nonetheless the a r t i s t i s not t i e d by the ideas which are handed 
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down to him by the past, ( l A 86/119) although Kierkegaard c r i t i c -
izes Heine and the young Germany movement for going too far i n the 
direction of a c u l t of the new for newness' sake. ( l A 223/5157) A 
great a r t i s t or writer w i l l d i s t i l his idea from his own s p i r i t u a l 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 'An author's work should bear the imprint of his 
likeness,' ( l l A 270/5351) Kierkegaard claims, and he notices how 
a great individual can ar t i c u l a t e l i f e ' s haxd-leamt lessons i n a 
concise and memorable phrase, sublimating l i f e into l i t e r a r y express-
ion. ( I A 121/4386) 
The recipient of the work of art must also have the speculat-
ive capacity, be able to see the part i n r e l a t i o n to the whole. 
This i s something which, i n Kierkegaard's view, most people lack. 
They do not see the tragedy or hear the opera, they see and hear 
only monologues and arias, only the parts, not the whole. ( l A 111/ 
2245) When the idea i s perceived and the aesthetic experience of 
attimement i s consummated then l i f e i s poetically 'transfigured', 
( l A 264/1629) a term which Kierkegaard takes over from the t r a d i t -
ion, and uses i n the sense of the l i f t i n g - u p or r e b i r t h of the real 
i n the realm of the ideal. 
Kierkegaard describes how such an experience of transfiguration 
comes to him through reading f a i r y - t a l e s : 
When I am weary of everything and " f u l l of days," f a i r y 
tales are always a refreshing, renewing bath for me. 
There a l l earthly, f i n i t e cares vanish; joy, yes, even 
sorrow, are i n f i n i t e ... one completely forgets the par-
t i c \ i l a r , private sorrows which every man can have, i n 
order to plunge into the deep-seated sorrow common to 
a l l ... ( I I A 207/5287) 
In the i n f i n i t y of the ideal medium of aesthetic experience even the 
experience of sorrow i s refreshing. (50) 
Aesthetic experience thus acquires a privileged r o l e for Kierke-
gaard. Here an attunement i s possible such as could only be achieved 
with great d i f f i c u l t y , i f at a l l , i n other spheres of l i f e - i n 
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natural science, i n theology, i n exis t e n t i a l experience. But what 
i s the scope of the privilege enjoyed by art? I s the aesthetic' ex-
perience absolute or merely provisional, anticipatory? And i f i t i s 
only provisional, by what i s i t limited? 
Kierkegaard quotes with e x p l i c i t approval from K. E. Schubarth's 
lectures Ueber Goethe's Faust that 
" ... Statt das also das Absolute i n die Philosophie auf-
zunehmen se i , wo es stets s t a r r , trocken, todt, ungenies-
sbar verbleibe und verrlickte Gombinationen veranlasse, ge-
httre der Begriff desselben recht ei g n t l i c h der Poesie an,-
die ihm a l l e i n G i l t i g k e i t zu verschaff en und ihn durch-das 
grenzenlose Schwarmen der Einbildungskraft, dem er ent-
sp r i c h t , erst lebendig, wirksam, wahr, so wie ergtttzlich 
und heiter zu machen im Stande sei." ( l C 97) 
The superiority of poetry over philosophy i s likewise indicat-
ed by Kierkegaard's approval of Poul M)Z$ller's insertion of an humor-
ous episode into the Immortality essay as being a dramatic device which 
improves on a merely s c i e n t i f i c presentation. ( l l A I7/52OI) 
However i t must be noted that Hegel too acknowledged that poetry 
had an i n t r i n s i c s i m i l a r i t y to speculative thought which put i t 'ab-
ove' merely dry, r a t i o n a l i s t i c , abstract philosophy. ( 3 I ) These pas-
sages are to some extent prophetic of Kierkegaard's l a t e r work, of his 
method of presenting philosophical and theological issues i n the im-
aginative, '-unscientific' fashion, but i t i s important to note that i n 
these early Papirer aesthetic experience i s expressly re l a t i v i z e d . I t 
does not represent the absolute. 
Although the f i r s t entry which we examined i n t h i s section des-
cribed the experience of works of a r t as being able to give an exper-
ience of ideal harmony such as would not be possible i n an encounter 
with phenomena of the natural world, t h i s quality of the experience of 
a r t also indicates i t s restrictedness. Such aesthetic experience 
leaves the question of the ultimate unity of phenomena in a c t u a l i t y , 
i n the real world, manswered - nor does i t answer the young man's 
ex i s t e n t i a l question as to what he should do with his l i f e , nor does 
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i t resolve the theological question concerning the o r i g i n of e v i l , 
of other-than-divine forces, and the place of such forces i n the 
universal order. 
Aesthetic experience, aesthetic attunement, thus stands i n a 
problematic r e l a t i o n to the actual situation of man-in-the-world. 
Typically, Kierkegaard asserts that the wholeness which poetry and 
art project and bestow i s not to be found i n r e a l i t y . As we have 
already seen, the refreshment which he finds i n reading f a i r y - s t o r i e s 
stands i n contrast to the weariness he feels i n l i f e . Elsewhere he 
refers to the 'poetic moming-dfeam of our l i f e ' being related to 
r e a l i t y as Moses i s related to Joshua: the one sees the promised 
land, but i t i s only the other, the follower, the epigone, v^o ent-
ers, ( l l A 165/859) However much poetry attempts to engage i t s e l f 
with r e a l i t y there i s a point of separation which can never be cro-
ssed. Just as Pharaoh dreamed f i r s t of the lean c a t t l e and secondly 
of the wasted corn, thereby moving from a less to a more adequate 
symbol of famine, so poetry can make i t s symbols more and more pre-
cise, i t can bring them closer and closer to r e a l i t y , but without 
touching i t : Pharaoh's dreams remain dreams. ( l l A 551/3^51) 
An experience which i s essentially akin to aesthetic experience 
i s the pantheistic mood i n which 
One dozes, as i t were, i n the t o t a l i t y of things ( a pan-
t h e i s t i c element, without producing strength as does the 
r e l i g i o u s ) i n an oriental reverie i n the i n f i n i t e , i n which 
everything appears to be f i c t i o n - and one i s reconciled as 
in a grand poem: the being of the whole world, the being 
of God, and my own being are poetry i n which a l l the m u l t i -
p l i c i t y , the wretched di s p a r i t i e s of l i f e , indigestible 
fo r human thought, are reconciled i n a misty, dreamy exist-
ence. But then, regrettably, I wake up again, and the very 
same tragic r e l a t i v i t y ' i n everything begins worse than ever 
( I I A 125/1019) 
Although t h i s i s intended as a description of a psychological mood 
with no specific connection to the experience of a r t , the comments 
that 'one i s reconciled as i n a grand poem,' that 'everything 
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appears to be f i c t i o n , ' that God, the world, the s e l f , have become 
'poetry' , a l l signal that there i s considerable overlap between 
such a mood and the mood which aesthetic attunement evokes i n us 
Earl i e r i n the entry the mood i s described as 'vegetative', and t h i s , 
together with the term ' o r i e n t a l ' , and indeed the whole tenor of the 
description, l i n k i t to the aesthetic vision of Friedrich Schlegel. 
(32) Kierkegaard's account of t h i s mood, however, makes-;it.'.elear 
that he regards such an experience as powerless to resolve the real 
c o n f l i c t s of existence, to which the dreamer must always return. 
The connection between pantheism and aesthetic experience i s 
also made i n another entry which contrasts such a mood with the de-
mands of Chr i s t i a n i t y . The middle section of the entry runs: 
The caricature of pantheism i s obviously the evaporation 
of the person brought about by the luxuriousness, the poetic 
world that the individual projects, i n which authentic consc-
ious existence i s surrendered and everything i s poetry, i n 
which the individual i s at most l i k e a flower woven i n a 
damask cloth. • . (IIA 464/ 3890) 
The world constructed by poetry i n the medium of i d e a l i t y i s a dream-
world, a pantheistic world. I n h i s attunement to the idea as i t i s 
present i n a work of ar t the individual transcends himself into an 
i n f i n i t e , ideal dimension, i n which he experiences a joyous, harmon-
ious integration of himself with the divine and with the world. Such 
an integration can however only be at best provisional and at worst 
i l l u s o r y . I t i s a loss of self rather than a finding of self. I t i s 
a dream i n which the boundaries of self and not-self disappear, so 
that the dreamer can ask with von Eichendorff (quoted by Kierkegaard): 
' "--Tr'aifflie ich denn, oder trftumt diese phantastische Nacht von mir? ?"' 
( I I A 405) And i n a fragmentary entry which seems to be a prelimin-
ary working of I I A 125 (the description of the pantheistic mood), we 
read of a 'misty, dreaming, f a i r y - l i k e existence - the purely aesthet-
i c - ...' ( I I A 618). The pure aesthetic experience i s a 'misty, 
dreaming, f a i r y - l i k e ' condition, the volatization of the personality. 
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I t i s the experience, the despairing experience, of the contra-
d i c t i c t i o n s of existence which, as we have seen, motivates the pur-
s u i t of the i n t u i t i o n of ideal harmony, ( l l A 49/1569) and i t i s a 
similar experience of du a l i t y , of "Zerrissenheit" which l i e s at the 
root of the creative power which produces the aesthetic world. The 
joy of aesthetic experience i s a ch i l d of sorrow. 
When one understands Brorson's words 
When the heart i s most oppressed 
Then the harp of joy i s tuned 
not r e l i g i o u s l y , as they were w r i t t e n , but esthetic-
ally'^ then he has i n them a motto f o r a l l poetic 
existence, which necessarily must be ixnhappy. 
( I l l A 12/800) 
Even i n describing the r e l a t i v i t y of a r t , however, Kierkegaard does 
not deny i t s r e l a t i v e validi-fcy. 
The poetic ... i s the Cord through which the divine 
holds fast to existence. Therefore one could believe 
that they are the blessed, those g i f t e d individuals, 
those l i v i n g telegraph wires between God and men. 
But t h i s i s most certainly not true ... their l o t . . . 
£ i s 3 annihilation of the i r personal existence as 
being incapable of enduring the touch of the divine 
... his fate: to know a t h i r s t which i s never sat-
i s f i e d . The poetic l i f e i n the personality i s the 
unconscious sacri f i c e ... i t i s f i r s t i n the r e l i g -
ious that the sac r i f i c e becomes conscious and the 
misrelationship i s removed. ( i l l A 62/1027) 
The realm of poetry, of a r t i n general, i s ambiguous. On the 
one hand, as ill-uminated by the power of i d e a l i t y , as the tr a n s f i g -
uration of l i f e , i t i s akin to the divine. But i n such aesthetic 
experience of transfiguration the self i s dissipated i n the ideal, 
i t does not f i n d i t s e l f . 
Kierkegaard's presuppositions here ar-e at once religious and 
philosophical. Religiously he presupposes a gulf between the ex-
ist e n t self and the divine, a gulf which cannot, i n the f i r s t i n -
stance, be crossed from the human side. This means that conscious-
ness i s required to be clear about the difference, the separateness 
of h-uman and divine selfhood. Thus any such confusion of divine and 
human as occurs i n the pantheistic mood v e i l s the divine rather than 
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bringing i t closer. 
Kierkegaard's presuppositions here are at once religious and 
philosophical. Religiously he presupposes a gulf between the exist-
ent s e lf and the divine, a gulf which cannot, i n the f i r s t instance, 
be crossed from the human side. This means that consciousness i s 
required to be clear about the difference, the separateness of hioman 
and divine selfhood. Thus any such confusion of divine and human as 
occurs i n the pantheistic mood v e i l s the divine rather than bringing 
i t closer. 
Philosophically, Kierkegaard's thought at th i s point echoes the 
idealist' t r a d i t i o n from Fichte to Hegel, and i n particular Hegel, i n 
that i t requires that the 'idea' does not exist merely one-sidedly, 
as an idea i n opposition to r e a l i t y , but also comes into r e l a t i o n -
ship to r e a l i t y . Aesthetic experience however involves the suspens-
ion of the consciousness of r e a l i t y and transposes the self into a 
realm of pure i d e a l i t y . I t i s a f l i g h t from r e a l i t y rather than the 
integration of the manifold of the elements of r e a l i t y into an ideal 
unity. 
Putting these r e l i g i o u s and philosophical analyses together, we 
may say that a r t , aesthetic experience, i s the sublimation of the 
painf-ul experience of ex i s t e n t i a l self-contradiction rather than the 
facing and overcoming of t h i s contradiction. Consequently the 'cure' 
which r e l i g i o n proposes f o r the unhappy consciousness of the poet i s , 
as the last-quoted extract makes clear, not the introduction of a new 
object i n t o consciousness, but rather an increase i n consciousness. 
The cure consists f i r s t l y i n the self acquiring insight into i t s con-
tra d i c t o r y predicament. The poet's problem however, i s that he i s 
unable to come to a clear understanding of the duality by which his 
existence i s defined, but when such knowledge i s attained, then the 
'sacr i f i c e .becomes conscious and the misrelationship i s removed.' 
( I l l A 62/1027) 
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In t h i s perspective, the n i h i l i s t i c or d u a l i s t i c phase of romantic-
ism reveals the true nature of the idea i n a r t , for i t reveals the 
discord, the pain, the suffering, which i s the real root of the 
world of harmonious images, the world of aesthetic experience. 
To see the way i n which Kierkegaard envisages the increase of 
consciousness which w i l l lead to the overcoming of the aesthetic 
self-misunderstanding we turn f i r s t l y to his discussion of the 
'Representative Figures'. 
(C) The Representative Figures 
In these early Papirer there are a considerable nimiber of entries 
r e l a t i n g to the three 'representative figures' of Don Juan, Faust and 
th Wandering Jew ( i n Danish the 'eternal' Jew). The relevant entries 
comprise reading l i s t s , notes and excerpts from primary and secondary 
sources as well as Kierkegaard's own observations and insights. The 
vast majority of these entries are from the years 1835-6, not from the 
very e a r l i e s t strata of the Papirer but s t i l l early. I t a period 
which Nelly Viallaneix and those who share the 'romantic Kierkegaard' 
hypothesis see as his romantic phase. (33) The treatment of the re-
presentative figures however shows the application of a d i a l e c t i c a l 
method akin to hegelian rather than to romantic procedures. Kierke-
gaard's int e r e s t i n these figures does not disappear, and he contin-
ues to ref e r to them and to use the lessons he had learned from his 
study of them i n the period of his published authorship. 
These, entries form a d i s t i n c t group and i t i s clear that Kierke-
gaard had i n mind some l i t e r a r y project i n which the three figures 
were c o l l e c t i v e l y involved. In the perspective which has been adopt-
ed f o r t h i s study they can be seen as playing a key role i n the theory 
and c r i t i q u e of a r t . Although the editors of the Papirer use Kierke-
gaard's preoccupation with these figures as evidence f o r their hypo-
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thesis concerning his study of the medieval s p i r i t (34) i t may be 
argued that they are not studied so much as h i s t o r i c a l phenomena, as 
embodying the s p i r i t of the l a t e Middle Ages, but as ideas. Kierke-
gaard himself defines them as the 'three great ideas representing 
l i f e i n i t s ' t h r e e tendencies, as i t were, outside of r e l i g i o n . . . ' 
( l A 150/795). Moreover his interest i n them i s t y p i c a l l y focussed 
on t h e i r use as a r t i s t i c ideas, i n the sense described i n the prev-
ious section of t h i s chapter. (35) As a r t i s t i c ideas they were of 
dir e c t contemporary relevance, since they had been taken up by Moz-
ar t (Don Juan), Goethe (Faust) and n i h i l i s t i c romanticism (The Wand-
ering Jew). (36) 
Kierkegaard seeks to relate these ideas to their appropriate 
aesthetic media. At one point he argues that Faust, as the most med-
iated f i g u r e , 'contains' both Don Juan and the Wandering Jew, and he 
supports t h i s claim by arguing that Don Juan i s essentially repres-
ented l y r i c a l l y , i.e. musically, the Jew epically and Faust dramat-
i c a l l y , ( l C 58/1179) I t i s a guide to Kierkegaard's i n t e l l e c t u a l 
orientation i n these studies that t h i s point e x p l i c i t l y r e f l e c t s 
Heiberg's arrangement of poetic forms - l y r i c , epic, dramatic -
precisely at the point where Heiberg's aesthetic schema d i f f e r s from 
Hegel. The same entry implies that there i s an i n t r i n s i c d i a l e c t i c a l 
connection between these f i g i i r e s , they are not jus t chosen at random 
from the manifold of cu l t u r a l history. 
I t i s tempting to draw the conclusion that we see Kierkegaard 
here as an aspiring man of l e t t e r s i n the school of the hegelian 
Heiberg. Why should we r e s i s t t h i s temptation? Indeed such a con— 
elusion i s encouraged by the consideration that these entries date 
from the same period as Kierkegaard's j o u r n a l i s t i c debut i n Heib-
erg's Kji^benhavns Flyvende Post. As a good heibergian Kierkegaard i s 
seeking to formulate the correct relationship of each idea to i t s 
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corresponding aesthetic form. 
At an ear l i e r stage Kierkegaard had been interested i n the 
'idea' (understood i n a similar sense) of the Master-Thief as re-
presented i n various f o l k - t a l e s . (37) But t h i s idea does not get 
worked in t o the complex of Don Juan, Faust and the Jew. Yet the 
Master-Thief too would surely serve as a figure representing one 
aspect of l i f e outside religion? Could i t be that for a young hei-
bergian the t r i a d i c logic of aesthetics means that three i s company 
and four a crowd? I s t h i s why the figure of the Master-Thief f a l l s 
by the wayside? 
Whatever the answer to these l a s t speculations, the d i a l e c t i c a l , 
indeed the hegelian, nature of Kierkegaard's approach to these 'ideas' 
i s manifest i n a lengthy entry r e f l e c t i n g on the mozartian personae: 
Cherubino, Papageno and Don Juan,( I C 125/4397) reflections which 
are l a t e r taken up i n Either-Or . (38) Kierkegaard believes that 
these three figures represent three stages i n which 'Mozart has con-
stmmiately and perfectly presented a development of love on the level 
of immediacy. ' ( i b i d . ) Don Juan himself ' i s the unity of both stages 
and i s the f i n a l stage of the development of immediacy.' ( i b i d . ) 
Following Heiberg, Kierkegaard equates the 'immediate' quality of 
these figures with the requirement that they be presented musically. 
He says that 'naturally, a l l three stages, being immediate, are 
purely musical, and any attempt i n another presentation i s l i k e l y to 
endow them with far too much consciousness.' ( i b i d . ) 
The three figures - Don Juan, Faust, the Jew - represent re-
spectively sensuousness, doubt and despair. But as 'ideas' they are 
not subject to moral or rel i g i o u s judgement. Such a moralistic, 
judgmental approach only becomes possible i f an individual t r i e s to 
l i v e i n accordance with these ideas. ( l A 150/795) The implication -
i f they are understood as essentially aesthetic ideas - i s that the 
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realm of a r t has i t s own autonomous principles of judgement d i s t i n c t 
from those of morality and r e l i g i o n . 
The importance f o r a r t of a correct understanding of what i t 
i s that each idea represents i s demonstrated by Kierkegaard i n his 
comments on Goethe's Faust. Goethe i s wrong, he asserts, to l e t 
Faust convert. ( l A IO4/II78; I A 292/1181; I A 72/5092) Faust 
i s doubt personified and as such he cannot be shown as going back to 
a state of pre-doubting innocence without ceasing to be Faust. He i s 
nailed to the spot to which the d i a l e c t i c of the idea confines him. 
Likewise Lenau i s c r i t i c i z e d for having Faust commit suicide which 
again, according to Kierkegaard, shows a misconception of the Faust 
idea. ( l l A 50/1183;^  I I A 56/II84) 
One might be permitted at t h i s point to suspect that Kierke-
gaard i s displaying the typical heibergian weakness of making the 
actual aesthetic material f i t the log i c a l schema rather than the 
other way round. 
I f an a r t i s t wants to portray a position of despair, beyond 
doubt then he must, according to Kierkegaard, allow 'the idea hover-
ing over a l l i t s actual forms' to potentiate i t s e l f to a nev; idea -
the Wandering Jew. ( l l A 56/II84) Though t h i s entry again shows the 
inherent d i a l e c t i c a l interrelatedness of the ideas i t suggests a new 
arrangement. Instead of Don Juan - the V/andering Jew - Faust, we now 
have Don Juan - Faust - the Wandering Jew. What i s the significance 
of the new arrangement? 
Basically i t means that now the idea of l i f e outside r e l i g i o n i s 
seen as potentiating i t s e l f through increasingly inward, increasing-
l y self-conscious levels of despair. This despair was only implic-
i t l y conscious i n the immediate, genial form of Don Juan but i t comes 
to a f u l l consciousness of i t s e l f i n the figure of the Jew, whose 
character i s summed up for Kierkegaard i n words which he excerpts 
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from E. T. A. Hoffmann, who writes that the Jew '..."durch das bunt-
este Gewlihl der Welt, ohne Freude, ohne Hoffnung, ohne Schmerz, i n 
dumpfer S l e i c h g i i l t i g k e i t , die das caput mortuimi der Verzweifelmg 
i s t . wie durch eine \mwirthbare trostlose Ein5de wandelte^.^"g^>j 
This arrangement also suggests that Kierkegaard i s free from any 
r i g i d adherence to heibergian dogma, but i n no way does i t necessar-
i l y put him outside the hegelian pale. On the contrary the dialect-
i c of the development of a self-consciousness of estrangement from the 
substantial divine ground which Kierkegaard develops here parallels 
Hegel's account of the 'Unhappy Consciousness' i n the Phenomenology. 
This does not mean that Kierkegaard derived t h i s pattern from Hegel -
i t may simply be the consequence of the application of the dialect-
i c a l method to similar material, with certain common presuppositions. (39) 
The culmination of the dia l e c t i c s of despair i n the figure of the 
Wandering Jew also l i n k s Kierkegaard's speculations to Po\il M i l l e r . 
M i l l e r , as we have seen, wrote a set of aphorisms depicting the char-
acter of Ahasverus, the Jew, as the embodiment of the n i h i l i s t i c at-
ti t u d e . I f Kierkegaard too saw the essential characteristic of the 
present a^e revealed i n n i h i l i s m i t would be consistent for him to 
have the d i a l e c t i c s of despair culminate i n the Jew, i n n i h i l i s m . 
Can the d i a l e c t i c of the three figures i n fact be projected on 
to the screen of history? By piecing together excerpts from various 
entries we may conclude that i t can. 
Though i n one sense a l l three figures emerge from the folk-con-
sciousness of the Middle Ages, Don Juan belongs to t h i s period i n a 
special way. This i s i m p l i c i t i n a number of entries i n the Papirer 
and i s stated e x p l i c i t l y i n Either-Or.(SV2p.83) Faust however - as 
Martensen had maintained (40) - i s a parody of the reformation, 
(11 A 53/1968) and the Jew i s said to be essentially a figure of the 
modern age. ( l A 181/737) 
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This h i s t o r i c a l sequence can now be related back to the charac-
t e r i z a t i o n of the figures as a r t i s t i c ideas and i t i s seen thgit they 
represent the process of development of the consciousness of a r t of 
i t s separation from the substantial divine ground, or, i n other 
words, three stages i n the secularization of a r t , leading to the sel f -
a n n i h i l a t i n g insight into the emptiness of i t s content. Art can at-
ta i n to knowledge of t h i s situation but cannot i t s e l f resolve i t . 
This i s the significance of the Wandering Jew who represents a l i m i t 
for a r t ; a r t cannot go beyond t h i s idea. I f i t does i t ceases to be 
a r t , f o r the next stage i s not aesthetic - i t i s religious. 
The representative figures are thus patient of interpretation as 
essentially aesthetic ideas which by the d i a l e c t i c of their develop-
ment point to the need for the transcendence of the aesthetic as such. 
For Kierkegaard as for Hegel the Reformation constitutes a watershed: 
t h i s side of the Reformation we cannot avoid the consciousness that 
a r t i s imable to give a satisfactory form to rel i g i o u s b e l i e f , that 
the s p i r i t now requires the inwardness of f a i t h , not the externality 
of the image. (41) The three figures reveal the negative aspect of 
t h i s process: the imagination's acquisition of the consciousness of 
i t s inner emptiness, of the knowledge that the content of a r t i s i r r e v -
ocably secular, unavoidably r e l a t i v e . 
This reading of these fragmentary notes carries further the an-
alysis of the ideal status of a r t i n the preceding section. I t ac-
quires support from the larger body of notes which we shall examine 
under the heading 'TheDialectics of Romanticism.' 
(p) The Dialectics of Romanticism 
(D) ( i ) The Dia l e c t i c a l Nature of Romanticism 
Kierkegaard regarded romanticism as i n t r i n s i c a l l y d i a l e c t i c a l , 
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i n a sense which he was prepared to acknowledge was hegelian: 
I t i s quite curious that, after being occupied so long with 
•t the concept of the romantic, I now see for the f i r s t time 
that the romantic becomes what Hegel c a l l s the d i a l e c t i c a l , 
the other C = second, i.e. second stage of the d i a l e c t i c a l 
t r i a d , G.P.] position where 
Stoicism - fatalism 
Pelagianism - Augustinianism 
Humo-ur - irony 
et. 
are at home, positions which do not have any contin\iance by 
themselves, but l i f e i s a constand pendulum movement between 
( I A 225/1565) 
This means that the essence of romanticism can only reveal i t s e l f 
through a sequence of one-sided positions. I n t h i s respect i t can 
be contrasted with classicism which represents a position of self-
enclosed unity and haxmony. Kierkegaard spells out t h i s contrast i n 
a nmber of ways. In discussing these positions Kierkegaard claims 
that they are not so much h i s t o r i c a l forms as ideal p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
l a t e n t i n every age and i n every dimension of aesthetics, ( l A 171/ 
38O4) but nonetheless most of what he act-ually says on the subject 
presupposes the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the classical with ancient Greece 
and of the romantic with the Middle Ages. 
He formulated the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two with regard to 
the d i f f e r e n t ways i n which they r e f l e c t the p o l a r i t i e s of i d e a l i t y 
and r e a l i t y (or a c t u a l i t y ) . In the classical the ideal and the real 
are perfectly integrated, but i n the romantic such integration can 
never be achieved. ( l A I35 / I6) That i s to say that the classical 
has no ideals other than those which are capable of actualization i n 
the forms of f i n i t e existence, whereas the romantic s p i r i t posits an 
ideal which perpetually transcends r e a l i t y . ( l A 221/853) Consequent-
l y classicism expresses i t s e l f i n images of repose, romanticism i n 
images of restlessness. ( I A 203/38O6) 
I n p r i n c i p l e each at t i t u d e requires the other: 
When I consider the matter e n t i r e l y i n abstracto, I must 
i n a l l consistency come to the conclusion that the romantic 
resolves i t s e l f into a classicism,* although every attempt 
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to demonstrate the c lass ical period in time i s naturally 
of a mythological natiire and arises only because of the 
human weakness which can never grasp a concept in a l l i t s 
inf in i te evanescence but must always stake i t off by using 
boundaries . . . every attempt to say "now i t i s f in i sh-
ed" i s an attempt to transform i t into mythology. 
. .3 romantic striving i s a self-consuming, and I cannot 
render i t eternal, since then I would get an eternity con-
sisting, of. an inf ini te aggregate of moments - yet a l l this 
in abstracto. 
( I A 294/3815) 
The unbalanced state of the romantic sp i r i t , Kierkegaard i s say-
ing, reaches out for and requires the stabil i ty of the classical -
although the romantic sp ir i t can never entirely be captured in any 
f in i te particular form. This in turn means that i f the romantic with-
out the c lass ica l tends towards a 'self-consuming' formlessness, then 
the c lass ica l without the romantic wi l l tend towards the reduction of 
ideals to the level of the particular. Classicism, he says, 'has no 
ideal - or, what amounts to the same thing - i t has an ideal attain-
able in this world.' ( l A 221/852) Consequently classicism, l e f t to 
i t s e l f , would bring about a situation where 'the esthetic ideal i s re-
placed by national taste, yes, town-and-class taste, and the most 
correct copy of i t . " ( l A 222/853) Each concept wi l l therefore 
tend to cancel the other while at the same time requiring the tension 
which the other gives i t . 
Kierkegaard jots down a considerable number of notes showing how 
the basic difference in structure manifests i t s e l f . In dramatic art , 
for instance, the use of masks in greek tragedy exemplifies the class-
ica l concept of character as something stat ic , whilst the romantic 
actor presupposes a more open, a more f luid concept, and his perform-
ance i s consequently a constant striving to represent an imagined 
character whose persona i s not completely f t i l f i l l ed and cannot be 
represented in i t s entirety in any one moment or in any one appear-
ance, ( l A 219/58II) In sculptvire the romantic spir i t i s express-
ed by the use of drapery as opposed to the simple nudity of greek 
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statuary. ( l A 218/3810) Kierkegaaxd also sees the reconciliation 
of the ideal and the real in the representatives of contemporary neo-
classicism, amongst whom he numbers Goethe, Hegel and the danish 
sculptor Thorvaldsen. (42) 
The dualism of the romantic consciousness i s again manifested 
in the romantic concept of time. The romantic sp ir i t can only see 
time in a negative aspect. Consequently 'the romantic Middle Ages 
comprehends only one side of eternity - the vanishing of time.' ( l l 
A 100/832) The same dissatisfaction with time i s evidenced in the 
latter-day romantics' wish to recal l the age of chivalry, although 
Kierkegaard sees their wish as essentially in vain. ( I C 86) The 
way in which time i s apprehended thus becomes another criterion for 
distinguishing the romantic and the c lass ical from each other: 'The 
c lass ica l i s present tense; the romantic i s aorist . ' ( I A 137/1?) 
The romantic consciousness of time i s reflected in the status 
which music comes to possess in romanticism. In Molbech's Forelaes-
ninger over den Nyere danske Poesie Kierkegaard read that music i s 
the most romantic of the arts 'for i t exceeds a l l other art in deal-
ing with the in f in i te , the inexhaustible, the unfathomable in the 
soul, but here only through feeling, immediately intuited . . ( I C 
88/5135) He notes that the essential element of music, the perfect 
tone, i s not a logically or mathematically definable point, but i s 
rather a constant oscil lation between the mathemg.tically perfect and 
the imperfect. ( I I A 7II /IO24) In this respect, in i t s lack of 
static perfection music mirrors the dialectical structure of the 
romantic idea. The essential musicality of the romantic spir i t ap-
pears again in romantic poetry, the predominant element of which i s 
tonality. ( l A 250/2304) The close historical connection between 
music and romantic (=medieval) poetry i s noted by Kierkegaard in con-
nection with his reading of Priedrich Diez, Die Poesie der Troubadours. 
( I c 89/5137) 
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The dialect ical structure of romanticism i s also traced by 
Kierkegaard to i t s historical genesis out of the marriage of Christ-
ianity with the northern cultures, with their conception of l i f e as a 
struggle, and thus as a constant self-surpassing striving. ( I C 85/ 
^^^^Although we have described the essence of romanticism as being 
rooted i n the s p l i t between the idea and r e a l i t y Kierkegaard also des-
cribes i t as a s p l i t w i th in the idea i t s e l f . 
The romantic actually arises from the two halves of one idea 
being kept apart by some intervening foreign element. Vftien 
Adam was created, Adam's idea craved i t s supplement in Eve 
. . . Eve comes, and the romantic i s over, there i s repose . . . 
I s echo romantic? Yes, but when i t answers, the romantic i s 
over. 
The romantic period always has something in mente. ( l A I4O/38OI) 
The la s t sentence indicates again Kierkegaard's idea that the romant-
ic ideal always transcends the actual available forms which might 
serve for i t s manifestation. 
We shall now develop this dialectical conception of romantic-
ism under three further headings: The Dialectic of Moods; The 
Dialectic of the Middle Ages; Irony and Humour. 
(D) ( i i ) The Dialectic of Moods 
The essential mood of romanticism ref lects the basic dualism of 
the romantic idea. I t i s a mood in which there i s both presence and 
absence, a mood which, l ike the musical tone, cannot be fixed. 
In his notes on Molbech's lectures Kierkegaard recapitulates 
Jean Paul's description of this mood: 
Jean P. likens the romantic to the i l lw inat ion of an area ; 
by moonlight or to the tone waves in the echo of a ringing 
b e l l , of a stroked string - a trembling sound that swims 
as i t were, farther and farther away and f inal ly loses i t -
self in us and s t i l l sounds within us although outside of 
us i t i s quiet. 
( I c 88/5135) 
The romantic i s 'a continual grasping after something which e-
ludes one,' ( l A 303/38I6) and can only be expressed allegorically -
the romantic image tes t i f i es as much to the absence as to the pre-
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sence of i t s object, i t gives 'only the image of the shadow,' 
( l A 3O3/38I6) because 'the whole idea cannot rest and be con-
tained in the actual expression,' ( I A 214/38O7) There.Lis an in-
escapable dimension of mystery in the romantic. ( l l A 78/1682) 
The typical romantic mood may therefore be described as a mood 
of yearning or longing. Although some theorists of romanticism loc-
ated the essence of the romantic in i t s delight in the manifold, 
Kierkegaard dissents. ( I A 155/3803; I A 315/3817; I I A 638/1945) 
For the manifold i t s e l f i s called into being by a longing, vdiich i s 
thus prior to the manifold and which the manifold i s incapable of 
satisfying. ( I A 155/3803) 
Kierkegaard accordingly finds the situation of Ingeborg in 
Fr i th io f ' s Saga archetypically romantic, as she s i ts on the seashore 
watching the departing sa i l of Fri thiof ' s vessel. ( l A I36/38OO) 
Similarly 
I find an absolutely perfect example of the romantic in the 
Old Testament, in the Book of Judith, chapter 10, verse 11: 
"And Judith went out, she and her maidservant with her; but 
the men of the city watched her until she came down from the 
movtntain, unti l she came through the valley and they could 
see her no more. And they proceeded onward in the valley." 
( I I A 197/3822) 
Why are such scenes 'romantic'? Because they evoke the mood of 
longing, a mood in which consciousness reaches out after a vanishing 
object and seeks to transcend the boxindaries set for i t by the solid 
data of immediate sensuous experience. This longing i s 'the lombilic-
al cord of the higher l i f e . ' ( l l A 343/4409) I t i s a movement from 
the given to the possible. 
The typically romantic landscape i s thus, for Kierkegaard, one in 
which monotony predominates, because the absence of landmarks by which 
to judge distances or to guess the places of origin of the sounds which 
reach the ear, allows the mind to exercise i t s e l f in precisely this 
kind of stretching-out, this disportment in the possible. Such 
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romantic landscapes are the Jutland Heath or the Arabian Desert. 
( I A 131/3797); I I A 68/2279) The same motif recurs in Kierke-
gaard' s observation that the favourite romantic sports are hunting 
and f ishing, and he notes that in such sports the sportsman's con-
sciousness i s preoccupied with the possible - what might be caught. 
Such sports stand in contrast to the 'c lass ica l ' sports such as 
athlet ics , which involve hard, constraining discipline. ( l A 132/3798) 
The relativization of boundaries which both encourages and is demand-
ed by the mood of longing i s also shown in the importance of 'wander-
ing' in the romantic Middle Ages. Kierkegaard sees this character-
i s t i c exemplified in the wandering knights, scholars, minstrels, 
rel igious, etc. of that era. (lA 262/3814; I I A 428/4927) 
The same structure i s reflected in the kindred mood of premon-
ition (dan. Ahnen or Ahnelse, tr . by Hong and Hong as Presentiment). 
Once more with reference to Molbech Kierkegaard notes that 'the rom-
antic has been called the poetry of presentiment.' ( l C 88/5135) We 
have already seen the importance which Steffens gave to this idea, 
and Kierkegaard cites Steffens in this connection, though he does not 
cite the 1802-3 lectures. ( l l A 32/3551; I I A 588/3555) Premonition, 
he says, ' i s the homesickness of earthly l i f e for the higher, for the 
perspicuity which man must have had in his paradisic l i f e , ' ( I I A 
191/92) a statement which ref lects the definition of longing as the 
'umbilical cord of the higher l i f e . ' ( l l A 343/4409) 
For Kierkegaard premonition i s ambiguous. I t can relate to evil as 
well as to good, as i s evidenced by the use made of i t in folk-tales: 
folklore i s also permeated with a profound, earnest melancholy, 
a presentiment of the power of e v i l , a quiet resignation which 
allows every age to pay i t s tribute to this unyielding power, 
that i s why execution s i tes , ravens and crows, prisons, seduct-
ions etc. play such a large role ( f . . . 3 Al l presentiment i s 
murky and r i ses a l l at once in the consciousness or so gradual-
ly f i l l s the soul with anxiety that i t does not arise as a con-
clusion from given premisses but always manifests i t s e l f in an 
imdefined something . . . ( I I A 32/3551) 
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Premonition can not only receive v/arnings of impending ev i l , i t i s 
i t s e l f a dangerous power for i t can arouse a fear of evil which leads 
to the execution of the act which i t anxiously anticipates. 
A certain presentiment seems to precede everything which i s 
to happen (cf. a loose sheet); but just as i t can have a de-
terring effect, i t can also tempt a person to think that he 
i s , as i t were, predestined; he sees himself carried on to 
something as though by consequences beyond his control. 
Therefore one ought to be very careful with children, never 
believe the worst and by untimely suspicion or by a chance 
remark (a flame of hel l which ignites the tinder which i s in 
every soul) occasion an anguished consciousness in which in-
nocent but fragile souls can easily be tempted to believe 
themselves guilty, to despair, and thereby to make the f i r s t 
step toward the goal foreshadowed by the \insettling present-
iment . . . 
( I I A 18/91; c f . I I A 19; I I A 2O/5205r* I I A 584/3999) 
Premonition i s thus a mood in which the anxious consciousness of 
original sin can be aroused. ( l l A 32/3551; I I A 33/3552; I I A 
588/3555) Indeed what Kierkegaard says about premonition in these 
early Papirer lays the foundation for his later development of the 
concept of angst, and i t i s notable that the adjectival forms of 
'angest' appear in several of the entries mentioned here. 
Although the predominant tone of premonition i s anticipatory, 
i t can also be described as a beholding of the future in the mirror 
of the past. ( l l A 558/3553) This provides a l ink to i t s function 
as the agency of the arousal of the consciousness or original s in, 
especially since the danish term'Arvesynd'means l i t e r a l l y 'heredit-
ary s in' , and explicit ly l inks the individual not just to the race 
but to the past of the race from which this sin i s inherited. I t 
also provides a link to another mood akin both to premonition and to 
longing. This i s melancholy (dan. Veemod cf. ger. Wehmut). 
Melancholy i s a term naturally associated with bereavement, 
being the consciousness of absence or incompleteness. I t can be ob-
ject ive, a quality belonging to a landscape. Such objective melanchol-
y i s evoked in Kierkegaard's description of Gurre Lake, a lake gradual-
ly being overgrown by rushes and so reclaimed by the land. 'Here 
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around Lake Gurre there rests a quiet melancholy; the region l ives , 
so to speak, more in the past.' ( I A 64/5095) 
The association with bereavement i s brought out in one of the 
well-known entries in the Gilleleie-Journal in which Kierkegaard -
or his Faustian letter-writer - describes how, on a walk along the 
c l i f f - tops near the fishing village of Gi l l e l e i e , he experiences a 
momentary feeling of communion with his departed loved ones: 'but 
then the seagull's harsh screech reminded me that I stood alone, and 
everything vanished before my eyes, and I turned back with a heart 
f u l l of melancholy to mingle with the world's crowds - without, how-
ever, forgetting such blessed moments.' ( l A 68/5099 adapted) Here 
the word melancholy has a double resonance. I t evokes both the mel-
ancholy which the loss of his loved ones had in the f i r s t instance 
induced.;and i t also evokes the moment of melancholy which follows the 
withdrawal of imaginary communion with them, a moment in which the 
f i r s t bereavement i s also made elsewhere. 
This sort of melancholy must be distinguished from the melan-
choly which Kierkegaard discusses in his published work, and with 
which his l i terary personality i s regrettably but irrevocably linked. 
This la t ter sort of melancholy translates a quite distinct word"-^  ,.-. 
'Tungsind' - l i t e r a l l y 'heavy-mindedness', perhaps more suitably 
translated as 'depression'. (43) 
There i s a certain paral lel between the relation of veemod-mel-
ancholy to tvmgsind-melancholy and the relation of premonition to 
angst. The second term in each case marks a subjectivization, an 
internalization, an intensification of the f i r s t term. In both 
cases we can see how Kierkegaard's typically existential concepts 
grow out of the development of concepts originally employed in the 
analysis of romanticism. 
The romantic moods of longing, premonition and melancholy a l l 
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betray the same dualistic structure, and point to the concepts of 
irony and humour in which the romantic consciousness fx i l f i l s and 
transcends i t s e l f . We shall not however, proceed directly to the 
exposition of these concepts. We turn next to the characterization 
of the Middle Ages as the romantic era par excellence, ..'wbich wil l 
also lead us to irony and humour, and which wil l amplify the per-
spective in which these concepts are to be seen. 
(D) ( i i i ) The Dialectic of the Middle Ages 
The dualism which characterizes the romantic spir i t and which 
can be traced in the structure of typical romantic moods can be seen 
again in Kierkegaard's characterization of the Middle Ages. Indeed 
he sees this dualism everywhere in the l i f e of the Middle Ages. A l -
though medieval culture was based on the Church and on organic social 
forms the manifestations of medieval l i f e are consistently polarised 
into dialect ical pairs. Thus the Middle Ages had separate scientif ic 
and poetic languages, ( I A 213/2698) poetry i t s e l f was divided into 
nature-poetry and art-poetry, ( l A 226/2699) the cloister existed in 
tension to the chivalric ideal , ( l A 267/2745) as the ideal of cel ib-
acy stood in opposition to the idea of courtly love. ( I I A 429/2581) 
Even in the liturgy the clergy were divided from the people. ( I A 
284/2702) The same predisposition to duality emerges in the many 
self-contradictory features of the chivalric sagas and narratives. 
( I I A 36/5209; I I A 43r5/5212-4) I t also appears in Gothic archit-
ectiore and scholastic method, both of which, Kierkegaard claims, in -
volve the continual refraction and repetition of the same basic pat-
terns. ( I l l A 92/755) 
I t i s perhaps above a l l in the figure of the licensed fool that 
this dualistic tendency can be seen. The fool i s the dialectical 
counterweight to the knightly hero. The figure of the fool appears 
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in the legends of a l l of the representative figures who emerge in 
the Middle Ages. Thus Don Quixote has his Sancho Panza, Don Juan 
his Leporello, Faust his Wagner. ( I A 122/4387) This Fool, or 
clown, who in von Eichendorff' s phrase i s 'der DoppelgSbiger a l ler 
menschlichen Torheiten,' ( l A 157) represents the chorus in the 
world-tragedy and provides a constant reminder of the social spl i t 
between the nobility and the lower classes, and a reminder too that 
in such a situation of division i t takes both parts to make the 
whole man. ( I A I45/1670) 
In the figure of the fool the dialectic of the Middle Ages pot-
entiates i t s e l f to the standpoint of irony. However, since the Mid-
dle Ages i s essentially a period in which l i f e i s manifest in object-
ive or external forms, irony too can only appear in objective forms, 
such as the fool, or the children's crusade, which Kierkegaard ca l l s 
'history's sarcastic comment on chivalry. ' ( I A 281/2701) Such 
objective irony i s indeed a rec^lrrent element of the folk-tales which 
originate in the Middle Ages: 
. . . in order to extort some g i f t from a tro l l i t was only 
a matter of getting in between (the stones) when the trol l 
wanted to go down under. But the really remarkable thing i s 
the nemesis that was l ike ly to follow when someone became in-
5/olved with them, for how often we hear of someone's having 
gotten the good sword, the bow, the arrow, etc . , he asked for, 
and yet there usually was a l i t t l e "but" that went with i t in 
that he often thereby became an instrument in the hands of 
fate to wipe out his own family, etc. , how many tragic conse-
quences res^llted from the minor circumstance that this sword, 
once drawn, cannot be put in i t s sheath unless i t has been 
dipped in warm human blood. ( l A 144/5133, cf. I C 84/5130) 
Irony i s a manifestation of the imbalance between ideality and 
rea l i ty which underlies the whole of the romantic development. In 
irony the self or ideal pole i s unable to overcome the world, but i s 
tied to the world in i t s dialectical or dualistic forms. (lA 154/ 
1671) Within the realm of finitude in i t s separation from the inf in-
i te idea such irony cannot be avoided. Every development culminates 
in i t s own parody and ends in self-contradiction. 
( I A 285-288/4066,5178,2209,4067) 
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In this way idea and rea l i ty , or the two halves of the idea in 
i t s separation from i t s e l f , come into contradiction with each other. 
Consequently despair belongs to the essence of romanticism, a despair 
which i s figured in the person of the Wandering Jew. ( l l A 50/II83) 
This despair was contained in the Middle Ages by the objectivity of ,• 
the forms in which i t appeared, for the medieval dialectic was based 
in the stablizing context of social and ecclesiastical cohesion. 
( I I 1 114/1698; I I A 383/35; I I A 385/1978; I I A 468/2707) The 
'desperate' nature of irony could only be f\ i l ly revealed in a furth-
er development in which the individual was subjectivized, torn out 
of the organic wholeness of religion and society and thrown back up-
on his own resources. We see this take place in the dialectic of 
irony and humour. 
(D) ( iv ) Irony and Humoxir 
H-umour and irony are frequently juxtaposed by Kierkegaard. 
Humour i s in a sense a potentiation of irony in terms of subject-
iv i ty and self-consciousness. 'Humour i s irony carried through to 
i t s most powerful vibrancy.' ( l l A 136,(/l699)) what appears object-
ively in irony i s subjectively and individ\ially appropriated in 
humoiar - ' irony in nature and h-umo\ar in the individual. • ( I I A 
6O8/17II c f . I I A 102/1690) When irony sees into i t s own nature i t 
destroys i t s e l f , seeing i t s own ni i l l i ty , but i t i s precisely this in -
sight which humour presupposes. ( l l A 102/1690) 
Humour, l ike irony,reflects a dissonant relationship of self 
and world. But whereas in the ironic stage the individual vho knows 
his "difference" from the world and who tries to act upon this know-
ledge ends up being mocked by the world, the humorous individual 
cannot be touched by the world. Humour and irony are likened to the 
two ends of a seesaw: humour l i e s above the point of balance, irony 
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below. ( I A 154/1671) But humour i s not merely a potentiation of 
the concept of irony. For the concept of humour coalesces with the 
concept of character. The position beyond irony can equally well be 
labelled humour or character. Both transcend both the immediate and 
the dialect ical stages of existence. ( I A 239/1676) This new pos-
ition of htffiiour/character i s however not merely the result of a spon-
taneous self-development by the dialectical stage, which, as we have 
seen, i s represented in the romantic consciousness and which culmin-
ates in irony. 
Humour does not stem from the dialectical self-development of 
the idea, but from the christian revelation. I t i s essentially a 
christian category, for i t presupposes the christian negation of the 
world in i t s total ity, the devaluation of a l l hitherto received 
values. Here a l l i s made new. ( I I A 6O8/I7II) Humour sees that 
everything which hitherto had asserted i t s e l f in the world 
and continued to do so was placed in relation to the pre-
sumably single truth of the Christians, and therefore to 
K the Christians the kings and the princes, enemies and per-
secutors, e tc . , etc. , appeared to be nothing and to be 
laughable because of their opinions of their own greatness. 
Cl A 207/1674) 
The humorist thus assumes, or perhaps posits, a separation of 
self and world far more drastic than that vdiich i s present in the 
ironic self-consciousness. The separation i s here made absolute, 
the world i s relativized in i t s entirety, whereas in irony i t was 
only the case that one aspect of the world was played off against 
another aspect. 
In accordance with this separation of self and world the humor-
i s t i s essentially sol i tary, l ike a beast of prey ( l l A 694/1719) 
or l ike Robinson Crusoe on his desert island. ( I I A I 36 / I699) 
Humour i s 'absolutely isolated, independently personal.' ( ibid. ) 
In this respect there i s a certain similarity between the humorist 
and Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew, as described in Poul M^^ller's 
aphorisms. Kierkegaard, for instance, imagines 'a travelling 
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humorist who i s making preliminary studies, preparatory work for a 
theodicy - he travels about seeking as far as possible to experience 
everything in order to prove that, everything i s a disappointment.' 
( I I I A 98/1736) Such a figure i s very close to the Ahasverus of 
Mi l ler ' s 17th aphorism: 'Your stupid philosophers believe that 
every philosophical system which appears i s new; but in many mil-
ieux I have learnt that philosophy has gone thro-ugh i t s natural 
stages, and I have heard the same squabbles about the same d i f f i c -
u l t ies . For me the whole thing i s only a cycle of pieces on a 
barrel-organ.' (44) Both represent the philosophy of the Preach-
er that ' A l l i s vanity^' that 'there i s nothing new under the sun.' (45) 
We have seen that art i s essentially a sublimation and a mask-
ing of a deep existential suffering. When the dialectic of'.art 
reaches i t s l imit in the culmination of the dialectic of romantic-
ism, in the acquisition of insight into the absolute dualism of idea 
and rea l i ty , we are at the same time faced with the revelation of 
suffering, suffering no longer sublimated, but raw, exposed and 
aching. This i s an insight which the humorist makes his own. 
When an ironist laughs at the whimsicalities and witticisms 
of a humorist, he i s l ike the vulture tearing away at 
Prometheus's l i v e r , for the humorist's whimsicalities are 
not capricious l i t t l e darlings but the sons of pain, and 
with every one of them goes a l i t t l e piece of his inner-
most entrai ls , and i t i s the emaciated ironist who needs 
the humorist's desperate depth. His laughter i s often the 
grin of death . . . ( l ike the dead man's grin which i s ex-
plained as the muscle twitch of rigor mortis, the eternal-
ly humorous smile over human wretchedness) . . . ( I I A 179/1706) 
The self-consciousness of suffering which i s achieved in the 
humorous standpoint means that the misty dreams of poetry can no 
longer function as a satisfactory i^expression of self-consciousness. 
With humour art i s transcended. ' . . . humour i s not an esthetic con-
cept, but l i f e ( I I A 136/1699) I t can only find ambiguous 
expression in l i terature, for the act of writing i t s e l f presupposes 
a degree of reconciliation with the world which would fa l s i fy the 
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spl i t presupposed by the humorist. J . G. Hamann - for Kierkegaard 
the preeminent representative of the humorous standpoint - i s thus 
seen as having been true to his idea in bequeathing a merely occas-
ional , fragmentary l i terary inheritance to posterity. ( l l A 138-9/ 
1700-01; I I A 658/1715) In a similar vein the humorous nature of 
Christianity i s test i f ied by i t s proclamation of a truth which i s 
concealed in mystery, which Kierkegaard takes to mean that the truth 
i s not merely hidden, but i s concealed even in the act of revelation. 
( I I A 78/1682) 
But the himorist's vision i s not merely negative, not merely 
world-denying, for ' . . . h-umor i s also the joy which has overcome 
the world.' ( I I A 672/1716) The christian humorist i s l ike a 
plant whose roots alone are v i s ib le , but whose flower unfolds be-
fore an higher, an invisible sun. ( I I A IO2/I690) His pessimism 
i s an outward shell or, to use a later expression of Kierkegaard's, 
an incognito. 
As well as signifying a standpoint which i s beyond art , beyond 
poetry, the inner joy of the humorist i s also the fulfilment of poet-
ry , the actual accomplishment of joy in despite of pain which the 
poet too had sought. 'Humor i s l yr i ca l ( i t i s the most profound 
earnestness about l i f e - profound poetry, which cannot form [| gestalt} 
i t s e l f as such and therefore crystal l izes in baroque forms - i t i s 
hemorrhoidal non fluens - the molimina of the higher l i f e ) , ' ( ibid.) 
I t i s 'profound poetry', poetry which i s beyond form, which f u l f i l s 
the dialectic of romanticism, not by the posttilation of a new, 'c las-
s i c a l ' synthesis, but by the intensification of the spl it in the rom-
antic consciousness. 
In accordance with Kierkegaard's general approach humour i s 
described as having a history, emerging in objective form in the 
Middle Ages, in the existence of the Church, which stood in a 
humorous (denying) relationship to the world as a whole and which 
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also expressed i t s himiour in i t s own l i f e . ( I I A I I 4 / I 6 9 8 ) A 
typical manifestation of this humorous aspect of the Church's l i f e 
was the r i tua l inversion of ecclesiastical authority on specified 
occasions, in such phenomena as 'der Narrenpapst, der Kinderbischof, 
der Abt der Unvernunft.' ( l l A 85/1687) These examples are taken by 
Kierkegaard from Walter Scott's The Abbot. But to find i t s essential 
expression humour has to move beyond these objective forms, for as 
we have seen, i t i s essentially individual and inward. 
In his development of the negative aspect of humovir, Kierke-
gaard departs from his model humorist, Hamann, who, according to 
Ronald Gregor Smith, never gave up on f in i t e , corporeal existence. 
Smith sums up Hamann's position by quoting from Hamann himself ( as 
Hamann comments on Descartes' argument for existence) • " . . . was 
Cartes von seinem cogito sagt, davon ttberfUhrt mich die ThStigkeit 
meines Ma^ gens." ' (46) Smith comments that ' The connexion between 
God and the world i s not broken.' (47) 
Kierkegaard i s however closer to Hamann in denying that the 
humorist can as l i t t l e be a systematic thinker as he can be a writer 
in a conventionalcisgnse. 
. . . the humorist himself has come alive to the incommensur-
able which the philosopher can never figure out and there-
fore must despise. He l ives in the abundance and i s there-
for sensitive to how much i s always l e f t over, even i f he 
has expressed himself with a l l f e l i c i ty (therefore the dis-
inclination to write). The systematizer believes that he 
can say everything, and that whatever cannot be said i s 
erroneous and secondary. ( I I A I4O/1702) 
The analysis of humoTir crowns Kierkegaard's early studies on 
the sp ir i t of romanticism which in turn constitute the working-
out of his analysis of the experience of art. As we have seen, 
these studies at many points show the impress of hegelian concept-
ions, not least in the way in which Kierkegaard deploys the d ia l -
ectical method in his analysis of romanticism. The concept of 
humour i t s e l f fianctions to a certain extent as a mediating concept 
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in the hegelian sense. That i s to say i t l inks two spheres of exper-
ience: the aesthetic and the religious. I t i s developed as an in-
tensification of the dialect ical process which ciilminated in irony 
and at the same time marks a radically new departure. Thus far i t 
ref lects the conventional ambiguity associated with the hegelian 
term-'Aufhebxmg'j which means both the annulment or abolition of 
what has gone before as well as i t s sublimation or preservation. (48) 
On the other hand, the individualist ic , anti-systematic and 
agonized elements of the humorous standpoint show that Kierkegaard's 
orientation i s ultimately different from that of the hegelians. The 
similarity in method does not hide the difference in goal and res-
u l t s . Dialectics could be used to analyse but not to overcome the 
dualis'Sv of the romantic consciousness. Such an overcoming co\ald 
only be achieved through the positing of non-dialectical categories, 
such as humour or character. The dialectic does not lead to the 
logic of pure thought, but to the anguished conscience of the sol-
itary individual. 
Kierkegaard understood, or f e l t , the n i h i l i s t i c mood of his gen-
eration too well to think that i t could be satisf ied by a return to 
some new form of classicism, which would inevitably end in the crass 
bourgeois philistinism which both he and the n i h i l i s t s despised. The 
only authentic response to the sting of dualism was to l ive the 
"Zerrissenheit" of the dualistic consciousness through to i t s utter-
most potentiation, to move from irony to humour, to affirm the free-
dom of absolute selfhood in despite of this total c lef t within the 
self . In place of rebirth into the ideal world of aesthetic exper-
ience, Kierkegaard counsels rebirth in an individualizing, religious 
sense, and he points to the promise that in Christ "al l i s new" as 
the basis of this rebirth. 
This pattern, worked out in the early Papirer, was taken up and 
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developed, expanded, modified in the mature authorship, which, 
despite a l l modifications can be seen to be fundamentally and re-
cognizably an expression of the same essential insights. 
( E ) Notes on Aesthetics in Papirer I V C 
When Kierkegaard had worked out the basic structure of his 
philosophy of art , and had explained to himself how and in what 
direction the aesthetic had to be transcended, he did not simply 
abandon his interest in aesthetics. The authorship i t s e l f test i f ies 
to this . So too does the group of notes collected in Papirer lY C 
and numbered 102-127. These notes date from November 1842 - early 
1845, a period which saw the completion of Either-Or. They constit-
ute a distinctive group in the writings on aesthetics in the Papirer, 
for thcugh they show the same general structure as the writings we 
have just been examining they ref lect a new reading of Aristotle and 
Lessing. And at the same time as he was reading Aristotle's Poetics 
and Lessing's Hamburgische Dramaturgie and Letters he was gaining 
insights from both authors which would prove decisive in the formul-
ation of his critique of the epistemological foundations and re l ig -
ious consequences of hegelian idealism. ( 49 ) 
A point of contact between these and previous notes on aesthet-
ics i s the concern to establish the l imits of ar t , a concern which 
appears in reflections on the relation of aesthetics and ethics and 
on the definition of tragedy and comedy. This question of the limits 
of art i s raised in connection with the general question of 'boimdary 
disputes in the sciences.' 
Some of the most d i f f i cu l t disputes are a l l the boundary dis-
putes in the sciences - the boundary between jurisprudence 
and ethics; moral philosophy and dogmatics - psychology and 
moral philosophy, etc. Usually a single science i s treated 
by i t se l f ; then one has much to say and gives no thought to 
the possibil ity of everything suddenly being dissolved i f the 
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presuppositions must be al tered. 
This i s special ly true of esthetics, which has always 
been assiduously cu l t i va t ed , but almost always i n i s o l a t -
ion . Many of the estheticians axe poets. A r i s t o t l e i s an 
exception. He easi ly perceives that i t has a r e l a t i on to 
r h e t o r i c , e thics , and p o l i t i c s . ^ IO4/143) 
The r e l a t i o n of aesthetics to ethics i s taken up i n the f o l l o w -
ing entry 
The r e l a t i o n between esthetics and ethics - the t rans i t ion -
p a t h o s - f i l l e d not d i a l e c t i c a l - there a qua l i t a t i ve ly d i f f e r -
ent d i a l ec t i c begins. To what extent are poetry and a r t r e -
concilable with l i f e - something i s true i n esthetics -
something else i n ethics? ^ IO5/8O8) 
Despite the sketchy nature of t h i s entry we are able to see the 
d i rec t ion i n which Kierkegaard's thought i s moving. He i s grappling 
wi th the question of how to define or how to t rea t the qua l i ta t ive 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two realms. The comments on d ia lec t ics im-
ply a v ind ica t ion of our analysis of the way i n which such personal-
i s t , i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c categories as humour and character are used by 
Kierkegaard to resolve the d i a l ec t i c of romanticism, categories which 
correspond to what he here re fe rs to as ' p a t h o s - f i l l e d ' . Dialect ics 
can cope wi th the realm of aesthetics, aesthetic phenomena can be 
treated i n terms of d i a l e c t i c a l laws (a sign of Kierkegaard's con-
t i nu ing indebtedness to Heiberg) but a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t ap-
proach i s required outside t h i s realm. So d i f f e r e n t i s the aesthet-
i c realm from the e th ica l that Kierkegaard i s prepar.ed to consider 
that d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a of t r u t h may have to be employed i n the two 
realms. This sharpens h is posi t ion regarding the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
of moral c r i t e r i a to a f i g u r e such as Don Juan regarded as an 
aesthetic ' i d e a ' . I t i s a point which serves both to l i m i t and to 
recognize the autonomy of a r t , of the aesthetic sphere. 
From another angle the question he i s wrest l ing with i s that of 
the r e l a t i o n of a r t to r e a l i t y , s p e c i f i c a l l y to the real existence of 
the ind iv idua l subject as involv ing the experience of su f f e r ing . 
- 176 -
'To what extent are poetry and a r t reconcilable wi th l i f e , ' (IV C 
IO5/8O8) he asks. How fax does the aesthetic attunement r e a l l y 
resolve the discords of l i f e ? This question i s raised again i n an^ 
other very sketchy entry: 
. . . " A l l poetiy i s imi t a t i on" ( A r i s t o t l e ) - "better or worse 
than we are." Hence poetry points beyond i t s e l f to ac t i i a l i ty 
and to the metaphysical i d e a l i t y . - Where does the poetic 
center l i e - As soon as i t i s directed toward sympathy -
Therefore we cannot say that we sympathize wi th Christ . Scr ipt -
ure also says the opposite. See Hebrews 4. 
(IV c 109/144) 
Once more we see poetry occupying the f a m i l i a r ground between 
external sensuous ac tua l i t y ( r e a l i t y ) and metaphysical i d e a l i t y : 
p'oetry points beyond i t s e l f i n both di rect ions . The poetic centre, 
i t i s suggested, l i e s i n the sympathetic power of poetry, sympathy, 
that i s , i n the sense of F. C. Sibbem,(50) sympathy by which the 
idea indwel l ing the work of a r t i s apprehended and appropriated i n 
aesthetic experience. Such sympathy i s not possible f o r us when 
faced wi th a r e a l i t y such as the su f fe r ing of Chris t which cannot 
be transposed in to aesthetic terms. 
The f u r t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the operation of th i s sympathy i s 
re la ted by Kierkegaard to Aristot le 'v ,s d e f i n i t i o n of the e f f ec t of 
tragedy on the spectator, namely that through fear (phobos) and 
p i t y (heleos) i t e f f ec t s the p u r i f i c a t i o n (catharsis) of such pas-
sions. Kierkegaard's thoughts on th i s are shaped by his reading of 
Lessing's Hamburgische Dramaturgie and the correspondence between 
Lessing, N i c o l a i and Moses Mendelssohn. Kierkegaard's in te rpre ta t -
ion of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s that i t means 
that by means of p i t y and fear (the medium - the necessity 
and esthetic s ignif icance of these) tragedy ef fec t s the 
p u r i f i c a t i o n of these by ennobling the sympathies. A i 
ego t i s t i c a l determinants I X t o S and <jbo^ c?5 are the condit-
ion f o r making an esthetic impression; the e f f ec t i s 
that^XioS and (pobos become purely sympathetic, that 
fo rge t myself i n esthet ic , purely sympathetic gX^oS Ao<^ / 
(^StioS . Generally speaking t h i s i s the calming e f f e c t 
produced by the esthet ic , not through the thought that 
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others su f fe r more but through the loss [ of oneself2 
i n contemplation of the esthetic i t s e l f , of the 
esthetic su f f e r i ng . ( I V C 110/4826) (51) 
This restates an ins ight which we have already seen formulated 
i n e a r l i e r pages of the Papirer, namely, that aesthetic form i t s e l f , 
by v i r t u e of the transposit ion of i t s subject-matter in to a realm 
const i tuted on the basis of i d e a l i t y , softens or calms the tensions 
and contradict ions experienced i n rea l l i f e , (52) although t h i s i s 
only achieved at the cost of a loss of selfhood. Lessing had used 
A r i s t o t l e ' s d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the purpose of constructing a purely 
aesthetic theory, but Kierkegaard puts Lessing's reformulation of 
A r i s t o t l e to use i n developing a c r i t i que of a r t as such. 
The f a c t that the r econc i l i a t i on accomplished i n aesthetic 
experience i s only provisional and simply d is t rac ts from, rather 
than resolves, the contradictions of existence:.is developed i n an-
other entry i n t h i s group: 
I n tragedy the hero succumbs. This i s supposed to recon-
c i l e me wi th a c tua l i t y . I s i t through grasping how great-
ness consists precisely i n succumbing that I am supposed 
to be inspired to a s imi lar heroism? But i n that case I am, 
i n f a c t , at loggerheads wi th a c t u a l i t y , inasmuch as I assume 
ac tua l i t y to be such that the f a t e of greatness i s that i t 
must succumb. (IV C 115/4829) 
I n aesthetic experience i t i s only the phantasy which i s recon-
c i l e d , r econc i l i a t i on i s only i n the medium of phantasy, of i d e a l i t y . 
(IV C 117/4833) I n the same entry i n which he states th i s Kierke-
gaard copies the fo l lowing c i t a t i o n from Boethius' Consolation of 
Philosophy i n which the f i g u r e of Philosophy rebukes the Muses of 
Poetry: 
"Who," she demanded . . . "has allowed these hyster ical s luts 
to approach t h i s sick man's bedside? They have no medicine 
to ease h is pains, only sweetened poisons to make them worse. 
These are the very women who k i l l the r i c h and f r u i t f u l 
harvest of Reason with the barren thorns of Passion. They 
habituate men to the i r sickness of mind instead of curing 
them." (53) 
But Kierkegaard continues to recognize a d i a l ec t i ca l progress-
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ion w i t h i n the autonomous sphere of the aesthetic. Here he sees 
poetry as developing from tragedy to comedy, the t ragic remaining 
closer to the sensuous, to h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , vAiilst comedy approxim-
ates more to the metaphysical detachment from the h i s t o r i c . Kierke-
gaard asserts that the h i s t o r i c i t y of tragedy i s 
i n d i r e c t evidence against the absolute r econc i l i a t ion of 
poetry and a r t , that I do not believe them i n and f o r 
themselves when they show the extraordinary but demand 
external proof; on the other hand, I believe the comic 
and demand no h i s t o r i c a l proof. I f I am depicting a 
f o o l , I do not need to give him a h i s t o r i c a l name, be-
cause i f I do, I weaken the e f f ec t ; i f I want to depict 
a hero, I must t r y to f i n d a h i s t o r i c a l person, other-
wise no one believes i t . ^ 121/4837) 
The metaphysical character of comedy i s mentioned i n connection 
wi th Hegel, whose Aesthetics'^Kierkegaard had by th i s time read, (54) 
and wi th a snide comment directed at Martensen, doubtless r e f e r r i n g 
to Martensen's wr i t ings on spec\alative comedy. (IV C 108/1738) The 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of comedy with metaphysics i s also j u s t i f i e d by r e f e r -
ence to A r i s t o t l e . Kierkegaard notes that ' t ha t comedy approaches 
the metaphysical i s seen also i n t h i s , that i t has the mive r sa l as 
i t s object i n a sense d i f f e r e n t than tragedy.' (IV C I2O/4836; 
c f . IV C 118/4854) 
Kierkegaard of course did not allow the metaphysical character of 
comedy to seduce him in to speculations about speculative comedy. The 
favourable mention of Hegel and the aspersions on Martensen suggest 
that f o r Kierkegaard, as f o r Hegel, the d i a l ec t i c of the forms of a r t , 
the movement from tragedy to comedy, points to the transcendence of 
the aesthetic as such. 
This impl ica t ion i s supported by the f i n a l entry i n th i s sect-
i o n , an entry which shows that at least at one point he was hoping 
to draw a l l these threads together in to a systematic exposition. 
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The Plan For My Lectures 
1. 
On the Concept of Poetry 
2. 
The Movement through Esthetics 
3. 
The Comic Esthetics. Abrogated 
Cultus des Genius 
(IV C 127/5608) 
The comic - not coincidental ly - thus comes to occupy a border-
l i n e pos i t ion s imilar to that occupied by the concept of humour. I t 
i s tempting to i d e n t i f y the two. Against such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i t 
must be noted that hmour was not , as we have seen, regarded as i t -
s e l f a d i a l e c t i c a l concept, but i n the sense of IV C 105/808 (55) 
a pathetic pos i t i on , a posi t ion beyond d ia lec t i c s . Comedy however 
i s the ctilmination of the d i a l e c t i c a l movement, i t i s at the f r o n t i e r 
o f , but s t i l l w i th in the realm of aesthetics. The th in l i n e d i v i d -
ing comedy and humour i s thus the nearest we have come so f a r to 
de f in ing the bomdary between the aesthetic and the re l ig ious - we 
s h a l l , however, see Kierkegaard define i t s t i l l more closely than 
t h i s . 
The s ignif icance of the note Cultus des Genius i s hard to assess. 
I f i t r e fe r s to the romantic notion that genius i s a qual i ty of per-
sona l i ty , an endowment of the capacity f o r aesthetic i n t u i t i o n , 
rather than a par t i cu la r g i f t f o r working wi th the technical s t ruc t -
ures of poetry, i t might be suggesting that t h i s i s an improper a t t -
empt to move from aesthetic categories to ' l i f e ' . Such a ' c u l t of 
genius' i s a response to the perceived l i m i t a t i o n of a r t which, 
wh i l s t i t i s prepared to abandon a r t i n a formal sense, retains the 
aesthetic approach. I t i s the attempt to tiom l i f e into a r t . Kierke-
gaard however would say that the l i m i t s of a r t are also the l i m i t s 
of the aesthetic categories. 
This group of aesthetic entries i s s i gn i f i can t i n several respects. 
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I t shows that Kierkegaard, l i k e Hegel, approached the question of 
the transcendence of a r t not only through an analysis of the stages 
of a r t ( c l a s s i c a l , romantic) but also through an analysis of the: 
forms of a r t (tragedy, comedy), although as f a r as the Papirer goes 
h i s notes on t h i s l a t t e r theme are r e l a t i v e l y sparse. However, as 
we shal l see i n the next chapter, the applicat ion of the schema of 
immediacy and r e f l e c t i o n to tragedy and comedy i s well attested i n 
h is published work. 
The use of A r i s t o t l e and Lessing provides also a l i n k between 
Kierkegaard's aesthetic wr i t ings and his c r i t i que of i dea l i s t epi -
stemology. I n par t i cu la r h i s equation of i d e a l i t y with p o s s i b i l i t y , 
wi th the 'merely imagined', with 'contemplation' and the pa ra l l e l 
analysis of r e a l i t y i n terms of ' a c t u a l i t y ' , 'existence' and ' the 
e t h i c a l ' provide a bridge between the two f i e l d s . Thus although his 
theory of a r t has i n many points an hegelian structure and fee l to i t , 
h i s c r i t i q u e of a r t taps the same sources as h is c r i t i que of idealism. 
I f Kierkegaard's aesthetics were merely c r i t i que then we would be 
dealing wi th l i t t l e more than a r epe t i t i on of h i s better known c r i t -
ique of philosophy, but i t i s precisely i n the in terac t ion of theo-
r e t i c a l or pos i t ive and c r i t i c a l or negative elements that i t s d i s -
t inct iveness l i e s . These entries also show that Kierkegaard's con-
cern wi th aesthetics extended beyond the aim of providing a c r i t i que 
of contemporary l i t e r a r y and aesthetic trends, and that he was grap-
p l i n g wi th the much wider-ranging question of the d e f i n i t i o n and 
s ignif icance of a r t as such. 
Although the c r i t i q u e of a r t points to the l i m i t a t i o n of hegel-
ian categories and methods i n the face of the ex is ten t ia l s i tua t ion 
of the ind iv idua l i t does not altogether deny philosophy. For i t 
s t i l l a l lows, indeed i t sets i t s e l f , the philosophical task of d i s -
t inguishing and def in ing the boundaries between aesthetics and r e -
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l i g i o n . Although t h i s i s to be done i n the interests of r e l i g i o n 
the task i s nonetheless i t s e l f philosophical . I t i s a question of 
e lucidat ing the 'grammar' of the relevant concepts. Kierkegaard 
practises a c r i t i c a l philosophy which i s more humble and more tent-
a t ive than absolute idealism. I t i s above a l l i n h is so-called 
'novels ' that Kierkegaard applies th i s c r i t i c a l philosophy to a r t . 
Before examining these 'novels ' we t u r n , however, to the purely 
aesthetic appl icat ion of h is d ia lec t ics of a r t , to h is practice as 
a l i t e r a r y c r i t i c . 
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Chapter Seven; Kierkegaard as C r i t i c 
( A ) The Theory and Cr i t ique of Ar t and the Aesthetic Authorship 
The term 'aesthetic authorship' i s used here to denote the group 
of pseudonymous works which Kierkegaard published between 1843 and 
1845: Either-Or; Fear and Trembling; Repetit ion; The Concept of 
Angst; Forewords; Philosophical Fragments; Stages on L i f e ' s Way. 
Kierkegaard himself defines these works as cons t i tu t ing a specif ic 
group w i t h i n the t o t a l i t y of h is authorship. ( l ) He also indicates 
that the p o l a r i t y of the aesthetic and the re l ig ious provides the key 
to the in te rp re ta t ion of these tex t s , and that despite the i r aesth-
e t ic form these works point to the re l ig ious question. (2) 
But i n what sense does Kierkegaard describe these works as 
'aesthet ic '? I n The Point of View, where he takes stock of his auth-
orship, he i s looking back at his work from an e x p l i c i t l y re l ig ious 
' po in t of v i ew ' , and ' the aesthetic ' i s used somewhat ambiguously -
i t s meaning hovers between the sense of aesthetic = concerning a r t , 
and aesthetic = inau then t ic i ty . Thus he applies the term - without 
r e a l l y d is t inguishing between these two senses - both to h is purely 
aesthetic l i t e r a r y review of Madame Heiberg as J u l i e t , (3) and to the 
condit ion of those l i v i n g i n Christendom who think they are Christians 
although they do not l i v e i n decisively chr i s t i an categories. (4) 
Bearing th i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n mind i t becomes possible to d i s t i n -
guish wi th in the aesthetic authorship a group of wri t ings which are 
aesthetic i n the spec i f ic sense of dealing wi th the nature and scope 
of a r t , of the v a l i d i t y of a r t i s t i c interpretat ions of the human 
s i t ua t i on . 
Although The Point of View looks at the authorship i n the double-
perspective of ' the aesthetic ' and ' the r e l i g i o u s ' the authorship 
i t s e l f more f requent ly juxtaposes ' the aesthetic' and ' the e t h i c a l ' . 
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This emerges wi th pa r t i c i i l a r c l a r i t y i n the very structure of Ei ther-
Or, the most obvious reading of which i s the confrontation of the 
aesthetic and the e th ica l points of view, but the same dual i ty emerg-
es i n e .g . , the discussion of aesthetic and e thical silence i n Fear and 
Trembling. (5) 
I n a quite general way th i s means that a r t i s l i m i t e d by l i f e i n 
the sense that though we may spend an evening i n the theatre or read-
ing a novel we have also to acknowledge that there comes a time when 
we must leave the theatre, put down the novel , and act , make decisions, 
assTome r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , etc. The beauty which can be f igured i n a 
pa in t ing or i n any other work of a r t i s not the beauty we are to f i n d 
or to create i n l i f e . (6) 
However we w i l l want to define the boundaries of a r t and l i f e 
more closely than t h i s . I n f a c t a study of Kierkegaard's wri t ings on 
the subject leads us to see that he distingiiishes three levels i n the 
re la t ionsh ip of a r t and l i f e . 
F i r s t l y there i s the l eve l at which a r t and l i f e are i n d i f f e r -
ent to each other, such that although a r t does not r e f l e c t e th ical 
or ex i s t en t i a l concerns i t does not impede the e th ica l . In th i s way 
a r t and ethics const i tute two d i s t i n c t , autonomous spheres. 
Secondly, there i s the leve l at which the r e l a t i on of a r t and 
l i f e i s ac tual ly pos i t i ve , such that the work of a r t r e f l e c t s a gen-
uine e th ica l concern, and may i t s e l f , to however l im i t ed a degree, 
contr ibute to the shaping and nur tur ing of an e th ica l ly concerned 
view of l i f e . 
But t h i r d l y , there i s the leve l at which a r t i s opposed to eth-
i c s , where the a r t i s t i c expression or in te rpre ta t ion of a s i tua t ion i s 
i n f a c t culpable, obstructing and obscuring the e thical in te res t , 
thereby preventing i t from taking form and acting. 
I n a general way we may say that these three levels correspond 
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to the three stages of the aesthetic, the e thical and the r e l i g ious . 
Thus the opposition between a r t and l i f e only emerges when l i f e i s 
understood i n a r e l i g ious perspective. The e thical as such i s not 
opposed to a r t , but can indeed enter in to an al l iance with a r t , a l -
b e i t -under cer ta in conditions. We shall elucidate these three levels 
of the r e l a t i o n of a r t and l i f e i n such a way that i t w i l l be seen 
that Kierkegaard's pos i t ion i s the outworking both of a genuine aes-
the t i c concern f o r a r t , which involves and which presupposes a theory 
of a r t constructed on purely aesthetic p r inc ip les , and of a r e l i g -
ious concern to make the d i s t i n c t i o n between aesthetic and r e l i g -
ious categories. The f i r s t two levels are best i l l u s t r a t e d by r e f -
erence to Kierkegaard's work as a c r i t i c . The t h i r d leve l i s brought 
in to focus by Kierkegaard's so-called novels. 
We now t i i rn to Kierkegaard's c r i t i c a l work. I t must, however, 
be noted that i n f a c t t h i s aspect of h is work i s not confined to his 
'aes thet ic ' authorship i n the sense i n which that was described at 
the beginning of t h i s chapter, although these works are 'aesthetic ' 
i n the usual sense of the term. Several of the pieces which w i l l 
be examined here, namely the reviews of Andersen's Kun en Spillemand, 
Schlegel's Lucinde and Thomasine Gyllembourg's To Tidsaldre, were i n 
f a c t published under Kierkegaard's own name. Of the other pieces, 
one, the review of Madame Heiberg as J u l i e t , postdates the period of 
the aesthetic authorship proper, although Kierkegaard himself conn-
ects i t wi th th i s authorship; (7) another piece, the review of 
Herr Phister as Captain Scipio, although complete, was never pub-
l i shed by Kierkegaard but i s pr in ted wi th Papirer IX. 
Not every one of Kierkegaard's c r i t i c a l wr i t ings i s examined 
here, but only those pieces which can count as aesthetic reviews 
properly speaking, pieces which are f u l l y - f o r m e d , complete pieces 
of w r i t i n g , and which focus on a speci f ic work or a speci f ic por t -
- 185 -
raya l . Consequently those pieces of aesthetic c r i t i c i s m which 
Kierkegaard never got fu r the r than sketching i n the l a t e r Papirer 
are excluded, (s) The chapter on Tieck's dramatic w r i t i n g i n The 
Concept of Irony and the essay on The Ancient Tragical Mot i f i n 
Either-Or on the other hand are too general to r e a l l y count as 're-
views ' . The point here i s , a f t e r a l l , not to repeat everything 
Kierkegaard said on aesthetics but to present h i s aesthetic wr i t ings 
i n a framework which w i l l make sense of the whole, including those 
passages not represented here. 
Kierkegaard's c r i t i c a l w r i t i n g has been r e l a t i v e l y neglected i n 
the secondary l i t e r a t u r e , both by the theological/philosophical and 
by the l i t e r a r y commentators. Indeed i n h i s study of danish l i t e r -
ary c r i t i c i s m i n the nineteenth century, Paul Rubow cast doubt on 
whether Kierkegaard had wr i t t en anything which would count as l i t -
erary c r i t i c i s m i n the normal sense of the word. He says that 
The works which he subject^to c r i t i c i s m serve him only 
as occasions f o r making some protest or other . . . he 
i s an ideal c r i t i c i n Oscar Wilde's sense, an a r t i s t , 
who takes his s t u f f from a r t and can transform a hum-
drum bourgeois comedy in to a deeply i ron ic phantasy. (9) 
A recent monograph, Kierkegaard som K r i t i k e r , by Merete J^rgen-
sen has, however, been devoted to th i s aspect of Kierkegaard's work. (IO) 
Ms. J^rgensen categorizes the c r i t i c a l wr i t ings under two headings, 
the aesthetic and the e th i ca l . Under the former she counts those 
wr i t ings which approach the i r theme with piirely aesthetic categor-
ies; imder the l a t t e r she reckons those which confront the work of 
a r t wi th e th ical claims. She notes that the former group were pub-
l i s h e d , or were planned to be published, pseudonymously, whereas 
the l a t t e r appeared under Kierkegaard's proper name. There i s only 
one exception to t h i s - a footnote i n Stages on L i f e ' s Way which i s 
ascribed to the pseudonymous representative of the ethical pos i t ion . 
Assessor Wilhelm. ( I I ) 
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One of Ms. JjZ^rgensen's aims i s to rebutt the posi t ion which she 
f inds i n Adomo's Kierkegaard, that Kierkegaard's wr i t ings on a r t 
presuppose a crude d iv i s i on between the realms of idea l i ty / inward-
ness and r e a l i t y ( a c t u a l i t y ) . ( l2) She argues that the e thical 
c r i t i c i s m quite c lear ly seeks to bring the ideal and the real tog-
ether, to re la te a r t i s t i c meaning to actual existence i n the world. 
(13) However, although she does note the d i s t i n c t i o n Kierkegaard 
makes between e th ica l religiousness and spec i f i c a l l y chr i s t ian r e l -
igiousness, she does not r e a l l y take f u l l account of the d iv is ion 
wi th in the e th i ca l . She says that ' . . . the e th ica l and the r e l i g -
ious do not stand i n opposition to each other, but s l ide together 
i n an e th i ca l - r e l i g ious existence, where f a i t h i s immediate and \ i n -
problematic (new immediacy).' (14) A r t , constructed on an ethical 
basis can consequently func t ion as an expression of th i s new 
immediacy. (15) 
That there i s a l eve l of e th ical existence at which a r t and 
ethics can be brought in to a mutua l ly-af f i rming re la t ionship i s not 
to be denied, but i t i s also necessary, especially i n a theological 
reading of these t ex t s , to see that there i s another leve l of the 
e th ica l at which the e th ica l breaks away from the external into the 
inwardness of r e l ig ious existence, and that at t h i s l eve l a r t and 
ethics have become mutually exclusive. Although i t i s misleading to 
overemphasize the d iv i s i on between a r t and the e thical i n Kierke-
gaard' s work, i t i s also misleading to overemphasize the degree of 
convergence. Everything depends on get t ing the points of contact, 
which are also always points of tension, established with absolute 
precis ion. 
The present study does not use Ms. J^rgensen's categorization 
of Kierkegaard's c r i t i c a l wr i t ings in to the aesthetic and the e thic-
a l , but approaches them according to the nature of the aesthetical 
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material which they study. Again two categories emerge: the theat-
r i c a l reviews, and the reviews of novels. To a considerable extent 
these categories overlap wi th those of the aesthetic and the e th ic-
a l as defined by Ms. Jjiirgensen. What t h i s method of categorization 
does make c lear , however, i s the cont inui ty i n Kierkegaard's c r i t i c -
a l methods. That aesthetic methods are employed on thea t r ica l pieces, 
and e th ica l pr inc ip les brought to bear on nove l i s t i c l i t e r a t \ i r e i s 
not accidental , but i s revelatory of some of the basic presupposit-
ions of Kierkegaard's theory of a r t . I n par t icu lar i t suggests the 
cont inu i ty between h is approach to l i t e r a t u r e and Heiberg's doctrine 
that a work of a r t must be judged by i t s conformity to the require-
ments of the genre to which i t belongs. I t i s at least en t i re ly i n 
keeping wi th t h i s approach that Kierkegaard brings d i f f e r e n t stand-
ards to bear when dealing wi th the novel , and there are good reasons 
f o r be l iev ing that he would have maintained that the novel as such 
makes a claim to , and requires assessment i n the l i g h t o f , an i n t r i n -
sic r e l a t i o n to the rea l world i n i t s complex concreteness. ( l 6 ) 
Kierkegaard himself expressed the basic tenet of heibergian 
c r i t i c i s m i n a speech he made to the Student Association of Copen-
hagen Univers i ty i n I836. He said that ' form i s nothing but the 
coming in to existence of the Idea i n the world, and . . . the task of 
r e f l e c t i o n i s only to investigate whether or not the Idea has gotten 
the properly corresponding form. ' (17) The c r i t i c i s the ' r e f l e c t -
eur' who seeks out the ideal kernel i n the work and then judges 
whether t h i s i d e a l i t y has received an appropriate expression i n the 
work. I t i s also h is task, as c r i t i c , to help others to tune i n to 
t h i s idea, and to f a c i l i t a t e the i r consummation of the aesthetic ex-
perience. I t i s as such a ' r e f l e c t eu r ' that we see Kierkegaard the 
c r i t i c . 
I t shotild be emphasized that the aim of th i s survey i s not to 
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enter in to the de ta i l s of Kierkegaard's analyses of the pieces which 
he reviews, but to focus on the main outlines of the theory of a r t 
which he presupposes i n h is work as a c r i t i c . 
( B ) Kierkegaard's Theatrical Cr i t i c i sm 
( B ) ( i ) Don Juan 
The appl icat ion of heibergian p r inc ip les , the requirement of 
the coincidence of idea and form, i s c lear ly evidenced i n the length-
y essay on Mozart's Don Giovanni (hereafter Don Juan) i n Either-Or, 
a piece which Kierkegaard e n t i t l e d The Immediate Erotic Stages or 
The Musical Ero t i c . 
We have already seen something o f Kierkegaard's perhaps improb-
able preoccupation wi th Don Juan as one of the three representative 
f i g u r e s , who show l i f e outside r e l i g i o n i n i t s three major forms.(18) 
Don Juan, i t w i l l be reca l led , represented the ' lowest ' o f these 
f igures i n respect of the degree of self-consciousness manifest i n 
each. Don Juan i s sensuous immediacy incarnate, he i s '^ the express-
ion f o r the demonic determined as the sensuous.' (SV 2 p.86) 
Kierkegaard argues that whi l s t both language and music negate 
immediate sensuousness, addressing themselves to the ear, i n the 
medium of time, only language i s absolutely s p i r i t u a l , containing, 
as he argues, an i n t r i n s i c ref lect iveness . Music, on the other 
hand, i s determined by i t s r e l a t i o n to S p i r i t but i s excluded from 
S p i r i t i n i t s absolute nature (which i s only open to language). 
Music thus expresses an immediacy which, s p i r i t u a l l y determined, 
i s also excluded from S p i r i t . (SV 2 pp. 64-9) I t i s therefore 
the most appropriate medium f o r dealing with the f igure of Don Juan. 
For Don Juan does not represent the immediate sensuous genius i n the 
undetermined immediacy of nature or childhood, but immediacy i n i t s 
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opposition to S p i r i t . 
As i n the Papirer, Kierkegaard makes i t clear that he i s not 
regarding Don Juan as an i n d i v i d u a l , but as a representative f i g u r e , 
an idea. He says 'Nat i i ra l ly therefore we must not overlook the f a c t 
that we are not t a l k i n g here of desire i n a par t icu lar i nd iv idua l , 
but of desire as a p r i n c i p l e , s p i r i t u a l l y determined as that which 
the S p i r i t excludes.' (SV 2 p . 8 l ) Because of the immediacy, or , 
as Kierkegaard also ca l l s i t , the abstractedness of th i s idea i t i s 
- not i n f a c t possible f o r the idea to acquire a concrete individual 
form: ' . . . to think of the sensuous i n an indiv idual cannot be 
done. Don Juan exists i n a perpetual hovering between being an 
idea, that i s to say fo rce , l i f e - and being an ind iv idua l . But 
t h i s hovering i s the musical v i b r a t i o n . ' ( i b i d . , p.88) We have 
already seen how Kierkegaard regarded the musical tone not as a 
po in t , but as a constant o s c i l l a t i o n . (19) 
The absolute coincidence of the idea (Don Juan) and the form 
(music) means that the opera Don Juan consti tutes a classical work. 
Again the heibergian tone i s struck i n the assertion that 
•'only where the idea has been brought to repose and se l f - t rans-
parency i n a determinate form, can there be ta lk of a classic-
a l work . . . This u n i t y , t h i s reciprocal indwell ing belongs to 
every class ical work, and one can easily see that every a t t -
empt to c l a s s i fy the various "classics" which takes as i t s 
point of departure a separation of matter and form, or idea 
and form must eo ipso go wrong. 
( i b i d . , p. 53) 
The musical i ty of the idea of Don Juan means that the c r i t i c , 
whose medium i s language, cannot himself communicate the idea d i r ec t -
l y , but he can seek to br ing about the appropriate attunement i n h is 
reader by leading him to the f r o n t i e r s of language and point ing the 
way across to the realm of music. So Kierkegaard wri tes 
. . . I sha l l constantly seek out the musical element i n the 
idea, i n the s i t ua t i on , e t c . , tune i n to i t , and when I 
have brought the reader to be so musically receptive that 
he seems to hear the music, although he hears nothing, then 
I have completed my task, then I w i l l be quiet , then I w i l l 
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say to the reader as to myself: l i s t e n . 
(SV 2 p. 83) 
The opera Don Juan w i l l only reveal i t s essence to the l i s t ener who 
genuinely l i s t e n s , who suspends his r e f l e c t i v e judgement and r e a l l y 
l i s t e n s . 
I t i s therefore notable that Kierkegaard's own language i t s e l f 
r i ses to moments of almost pure l y r i c i s m . Commenting on th i s essay, 
F. Bi l leskov Jansen says that ' t h i s incomparable piece of l y r i c a l 
prose i s an outstanding example of how Kierkegaard can both paint 
images i n and make music wi th the Danish language.' (20) 
The converse of a l l t h i s i s , of course, that any non-musical 
in te rp re ta t ion of the Don Jiian theme w i l l miss the mark, and i n 
t h i s connection Kierkegaard discusses Don Juan works by Moliere, 
Byron, Heiberg and the Danish wr i te r Hauch. With regard to Byron, 
Kierkegaard says that ' that Byron was i n many respects per fec t ly 
equipped to produce a Don Juan i s cer ta in enough, and one can there-
fo re be sure that i f the project miscarries the f a u l t i s not i n 
Byron, but l i e s deeper, ' ( ib id . ,p . lOO) namely i n the misrelat ion-
ship of idea and form. 
Kierkegaard returned to the Don Juan theme i n a two-part a r t i c -
l e published i n the newspaper Faedrelandet. (21) He en t i t l ed th is 
a r t i c l e A Cursory Observation Concerning a Deta i l i n Don Juan. For 
Kierkegaard however, there are no i n s i g n i f i c a n t de ta i l s i n aesth-
e t i c s , and the apparently unassuming t i t l e masks a po l i t e but damn-
ing appraisal of the production of the opera staged i n the Theatre 
Royal, Copenhagen, early i n 1845. The nub of the argument i s that 
the male lead has construed h is ro le too r e f l e c t i v e l y - and there-
fore misconstrued i t . Given tha t , f o r Kierkegaard, the whole opera 
i s merely the unfolding of the idea of Don Juan himself , t h i s means 
that the whole opera i s misconstrued. 
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( B ) ( i i ) Madame Heiberg as J i i l i e t 
Perhaps Kierkegaard's most successful piece of thea t r ica l c r i t -
icism was the review he wrote of Madame Heiberg i n the ro le of J \ i l i e t , 
a r o l e wi th which she had made her reputation as budding actress and 
to which she returned when i n her t h i r t i e s . I t i s the la te r per-
formance which Kierkegaard reviews. As wi th the review of Herr 
Phister , which we shal l be examining shor t ly , the piece i s some-
th ing of a personal t r i b u t e . I t s theme i s basical ly that 'age has 
not withered her , ' and tha t , on the contrary, she i s now able to 
b r ing to the part an a r t i s t i c maturity which enables her to play i t 
more successfully, to communicate more f u l l y , the ' idea ' of the 
pa r t , which Kierkegaard defines as the idea of 'feminine y o u t h f u l -
ness. ' 
Basic to Kierkegaard's argument i s a d i s t i n c t i o n , s imilar to 
that between DonsJuan as an indiv idual and Don Juan as an idea, 
between feminine youthfulness and the idea of feminine y o u t h f u l -
ness. The former i s what the public wants. I t wants 'a damned 
p re t ty and a d e v i l i s h l y smart lass of 18. These 18 years, t h i s 
damnable prett iness and t h i s dev i l i sh smartness, that i s the a r t 
appreciation - and also i t s b e s t i a l i t y . " (SV 14 p.107) A l l i t 
wants i s the same qual i ty as that which enables a g i r l to cause a 
sensation f o r a season i n society, ( i b i d . , p. 108) A gentiine 
aesthetician however i s i n search of the idea. The time f o r the 
manifestation of th i s idea comes wi th what Kierkegaard ca l l s the 
metamorphosis, which w i l l i n f a c t only occur i f the a r t i s t ' s 
genius i s i n tune with the a r t i s t i c idea, i n th i s case i f the g i r l 
possesses the idea, as wel l as the appearance, of feminine youth-
fulness . 
Time can i n f a c t help th i s metamorphosis to come about. For by 
s t r ipp ing away the merely external bloom of feminine youthfulness, 
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i t can serve to make the idea the more manifest, so that the act-
ress 'can now i n f u l l and conscious, i n acquired and dedicated com-
mand over her essential powers t r u l y be the servant of her idea, 
which i s the essential aesthetic r e l a t i on and essential ly d i f f e r e n t 
from the 17th,[]sicT) year 's immediate r e l a t i on to i t s own youth . ' 
(SV 14, p.122) The essential aesthetic r e l a t i o n , that i s , i s the 
self-transparency of the idea i n the vehicle of i t s expression, 
whether that be understood as the play or the a r t i s t . 
Kierkegaard distinguishes two ways i n which th i s essential 
aesthetic re la t ionship can develop i n an actress. One way i s what 
he c a l l s the metamorphosis of con t inu i ty , and the other i s the meta-
morphosis of potent ia t ion . The fonner i s a metamorphosis i n which 
the a r t i s t i c idea develops i t s e l f through a sequence of forms, i t i s 
a process, a succession, a continual transformation over the 
years, such that the actress gradually, as she grows older, 
changes her f i e l d , takes older ro les , again with the same 
perfec t ion as that wi th which she had performed her younger 
parts . ( i b i d . , p.123) 
The metamorphosis of potent ia t ion on the other hand i s that which he 
acclaims i n Madame Heiberg, i t i s 'a more and more intensive return 
to the f i r s t , * ( i b i d . ,pp. 125-4) to the f i r s t r o l e , the f i r s t idea: 
feminine youthfulness. I n t h i s re turn 
an i d e a l i t y of r eco l l ec t ion w i l l again cast a br ight l i g h t 
over the whole performance . . . This pure, calming, rejuven-
a t ing reco l l ec t ion w i l l i r r ad ia t e the whole performance 
l i k e an idea l i z ing l i g h t , and i n th i s l i g h t the perform-
ance w i l l be pe r fec t ly transparent [] to i t s idea 2 • 
( i b i d . , p.123) 
Both forms of aesthetic idea l iza t ion are able to withstand the 
corrosive workings of time, the metamorphosis of cont inui ty by i t s 
gradual achievement of perfect ion through time, the metamorphosis 
of potent ia t ion by allowing i t s one idea to shine more and more 
b r i g h t l y through i t . I t may indeed even be said of the actress who 
achieves the metamorphosis of potent ia t ion that by expressing the 
idea of feminine youthfulness more and more per fec t ly she actually 
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becomes younger. (SV 14, p.124) 
I n discussing the metamorphosis of cont inui ty Kierkegaard 
r e f e r s to h is own (mder the pseudonym of Assessor Wilhelm) lengthy 
footnote on Madame Heiberg's thea t r ica l r i v a l , Madame Nielsen, who 
thus comes to be b i l l e d as the model of t h i s type of metamorphosis. 
( c f . SV 8 pp. 118-9) 
( B ) ( i i i ) Farce at the KBnigstater 
We now turn to Kierkegaard's reviews of comedies. I t w i l l be 
remembered that i n Heiberg's schematization of the genres of poetry 
comedy i s regarded as essent ial ly r e f l e c t i v e . Like everything else 
however, i t has i t s three stages and the immediate stage of comedy i s 
fa rce . Kierkegaard turns h i s a t tent ion to farce i n Repetition i n a 
section which, although not marked o f f as such, i s i n e f f ec t a s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t piece of thea t r i ca l c r i t i c i s m . I t i s concerned with the 
presentation of farce i n B e r l i n ' s KOnigstSlter Theatre, and i n par t -
i cu l a r i t focusses on the genius of two of the leading members of 
the company, Beckmann and Grobecker. 
As wi th any other work of a r t the idea must be transparent 
both to actors and audience i f the work i s to be properly apprec-
ia ted . Because of the immediacy of the genre the actors most s u i t -
ed to farce 
are not so much r e f l e c t i v e a r t i s t s , who have studied laxighter, 
as they are l y r i c i s t s , who themselves plungeiirito the'abyss 
of laughter and now allow i t s volcanic power to hur l them on 
to the stage. They have not therefore calculated much on 
what they w i l l do, but they l e t the moment and the natural 
power of laiighter be responsible f o r everything. (SV 5 P«14.l) 
This same spontaneity w i l l also characterize an audience which 
r e a l l y knows how to enjoy farce , f o r 
One cannot therefore r e l y upon one's neighbours or upon the 
newspapers i f one i s to know whether one has enjoyed oneself 
or not . Each ind iv idua l must decide t h i s f o r himself; and 
hardly yet has any c r i t i c succeeded i n prescribing a ceremon-
i a l f o r the educated theatre-going publ ic , which woiild look i n 
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on a farce; i n th i s f i e l d no bon ton can establish i t s e l f 
at a l l . The otherwise so r e l i a b l e reciprocal respect be-
tween actor and audience i s broken, one can get in to the 
most unpredictable mood when seeing a fa rce , and one can 
never know wi th cer ta in ty whether one has conducted one-
se l f i n the theatre as a worthy member of society, who 
has laughed and cr ied at the appropriate places. 
(SV 5 p.140) 
Kierkegaard describes h i s own enjoyment of the production at the 
K5nigstater thus: ' . . . I rec l ined i n my box, cast aside l i k e a 
swimmer's clothes, stretched out beside the stream of laughter, of 
playfulness and of j o l l i t y , which foamed uninterruptedly past me.' 
( i b i d , p.146) 
I n a sense there i s therefore no task f o r the c r i t i c , the 
' r e f l e c t e u r ' , since r e f l e c t i o n i s out of place. A l l the c r i t i c 
can do i s to warn the spectator of what he must leave behind, and 
i t i s precisely h i s knowledge of the genres and of the laws govern-
ing them that t e l l s him to l e t himself go. 
( E ) ( i v ) The F i r s t Love 
The s i tua t ion i s however very d i f f e r e n t with comedy proper. 
Kierkegaard gives us two comedy reviews: The F i r s t Love by A. E. 
Scribe and Herr Phister as Captain Scipio. 
The review of The F i r s t Love, l i k e the eulogy of Mozart's Don 
Juan appears i n the f i r s t part of Either-Or. I n his review of 
Either-Or Heiberg, commenting on the review of The F i r s t Love, 
wrote of i t that 'out of a pre t ty l i t t l e bagatelle he the a u t h o r j 
has sought to make a masterwork and ascribed to i t an intent ion 
which i s v i r t u a l l y the opposite of that which Scribe openly acknow-
ledges. ' (22) Nonetheless Kierkegaard shows that here too he i s 
dependent on heibergian pr inc ip les . For the qual i ty he i s seeking 
here, which he f inds and which he praises, i s the qual i ty of r e f l e c t -
ion which belongs to comedy i n t r i n s i c a l l y , according to the heiberg-
ian table of genres. 
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I n accordance wi th th i s qua l i ty of r e f l e c t i o n , and again i n 
accordance with Heiberg's s t ipu la t ions , i t i s above a l l the s i tua t -
ional dimension of the comedy which Kierkegaard seeks to emphasize: 
' l e t the dialogues i n the play be never so w i t t y , one w i l l forget 
them; one cannot possibly forget the s i tua t ions , when one has seen 
them.' (SV 2 p.256) 
Likewise the ref lect iveness of comedy means that i t i s i n a 
way 'h igher ' than tragedy: 
People generally believe that the comic i s more a thing of 
the moment than i s tragedy; one laughs at i t and forgets i t . 
whereas one of ten returns to the tragic to lose oneself i n i t . 
Now the comic and the t ragic can consist either i n dialogue 
or i n s i tua t ion . Some people are t o t a l l y stayed on the d ia-
logue, they preserve i t i n memory and of ten return to i t . 
Others are t o t a l l y stayed on the s i tua t iona l element, to 
reconstruct i t f o r memory. These l a s t are the contemplat-
ive natures . . . a comic s i tua t ion . . . i f i t i s i n other re -
spects correct , w i l l , more than tragedy, tempt one to lose 
oneself i n i t . ( i b i d . , p.242) 
In contemplation of a t ragic s i tua t ion the soul;comes to rest 
i n an ' i n f i n i t e melancholy (Veemod)' , but:;'?,. 
The comic s i tua t ion indeed has a s imilar permanence fo r con-
templation, but at the same time r e f l e c t i o n i s moving i n i t , 
and the more one discovers, the more i n f i n i t e the comic s i t -
uat ion becomes wi th in i t s e l f , as i t were, and the more one 
gets dizzy, and yet one cannot stop star ing at i t . The s i t -
uations i n The F i r s t Love are of precisely th i s k ind . The 
f i r s t impression they make i s already that of a comic e f f e c t , 
but when one reproduces them f o r the i n t u i t i o n , then the 
laughter grows quieter , but the smile clearer fo rk l a r e t = 
t ransf igured , explained J , one can scarcely tear one's 
thoughts away from i t again, because i t i s as i f something 
s t i l l more laughable might come. ( i b i d . , p.243) 
Kierkegaard goes on to l i k e n t h i s enjoyment to the pleasure of 
a smoker (on several occasions Kierkegaard re fers to his penchant 
f o r a good cigar (23) ) who s i t s back and watches the patterns of 
h i s smoke. Though Kierkegaard does not develop th i s image i t i s 
quite apt. For that which the smoker contemplates i s essential ly 
nothing, i t i s contentless, merely a screen f o r the mind's dreajay 
pro jec t ions , and h is contemplation i s therefore a pure r e f l e c t i o n 
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of h is own consciousness without objective or substantial reference. 
Likewise the comic s i tua t ion hinges on the revelat ion of the essent-
i a l nothingness of the characters and of the i r in ter re la t ionships . 
There must not be a single f i gu re i n i t , not a single dramat-
i c r e l a t i onsh ip , which could lay a claim to survive the down-
f a l l which i rony , r i gh t " f rom the beginning, has been prepar-
ing f o r . e v e r y t h i n g i i n i i t . (SV 2 p 252) 
The cur ta in f a l l s , the play i s over, nothing remains standing, 
only the. broad o u t l i n e , i n which the s i tua t ion ' s fantas t ic 
Schattenspiel, directed by i rony, remains f o r contemplation. 
The immediately rea l s i tua t ion i s the unreal s i tua t ion , be-
hind t h i s a new s i tua t ion reveals i t s e l f , which i s no less 
topsy-t \ irvy, and so on, and so on. I n the s i tuat ion one hears 
the dialogue - when i t i s most reasonable i t shows i t s e l f to 
be at i t s maddest, and as the s i tua t ion distances i t s e l f , so 
the dialogue f o l l o w s , more and more meaningless, despite i t s 
reasonableness. ( i b i d . , pp. 255-6) 
Again Kierkegaard uses h is ro le as c r i t i c to help provide the 
reader wi th the appropriate attunement, to get the reader in to the 
proper mood f o r a f u l l appreciation of the work. To th i s end he 
s tar ts the review with a rather whimsical in t roduct ion , which de-
spite i t s rather i r re levan t appearance, i s deeply connected with the 
theme of the review. Two points i n particiolar serve to indicate th i s 
connection. 
F i r s t l y i t develops the notion of the importance of occasion 
f o r a wr i t e r - both f o r a t r u l y creative wr i t e r and f o r a reviewer. 
He claims that even i f someone i s brimming over with ideas i t r e -
quires an occasion, possibly a quite t r i v i a l occasion, f o r these 
ideas to come out and acquire aesthetic form. In f ac t the occasion 
' i s always the accidental , and th i s i s the monstrous paradox, that 
the accidental i s altogether absolutely as necessary as the necess-
ary. ' ( i b i d . , p .2l6) 'A creation i s a production out of nothing, 
the occasion on the other hand i s the nothing which l e t s every-
th ing come ou t . ' ( i b i d . , p.218) This i s of coxirse precisely what 
we have seen the content of the play, and indeed of the review i t -
s e l f , to be: nothing, a something whose content i s nothing; the 
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l i v e s and personal i t ies of whose dramatis personae are nothing, 
content-less, n u l l and void . 
Secondly the in t roduct ion t e l l s a f i c t i t i o u s love-story. The 
reviewer t e l l s how he was once i n love , but his shy and bashful 
romantic love could not express i t s e l f , u n t i l he saw i n the paper 
that a play cal led The F i r s t Love was to be performed. The t i t l e 
f i l l s him with enthusiasm, 'This play w i l l by i t s poetic power, 
cause the love which i s i n my heart to break f o r t h , w i l l cause i t s 
f lower to burst open l i k e a passion-flower. ' (SV 2 p.223) At the 
theatre the g i r l of h i s dreams i s coincidental ly present, which 
gives an added poignancy to the piece. ' I w i l l think only of her 
and of my love; everything which i s said i n honour of f i r s t love, 
I w i l l apply to her and to our r e l a t i onsh ip . ' ( i b i d , , p . 2 2 4 ) 
Of course no kierkegaardian love-story has a happy ending, and 
t h i s l i t t l e a f f a i r peters out. Some years l a t e r the youth meets the 
g i r l again to f i n d that she i s now engaged to another, who, she t e l l s 
him, i s her f i r s t love. 
This story anticipates the theme of the review, that the play 
The F i r s t Love i s ac tual ly an i ron ic annih i la t ion of the concept of 
' f i r s t l o v e . ' This twofold r e f l e c t i o n of the content of the review 
i s i t s e l f a mark of the r e f l e c t i v e qual i ty which the reviewer i s 
seeking to i n c i t e i n the reader, and i t s e l f r e f l e c t s what the review-
er thinks i s the appropriate mood i n which to receive the play. 
( B ) (v) Herr Phister as Captain Scipio 
The same qual i ty of r e f l e c t i o n i s cal led on i n the review of 
Herr Phister as Captain Scipio i n the musical play Ludovic by J. H. 
Vernoy de St. Georges. Captain Scipio i s a comic chgracter, a 
character, that i s , who w i l l turn out to be a nothing, a s e l f -
negating character, since, as Heiberg says, comedy demands the 
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t r i m p h of s i tua t ion and the annih i la t ion of character. 
Captain Scipio i s a Captain i n the Papal pol ice . This, accord-
ing to Kierkegaard already involves a contradict ion. By h i s m i l i t -
ary uniform he lays claim to the d ign i ty of the m i l i t a r y - but he i s 
also a c i v i c functionary who has to look a f t e r gutters and sewers. 
(IX B 68 pp. 589-90)fe^Thus ' i n every moment the c i v i l i a n ' s idiosyn-
crasies make a mock of the so ld ie r . ' ( i b i d . , p.390) 
Captain Scipio i s also perpetually t ipsy . But th i s contains 
another contradict ion - he i s both drunk and not drunk f o r he 'has 
reached the maximum at which he cannot get drunk. ' ( i b i d . , p.395) 
I t i s the easiest th ing i n the world to portray a drunk - but i t 
requires r e f l e c t i o n to portray the ambiguity of a state such as 
Capt. Sc ip io ' s . 'The immediate i s i n a cer ta in sense negated; i t 
must never be immediately apparent that he i s drunk, f o r he i s not 
drunk i n that way.' ( i b i d . ) The drunkenness i s revealed precisely 
i n the por t rayal of the way i n which i t i s concealed, ( i b i d . , p.596) 
Herr Phister i s able to achieve th i s task because his f o r t e i s 
r e f l e c t i o n , ( i b i d . , p.385) The c r i t i c must respond to such accomp-
lishment wi th a corresponding r e f l e c t i o n . 
I n response to r e f l e c t i o n and to a reflective.performance . i t 
i s absolutely meaningless to say neither more nor less than 
bravo.' or even bravissimoJ and i t can only weary and t i r e 
the r e f l e c t i o n which i s the object of such admiration . . . 
I n r e l a t i o n to r e f l e c t i o n admiration has to be expressed i n 
the language of r e f l e c t i o n . Reflect ion i s t h i s : why? -
because; why i s the whole arranged thus? - because; why i s 
t h i s l i t t l e stroke put i n here? - i t i s because, e tc . , every-
thing i s consciousness. Admiration i s therefore again being 
able to discover and to understand the whole: why? - be-
cause. True admiration i n the r e l a t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n and 
r e f l e c t i o n (and only l i k e understands l i k e ) i s therefore 
perfec t comprehension, neither more nor less. I n a cer ta in 
sense there i s therefor®no 'admiration' i n the r e l a t ion of 
r e f l e c t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n . ( i b i d . , p.586) 
I n accordance wi th t h i s doctrine and consistent with his praise of 
the abiding in teres t a comic s i tua t ion can arounse, Kierkegaard con-
cludes the review by commenting 
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This l i t t l e a r t i c l e i s a reco l lec t ion ; i t i s many years 
since i t s author saw Ludovic, and i t i s already some 
years since the play was performed. I am therefore i n -
v o l u n t a r i l y tempted to make the fo l lowing observation: 
the usual t hea t r e - c r i t i c s go on the f i r s t n ight of a 
new play; and j u s t seeing i t once i s enough f o r them 
to judge the play and every actor i n i t - a Phister, a 
Nielsen, a Wiehe, a Madame Heiberg, a Madame Nielsen, et 
a l . , who have sometimes expended months and a l l the i r 
genius, a l l t he i r thought, a l l the i r energy i n order to 
achieve the set task. I t i s otherwise wi th t h i s l i t t l e 
a r t i c l e . ( iX B 68 pp. 399-400) 
( E ) ( v i ) The Nature of Theatrical A r t 
I t w i l l be appgrent that the arrangement of the theat r ica l 
reviews here emphasizes Kierkegaard's dependence on the basic d i a l -
ec t i ca l s tructure of the forms of a r t propounded by Heiberg, since 
we have moved from the immediacy of opera through to the t o t a l l y 
r e f l e c t e d self-transparency of comedy. I t w i l l be seen too that -
despite Kierkegaard's aesthetic respect f o r such a prac t i t ioner of 
the comic a r t as Herr Phister, and despite h is admiration f o r what 
he sees as the i ron ic ann ih i la t ion of the concept of f i r s t love i n 
Scribe's play - the revela t ion of the nothingness of i t s content by 
comedy, i f comedy i s understood as the culmination of the d ia lec t i c 
of the forms of a r t , indicates a cul-de-sac which cannot but prove 
unsat isfactory f o r the human s p i r i t , and which suggests, as Hegel's 
analysis of c lass ical comedy was intended to show, (24) that beyond 
comedy some new form of s p i r i t i s demanded, i n which a new re l a t ion 
to r e a l i t y i s established, i n which content or substant ia l i ty i s 
restored to the empty so^LL. 
The thea t r i ca l reviews do not discuss the r e l a t i on of the aes-
the t i c ideas which they c a l l '^upon to r e a l i t y i n a wider sense. 
They are treated purely on aesthetic grounds. Why i s this? I s i t 
because the thea t r i ca l form i s i n f a c t abstract to such a degree 
that i t nei ther makes a claim on nor provides a challenge to rea l i ty? 
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Some support f o r t h i s view might be found i n the general observat-
ions on t h e a t r i c a l a r t which are attached to the discussion of 
farce i n Repe t i t ion . Here Kierkegaard wri tes 
There i s surely no young man of any imagination (Phantasi ) who 
has not at one time f e l t himself caught by the magic of the theatre 
and desired himself to. be..-transported in to that f i c t i t i o u s r e a l i t y , 
so that l i k e a Loppelganger he can see and hear himself , to s p l i t 
h i s s e l f up in to a l l manner of possible d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of himself 
from h imse l f , so that each d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s i n turn a single se l f . 
(SV 5 p.135) 
The w r i t i n g i s somewhat tortuous but the point i s f a i r l y clear -
that i n the spectacle of the theatre, i n the manifold of the dramat-
i s personae, we see and i d e n t i f y wi th what are r e a l l y a l l p o s s i b i l -
i t i e s of any and every personal i ty: we sympathize wi th the charact-
er on stage because he or she i s or represents an aspect of what we 
each covild be. (25) He continues 
I t i s n a t u r a l l y only at a very young age that such a desire 
expresses i t s e l f . Only the phantasy i s awake i n th i s dream o-f 
. personal i ty , every other f a c u l t y i s s t i l l sound asleep. Ir i 
such a f an tas t i c self-contemplation the ind iv idua l has no 
actual form, but i s only a shadow, or ra ther , the actual form 
i s i n v i s i b l y present, and i s therefore not content with cast-
ing one shadow, but the ind iv idua l has a m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
shadows, which a l l resemble him, and f o r each moment have an 
equal, claim to be himself . The personali ty i s not yet d i s -
covered, i t s energy annotinces i t s e l f only i n the passion of 
p o s s i b i l i t y . . . ( i b i d . , pp. 155-6) 
Kierkegaard thus c a l l s the theatre the shadow-play (Schatten-
sp ie l ) of the hidden i n d i v i d u a l : the rea l personali ty i s l i k e a 
concealed point of l i g h t , which from i t s hidden centre casts an 
array of shadows, a l l o f which equally represent and d i s t o r t i t . 
An analogy w i t h Pla to ' parable of the cave i s not too hard to f i n d . 
But the theatre does not cut across the f i e l d of the e thical 
personal i ty because i t simply does not operate at the same l e v e l . 
The hidden ind iv idua l i s the ind iv idua l with no clear sense of per-
s o n a l i t y , and i t i s indeed precisely through the shadows he projects 
that he f i r s t arr ives at a provis ional conception of personali ty. 
There does however come a moment when the personality i s r e -
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quired to wake up, to leave the cave and to walk i n the l i g h t , 
there comes a moment when 
the cock now crows, and the t w i l i g h t f igures f l e e away, the 
voices of the night f a l l s i l e n t . I f they continue, then we 
are i n a quite d i f f e r e n t domain, where a l l t h i s goes on voi-
der the disquiet ing eye of r e spons ib i l i t y , then we are on 
the border of the demoniacal. 
(SV 5, p.137) 
The actual machinery of the theatre i s , however, as Kierke-
gaard observes, arranged to provide jus t the r i g h t sort of envir-
onment f o r the Schattenspiel of the hidden personality,-.to ensure 
that the harsh l i g h t of r e a l i t y does not dist t i rb the h a l f - l i g h t i n 
which the ephemeral forms of the fan tas t ic consciousness move. ( i b i d . ) 
I n one sense t h i s i s a l l c lear ly a deficiency i n the theatre, 
but from another angle, i t means tha t , as long as i t keeps wi th in 
i t s own proper sphere, thea t r i ca l a r t i s to be regarded as immme 
from moralizing interference. The magic of the theatre i s regul -
ated by i t s own proper laws and structures. Kierkegaard's thea t r ic -
al c r i t i c i s m therefore appropriately f l o a t s i n a medium of ideal d i s -
engagement from the claims and projects of the exis t ing ind iv idua l . 
I n the theatre i t i s only the aesthetic appropriateness that matters. 
The l i l t imate achievement of thea t r ica l a r t i s the teasing ins ight 
in to the n u l l i t y of i t s own f igures which i s attained i n the work 
of such r e f l e c t i v e comedians as Herr Phister. Against Heiberg, 
however, the f igures of the stage can never be more than p o s s i b i l i t -
i e s , p ro jec t ions , aesthetic ideals. The can never be ' t rue appear-
ances' of the Idea i n an absolute sense, as Heiberg had claimed in 
Fata Morgana, but are only the shadows cast by the hidden l i g h t of 
the se l f i n i t s dream of personali ty. 
- 202 -
"(C) The L i t e r a r y Reviews 
(C) ( i ) The Principles of Novel i s t ic L i te ra ture 
When we turn to Kierkegaard's reviews of nove l i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e 
we f i n d ourselves i n an atmosphere quite d i f f e r e n t from that of the 
f an tas t i c h a l f - l i g h t of the theatre. Here a d i f f e r e n t set of c r i t -
e r i a i s broiight to bear on the work of a r t , and, i n par t i c \ i l a r , aes-
the t i c production i s tested against the standards of an e thical 
' l i f e - v i e w ' . 
The broad congruence of the thea t r ica l with the purely aesth-
e t i c c r i t i c i s m , and of the l i t e r a r y wi th the e thical c r i t i c i s m does 
suggest that t h i s move i s deliberate and of i t s e l f says something 
about Kierkegaard's conception of the novel. I t would seem to sug-
gest that he considers that by i t s very form the novel makes some 
sort of claim to count as a representation of r e a l i t y i n a way that 
the theatre does not , and tha t , conversely, the novel must be answer-
able to the claims of r e a l i t y . Kierkegaard would not be alone i n 
t h i s view f o r as John Hospers has said • some'Jformalistically-minded 
c r i t i c s . . . would say that l i terat-ure d i f f e r s importantly from the 
other a r t s , and that the appreciation of l i te ra t iare does involve con-
siderations of correspondence wi th r e a l i t y , whereas appreciation of 
the other ar ts does not . . . " (26) 
We have already seen how i n the early Papirer Kierkegaard found 
an un i ty and t o t a l i t y i n Goethe's Wilhelm Meister which made i t a 
' t rue microcosm* (27) The novel 's power of depicting the many-
faceted concreteness of the world enta i ls that i t i s as a represent-
a t ion of the world , of l i f e , that the novel has to be judged. In 
making t h i s assiomption Kierkegaard would be i n cont inui ty with the 
early romantics who regarded the novel as the r ichest mode of a r t , 
incapable of incorporating a manifold of aesthetic forms - and i n 
t h i s respect Wilhelm Meister again provided them with a pattern. (28) 
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I n br inging a d i f f e r e n t standard to bear upon the novel , Kierke-
gaard i s not necessarily abandoning the pr inc ip les of heibergian 
c r i t i c i s m which he had brought to bear on the theatre, f o r here too 
the question i s whether the work of a r t answers to the requirements 
of i t s genre. However i n formulating th i s requirement v is -a-v is the 
novel , Kierkegaard invokes the s p i r i t of Poul M i l l e r and M i l l e r ' s 
statement that a genuine work of a r t was only possible on the basis 
of a soimd ' l i f e - v i e w ' or 'wor ld-view' , (29) and we shall f i n d too 
that he takes account of M)^ller's question as to whether the achieve-
ment of such a view i s possible i n the present age. 
By connecting the work of a r t to r e a l i t y i n th i s way Kierke-
gaard i s not breaking with the broad i d e a l i s t view of a r t , f o r i t 
w i l l be recal led that the ' l i f e - v i e w ' i t s e l f , as M i l l e r had form\i l -
ated i t (and we shall now see Kierkegaard using i t ) , i t s e l f has an 
i d e a l i s t i c character, being the in tegra t ion of the manifold of exper-
ience in to an m i t y and wholeness permeated by the harmonizing l i g h t 
of the idea l . I t i s precisely th i s synthesis of the ideal and the 
rea l which the work of a r t i s to r e f l e c t i n i t s own medim. 
As wi th the thea t r i ca l reviews the aim here i s not to enter i n -
to a deta i led account of the par t icu lar aesthetic judgements and an-
alyses which Kierkegaard makes, but to extract the pr inciples which 
he i s applying, to see the theory of a r t which he presupposes. 
(C) ( i i ) From the Papers of One S t i l l L iv ing 
The f i r s t of these reviews to be considered i s From the Papers 
of One S t i l l L i v i n g , Kierkegaard's f i r s t book. I t opens with an 
attack on the n i h i l i s t i c tendencies of the age, pa r t i cu la r ly as 
manifest i n such movements as der junge Deutschland, and i t c r i t i c -
izes the assumption by t h i s tendency of a s p l i t between the ideal and 
the r e a l . Hegel on the other hand i s praised insofar as the negative 
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moment i n h i s philosophy i s jus t tha t , a moment, and i s used as a 
means to re la te the Idea back to the fulness of existence. (SV 1, 
p. 21) The p o l i t i c a l l e f t i s s t r ingent ly condemned f o r i t s d i s a f f -
ec t ion , i t s nega t iv i t y , which can only sap the substantial value of 
the received forms of social and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Such radicalism 
negates p o l i t i c a l i d e a l i t y , ( i b i d . , pp . 22f f . ) 
A f t e r t h i s polemical int roduct ion Kierkegaard turns to the' 
contemporary l i t e r a r y scene and before coming to his main item, 
Hans Chris t ian Andersen's Kun en Spillemand, he refers to the work 
of Thomasine Gyllembourg, Carl Bernhard and Steen Steensen Blicher . 
He uses Madame Gyllembourg as an example of what he f inds admirable 
and desirable i n a novel. Madame Gyllembourg's work, i t i s said, 
contains a ' l i f e - v i e w ' which must have a corresponding a t t i tude i n 
the author 's own l i f e . This l i f e - v i e w i s described ( i n an impossible 
sentence - F. Bi l leskov Jansen re fers to the 'deterr ing s ty le ' of 
t h i s review)(30) as 
The sublimate of joy over l i f e , the fought- for confidence i n 
the world which resul ts as l i f e ' s y i e l d , which maintains 
that even i n i t s most i n s i g n i f i c a n t f igures the spring of 
l i f e ' s poetry has not dried up; the confidence i n people, 
that there too i n the i r most t r i v i a l forms of self-present-
a t i on , i f one w i l l only seek cor rec t ly , w i l l be found a 
fu lness , a divine spark, which, ca r e f i i l l y ni ir tured, can i r -
radiate the whole of l i f e ; i n b r i e f , the v e r i f i e d congruence 
of youth's demands and pronouncements wi th l i f e ' s achieve-
ments, which i s her proved not ex mathematica pura but i s 
made v i s i b l e de profvindis, from out of a r i c h mind's whole 
inner i n f i n i t y , and presented with youthful seriousness. 
( i b i d . , p.25) 
This l i f e - v i e w i s said to give the author's tales 'an evangelistic 
touch. ' (SV 1 p.25) However, i t i s also hinted that there are 
cer ta in negative moments i n l i f e , cer tain sorrows, which are not 
adequately treated i n these books, although Kierkegaard's f i n a l word 
on them emphasizes t he i r qua l i ty rather than the i r shortcomings. 
He thinks that these novels w i l l f i n d the i r true readers among 
the members of the older generation f o r whom a ' l i f e - v i e w ' was a 
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presupposition of personal development, who possess 'a resignation 
which i s not the consequence of external pressure . . . but the dev-
elopment of an inner e l a s t i c i t y , of the joy which has triumphed ov-
er the w o r l d . ' (SV 1, p.26) 
He says less about Carl Bernhard and Bl icher . Blicher i s con-
trasted wi th Madame Gyllembourg and praised even though he does not 
possess the ' l i f e - v i e w which belongs to the individual who has run 
the race and kept the f a i t h , ' b u t 6nly 'a deep poetic mood, shrouded 
i n the misty v e i l of immediacy." ( i b i d . , p.28) 
Kierkegaard next turns to h is main theme - one might say his 
main target : Hans Chris t ian Andersen. Employing the heibergian 
equation of l y r i c = immediate, subject ive/ epic = object ive , 
Kierkegaard f inds Andersen lacking as a l y r i c a l w r i t e r , f o r he i s 
devoid of the naive self-confidence of l y r i c a l genius. Andersen i s 
no "personality c lear ly marked out by nature, who has no other 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s remarkable outburst and his remarkable claims 
on the world than nature's imprimatur. ' ( i b i d . , p.29) As a l y r i c -
i s t he i s a mere 'e legaic ' poet, a mere ' p o s s i b i l i t y of a personal-
i t y , caught i n a . . . web of accidental moods.' As f o r Andersen's 
'epic" q u a l i t y , which, says Kierkegaard, should succeed the l y r i c a l 
stage i n a w r i t e r ' s development, i t i s simply non-existent: 'Ander-
sen has leapt over h is epos.' By such an epic stage i s meant 'a 
deep and serious embracing of the given r e a l i t y . . . a l i f e - s t r e n g t h -
ening abiding i n i t and admiration f o r i t . ' ( i b i d . , pp. 29 f . ) 
This lamentable state of a f f a i r s i s not en t i re ly Andersen's 
f a u l t . The t r ans i t i ona l nature of the age does not allow much op-
por tuni ty f o r such an epic absorption i n permanent and supra-person-
a l values. But whatever the cause the consequence i s disastrous: 
I f therefore Andersen was at an early stage ensnared by h is 
own s e l f , he also at an early stage f e l t himself thrust 
back upon himself , l i k e a superfluous cornflower i n the 
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midst of the useful com. And because he was i n th i s way 
cont inual ly pushed back down the funnel of h is own person-
a l i t y , h is poetic powers, i n the i r self-corroding (and only 
i n t h i s way productive) a c t i v i t y , had - i n that his o r ig ina l 
elegiac mood modified i t s e l f by such a type of r e f l e c t i o n to 
a k ind of d i s a f f ec t i on and bit terness towards the world -
rather to show i t s e l f as a subdued flame which now and again 
f l a r e s up, than, as would have been the case with a more s ig -
n i f i c a n t personal i ty , as a subterranean f i r e , which t e r r i f i e s 
the world i n i t s bu r s t i ng - fo r th . (SV 1 p . 5 l ) 
I n a word, Andersen u t t e r l y lacks what Madame Gyllembourg so 
pre-eminently possesses - a l i f e - v i e w . ( i b i d . , p.54) Kierkegaard 
defines a l i f e - v i e w i n terms which c lear ly echo M i l l e r ' s formulat-
ions: 
A l i f e - v i e w , namely, i s more than . . . a sum of statements main-
t a i n tained i n the i r abstract neu t r a l i t y ; i t i s more than experi-
ence, which as such i s always a tomist ic , i t i s i n f a c t the 
transubstantiat ion of experience, i t i s an -unshakeable conf id -
ence i n oneself, won i n the teeth of the empirical manifold; 
whether i t has merely orientated i t s e l f with regard to a l l 
worldly relat ionships (a purely h\iman standpoint, e.g.Stoicism), 
which thereby keeps i t s e l f back from contact wi th a deeper 
empiricism, or whether i t has by being directed towards heaven 
(the r e l i g ious ) therein found the central po in t , both f o r the 
heavenly and the earthly existence, has won the true chr i s t ian 
assurance "that neither death nor l i f e , no angel, no prince, 
no power, nothing that ex is t s , nothing s t i l l to come, or height 
or depth, or anything i n a l l creat ion, can separate us from the 
love of God i n Christ Jesus our Lord ." / - T . . - , 
( i b i d . , pp.34f) 
This i s the l i f e - v i e w which Andersen lacks, and yet i t i s ' the 
conditio: sine qua non f o r a novel i s t of the type to which Andersen 
ielongs." ( i b i d . , p.35) Andersen does have a recurrent l idea ' i n his 
novels, but t h i s i s not enough, f o r Kierkegaard says that " I have 
never asserted that an idea simply as such ( least of a l l an idee f i x e ) 
i s to be regarded as a l i f e - v i e w ! ( i b i d . , p.37) Everything depends 
upon the content of the idea. Andersen"s idea i s the idea of the 
downfall of everything noble, genia l , exalted." Kierkega^d how-
ever regis ters h is protest against c a l l i n g such a decadent idea a 
l i f e - v i e w . Even i f such an idea were to be conceded th i s status, 
he argues, i t could only be v a l i d l y maintained by one who had fought 
hard wi th l i f e , and who could set out the dreadful and overpowering 
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s e t o f events which l e a d to h i s h e r o ' s d o w n f a l l . Andersen however 
mere ly enthuses about h i s h e r o ' s g r e a t a b i l i t y , e t c . - and t h e n , 
w i thout e x p l a n a t i o n , goes on to speak o f i t s l o s s . (SV 1 p. 58) 
Andersen i s fundamenta l ly p a s s i v e , H i s genius depends on i t s 
environment i n s t e a d of t r iumphing over i t . K i e r k e g a a r d quotes 
Andersen h i m s e l f as s a y i n g t h a t ' gen ius i s an egg which r e q u i r e s 
warmth, the f e r t i l i z i n g power of f o r t u n e , or e l s e i t w i l l become a 
w i n d - e g g ' , ( i b i d . , p . 3 8 , n . 3 ) K i e r k e g a a r d ' s i d e a of genius by con-
t r a s t i s t h a t o f a n t i q u i t y - i t s p r i n g s f o r t h f u l l y - a r m e d from 
J u p i t e r ' s head, ( i b i d . ) 
The p o s s e s s i o n o f a proper l i f e - v i e w , o f a s e l f - a s s \ i r e d t r a n s -
cendence o f p e r s o n a l be ing over the a c c i d e n t s and c o n t i n g e n c i e s of 
e x i s t e n c e , m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n the nove l as a k i n d of providence: 
i t p r o v i d e s a deeper u n i t y which g i v e s the nove l ' a c e n t r e o f g r a v -
i t y ' i n i t s e l f , ( i b i d . , p.59) 
The l a c k of such a l i f e - v i e w on the o ther hand tends to be com-
pensated f o r e i t h e r by u s i n g the nove l a s a p l a t f o r m f o r some t h e o r y , 
which l e a d s to the product ion of what K i e r k e g a a r d c a l l s the 'dogmat-
i c , d o c t r i n a i r e n o v e l ' , ( i b i d . ) or by the i n t r u s i o n of ' a f i n i t e 
and a c c i d e n t a l r e l a t i o n to the a u t h o r ' s f l e s h and b l o o d . ' ( i b i d . ) 
K i e r k e g a a r d r e g a r d s S c h l e g e l ' s n o v e l L u c i n d e as an example of the 
f i r s t type of e r r o r , a s we s h a l l soon s e e , w h i l s t Andersen i s an ex-
ample o f the second k i n d of f a i l i n g . 
K i e r k e g a a r d does not mean t h a t d e f i c i e n t , decadent , doomed or 
o t h e r w i s e f l a w e d c h a r a c t e r s should not appear i n a nove l but t h a t 
the n o v e l i s t must m a i n t a i n a proper d i s t a n c e from such c h a r a c t e r s . 
A c c o r d i n g l y the n o v e l i s t should not h i m s e l f be ' immediate ly ' p r e s -
ent i n the n o v e l but ' i n the n o v e l t h e r e must be an immortal s p i r i t 
which s u r v i v e s the w h o l e . ' ( i b i d . , p.40) T h i s s p i r i t i s the s p i r i t 
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o f the n o v e l i s t h i m s e l f . The n o v e l i s t s tands o u t s i d e the nove l 
p r e c i s e l y i n order to f u n c t i o n as the p r o v i d e n t i a l hand which 
gu ides the whole. A n d e r s e n ' s n o v e l s however ' s t a n d i n such a 
p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n to h i m s e l f , t h a t t h e i r g e n e s i s i s not so much 
to be r e g a r d e d as a produc t ion but as an amputation of p a r t of 
h i m s e l f . ' (SV 1 p . 4 l ) 
On the b a s i s o f these p r i n c i p l e s K i e r k e g a a r d proceeds to a n -
a l y s e the s t y l e and content o f K\m en S p i l l e m a n d . Needless to s a y , 
h i s judgement i s not f a v o i i r a b l e . 
The r e v i e w i s p r e f a c e d by a b r i e f i n t r o d u c t i o n which i s used 
i n a manner r e s e m b l i n g the way i n which the i n t r o d u c t i o n to the r e -
v i ew of The F i r s t Love i s used - to a n t i c i p a t e and encapsu la te the 
theme o f the r e v i e w . T h i s l i t t l e i n t r o d u c t i o n p r e s e n t s a d ia logue 
between two p a r t s o f the a u t h o r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y . One p a r t i s a p o e t i c 
dreamer who tends to l o s e h i m s e l f i n 'dark p r e m o n i t i o n s , ' ( i b i d . , p.14) 
who, h a v i n g completed the manuscr ip t of the book, w i l l not p u b l i s h i t 
because of h i s f e a r of be ing r e c e i v e d uncomprehendingly. The other 
h a l f however t a k e s the commanding, no-nonsense l i n e of ' p u b l i s h and 
be damned': 'What I have w r i t t e n , t h a t have I w r i t t e n . ' ( i b i d . , p . 1 5 ) 
T h i s i s , i n e f f e c t , the i s s u e between an A n d e r s e n - l i k e f i g u r e and the 
author who p o s s e s s e s a l i f e - v i e w . 
I t i s q u i t e c l e a r from the r e v i e w t h a t the requirement o f a 
l i f e - v i e w i s s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed to Andersen as a n o v e l i s t ; a 
l y r i c a l p o e t , f o r i n s t a n c e , would not need to undergo the o b j e c t i v e 
d i s c i p l i n e o f the e p i c s t a ^ e , out o f which the c a p a c i t y to commun-
i c a t e a l i f e - v i e w a r t i s t i c a l l y i s b o m . T h i s supports the c o n t e n t -
i o n made h e r e t h a t K i e r k e g a a r d ' s r e v i e w s of n o v e l s do not apply a 
d i f f e r e n t theory from the t h e a t r i c a l r e v i e w s , but apply the same 
a e s t h e t i c demand f o r the congruence of i d e a and form a t a d i f f e r e n t 
l e v e l . I t i s to the nove l as a s p e c i f i c l i t e r a r y genre , not to a r t 
- 209 -
as s u c h , t h a t the c h a l l e n g e of the l i f e - v i e w i s posed. 
I n the r e v i e w K i e r k e g a a r d o f f e r s two models o f the l i f e - v i e w . 
One, which he c a l l s the s t o i c p o s i t i o n , i s a merely t h i s - w o r l d l y 
p o s i t i o n , the o ther r e l a t e s i t s e l f to a rea lm of h i g h e r e x p e r i e n c e , 
to what M i l l e r had c a l l e d ' e x p e r i e n c e of an h i g h e r k i n d . ' (51) But 
K i e r k e g a a r d does not h e r e c l a r i f y the ng ture of t h i s h i ^ e r exper-
i e n c e , nor does he say how f a r i t can adequate ly be m i r r o r e d i n 
a e s t h e t i c form. Does the i n t e g r a t i o n of i d e a l i t y and r e a l i t y which 
the l i f e - v i e w a c h i e v e s , and which i s r e f l e c t e d i n n o v e l s such as 
Madame G y l l e m b o u r g ' s , s t i r v i v e the d e s t r u c t i o n of the br idge between 
i d e a l and r e a l which o c c u r s i n the n i h i l i s t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s ? 
Can a r t , i n f a c t , m i r r o r l i f e wi thout d i s t o r t i o n , without an o v e r -
emphasis on the i d e a l , w i thout a b s t r a c t i n g from the complexi ty of 
e x p e r i e n c e and i n p a r t i c u l a r from the s u f f e r i n g which exper ience 
imposes on the i n d i v i d u a l ? K i e r k e g a a r d d i d a f t e r a l l h i n t t h a t 
t h e r e were d a r k e r themes w i t h which Madame Gyl lembourg's genius 
d i d n o t and c o u l d not d e a l . I s t h e r e an exper ience of an h i g h e r 
k i n d which i n v o l v e s a t u m i n g - a w a y from the world r a t h e r than an 
a c h i e v e d i n t e g r a t i o n of the m a n i f o l d of w o r l d l y exper ience? These 
a r e q u e s t i o n s which l u r k i n the background of t h i s r e v i e w , ques t -
i o n s to which we s h a l l see K i e r k e g a a r d re t \ arn . 
( c ) ( i i i ) L u c i n d e 
I n the s e c t i o n of h i s Master o f A r t s t h e s i s (On the Concept of 
I r o n y ) e n t i t l e d ' I r o n y a f t e r F i c h t e ' K i e r k e g a a r d deploys the: i n -
s i g h t s ga thered from h i s preoccupat ion w i t h romant ic i sm i n the e a r l y 
P a p i r e r to l a u n c h a v i o l e n t a t t a c k on the l e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 
and i d e a s o f e a r l y r o m a n t i c i s m , w h i c h , by v i r t u e of i t s l i n k s w i t h 
the young Germany movement he sees as very much a l i v i n g f o r c e . (32) 
Mlriy o f the themes i n t h i s a t t a c k a r e gathered together i n the 
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c h a p t e r devoted to FT. S c h l e g e l ' s nove l L u c i n d e , a chapter which 
can s tand on i t s own as a p i e c e o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m . 
We have a l r e a d y observed t h a t K i e r k e g a a r d regarded t h i s work 
as an example of a dogmatic or d o c t r i n a i r e nove l which as such s i g -
n i f i e s the l a c k of a genuine l i f e - v i e w . Although the s p e c i f i c form-
u l a t i o n o f the requirement o f a l i f e - v i e w f o r n o v e l i s t i c a r t i s not 
made i n t h i s r e v i e w we can e a s i l y dec ipher the same b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s 
g u i d i n g the t e x t . 
G i v i n g what he c a l l s a g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of poetry ( P o e s i ) 
K i e r k e g a a r d says t h a t i t i s 
a tr iumph over the wor ld: i t i s through the negat ion o f the 
i m p e r f e c t r e a l i t y t h a t poetry opens up an h i g h e r r e a l i t y , ex-
tends and t r a n s f i g u r e s the i m p e r f e c t i n t o the p e r f e c t , and 
thereby r e c o n c i l e s the deep p a i n which seeks to darken a l l 
t h i n g s . Thus f a r i s poetry a k i n d of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , but i t 
i s n o t the t r u e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n f o r i t does not r e c o n c i l e me 
to the r e a l i t y i n which I l i v e , i n t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n there 
o c c u r s no t r a n s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of the g iven r e a l i t y , but i t r e -
c o n c i l e s me to the g iven r e a l i t y by g i v i n g me another r e a l i t y , 
an h i g h e r and a more p e r f e c t one. (SV 1 pp. 305-6) 
P o e t r y , t h a t i s to s a y , c r e a t e s an i d e a l w o r l d , which endows i t s 
forms and f i g u r e s w i t h a s o r t o f r e a l i t y - but not the r e a l i t y of the 
' r e a l ' wor ld of e m p i r i c a l , everyday e x p e r i e n c e . Poetry by i t s e l f 
does n o t t h e r e f o r e answer the requirement o f the l i f e - v i e w t h a t 
r e a l i t y and i d e a l i t y be brought i n t o harmony w i t h each o t h e r . I t s 
w o r l d i s an a r t i f i c i a l wor ld p r o j e c t e d by the i r o n i c a l l y c r e a t i v e 
s u b j e c t i v i t y which h o l d s i t s e l f a l o o f from the r e a l w o r l d , and, f o r 
t h i s r e a s o n , p o e t r y , i n the sense K i e r k e g a a r d g i v e s i t h e r e , l a c k s 
r e a l c o n t e n t . 
I n the s e c t i o n on p o s t - f i c h t e a n i r o n y which precedes and i n t r o -
duces the S c h l e g e l r e v i e w K i e r k e g a a r d makes t h i s po in t the nub of 
h i s o v e r a l l c r i t i c i s m of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and l i t e r a r y movement 
which took i t s cue from F i c h t e ' s ph i losophy . Arguing t h a t the r o o t 
o f F i c h t e ' s ph i lo sophy i s the i n f i n i t i z i n g of knowledge i n the r e l -
a t i o n o f the a b s o l u t e ego to i t s e l f , the 1=1, he a s s e r t s t h i s to be 
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a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e i n f i n i t y , an i n f i n i t y wi thout content . He c a l l s 
t h i s f i c h t e a n p o s i t i o n such names as 'acosmism' and 'docet i sm' i n 
t h a t i t d e n i e s the v a l i d i t y o f r e a l , h i s t o r i c a l e x i s t e n c e . (SV 1 p .286) 
But whereas P i c h t e conce ived t h i s n e g a t i v e i n f i n i t y s o l e l y i n 
m e t a p h y s i c a l t e rms , t h a t i s as an a p r i o r i c o n s t r u c t i o n of the con-
d i t i o n s o f knowledge, S c h l e g e l and the romant i c s a p p l i e d F i c h t e ' s 
model o f the s e l f to a c t u a l , i n d i v i d u a l , h i s t o r i c a l e x i s t e n c e . F o r 
them F i c h t e ' s ' S e l f was not a m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n s t r u c t , i t was the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' I ' which they endowed w i t h the q u a l i t y of be ing a b l e to 
c r e a t e i t s own w o r l d . The r o m a n t i c s thus a s c r i b e d to the s e l f a b -
s o l u t e freedom, ' the power to b i n d and to l o o s e . ' ( i b i d . , p .288) 
T h i s i s what K i e r k e g a a r d sees a s the essence of romant ic i r o n y . 
K i e r k e g a a r d argues t h a t f o r the i r o n i c i n d i v i d u a l who makes t h i s 
s t a n c e h i s own, the wor ld i n f a c t does come to l o s e i t s s o l i d i t y , 
e x p e r i e n c e l o s e s i t s c o n t i n u i t y and becomes a sequence of fragment-
ed moods. The p e r s o n a l i t y o f the i r o n i s t i s d i s s o l v e d , and he most 
f r e q u e n t l y comes to n o t h i n g , j u s t a s the r o m a n t i c s themselves i m p l i c -
i t l y acknowledged i n t h e i r p r a i s e of the ' T a u g e n i c h t s ' , the good- for -
n o t h i n g . (55) T h i s i s a l l a consequence of the s p l i t which the rom-
a n t i c i s t assumes between i d e a l i t y and r e a l i t y , and d e s p i t e the i r o n -
i s t } s c o n c e i t t h a t he i s l i v i n g p o e t i c a l l y , t h a t he i s the c r e a t o r 
o f the moods i n which he e x i s t s , t h a t he i s e x a l t e d over the world 
l i k e a L o r d over h i s domain, a l i f e based on such a s p l i t w i l l i n -
e v i t a b l y f a l l v i c t i m to the m a n i f o l d , to the changing p a t t e r n s of 
the w o r l d , f o r r e a l i t y cannot j u s t be put to one s i d e . ( i b i d . , p p . 2 9 1 f f . ) 
A r e a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the elements i n t h e i r d i v i s i o n from 
each o t h e r c a n , K i e r k e g a a r d s a y s , only be brought about r e l i g i o u s -
l y , no t p o e t i c a l l y : poetry can only a c h i e v e an imagined r e c o n c i l -
i a t i o n , ( i b i d . p.506) P o e t r y i s an 'exodus' from r e a l i t y , ( i b i d . ) 
i t i s mere ly ' e x t e r n a l ' i n the sense t h a t i n p o e t i c exper ience I am 
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' o u t s i d e ' m y s e l f , I am not e x i s t i n g i n the f u l n e s s o f the p e r s o n a l 
l i f e . (SV 1 , p.306) Only the r e l i g i o u s i s a b l e to a c h i e v e ' the t r u e 
b l e s s e d n e s s i n which the s u b j e c t does not dream, but i n i n f i n i t e 
c l a r i t y p o s s e s s e s h i m s e l f , i s a b s o l u t e l y t r a n s p a r e n t to h i m s e l f . ' 
( i b i d . ) T h i s i s i n o ther words a re s ta tement o f the requirement of 
the l i f e - v i e w . 
K i e r k e g a a r d a d d r e s s e s h i m s e l f to S c h l e g e l ' s p r i n c i p l e t h a t to 
l i v e p o e t i c a l l y i s to enjoy l i f e , to enjoy the world which i f i t i s 
no t the b e s t o f a l l p o s s i b l e worlds i s the most b e a u t i f u l . (34) B u t , 
c o u n t e r s K i e r k e g a a r d , i f the world which i s p o e t i c a l l y enjoyed i s not 
the r e a l w o r l d , mere ly a f a n t a s t i c w o r l d , a wor ld e x t e r n a l to the 
wor ld i n which my r e a l s e l f e x i s t s , then I can n e i t h e r f i n d myse l f 
nor enjoy m y s e l f i n i t , ( i b i d . ) f o r S c h l e g e l ' s aim i s not merely to 
enjoy the wor ld i n the sense o f l o s i n g h i m s e l f i n the w o r l d , but to 
be a b l e to f e e l and enjoy the enjoyment i t s e l f , to be consc ious of 
h i m s e l f e n j o y i n g h i m s e l f i n h i s w o r l d . (35) Such a p o e t i c a l l i f e o f 
enjoyment i s c a s t i g a t e d by K i e r k e g a a r d a s not p o e t i c a l a t a l l because 
the enjoyment i s i n a u t h e n t i c . I t i s , he s a y s , a ' cowardly ' l i f e 
because i t r e f u s e s to f a c e the task of becoming t r a n s p a r e n t to i t -
s e l f i n i t s ' a b s o l u t e and e t e r n a l v a l i d i t y . ' ( i b i d . , p.30?) 
Although the language and s t y l e of argument i n the S c h l e g e l ^.re-
v i ew a r e more p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y and t h e o l o g i c a l l y weighted than i n the 
Andersen c r i t i q u e the s tandpo int i s e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . The prop-
er b a s i s o f a e s t h e t i c p r o d u c t i v i t y i s seen a s the e s tab l i shment of 
the s e l f i n a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n to a rea lm of t ranscendent r e a l i t i e s 
and v a l u e s which i s no t merely the p r o j e c t i o n o f the s e l f ' s own pos-
s i b i l i t i e s , but which i s an a c t u a l encounter w i t h what i s o t h e r , 
w i t h what i s g iven to the s e l f by the d i v i n e ground of i t s be ing . 
V/here such a c o n d i t i o n i s not a t t a i n e d then the s e l f , f a r from h a v -
i n g the freedom a s c r i b e d to i t by the i r o n i s t , i s the v i c t i m of the 
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world i t c l a i m s to have m a s t e r e d , i t s transcendence i s a ' t r a n s c e n d -
ence' o f a v o i d a n c e , a r e f u s a l to engage i n the s t r u g g l e to a c h i e v e 
a u t h e n t i c s e l f h o o d . F a r from be ing i r o n i c a l l y e l e v a t e d over the 
wor ld such a s e l f i n f a c t s u f f e r s ( i n the t e c h n i c a l sense) under the 
s t r e s s o f e x i s t e n c e . The f a u l t o f the d o c t r i n a i r e nove l L u c i n d e i s 
t h e r e f o r e the same b a s i c f a u l t which K i e r k e g a a r d a n a l y s e d i n the 
' s u b j e c t i v e ' n o v e l a l a Andersen . 
I n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t which i s the remarkable t h i n g about L u c i n d e 
and the whole tendency which i s connected w i t h i t i s t h a t one, 
i n t a k i n g the freedom of the s e l f and i t s c o n s t i t u t i v e a u t h o r -
i t y a s a p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e , i n s t e a d of r e a c h i n g a s t i l l h i g h e r 
s p i r i t u a l e x i s t e n c e on ly a r r i v e s a t sensuousness , and so to one ' s 
o p p o s i t e . . . But s i n c e t h i s sensuousness i s not n a i v e , i t f o l l -
ows t h a t the same v o l i m t a r y power which endowed sensuousness 
w i t h i t s supposed r i g h t s , can ih'. the nex t moment s l i p over to 
a f f i n n i n g an a b s t r a c t and overdone s p i r i t u a l e x i s t e n c e . These 
v i b r a t i o n s can now be i n t e r p r e t e d , p a r t l y a s the p l a y of w o r l d -
i r o n y w i t h the i n d i v i d \ i a l , p a r t l y as the i n d i v i d u a l ' s attempt 
to copy w o r l d - i r o n y . ^^^^^^ 
S u b j e c t i v e romant i c i r o n y i s trapped i n the d i a l e c t i c a l phase 
o f e x i s t e n c e i n which concepts r e l a t e to each o ther only as oppos-
i t e s - i t does not mat ter which s i d e one chooses , the r e a l or the 
i d e a l , one i s imable to see both s i d e s together i n t h e i r i n t e g r a t e d 
who lenes s , one i s mere ly s u b j e c t e d to a c y c l e o f moods. I n a n a l y s -
i n g r o m a n t i c i r o n y i n these d i a l e c t i c a l terms K i e r k e g a a r d s p e c i f i c -
a l l y a l i g n s h i m s e l f w i t h Hege l , ( i b i d . ^ p . 2 8 8 ) T h i s al ignment can 
i n any c a s e be i n f e r r e d from the p r e s e n t a t i o n of K i e r k e g a a r d ' s c r i t -
ique o f r o m a n t i c i s m i n the e a r l y P a p i r e r , a s we have seen. (36) 
We s h a l l not f o l l o w K i e r k e g a a r d i n t o the d e t a i l s of the nove l 
i t s e l f , but a g a i n we observe t h a t he assumes the non-problemat ic 
n a t u r e o f the l i f e - v i e w , the a t t a i n a b i l i t y of the r e l i g i o u s l y groimd-
ed t r a n s p a r e n c y of the s e l f to i t s s e l f . Indeed he a s s e r t s t h a t ' i f 
t h i s i s no t p o s s i b l e f o r every man then l i f e i s m a d n e s s . ' ( i b i d . , p.30?) 
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n of s e l f and w o r l d , of i d e a l and 
r e a l i s on ly p r o v i s i o n a l , the d i f f i c u l t i e s can be f a c e d , overcome. 
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c l a r i f i e d and t r a n f i g u r e d . Again K i e r k e g a a r d does not dea l w i th the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s p l i t which cannot b e - h e a l e d ; e v e r y t h i n g , i t seems, 
i s p o s s i b l e f o r him who has courage. 
( C ) ( i v ) Two Ages 
The t h i r d r e v i e w to be examined i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s a l s o the 
most s u b s t a n t i a l a n d , l i k e the Ansersen r e v i e w , was p u b l i s h e d i n 
book form. I t c o n t a i n s a s e c t i o n t r a n s l a t e d s e p a r a t e l y i n t o E n g l i s h 
a s The P r e s e n t Age, which i s , i n a s e n s e , an appendix to the r e v i e w 
i t s e l f . (57) T h i s r e v i e w r e t u r n s to the f i g u r e of Madame G y l l e m -
bourg , s p e c i f i c a l l y to her n o v e l To T i d s a l d r e . I t s t a r t s however 
w i t h a g e n e r a l a p p r e c i a t i o n of the c y c l e of n o v e l s ( o f which the 
book under r e v i e w i s one) which began w i t h En H v e r d a g s - H i s t o r i e . He 
comments t h a t ' F o r a lmost twenty y e a r s t h e r e has been a good r e l a t -
i o n s h i p between t h i s author and the r e a d i n g p u b l i c , a n d , as they say 
of m a r r i a g e s , the two have r e a c h e d a good unders tanding wi th each 
o t h e r . ' (SV I 4 , p.15) T h i s i s not j u s t a c a s u a l o b s e r v a t i o n but 
p o i n t s d i r e c t l y to what K i e r k e g a a r d wants to p r a i s e i n the a u t h o r , 
t h a t she has a l i f e - v i e w which has enabled h e r to be t r u e to h e r -
s e l f , to h e r e s s e n t i a l v i s i o n . T h i s c o n s i s t e n c y f o l l o w s from the 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the l i f e - v i e w which K i e r k e g a a r d makes. The 
phenomenal wor ld can make no d i f f e r e n c e to the s t e a d f a s t n e s s o f the 
l i f e - v i e w and t h i s must be a b l e to be proved i n r e l a t i o n to t ime. 
We h e a r aga in t h a t i n r e l a t i o n to the m a n i f o l d of phenomena 
the p o s i t i o n of the author i n v o l v e s r e s i g n a t i o n , not i n the sense of 
g i v i n g up i n the f a c e o f d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r t h i s r e s i g n a t i o n r a d i a t e s 
' a q u i e t j o y over l i f e ' ( i b i d . , p . l 6 ) which comes from the c o n f i d -
ence t h a t 'not on ly does e v e r y t h i n g g r a d u a l l y become good aga in but 
t h a t i t was and remained good. ' ( i b i d . ) 
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The l i f e - v i e w which c r e a t i v e l y s u s t a i n s these s t o r i e s 
a b i d e s the same, w h i l e an ingen ious i n v e n t i v e n e s s , the 
r e s o u r c e s a c q u i r e d from a r i c h e x p e r i e n c e , and a f r u i t -
f u l d i s p o s i t i o n ' s v e g e t a t i v e l u x u r i a n c e a l l s erve the 
p r o d u c t i o n of change w i t h i n the c r e a t i v e r e p e t i t i o n . 
The t u r b u l e n c e i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same, the p a c i f y i n g 
o f i t e s s e n t i a l l y the same, the movement i n a l l the 
s t o r i e s i s from the same and 1D the same; the t ens ion 
which i s p o s i t e d has e s s e n t i a l l y the same e l a s t i c i t y , 
the p e a c e f u l n e s s and r e l a x e d n e s s a r e a l s o the same, 
i . e . the l i f e - v i e w i s the same. 
(SV 14, pp. 16-17) 
A g a i n s t a l l would-be c r i t i c s o f such sameness he a s k s 'But i s 
God, w i t h whom the poet i s l i k e n e d when he i s d e s c r i b e d as c r e a t i v e , 
l e s s a d m i r a b l e i n s u s t a i n i n g than i n c r e a t i n g the w o r l d ? ' ( i b i d . ) 
The r e s i g n a t i o n of the l i f e - v i e w i s aga in seen to be e s s e n t i a l l y 
r e l a t e d to p r o v i d e n t i a l gu idance . The sameness i s p o s s i b l e because 
the author has a l i f e - v i e w w i t h i n h e r s e l f w h i c h , t r u s t i n g i n God's 
p r o v i d e n c e i n r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d , i s i t s e l f a b l e to f u n c t i o n as 
a k i n d o f s t a b l e , s u s t a i n i n g prov idence i n h e r l i t e r a r y p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h i s l i f e - v i e w e x i s t s i n the author be fore i t 
i s t u r n e d to l i t e r a r y u s e . 
The l i f e - v i e w . . . must have r i p e n e d i n the author be fore he 
produces . H i s p r o d u c t i v i t y i s not a moment i n h i s deve lop-
ment, but when t h i s development has r i p e n e d , then i t b r i n g s 
f o r t h a s i t s f r u i t a work of inwardness . I t i s not g e n i a l i t y , 
n o t t a l e n t , no t v i r t u o s i t y which c o n s t i t u t e s the work, f o r then 
the p r o d u c t i v i t y would d i s a p p e a r w i t h the d i sappearance of 
t h e s e , not the work i t s e l f , the p o s s i b i l i t y of be ing ab le to 
w r i t e such works i s r a t h e r the reward which God has bestowed-
on the a u t h o r , a s h e , t w i c e - m a t u r e d , won i n h i s l i f e - v i e w , 
something e t e r n a l . ( i b i d . , p. 18) 
K i e r k e g a a r d makes an important d i s t i n c t i o n which Ms. J^rgensen 
f i n d s m a i n t a i n e d , though not a lways s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r e d t o , through-
out h i s c r i t i c a l w r i t i n g s . I t i s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between poe try /poe t 
( P o e s i / D i g t e r ) on the one hand and a u t h o r s h i p / a u t h o r , w r i t e r ( F o r f a t t -
e r s k a b / F o r f a . t t e r ) on the o t h e r . The 'poe t ' r e p r e s e n t s the immediate, 
p u r e l y a e s t h e t i c , approach to a r t , the ' a u t h o r ' what Ms. J^rgensen 
c a l l s t h e e t h i c a l approach . (38) 
T h i s a u t h o r , K i e r k e g a ^ d c l a i m s , the author of the ' T a l e s of 
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Everyday L i f e ' ( r e f e r r i n g to the whole c y c l e of n o v e l s ) , begins 
where p o e t r y s t o p s . 
F o r poe try does not i n v o l v e an e s s e n t i a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h 
r e a l i t y , i t r e c o n c i l e s through phantasy w i t h the i d e a l world 
produced by p h a n t a s y , but t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s i n the 
r e a l i n d i v i d u a l p r e c i s e l y a new s p l i t t i n g away from r e a l i t y . 
(SVx14, p. 17) 
I t i s the same argument which K i e r k e g a a r d had deployed a g a i n s t 
S c h l e g e l ' s s tandpo in t o f i r o n i c c r e a t i v i t y . Such poetry evades 
r e a l i t y , i t s world i s a wor ld produced and s u s t a i n e d s o l e l y by the 
i m a g i n a t i o n or phantasy . T h i s author on the o ther hand knows the 
r e a l w o r l d , knows the p a i n of the r e a l world and i s none the l e s s 
a b l e to bear t h i s p a i n and a f f i r m the goodness of the wor ld . 
( i b i d . , . p p . 1 7 - 1 8 ) 
Thus whereas a poet may be s a i d to ' t r a n s p o r t ' or to ' i n s p i r e ' 
h i s r e a d e r , the author of these s t o r i e s ' p e r s u a d e s ' ( o v e r t a l e ) . He 
i n v o k e s n e i t h e r the exc i tement nor the d e s p a i r which the poet can 
arouse but works w i t h the r e a d e r ' s ' r e l a x e d compl iance ' as ' the con-
d i t i o n f o r p e r s u a s i o n b e i n g a b l e to win a new harmony i n p l a c e o f 
d i s c o r d . ' ( i b i d . , pp. 21-2) The method of t h i s ' p e r s u a s i v e ' ap-
proach i s 
By u n d e r s t a n d i n g how to f i n d a m i l d e r a s p e c t i n which to see 
s u f f e r i n g , by h a v i n g the p a t i e n c e which expects good f o r t u n e 
to s m i l e a g a i n , by the f r i e n d l y sympathy of c a r i n g people , 
by the r e s i g n a t i o n which does not renounce e v e r y t h i n g but on-
l y the h i g h e s t , and by the contentment t h a t changes the second 
b e s t i n t o something j u s t a s good as the h i g h e s t . . . p e r s u a s i o n 
i s h e r e not a matter between two peop le , but i s the way of the 
l i f e - v i e w , and the n o v e l l e a d s one i n to the wor ld which the 
( l i f e - ) v iew c r e a t i v e l y s u s t a i n s . ( i b i d p 22) 
But t h i s wor ld which i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n the nove l i s not a f a n t a s -
t i c wor ld such as t h a t produced by the romant ic poet: i t i s an hon-
e s t r e f l e c t i o n o f the r e a l wor ld . The nove l t h e r e f o r e does not r e -
c o n c i l e one w i t h r e a l i t y by l e a d i n g one away i n t o a p u r e l y i d e a l 
r e a l m , i t r e c o n c i l e s one w i t h r e a l i t y by p o i n t i n g one back to r e a l i t y , 
and by communicating the s p i r i t o f the l i f e - v i e w by which one can be 
s u s t a i n e d i n r e a l i t y . 
The f a c t t h a t p e r s u a s i o n i s needed, however, does p o i n t to the 
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e x p e r i e n c e of d i f f i c u l t y , to a break wi th the easy contentment of 
immediacy. (SV 14, p .22) There i s an exper ience of s u f f e r i n g i n 
the background of the l i f e - v i e w as t h e r e i s a t the r o o t of the p o e t ' s 
c r e a t i v i t y . But the r e s p o n s e s o f the 'poet ' and of the ' a u t h o r ' a r e 
q u i t e d i s t i n c t . 
But i t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t K i e r k e g a a r d i n t r o d u c e s a t h i r d pos-
s i b i l i t y : the way of r e l i g i o n . I t now emerges t h a t the r e l i g i o s i t y 
o f the l i f e - v i e w , which i n the Andersen and S c h l e g e l c r i t i q u e s was 
e f f e c t i v e l y equated w i t h the c h r i s t i a n s t a n d p o i n t , i s not i t s e l f 
f i n a l . The r e f e r e n c e to a more r a d i c a l r e l i g i o s i t y i s not o b t r u s i v e , 
i n the c o n t e x t of the r e v i e w but i t i s more s i g n i f i c a n t . He says 
t h a t ' I n these s t o r i e s the author never s e t s h i m s e l f the t a s k of 
d e a l i n g w i t h the k i n d o f p a i n exper ienced i n r e a l i t y such a s cou ld 
on ly f i n d comfort i n d e c i s i v e l y r e l i g i o u s c a t e g o r i e s and i n the i d e a l -
i t y o f the r e l i g i o u s . ' ( i b i d . , p . 1 8 ) 
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s a degree or a k i n d of d i ssonance 
between s e l f and world i n response to which the s e l f i n unable to 
a f f i r m i t s e l f i n r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d , i s unable to i n t e g r a t e the 
m a n i f o l d of r e a l i t y i n t o the harmoniz ing l i g h t o f i d e a l i t y i n the way 
t h a t the l i f e - v i e w does. E q u a l l y i t i m p l i e s t h a t the f l i g h t i n t o a 
f i c t i o n a l wor ld of phantasy i s not the only response to the exper-
i e n c e of the s e p a r a t i o n of the i d e a l and the r e a l . 
A e s t h e t i c a l l y the i n d i v i d u a l i s c a r r i e d away from r e a l i t y and 
t r a n s p o s e d i n t o a f a n t a s t i c medium; r e l i g i o u s l y the i n d i v i d -
u a l i s c a r r i e d away and transposed i n t o the e t e r n i t y of the 
r e l i g i o u s : i n both c a s e s the i n d i v i d u a l becomes a l i e n to 
r e a l i t y . The i n d i v i d u a l i s a l i e n a t e d from r e a l i t y a e s t h e t i c -
a l l y by be ing put o u t s i d e i t , the i n d i v i d u a l i s a l i e n a t e d 
from r e a l i t y r e l i g i o u s l y by becoming an a l i e n and a f o r e i g n -
e r i n r e a l i t y . ^ p^22) 
The break w i t h r e a l i t y which the r e l i g i o u s presupposes i s too 
d r a s t i c to be papered over w i t h the forms of the imaginat ion and 
too d r a s t i c to be h e a l e d by the humble good-sense of the l i f e - v i e w . 
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But because the r e l i g i o u s assumes a t o t a l break i t i s ab le to ho ld 
out the promise o f a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n which i n v o l v e s a t o t a l l y new 
b e g i n n i n g , r a t h e r than the compromise w i t h r e a l i t y r e p r e s e n t e d by 
the l i f e - v i e w , 'Immediacy £"poetry3 does not know what p e r s u a s i o n 
i s , because i t does n o t need a h e a l i n g ; but the r e l i g i o u s cannot 
p e r s u a d e , p r e c i s e l y because i t presupposes a new b e g i n n i n g . ' 
(SV 14, pp .22 -3 ) 
The r e f e r e n c e s to the r e l i g i o u s i n the r e v i e w perhaps r a i s e 
more q u e s t i o n s than they answer. F o r what i s the n a t u r e of t h i s 
s p l i t w i t h r e a l i t y t h a t on ly the r e l i g i o u s can c u r e ? I s i t a dim-
ens ion o f s u f f e r i n g which though concea led from most people most of 
the t ime i s i m p l i c i t i n a l l human e x i s t e n c e , or i s i t a s p e c i a l 
s o r t o f s u f f e r i n g which on ly some i n d i v i d u a l s encounter and i n e i t h e r 
c a s e what , more p r e c i s e l y , i s i t s n a t u r e ? 
We s h a l l keep these q u e s t i o n s f o r a l a t e r chapter ( 3 9 ) , but 
t h e r e a r e o ther q u e s t i o n s to which we can g i v e a p r o v i s i o n a l answer, 
q u e s t i o n s concerned w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s s p l i t w i th 
r e a l i t y from the p o e t i c s p l i t w i t h r e a l i t y . S i n c e the r e l i g i o u s i s 
d e s c r i b e d as h a v i n g i t s own ' i d e a l i t y ' what i s the r e l a t i o n of poet -
i c or a e s t h e t i c forms to i d e a l i t y to r e l i g i o u s i d e a l i t y ? A r e they 
d i f f e r e n t i n degree or i n k i n d ? Do they r e l a t e to each other as the 
shadows of dramat i c a r t r e l a t e to the t r u e c e n t r e o f l i g h t which i s 
the p e r s o n a l i t y i t s e l f i n i t s p r i m o r d i a l freedom? I n t h a t ca se can 
we somehow ' r e a d ' the presence of the I d e a , i n an abso lute s e n s e , i n 
the p r o j e c t i o n s o f the a e s t h e t i c i m a g i n a t i o n , even i f i t i s q u i t e 
c l e a r t h a t they cannot be r e a d o f f ' immedia te ly ' f rom the p o e t i c 
image as c e r t a i n forms of romant ic theory would m a i n t a i n ? But then 
K i e r k e g a a r d has p l a c e d the ph i losophy of the l i f e - v i e w between the 
p o e t i c and the r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , such' t h a t pure ' p o e t r y ' , 
the dreaming i m a g i n a t i o n of the t h e a t r i c a l shadow-world, i s doubly 
removed from the r e l i g i o u s . The l i f e - v i e w s tands f i r m l y on the 
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path from poetry to r e l i g i o n - which suggests too t h a t n o v e l i s t i c 
l i t e r a t u r e a c h i e v e s a g r e a t e r approximat ion to the s o r t of e x p r e s s -
i o n which the r e l i g i o u s would r e q u i r e than do the pure imaginings of 
p o e t r y or dramat ic a r t . 
The p o i n t o f d i v i s i o n between the a e s t h e t i c and the r e l i g i o u s 
i s i n f a c t to be found a t the p o i n t where the p r o j e c t o f the l i f e -
v iew f a i l s , where the i d e a cannot be i n t e g r a t e d w i t h the r e a l . P u t -
t i n g the i s s u e i n these terms i t becomes c l e a r why the a e s t h e t i c c a n -
not get beyond t h i s p o i n t , why a r t cannot dea l w i t h the r e l i g i o u s . 
F o r a r t depends on the s y n t h e s i s o f i d e a and form - t h i s as we have 
seen i s the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e behind K i e r k e g a ^ d ' s a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c -
i sm. With r e g a r d to pure poetry or to dramat ic a r t the forms are 
themse lves formed out o f the f a n t a s t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w i th r e g a r d to 
n o v e l i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e they r e l a t e to the r e a l world; but i n each 
c a s e the key q u e s t i o n i s the correspondence of the p a r t i c u l a r i d e a 
w i t h i t s form: whether the comedy c o n t a i n s a t r i i l y r e f l e c t i v e i d e a , 
whether the nove l r e f l e c t s a l i f e - v i e w , e t c . But i f the r e l i g i o u s 
i s a r e s p o n s e to a s p l i t i n which the I d e a (and f o r ' I d e a ' here we 
may r e a d p e r s o n a l freedom) makes a t o t a l break w i t h r e a l i t y - as we 
saw i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r w i t h r e g a r d to the concept o f humour -
then i t becomes i m p o s s i b l e to speak of i d e a and form t o g e t h e r , the 
e lements o f the a e s t h e t i c s y n t h e s i s a r e s e p a r a t e d . I f t h e r e can be 
no correspondence o f i d e a and form there can be no a r t . 
I n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e i t might be seen as m i s l e a d i n g to t a l k of 
the l i f e - v i e w (and of the n o v e l i s t i c form corresponding to i t ) as 
' c l o s e r ' to the r e l i g i o u s , f o r the interdependence of the l i f e - v i e w 
and the n o v e l r e f l e c t s the elements o f the a e s t h e t i c s y n t h e s i s j u s t 
as much a s the i n t r i n s i c connec t ion between, e . g . the i d e a of Don 
Juan and o p e r a t i c form. K i e r k e g a a r d ' s e l e v a t i o n of the nove l over 
' p o e t r y ' does not so much imply an approximation of the n o v e l to a 
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r e l i g i o u s form of communication but s e r v e s more to d i s t a n c e the a e s -
t h e t i c , p u r e l y p o e t i c , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i f e from the r e l i g i o u s , to 
make s u r e t h a t the r e l i g i o u s i s not confused w i t h the p o e t i c i d e a l -
i t y . H i s c l a i m i s t h a t the p o e t i c i d e a l i t y i s b e h i n d , the r e l i g -
i o u s i d e a l i t y beyond, the i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n o f i d e a l i t y and r e a l i t y 
a c h i e v e d i n the l i f e - v i e w . 
K i e r k e g a a r d ' s d i a l e c t i c s o f a r t do not t h e r e f o r e - c u l m i n a t e i n 
a smooth t r a n s i t i o n from the sphere of a r t to t h a t of r e l i g i o n , 
they end a b r u p t l y , w i t h the r e a l i z a t i o n of the incommensurabi l i ty 
o f human freedom, the I d e a i n an a b s o l u t e s e n s e , and e x t e r n a l form. 
I t i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n th§, t the p r e s e n t w r i t e r d i f f e r s from Ms. 
Jji^rgensen i n a s s e s s i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of K i e r k e g a a r d ' s e t h i c a l 
c r i t i c i s m , the c r i t i c i s m which t a k e s i t s s tand on the p r i n c i p l e of 
the l i f e - v i e w . Although she i s c o r r e c t to draw a t t e n t i o n to t h i s 
d imension of K i e r k e g a a r d ' s a e s t h e t i c t h e o r y , and i t s demand f o r the 
a n s w e r a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c forms to the demands of the r e a l , 
e t h i c a l w o r l d , i t must be quest ioned whether she takes s u f f i c i e n t 
account o f the u l t i m a t e d ivergence o f the r e l i g i o u s from the s o r t 
o f e t h i c a l v i e w p o i n t which we f i n d i n the l i f e - v i e w . The s p l i t 
between r e l i g i o u s i d e a l i t y and e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y r e l a t i v i z e s the 
s t a n d p o i n t o f the l i f e - v i e w as much as i t does the s tandpoint of 
the p u r e l y a e s t h e t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 
( G ) ( v ) The L i f e - V i e w and N i h i l i sm 
Hegel argues f o r the s u p e r s e s s i o n o f a r t a s a s tage o f the 
S p i r i t both by means of an a n a l y s i s of the i d e a l s t r u c t u r e of the 
a e s t h e t i c s y n t h e s i s and by an h i s t o r i c a l account of the u n f o l d i n g 
and u l t i m a t e s e l f - t r a n s c e n d e n c e of t h i s s y n t h e s i s . (40) S i m i l a r l y 
POVLL M^^ller saw the a e s t h e t i c forms which he va lued threa tened by 
the n i h i l i s t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f the new g e n e r a t i o n , o f the ' n i n e -
- 221 -
t eenth c e n t u r y r a t i o n a l man. ' (41) Do we f i n d any s i m i l a r prog-
n o s t i c a t i o n s about the r e l e v a n c e of the age to owe p e r c e p t i o n of a r t 
i n K i e r k e g a a r d ' s work? Although K i e r k e g a a r d ' s d i a l e c t i c , l i k e 
H e i b e r g ' s , i s r e l a t i v e l y a h i s t o r i c a l by comparison wi th Hegel - and 
indeed we have seen t h a t K i e r k e g a a r d a t l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y eschews 
any i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the c l a s s i c a l and romant ic s tages of a r t w i th 
s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c p e r i o d s (42) - he does have a c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e which i s o f some r e l e v a n c e to our enqu iry . 
I t i s no t by a c c i d e n t t h a t the r e v i e w of To T i d s a l d r e ends 
w i t h the wel l -known a n a l y s i s o f the c h a r a c t e r o f ' the p r e s e n t a g e ' . 
The n o v e l i t s e l f , a t l e a s t i n K i e r k e g a a r d ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t , 
has had as one of i t s prime concerns the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
c h a r a c t e r o f the age of r e v o l u t i o n , the g e n e r a t i o n of the p e r i o d of 
the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n and of the R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wars , the f i r s t rom-
a n t i c g e n e r a t i o n , and the c h a r a c t e r of the p r e s e n t age , the age of 
bourgeo i s compromise as w e l l as o f n i h i l i s t i c r e b e l l i o n . 
T h i s p r e s e n t age i s d e f i n e d as ' e s s e n t i a l l y r a t i o n a l , r e f l e c t -
i v e , w i thout p a s s i o n , b r i e f l y b l a z i n g up i n enthusiasm and prudent -
i a l l y r e l a p s i n g i n t o i n d o l e n c e . ' (SV I 4 , p .63) R e f l e c t i o n here 
means the n e g a t i v e s p i r i t o f doubt, r a t i o n a l i z i n g r e a l i t y , b r e a k i n g -
up the g iven r e a l i t y i n t o a m u l t i t u d e of p a r t s , d i v i d i n g , d i s t i n -
g u i s h i n g , q u a l i f y i n g , sapping nat-ural enthusiasm and spontane i ty . 
Such a s p i r i t of doubt d r a i n s the p e r s o n a l i t y , such an age i s devoid 
of c h a r a c t e r , i t i s an age of l e v e l l i n g which reduces the i n d i v i d u a l 
to an a b s t r a c t i o n , a number, a man- in-the-crowd; , an age of i d l e 
c h a t t e r , o f s u p e r f i c i a l i t y , o f f o r m l e s s n e s s . 
I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the i n d i v i d u a l i s thrown back upon h i m s e l f , 
he cannot stop the p r o c e s s , and i s f o r c e d e i t h e r to l o s e h i m s e l f i n 
the g e n e r a l f o r m l e s s l e v e l l i n g of the age or to f i n d h i m s e l f i n the 
r a d i c a l inwardness o f the r e l i g i o u s . 
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I n such an age the s p e c i f i c s y n t h e s i s which i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
the l i f e - v i e w cannot be m a i n t a i n e d , f o r e x t e r n a l form i s d r a i n e d of 
meaning, and the i n d i v i d u a l i s power less to r e s t o r e i t . I t w i l l be 
r e c a l l e d t h a t i n the Andersen -rev i ew K i e r k e g a a r d s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t -
i f i e d the author of the ' T a l e s o f Everyday L i f e ' as a member, not of 
the p r e s e n t age , but o f the o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n f o r whom the p o s s e s s i o n 
of a l i f e - v i e w was the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of t h e i r l i v e s and moreover he 
had a s s e r t e d t h a t i t would on ly be members o f t h a t generat ion who 
c o u l d a p p r e c i a t e these s t o r i e s to the f u l l . (sV 1 , pp.26-7) 
The i m p l i c a t i o n of the a n a l y s i s o f ' the p r e s e n t age' i s thatf^art 
h a s e n t e r e d a prob lemat i c phase , and t h a t a h e a l i n g of the d i v i s i o n 
which h a s s p l i t the i n d i v i d u a l and confounded the proper order of 
s o c i e t y must precede the r e s t o r a t i o n of a r t to i t s t r u e p l a c e i n the 
c r e a t e d scheme of ' th ings . F o r the p r e s e n t t h i s h e a l i n g can take 
p l a c e on ly i n the s e c r e c y of inwardness and i t cannot be communic-
a t e d d i r e c t l y to o t h e r s by those who have found i t , each must work 
i n d i v i d u a l l y , every man f o r h i m s e l f . I t may even be t h a t the time 
f o r such h e a l i n g w i l l on ly come when r e f l e c t i o n and l e v e l l i n g have 
r u n t h e i r c o u r s e . (SV 14, pp. 98-9) 
I t i s because the middle-ground of the l i f e - v i e w i s thus squeezed 
o u t , because the i n t e g r a t i o n of i d e a l and r e a l i s i m p o s s i b l e when the 
r e a l i t s e l f has become so f o r m l e s s and so a b s t r a c t , t h a t K i e r k e g a a r d 
i s a b l e to narrow h i s op t ions down to two: e i t h e r the a e s t h e t i c or 
the r e l i g i o u s . I n the contemporary c l i m a t e , as K i e r k e g a a r d under-
stood i t , the l i f e - v i e w cannot be s u s t a i n e d . A c o r o l l a r y of t h i s i s , 
o f co iarse , t h a t the p r e s e n t age w i l l be unable to produce n o v e l i s t -
i c l i t e r a t u r e of a s a t i s f a c t o r y and s a t i s f y i n g k i n d , s i n c e the nove l 
i t s e l f i s the form which corresponds to the i d e a of the l i f e - v i e w . 
I t may t h e r e f o r e be expected t h a t we w i l l f i n d evidence f o r d e f i n i n g 
more c l o s e l y s t i l l the p o i n t o f d i v i s i o n of the r e l i g i o u s and the 
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aesthetic in those works of Kierkegaard which have a n o v e l i s t i c 
form: i t i s here that we s h a l l see where and how the religious 
content breaks loose from the aesthetic form, here that we see 
the suffering, the c r i s e s in human existence which art i s unable 
to express, and which can only be grasped in the r a d i c a l inward-
ness of the r e l i g i o u s . 
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Chapter Eight; Kierkegaard's Movels ( l ) 
(A) What are Kierkegaard's Novels? 
Not only does Kierkegaard's aesthetic authorship include a sub-
s t a n t i a l body of writing about a r t , such as the works of aesthetic 
c r i t i c i s m we have studied in the previous chapter, but i t also i n -
cludes a group of works which can be c a l l e d aesthetic in another 
sense - in the sense that they are themselves works of a r t , works 
of n o v e l i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e . To a certain extent most of what Kierke-
gaard wrote contains a great deal of a r t i s t r y in i t s use of language, 
of imagery, etc. , but there i s a group of writings which possess a 
s p e c i f i c aesthetic form. 
In h i s study of Kierkegaard's l i t e r a r y art P. Billeskov Jansen 
dey;otes a chapter to what he c a l l s 'the great novels' (de store 
Romanvaerker). He argues that Either-Or and Stages on L i f e ' s Way in 
p a r t i c u l a r are rooted in a tradition of n o v e l i s t i c art which found 
i t s pattern in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, and he r e f e r s to Tieck's 
Franz Stembald's Wanderimgen, Schlegel's Lucinde, Jean Paul's Titan 
and Novalis' Heinrich von Ofterdingen as other outstanding examples 
of t h i s genre. ( l ) I t i s the genre of what i s called the Bildungs- . 
roman, the 'novel of education'. 
Louis Mackey takes up Billeskov Jansen's point with the qualif-
i c a t i o n that whereas the german novels follow their hero through a 
process of growth and development, in a kierkegaardian work such as 
Either-Or 
There i s no narrative resolution of the stretto among 
A, Judge Wilhelm, the p r i e s t from Jutland, and a l l the 
r e a l or putative others. Each i s stuck f a s t i n h i s own 
categories ... the novel in which they l i v e i s a B i l d -
ungsroman, but without Bildung. 
(2) 
In a similar vein Carl Roos draws attention to the significance 
of Goethe's Pie Leiden des Jungen Werthers as a model for Kierke-
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gaard's various 'unhappy love' s t o r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Repetition and 
Guilty? - Mot-Guilty? (a section of Stages on L i f e ' s Way). He con-
cludes that 
As a novelist (novelleforfatter) Kierkegaard knew ... only 
one form: that of the epistolary and d i a r i s t i c novel, compiled 
by an editor,.-. The. c l a s s i c a l .exampl.e. of. t h i s i s however precise-
l y Goethe's Die Leiden des Jungen V/erthers. (3) 
Aage Henriksen e n t i t l e s h i s study of Kierkegaard's 'broken 
engagement' stories (The Seducer's Diary in Either-Or; Repetition; 
Guilty? -Not-Guilty?); Kierkegaards Romaner - Kierkegaard's Novels. 
He claims that 
They are novels in a traditional sense: f i c t i o n a l prose acc-
omts in which circumstances and r e f l e c t i o n form the l i n k s in 
a coherent action which takes place in a determinate space and 
which has a certain extension in time ... (4) 
He goes on to draw attention to the relation of The Seducer's Diary 
and Guil ty?-Not-rGuil ty? to the larger works of which they are part 
and to the l i t e r a r y natiore of these larger works: 
These books again function as subordinate parts of works 
which belong to the second type of f i c t i o n a l form employ-
ed by SK: dual-works, in which a timeless dialogue i s 
carried on between typified representatives of forms of 
existence, who talk to each other without influencing each 
other. (5) 
Henriksen also draws attention to the conventionality of the 
t y p i c a l Kierkegaardian device of using a pseudonymous narrator to 
present the predicament of the central character in the narrative. (6) 
Henriksen's emphasis on the l i t e r a r y aspect of Kierkegaard's 
novels i s a deliberate s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n , and he stresses that a f u l l 
interpretation of these works would have to take into account their 
function within the larger works of which they are part and of the 
authorship regarded as a whole. (7) 
In r e l a t i o n to Kierkegaard's early Papirer i t was observed that 
many of h i s early journal-notes can be construed as fragments of 
projected novels, a theory advanced by Emmanuel Hirsch and taken up 
by Henning Fenger. Fenger's work in particular shows the possible 
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l i n k s between Kierkegaard's n o v e l i s t i c style and danish (rather 
than merely german) models, such as Sibbem's Efterladte Breve af 
Ga b r i e l i s . (8) 
The significance of t h i s interpretation of the aesthetic form of 
Kierkegaard's novels for our enquiry i s that, i f i t i s accepted that 
these works did have an aesthetic form, we must, in the l i g h t of 
Kierkegaard's own aesthetic principles, go on to ask whether the 
content, the idea, with which they deal i s in fact patient of aes-
th e t i c representation. We must ask, as Kierkegaard would ask, 
whether idea and form correspond. An examination of the texts w i l l 
show that there i s no such correspondence - with the possible ex-
ception of Either-Or - and that despite their aesthetic form these 
works are e s s e n t i a l l y concerned with religious themes, religious in 
the s p e c i f i c sense of presupposing a s p l i t between idea and r e a l i t y 
such that not even the ethical endeavours of the life-view can bring 
about a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . They are religious in the sense that here we 
see the realm of inwardness breaking away from external form. 
Because of t h i s contrast between the aesthetic form and the 
r e l i g i o u s intentions of the works in question i t follows that they 
can only be called novels in a limited sense. Equally their aesthet-
i c form means that they cannot be d i r e c t l y accounted religious works. 
Although their ultimate intention i s r e l i g i o u s , their •function i s 
philosophical in the sense that what they achieve i s the definition 
of the boimdary between the aesthetic and the r e l i g i o u s , an elucid-
ation and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the categories and concepts with which we 
seek to appropriate and interpret the re l i g i o u s . I t i s not a purely 
philosophical exercise in that for Kierkegaard philosophy i s pressed 
into service as the handmaiden of the r e l i g i o u s , but i t i s in i t s own 
terms a v a l i d philosophical exercise in that i t does not attempt to 
answer the question of the truth or falsehood of the concepts with 
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which i t deals, but to define and demarcate the f i e l d s within which 
they can v a l i d l y be deployed. These books are novels in the sense 
defined by Nietzsche when he proclaimed that 
Plato has furnished for a l l posterity the pattern of a new 
a r t form, the novel, viewed as the Aesopian fable raised to 
i t s highest power; a form in which poetry played the same 
subordinate r o l e with regard to d i a l e c t i c philosophy as 
that same philosophy was to play for many centuries with 
regard to theology. (9) 
In confirmation of this understanding of the 'novels' i t may be 
noted that various commentators have noted p a r a l l e l s with the platon-
i c dialogues, both in terms of the general function of the novels and 
in terms of s p e c i f i c textual correlations. Henriksen, for example, 
notes the s i m i l a r i t i e s between Plato's Protagoras and Repetition (10), 
and many commentators have noticed the close l i n k s between Plato's 
Symposium and Kierkegaard's own 'banquet'. In Yino Veritas, which i s 
the f i r s t part of Stages on L i f e ' s Way. (11) 
The 'novels' to be examined here are Either-Or, Repetition and 
Guil ty ?-N 0 t-Guil ty? As w i l l have been apparent different comment-
ators work with different ' l i s t s ' according to their approach. Henrik-
sen' s l i s t for example, i s determined by the ©pic-er narrative f»rm »f 
the t e x t s , (12) There i s an apparent inconsistency in the present 
selection i n that the f i r s t two t i t l e s r e l a t e to whole works, whereas 
the l a s t i s only a section - a l b e i t a book-length section - of a 
larger work. Stages on L i f e ' s Way. The reason for t h i s i s that 
there i s a considerable overlap between the material which constit-
utes the f i r s t part of Stages on L i f e ' s Way and Either-Or and that 
to focus on the second part both avoids unnecessary duplication and, 
because of the actual content of Guilty?-Not-Guilty?, provides an 
adequate conclusion to our enquiry. 
In keeping with our deference to Kierkegaard's own aesthetic 
p r i n c i p l e s we s h a l l f i r s t l y examine these novels in terms of their 
aesthetic form i n order to gauge the extent to which they are in 
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fact a f f i l i a t e d to a clear and definite l i t e r a r y tradition, and 
then tvxn to the exposition of the content or 'idea* of each novel. 
(B) The Aesthetic Porm of Kierkegaard's Novels 
The tradition of the novel to which Kierkegaard's work i s to be 
related i s rather different from the tradition of the english novel, 
as w i l l soon enough become clear. The barriers which confront the 
english-speaking reader in h i s approach to Kierkegaard are, in part 
at l e a s t , connected with t h i s cultural difference. There i s much 
which s t r i k e s the anglophone reader as 'odd' and which he ascribes 
to Kierkegaard's own 'oddity' (not altogether to be denied), which 
i s i n f a c t a normal part of a particular l i t e r a r y form. This can 
be seen by reference to some of Kierkegaard's most obvious devices. 
The most s t r i k i n g i s the use of pseudonymity i t s e l f . Without 
denying that Kierkegaard used t h i s device to an unusual extent and 
endowed i t with more theoretical significance than i t may in fact , 
be able to bear (I5), the device i t s e l f i s quite normal in the rom-
antic novel. This was observed by Brandes (14) snd reiterated by 
B i l l e s k o v Jansen who says that 'in t h i s group of German writers 
the concealment of the author's name, p a r t i a l or total anonymity, 
flourished.' (15) Anonymity of course i s something different 
from pseudonymity, and a certain type of j o u r n a l i s t i c anonymity was 
anathema to Kierkegaard, but Billeskov Jansen i s using the term, 
as Kierkegaard also did, (I6) to include the use of pseudonyms. 
This i s clear when he c i t e s as an example 'Novalis' as the pseud-
onym of F r i e d r i c h von Hardenberg. 
I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t that the majority of Kierkegaard's 
pseudonymous names have some sort of "monastic" reference: Victor 
Eremita, Johannes Climacus, Prater Tacitumus, Johannes de S i l e n t i o . 
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At one time he had also considered using Simon S t y l i t e s . (iV B 78/ 
5659) This i s partly a coded signal of h i s re l i g i o u s aim in the 
authorship (17) but i t also echoes the romantic image of the mon-
astery as a place of beauty and a r t , an image exemplified in one of 
the epochal texts of early romanticism, Wackenroder's (pseudonymous) 
Herzensergiessungen eines K-unstliebenden Klosterbruders. 
A second s t r i k i n g feature, closely connected with the use of 
the pseudonymous 'author' as editor, i s the device of the text within 
a text. In Either-Or, for example, the editor, Victor Eremita, 
claims to have found the manuscripts which make up the book in a 
concealed drawer in a second-hand desk. The manuscripts.; f a l l into 
two parts, the papers of A and of B. A he cannot name, but B he i d -
e n t i f i e s by internal evidence as Assessor Wilhelm. A's papers con-
tain a variety of essays but also include The Seducer's Diary, an 
independent piece which A claims to have stolen from the author, 
although we are l e f t i n some doubt about t h i s . ( I 8 ) B's papers 
consist of two very long l e t t e r s from the Assessor to h i s young 
friend A and also a sermon, supposedly written by a c l e r i c a l friend 
of the Assessor's and passed on by him to A. These pieces a l l f i t 
together, says Victor Eremita ' l i k e a Chinese puzzle-box.' (SV 2 p. I4) 
A similar complexity i s found in Repetition. Here the 'editor', 
Constantine Gonstantius, uses the f i r s t part of the book to describe 
both h i s own experiences and thoughts on a t r i p to Berlin as well as 
t e l l i n g the uncompleted story of a young man of h i s acquaintance. 
In the second part he introduces a cycle of l e t t e r s from this young 
man which complete the story. The book concludes with a l e t t e r from 
Constantine to the reader prefaced by a page set out as an envelope 
'to: Mr. N. N. Esq. , 
t h i s book's r e a l reader.' (SV 5, p.187) 
The most bizarre and complex case of texts-within-texts however 
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occurs in Stages on L i f e ' s Way. This work comprises two main sect-
ions ! the book was actually conceived at one point as two separate 
books (19)^ 'collected, forwarded to the printer and published by 
H i l a r i u s Bookbinder.' (SV 7, p. 5),- who describes how these manuscri-
pts had been sent to him, together with other books, by a l i t e r a r y 
gentleman - only the papers got overlooked and were found again too 
long after their despatch to make i t worthwhile returning them. He 
does not himself read them, but h i s son's tutor persuades him to 
have them published. 
Each of the two parts again f a l l s into two parts. The f i r s t 
h a l f of the book includes In Vino Veritas, an accoimt of a banquet 
a l a Plato, related by one William Afham, coupled with another lengthy 
l e t t e r from Assessor Wilhelm, the banquet and the l e t t e r being linked 
by a b r i e f narrative section. The banqueteers include such familiar 
figures as Victor Eremita and Johannes the Seducer from Either-Or 
and Constantine Constantius from Repetition. 
The second h a l f of the book i s entitled "Guilty?-Not-Guilty? and 
t h i s in turn f a l l s into two parts. I t s pseudonymous editor, Prater 
Taciturnus, described in an introduction how he had by chance fished 
up a rosewood box from the bottom of the Sfihorg Lake, in which box 
he found a manuscript of a diary which t e l l s the story of an xmhappy 
love a f f a i r . 
The diary i t s e l f i s rather musual. There are three types of 
entry in i t : morning entries, which describe events taking place 
exactly a year before, r e l a t i n g the story of the love-affair up to 
the f i n a l rupture; midnight entries, which describe the events of 
the current year, detailing the inner suffering and anguish of the 
author, who i s the male protagonist in the love-story; and s i x 
quite d i s t i n c t midnight entries, which in various ways evoke the 
sense of g u i l t which l i e s at the heart of the d i a r i s t ' s predicament. 
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This diary constitutes the f i r s t part of Guilty? - Not-Guilty? To 
t h i s diary Frater Tacitumus appends h i s own l e t t e r to the reader 
in which he analyzes the situation of the d i a r i s t who, he now claims, 
i s h i s own creation. 
Excessive as Kierkegaard's use of i t may be, this device of 
the text-within-the-text, the device i t s e l f l i n k s him to the novel-
i s t i c t r a d ition of Goethe and the romantics. Whether i t was their 
reading of the 'play within a play' motif in Shakespeare which i n -
spired them to the use of t h i s device, they certainly adopted i t 
with fervour. As in many other respects V/ilhelm Meister provided the 
paradigmatic example, in the Confessions of a Beautiful Soul, a 
piece of feminine autobiography vdiich interrupts the account of 
Wilhelm's passage through l i f e and of h i s and his companions' adven-
tures. (20) Another example i s Hoffmann's Kater Murr. This pur-
ports to be the autobiography of a tom-cat ca l l e d Murr, delivered 
to Hoffmann for publication. But 
When Kater Murr wrote h i s l i f e and opinions, he unceremon-
iously ripped up a printed book which he found at h i s 
master's and simply used the leaves, partly as an underpad, 
partly as blotting paper. These papers remained in the 
manuscript and, by mistake, were printed as i f they belong-
ed to i t . (21) 
As a r e s u l t fragments of a quite different story are interspersed 
into the tom-cat's autobiography, a story which concerns Murr's 
master and, amongst others, Johannes K r e i s l e r who features in other 
books by Hoffmann. Georg Brandes describes t h i s device of the book-
within-the-book as a 'cabinet of mirrors with i t s duplication of 
r e f l e c t i o n . ' (22) 
The text-within-the-text i s not however i t s e l f always a story. 
As in Wilhelm Meister i t can on occasion be a piece ot l i t e r a r y or 
even s c i e n t i f i c theory. Wackenroder's Herzensergiessungen i s another 
example, containing essays on the history and theory of a r t , as well 
as poems, f i c t i o n a l l e t t e r s , and the n o v e l i s t i c l i f e of Joseph 
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Berglinger. The novel in t h i s particular tradition i s not solely, 
perhaps not even c h i e f l y , 'story.' Indeed Schlegel repudiates the 
idea that i t should be the narrative which gives the novel i t s unity. 
The unity of the novel, he argues, consists in the unity of i t s i d -
eal content, i t i s an ideal unity which runs through the whole work, 
and which i s r e f l e c t e d in the various l i t e r a r y genres which are 
united in the novel: 
d 
Sie behaupten zwar, der Roman habe am meisten Verwantschaft 
mit der erzSLhlenden, j a , mit der epischen Gattung. Dagegen ... 
ich kann mir einen Roman kaxsa anders denken, a l s gemischt 
aus ErzShlung, Gesang und andem Formen. (23) 
Thus the fact that large parts of, e.g.^ Either-Or consist of 
pieces of aesthetic theory does not mean that the whole of which 
they are a part i s not to be considered as a novel. What matters i s 
the ideal unity of the work. As we have seen i t was indeed a conse-
quence of romantic theory that the division of a r t and philosophy, of 
l i t e r a r y theory and l i t e r a r y practice tends to be weakened i f not to 
disappear. (24) 
I t i s in t h i s l i g h t that Kierkegaard understands Schleiermacher's 
Vertraute Briefe Uber die Lucinde: 
I t i s probably a model review and also an example of how 
such a thing can be most productive, in that he constructs 
a host of personalities out of the book i t s e l f and through 
them illuminates the work and also i l l m i n a t e s their indiv-
i d u a l i t y , so that instead of being faced by the reviewer 
with various points of view, we get instead many personal-
i t i e s who represent these various points of view. But they 
are complete beings, so that i t i s possible to get a glance 
into the individuality of the single individual and through 
numerous r e l a t i v e l y true judgements to draw up our own 
f i n a l judgement. Thus i t i s a true masterpiece. 
Cl C 68/3846) 
This passage provides a l i n k between Kierkega^d's reviews and 
h i s novels: the review and the novel each have the task of drawing 
out and elucidating an idea. In the case of the reviews the ideal 
content i s determined by the work to which they are addressed, in 
the novels, i t i s freely chosen - but the method i s the same. 
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The novels in t h i s l i t e r a r y tradition are essentially about 
ideas, and very often the idea which they are about i s a r t i t s e l f , 
as i n Schlegel's Lucinde which deals with the idea of poetic love, 
or Hoffmann's Kater Miirr which deals with the idea of art and i t s 
r e l a t i o n to bourgeois society. Following the fichtean model of 
s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n the romantic book, the novel, i s i t s e l f conceived 
as a r e f l e c t i o n on the idea of poetry. 
The s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e character of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous 
books, the 'cabinet of mirrors' of which Brandes speaks, i s i t s e l f 
a clue that here we are dealing with novels which are-.also r e f l e c t -
ions on the nature and scope of n o v e l i s t i c a r t , novels which are 
also theory. But whereas for Schlegel l i f e culminated in a r t , for 
Kierkegaard the main point i s to seek out what l i e s beyond the aes-
t h e t i c . These novels point beyond the aesthetic form to a r e l i g -
ious content or idea, by which the aesthetic i s limited. There i s 
thus a tension between content and form which means that whilst the 
form i n v i t e s a reading of them purely as aesthetic works, such a 
reading cannot be sustained. Despite their form, consciously and 
deliberately in despite of their form, they cannot ultimately be 
read as novels, but as works of philosophy in the service of the 
r e l i g i o u s . They are not intended to s a t i s f y , to provide a soothing 
attunement to a timeless ideal for a weary soiil, but to disturb, to 
unsettle, to r a i s e questions, to increase puzzlement. 
The l i t e r a r y a f f i l i a t i o n * of these works warns us against those 
readings which see them as veiled personal confessions. When Pierre 
Mesnard, speaking of the diary in Stages on L i f e ' s Way says that the 
use of pseudonymity here i s 'pour couvrir une communication, une mes-
sage de Kierkegaard,' (25) the point i s not at a l l self-evident. 
Rather than looking for Kierkegaard's face behind the mask of the 
text we should dir e c t our attention to the idea which i s c r e f l e c t e d 
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in the text. 
The tension between the aesthetic form and the religious con-
tent also warns us to be careful of such interpretations as that 
proposed by Martin Thust, that Kierkegaard's'novels' are s p e c i f i c -
a l l y designed as an appropriate medim by which to communicate the 
i n v i s i b l e , s p i r i t u a l stages of the s e l f in i t s ascent to the r e l i g -
ious, (26) for i t i s precisely the tension between form and content 
that Kierkegaard has i n mind. 
This reading supports Kierkegaard's own thesis that h i s author-
ship was r e l i g i o u s from the beginning, and that the aesthetic form 
of h i s work was intended as a way of meeting people where they were -
in the s p e l l of an aesthetic view of l i f e - and of gradually unveil-
ing the i l l u s o r y nature of the aesthetic. These works are ba s i c a l l y 
'a pious fraud', ( c f . SV 18, pp. IO4 f f . ) 
We now turn to a closer examination of the content of the novels 
and of the way in which the rel i g i o u s content makes i t s presence 
f e l t behind the aesthetic form. 
(C) Either-Or 
(C) ( i ) The Aesthetic Point of View 
In the Point of View Kierkegaard described Either-Or as 'a 
poetic evacuation which does not however go further than the ethic-
a l . ' ( i b i d . i p.90) I f moreover the ethical i s construed in terms 
which p a r a l l e l the philosophy of the life-view (as we shall see that 
i t i s ) then i t cannot be said that there i s any profound tension 
between the aesthetic form and the ethical content. Indeed, of the 
novels, i t i s Either-Qr which, for t h i s reason, has the best claim to 
be read simply as a novel, as a work of l i t e r a r y art. The tension 
between idea and form i s by no means obvious. I t i s hov/ever not 
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e n t i r e l y absent either, as we sha l l see, and Either-Or prepares 
the ground on which the boundary between the reli g i o u s and the aes-
thet i c i s to be erected. 
The term aesthetic i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to the 'idea' embod-
ied i n the f i r s t volme of Either-Or, comprising the papers of 'A'. 
In the f i r s t place i t contains examples of Kierkegaard's c r i t i c a l 
writings - the essays on Don Juan and The F i r s t Love - and other 
sections dealing with aesthetic themes. Furthermore, i t contains 
one piece of writing. The Seducer's Diary, which can i t s e l f be 
treated as an independent novel - and which has indeed been trans-
lated and dramatized i n i t s own right. (27) 
The idea represented in th i s f i r s t part was recognized by the 
more perceptive of Kierkegaard's contemporary readers, l i k e the re-
viewer i n Faedrelandet who heard in i t a reverberation of 'the torn 
and disintegrated condition of the age]] which i s audible as a 
succession of screaming dissonances from many of our time's most 
gifted children.' (28) Other reviewers saw in i t the s p i r i t of 
negation or of r e f l e c t i o n which characterized the age and in pa r t i c -
ular movements such as young Germany. (29) Kierkegaard was not 
alone i n h i s vision of a r i s i n g tide of ni h i l i s m i n contemporary 
cul tvire. 
We may therefor expect that the aesthetic stance which i s re-
presented i n A's papers i s that which posits the separation of the 
aesthetic idea from r e a l i t y . There can be no question of a l i f e -
view here. In fact the aesthetic form which recurs again and again 
in these papers i s that of the theatre, which i s precisely the embod-
iment of a poetic world apart from the r e a l world of ethical care and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y . The c r i t i c a l pieces are t h e a t r i c a l , the figures used 
in the psychological studies are taken from the theatre, and th i s 
emphasis makes i t s e l f f e l t i n other ways. A's existence i s i t s e l f 
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e s s e n t i a l l y t h e a t r i c a l , i t i s an existence in the magical theatre of 
p o s s i b i l i t y . Two points may be noted in t h i s connection: the fugit-
ive nature of A's personality, and h i s youth. 
The fugitive nature of A's personality i s hinted at in the edit-
or' s introduction, where Victor Eremita says that he can glean 'ab-
solutely nothing' of A's personality from h i s papers. (SV 2, p.13) 
This i s not merely accidental, for A's l i f e i s a l i f e such as Kierke-
gaard envisaged as the r e s u l t of romantic irony in The Concept of Irony: 
i t i s a l i f e which has fallen.apart into a sequence of fragmented and 
disconnected moods. I t lacks continuity. (SV 1, p.295) This i s 
most c l e a r l y depicted in the opening aphorisms, the 'Diapsalmata' 
and in the chapter devoted to boredom. (SV 2, pp.259 f f . ) A's r e s -
idence i s not far from Heiberg's h e l l of immediacy. 
A's lack of personality connects with the theatrical nature of 
h i s existence since, as we have seen, the theatre answers to a stage 
of development which i s below the l e v e l of personality, a shadow-
realm, i n which the individual knows himself only in the dark out-
l i n e s of the dream figures which are projections of the imagination. 
The theatre belongs naturally to the hidden, cryptic, personality. (30) 
Assessor Wilhelm i s quite clear about t h i s and sees that A ex-
i s t s only 'outside' himself i n the projections of h i s imagination, in 
a magic-theatre of p o s s i b i l i t y . He writes to A 
You are constantly hovering above yourself, but the l o f t y 
aether, the fine sublimate, in which you are dissolved i s 
the nothingness of despair ... that which you see beneath 
you i s a multplicity of moods and situations, which you 
use to find interesting points of contact with l i f e . (SV 3 pp.185-6) 
and 
You are constantly hovering over yourself and decisive as 
every step may be, you reserve for yourself a possible 
interpretation of things, which by means of a single word 
can change everything. ( i b i d . , pp.I6-I7) 
'A' l i v e s in the 'aether', the ideal medium, which i s the medium of 
poetry, of imagination; he i s outside the world, outside himself in 
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an empty transcendence. 
The Assessor also r e f e r s constantly to A as h i s 'young friend.' 
He explains h i s reasons for t h i s as follows: 
I f e e l ... with what j u s t i c e I c a l l you: my young friend. 
A difference of seven years i s not exactly an eternity, nor 
w i l l I boast of a more mature reason in comparison with you, 
but c e r t a i n l y of a more mature l i f e . Yes, I feel that I 
r e a l l y have grown older, but you constantly hold f a s t to 
youth's f i r s t f l o u r i s h . (SV 3, p. 85) 
Again r e c a l l i n g the excursus on the theatre in Repetition i t i s 
to be noted that t h e a t r i c a l art and youth correspond to each other. 
I t w i l l be remembered that Kierkegaard s p e c i f i c a l l y said ' ... there 
i s no young man of any imagination who has not at some time f e l t him-
s e l f cavight by the magic of the theatre ...' (SV 5i P.135) snd he 
added that 'the chief thing i s that everything happens at the right 
time. Everything has i t s time in youth ...' ( i b i d . , p.I36) 
The theatre i s appropriate for youth because youth has not 
developed to the point where the demands proper to a mat\ire ethical 
existence can be made. The personality of youth i s s t i l l l atent, 
s t i l l only a matter of p o s s i b i l i t y . The youth's love of theatre i s 
a healthy part of the process of growing-up. 
But i t w i l l also be r e c a l l e d that Kierkegaard spoke of a moment 
when 'the cock now crows and the twilight figures f l e e away,' ( i b i d . , 
p. 137) a moment when we must leave the theatre and go out into l i f e . 
A's problem i s precisely that he has been unable to respond to 
the demand put to him in t h i s moment. I t i s not h i s aptitude for 
the play of t h e a t r i c a l moods which i s wrong, but that he t r i e s to 
l i v e h i s l i f e i n such moods. Instead of leaving the theatre of 
childhood and acquiring a life-view he has made the theatre the basis 
of h i s l i f e - v i e w . But as Victor Eremita observes in h i s introduction, 
such a project can scarcely be carried out in l i f e . (SV 2, p. 19) 
Of A's papers i t i s The Seducer's Diary in which we find the 
aesthetic attitude best summarized. This diary represents the attempt 
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to l i v e a e s t h e t i c a l l y , and i t represents A's essential idea,(SV 2 p.14) 
thus the essential idea of th i s f i r s t part i n concentrated form. 
I t i s here too that we are brought closest to the boundary between 
art and eth i c a l existence. 
The connection between A and the Seducer i s in i t s e l f an ex-
ample of the Chinese-puzzle motif in Kierkegaard's writing and a l s o 
of the way in which he uses the narrator (editor) - hero re l a t i o n -
sh i p . A c l a i m s to have s t o l e n the papers which c o n s t i t u t e The Sed-
ucer' s Diary, and to have put them together with some l e t t e r s given 
him by Cordelia, the seducer's victim, he himself being merely the 
editor. Victor Eremita, however, thinks that The Diary i s a poetic 
work written by A himself, and that A's anxiety with regard to the 
Seducer i s anxiety about himself: 
The mood which governs A's introduction to The Diary 1 in 
a manner betrays the poet. I t i s actually as i f A himself 
had grown afrai d of h i s poem, which l i k e a disturbing dream 
continues to cause anxiety, even as i t i s being told. (ibid.) 
The world of the seducer i s described by A himself as a 'nebul-
ous realm, a dream-world, where every moment one i s scared by one's 
own shadow.' ( i b i d . , p.287) Victor Eremita too, when he thinks of 
the seducer, thinks of him moving'like a shadow across my floor.' 
( i b i d . , p.15) 
I t i s to the shadow realm of the theatre that the seducer esse n t i a l -
l y belongs, and within t h i s realm he i s the most shadowy figure of 
a l l . This i s how A puts i t : 
Behind the world i n which we l i v e , far away in the background, 
l i e s another world,w-which stands i n approximately the same 
re l a t i o n to t h i s world as the scene one sometimes sees in the 
theatre i n the background of the main scene stands in r e l a t -
ion to t h i s l a t t e r . Through a thin gauze one sees as i t were, 
a world of gauze, l i g h t e r , more ethereal, of a different qual-
i t y from the r e a l world. Many people who are physically pre-
sent i n the r e a l world do not actually belong to i t but to 
th i s other world. But that a man can thus fade away, indeed 
almost vanish from r e a l i t y , can have i t s basis either i n 
health or in sickness. This l a t t e r was the case with t h i s man... 
t-ihid. , pp. 283-4) 
The seducer i s not merely l i k e a figure in a play, but he i s l i k e a 
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f i g u r e i n a world which i s unreal even in comparison with the i l l -
usory world represented on the forestage; he i s not jus t a shadow, 
but a shadow of a shadow. 
This character is t ic i s constantly r e f l ec ted i n the Diary i t s e l f , 
i n the seducer's comments about himself. When he asks himself ' i n 
my r e l a t i o n to Cordelia have I been at a l l times true to my pact , ' 
he means not h is pact wi th the g i r l , wi th Cordelia, who i s a f t e r a l l 
a rea l human being, but true to h is 'pact with the a e s t h e t i c ' (SV 2, 
p.405) His strength i s ' t ha t I continually have the idea on my 
side' ( i b i d . ) - or i n other words he i s only strong i n the idea l , 
not i n the r e a l , world. 
As he anticipates the f i n a l rendezvous with Cordelia, he t e l l s 
himself 'Everything i s symbol, I myself am a myth about myself, f o r 
i s i t not l i k e a myth that I hasten to th i s meeting? Who I am has 
nothing to do with i t ; everything f i n i t e and temporal i s forgotten . . . ' 
( i b i d . , p.409) 
I t fo l lows from th i s that i n f a c t the sort of seduction with 
which he i s concerned, i n which his v i r t u o s i t y i s indicated by h is 
t i t l e , ' the Seducer', has l i t t l e to do with the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of 
sensuous passion. The moment of sexual g r a t i f i c a t i o n i s the least 
s i g n i f i c a n t part of the process and i s pa r t l y f o r th i s reason (and 
not merely f o r the sake of l i t e r a r y modesty) passed over i n silence. 
The essential seduction i s something i n t e l l e c t u a l , i t consists i n 
developing the g i r l to the point where thought or i d e a l i t y (which 
f o r Kierkegaard as wel l as f o r the seducer axe essentially masculine 
character is t ics) are about to develop i n her, and at th i s point she 
discovers that the development can only be f u l f i l l e d by her giving 
herse l f to him, f o r he i t i s who has no\arished th i s i d e a l i t y i n her, 
i t i s h i s thought, and she can only have i t i n him, jus t as i t i s 
r e a l l y only h is own thought which he enjoys i n her. ' I have made 
her l i g h t , l i g h t as a thought, and now should not th i s thought belong 
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to me." (SV 2,p.404) he cr ies i n triumph to himself. 
The seduction i s thus' i dea l ' , an*, event i n the ideal world which 
i s the seducer's true home, not an event i n the real world at a l l ; 
and at the same time there i s no real personal rec iproc i ty involved. 
Johannes describes h is method thus: 
However I do not spread out my cloaic i n order to s i t with her 
on the earth's greensward, but i n order to disappear wi th her 
in to the sky i n a f l i g h t of thought. Or I do not take her with 
me, but s i t myself astr ide a thought, wave my hand to her, blow 
her a k i s s , and vanish from her s ight , only audible i n the 
soughing of the winged words, yet not , unlike Jehovah, becoming 
more and more v i s i b l e through the word, but less and less , 
since the more I t a l k , the higher I climb. Then she wants to 
come too, away on a bold f l i g h t of thought. ( i b i d . , pp. 536-7) 
He i s thus able to wr i t e to her ' I carry you away, not from one per-
son to another, but out of the wor ld . ' ( i b i d . , p.366) For by ac-
companying him she i s indeed leaving the real world f o r a world of 
pure phantasy. 
Such a ptirely ideal seduction can have no abiding connection 
with the world. I t s consummation i s purely an a f f a i r of the moment, 
only i n the moment can the woman transcend her essential ly immediate 
being and exis t i n the pure translucency of the seducer's i d e a l i t y , 
only i n , only f o r , the moment - what comes afterwards, the b i r t h and 
ni i r ture of ch i ld ren , home-making, etc. , a l l belongs to the realm of 
nature, to the f i n i t e , to the real world and i s of no in teres t to 
Johannes. I t i s , he says, the business of husbands, not of seducers. 
( i b i d . , pp.598-9) 
The f a c t that he, as a man, i s essential ly at home i n the realm 
of i d e a l i t y means that the ideal consummation which he seeks i s , as 
we have seen, only a game carr ied on wi th in the ambience of his own 
consciousness, a game i n which the woman i s only the occasion, not 
the pgxtner. Johannes i s quite clear about t h i s : 
She l i s t e n s , she understands. She l i s t ens to the winged 
words, she understands i t , she l i s t ens to another's t a l k , 
she understands i t as her own; she l i s t ens to another's 
voice, as i t echoes i n her, she understands th i s echo as 
i f i t were her own voice, which reveals i t s e l f to her and 
to another. ( i b i d . , p.359) 
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I n a sense the two never meet. She does not , cannot, i s not 
allowed t o , enter in to the Relationship as a subject i n her own r i g h t . 
She i s merely .the screen onto which he projects his fan t i s ized possib-
i l i t i e s , merely the echo-chamber in to which he speaks to magnify h is 
own voice and creates an i l l u s i o n of dialogue. The diary continues: 
What do I do? Do I mock her? In no way; that would not 
help me at a l l . Do I steal her heart? I n no way, I prefer 
that the g i r l I love keeps her heart. Then what do I do? 
I make myself a heart i n the likeness of hers. An a r t i s t 
paints h is beloved, that i s h is pleasure, a sculptor forms 
h i s . I do th i s too, but i n a s p i r i t u a l sense. She does 
not know that I possess th i s p ic tu re , and-therein consists 
i n essence my falsehood. pp.559-60) 
I t i s not the real person of the g i r l he wants: i t i s an im-
age, which he can play wi th i n the magic theatre' of his imagination, 
•until the image breathes out i t s thought, i t s inner meaning, and ex-
pi res . His love-making i s a form of voyeurism, i t i s a stealing of 
others' images, E.-ather than of engagement with others. 
Assessor Wilhelm has observed A playing a s imilar game i n one of 
h i s cafe haunts: 
A p re t ty young g i r l , beside whom you quite by chance . . . were 
s i t t i n g at' table was too prim to bestow a glance on you . . . 
she sat opposite a mi r ro r , i n which you could see her. She 
cast a sly look at i t , not foreseeing that your eye had a l -
ready taken up i t s place there; she blushed when your eye 
met hers. Such things you regis ter as accurately as a daguer-
rotype - and as quickly as one, which as i s known needs only 
helf-a-minute , even i n the worst weather. (SV 5> P.15) 
This i s a perfect summary of the seducer's a t t i tude . I t i s the 
r e f l e c t i o n i n the mi r ro r , not the r e a l i t y , he desires, something he 
can put in to the album of h is memory and develop i n the l i g h t of his 
i dea l i z ing imagination. 
Johannes says that 'Memory i s not only a means of preserving, 
j\ but also of enhancing, what i s permeated by memory has a double-
^ e f f e c t . ' (SV .2, p.518) The term he uses here 'Er indr ing ' means 
/ 
both memory and i n t e rna l i za t i on . I t i s not jus t the f acu l ty of r e -
c a l l i n g something, but the power which l i f t s the rea l up in to the 
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ideal world. This same ambiguity was, as has been noted, used a l -
so by Hegel. (31) 
The demoniac qua l i ty of the seducer (SV 2, p.15), the ' f r i g h t -
f u l ' aspect which Kierkegaard expected he woiild present to his con-
temporary readers sho\ild not mislead us. This i s no Mi l tonic Satan, 
t h i s i s a p i t i a b l e f i g u r e , a man incapable of love , of f r iendship , 
of contentment. He i s retarded at what i s essential ly an adolescent 
phase of h i s development. Nor should we rush to the conclusion that 
t h i s f i g u r e i s a cipher f o r Kierkegaard himself. There i s every 
reason to believe that he i s the analyst, and not the pat ient . (32) 
For over against the aesthetic, poetic Schattenbild of the seducer, 
l u r k i n g i n the wings of h is own magic-theatre, Kierkegaard sets the 
demand f o r a l i f e - v i e w . He does t h i s by means of the Assessor 
helm, whose l e t t e r s make up the biolk of the second part of the book, 
the 'Or ' . 
The term 'demoniac' here indicates that the f r o n t i e r between 
the phantasy-world of i l l u s i o n and the real world has been reached: 
f o r the demonic i s defined i n the excursus on the theatre i n Repet-
i t i o n precisely as being activated i n the moment when a man cont in-
ues to exis t i n and through the shadowy f igures of the theatre a f t e r 
the cock has cijowed, a f t e r the day has dawned and the time to act 
has a r r ived . (55) The same f r o n t i e r i s indicated by the qual i ty of 
anxiety which the seducer arouses, both i n A and i n Victor Eremita, 
f o r , as we shal l see, anxiety (angst) i s rooted i n the gap between 
the i d e a l , fantasized world of imagination and the real world of 
e th ica l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . (34) 
(C) ( i i ) The Ethical Point of View 
The l i n e of enquiry which we are pursuing here i s aimed at 
seeking a closer d e f i n i t i o n of the boundaries of a r t , and the key 
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question wi th regard to the e thical point of view represented i n 
Part Two of Either-Or i s how i s the r e l a t i o n of the ethical to the 
aesthetic to be construed? Does i t represent an absolute l i m i t or 
merely a r e l a t i v e l i m i t to art? I s i s presented as '- complementary 
to or as a negation of the whole realm of the aesthetic? I s the 
e th ica l seen here i n terms of the l i f e - v i e w or of the rel igious? 
I n f a c t the e th ica l posi t ion which Assessor Wilhelm represents 
i s substant ia l ly the same as that represented by the l i f e - v i e w and 
embodied i n such f igures as Poul M i l l e r and Madame Gyllembourg. 
Indeed i t has been argued that Poul M i l l e r was the model f o r the 
f i g u r e of the Assessor (55)» but whether th i s i s so or not there i s 
a considerable conceptual overlap i n the i r posi t ions , pa r t i cu l a r ly 
wi th regard to the question we are piirsuing here. This overlap i s 
indicated i n the vocabulary of the Assessor's l e t t e r s : the over-
whelming major i ty of instances i n which Kierkegaard uses the expres-
sion ' l i f e - v i e w ' (Livsanskuelse) and related terms i n the specif ic 
sense which we have given to i t occur i n the group of wri t ings which 
contain h i s reviews of novels (On the Concept of Irony; From the 
Papers of One S t i l l L iv ing ; A L i t e ra ry Review) and i n th i s second 
part of Either-Or. (56) 
As the corre la t ion of th i s posi t ion wi th the idea of the novel 
shows, the elevation of l i f e over a r t which the l i f e - v i e w requires 
does not mean the abo l i t i on of a r t , f o r i t can permit a creative 
two-way re la t ionship i n which the work of a r t r e f l e c t s the standard 
of the l i f e - v i e w and the l i f e - v i e w i n turn expresses i t s e l f i n and 
sees i t s e l f i n the product of hove l i s t i c a r t . By set t ing up the 
standard of the l i f e - v i e w i n the Assessor's l e t t e r s Kierkegaard 
does not therefore introduce an idea which transcends the aesthetic 
form of the Bildungsroman which he i s employing. The l i m i t which 
aesthetics encounters here i s not an absolute l i m i t , i t i s not a 
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negation of the aesthetic as such, i t i s rather the demand f o r a 
quite spec i f i c ordering of the aesthetic wi th in a wider viewpoint. 
We shal l now look at the Assessor's posi t ion i n more d e t a i l , 
wi th constant reference to i t s implications f o r def in ing the scope 
of aesthetics. 
The f i r s t l e t t e r i s concerned with the aesthetic v a l i d i t y of 
marriage, and seeks to show that the idea of married love i s aesth-
e t i c a l l y beau t i fu l as against the romantic scorn of mari tal love. 
Although the Assessor i s arguing against the romantic posi t ion i n 
general i t i s l i k e l y that once again Schlegels Lucinde and Schleier-
macher's Vertraute Br ie fe Ueber Schlegels Lucinde are the specif ic 
targets . 
Just as Kierkegaard had condemned Lucinde-not f o r i t s moral 
f a i l i n g s but because i t was unpoetic, because i t d id not deepen i t -
s e l f i n the l i f e - v i e w which was the wel l -spr ing of a l l genuine aesth-
et ic (a t least n o v e l i s t i c ) c r e a t i v i t y , so the Assessor argues against 
the so-called 'aesthet ic ' objections to marriage that marriage both 
preserves ajid enhances the aesthetic aspect of love: married love 
i s more beau t i fu l than unhallowed love, and, consequently, a more 
appropriate theme f o r aesthetic treatment. I n th i s way he inverts 
the romantic posi t ion as that i s represented by Schleiermacher: 
Ich kenne gar keine U n s i t t l i c h k e i t eines Kunstwerkes, als d ie , 
wenn es seine Schuldigkeit nich t u t schOn und v o r t r e f f l i c h zu 
sein, Oder wenn es aus seinen Grenzen hinausgeht . . . (37) 
Although the dua l i s t i c or h i h i l i s t i c wing of romanticism pre-
supposes the i n t r i n s i c opposition of the realms of i d e a l i t y and r e a l -
i t y the Assessor sets out to prove the i r coherence and the impl ica t -
ions of t h i s coherence f o r the idea of love. 
What he ca l l s 'romantic love ' i s based on sensuous immediacy 
' . . . to see her was to love her; or , though she saw him through a 
s l i t i n the locked window of her maidenly bower jus t one time from 
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t h i s moment on she nonetheless loved him, him alone i n a l l the wor ld . ' 
(SV 5, p.24) The f i r s t love i s the true love. I t i s the qual i ty of 
immediacy which gives love i t s ' substantial content (Gehalt). ( i b i d . ) 
But the sensuous basis of th i s sort of love whose ideal i s sens-
uous beauty means that i t i s based on something which i s transient. 
This i s seen by the r e f l e c t i v e consciousness which draws the conclus-
ion that there i s an i r resolvable c o n f l i c t between love and perman-
ence. With Lord Byron i t a f f i rms ' love i s heaven, marriage i s h e l l . ' 
( i b i d . , pp. 26-7) A l i f e i n love becomes a sequence of a f f a i r s , mar-
riage becomes merely a matter of convenience. 
Such a v is ion of the incompat ib i l i ty of f i r s t love and marriage 
i s again expressed by Schleiermacher 
Auch i n der Liebe muss es voriaxifige Versuche geben, aus deren 
nichts bleibendes entsteht, von denen aber jeder etwas beitrSLgt 
um das GefUhl bestimmter und die Aussicht auf die Liebe grttsser 
und he r r l i che r zu machen . . . Auch muss es der Natur der Sache 
nach so sein, und h ier Treue fordern und ein fortdauemdes 
VerhSlltnis s t i f t e n wollen i s t eine eben so schMliche als 
leere Einbildung. (58) 
Though the Assessor sees the incompat ib i l i ty of t ry ing to bu i l d 
an e t e r n i t y , a love ' f o r ever and a day,' on the basis of sensuous 
immediacy alone, he poses the question 
whether the immediate, the f i r s t love might not be secured 
against such scepticism by being taken up in to an higher, 
concentric immediacy, so that mari ta l love would not need 
to biary the beau t i fu l hopes of f i r s t love, but mari ta l love 
would i t s e l f be the f i r s t love with an addit ional set of 
determinations which wo\ild not lessen but rather ennoble i t . 
(3V 5.. p. 55) 
I n the present age people mostly get stuck i n r e f l e c t i o n and do 
not win through to the higher experience, the higher uni ty v^ich pro-
vides un i ty and harmony. This higher realm ' i s the r e l i g i o u s , i n 
which r a t i ona l r e f l e c t i o n i s brought to a stop . . . ' ( i b i d . , p.54) 
To achieve th i s i s to br ing about the ' t r ans f igura t ion of f i r s t love, 
not i t s a n n i h i l a t i o n . ' ( i b i d . , p.55) I t i s achieved i n ch r i s t i an 
marriage, f o r i n the marriage ceremony love receives a re l ig ious 
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sanction, a r e l i g ious hallowing. 
This i s the basis f o r the assertion that marriage i s more beau-
t i f u l than extra-mari ta l love , f o r marriage contains a synthesis 
which pa ra l l e l s the aesthetic synthesis: 
i t i s freedom and yet necessity; i t i s i n the moment, i s i n 
the highest degree 'present' and yet i t has an e terni ty wi th in 
i t . A l l t h i s marriage has too, i t i s sensuous and yet s p i r i t -
u a l , but i t i s more than th i s . . . I t has inner i n f i n i t u d e i n 
i t s e l f , s t i l l more than f i r s t love has; f o r the inner i n f i n i t -
ude of marriage i s an eternal l i f e . . . the s p i r i t u a l element 
of marriage i s higher than that of the f i r s t love , and the high-
er the heaven over the b r ida l bed so much the bet ter , so much 
the more b e a u t i f u l , so much the more aesthetic; and over mar-
riage i t i s not the earthly heaven which i s arched but the 
Heaven of the S p i r i t . 
This aesthetic qua l i ty i s of course i n the f i r s t instance a qual i ty 
of l i f e , not of a work of a r t . The Assessor's own comment on th i s 
i s that 
There ce r t a in ly exists a misunderstanding among a great many 
people, which confuses what i s aesthet ical ly beau t i fu l with 
what permits i t s e l f to be represented as aesthet ical ly 
b e a u t i f u l . This can quite easily be explained by the fac t 
that the aesthetic sa t i s fac t ion which the soul needs i s sought 
by most people i n reading, or i n contemplating works of a r t , 
e t c . , whereas there are r e l a t i v e l y few who themselves see the 
aesthetic as i t i s i n existence, who themselves see existence 
i n an aesthetic l i g h t , and do not merely enjoy the poetic 
reproduction. ( i b i d . , p.126) 
The Assessor himself i s able to see beauty wherever the etern-
i t y of r e l i g ious i d e a l i t y i s brought in to creative contact wi th the 
f i n i t e conditions of existence, even where these are outwardly drab 
and u n i n v i t i n g . He knows that t h i s extension of the concept of the 
aesthetic w i l l not please h i s young f r i e n d A. 
Or does i t d is turb you that I s t i l l pronounce the word: 
aesthetic; do you think that i t i s almost a type of c h i l d -
ishness i n me, to want to seek th i s qual i ty among the poor 
and the su f f e r ing . . .do you not see that the poor, inasmuch 
as they t r u l y have the re l ig ious also have the aesthetic . . . 
( i b i d . , p.118) 
Because the poor see the i r suffer ings i n the l i g h t of a r e l i g -
ious i d e a l i t y these suffer ings are transfigured f o r them, external 
hardship i s seen i n the l i g h t of the inner l i g h t which continues to 
shine i n , wi th and under i t . But t h i s inner l i g h t of r e l ig ious 
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i d e a l i t y i s i n i t s e l f too f i n e a thing to be captured i n aesthetic 
media. 
The Assessor, naming Schel l ing, rehearses the conventional i d -
ea l i s t understanding of a r t developing through various stages, which 
move from the external to the i n t e r n a l , from spat ial to temporal 
forms, culminating i n poetry. 'Poetry f i n a l l y i s the most perfect 
of a l l ar ts and therefore also the a r t which best knows how to make 
the s ignif icance of time count. ' (SV 5> p.129) But even poetry 
involves a foreshortening of the temporal movement, i t concentrates 
i n a single moment of v is ion that which i n existence i s spread out 
through time. Where the h i s to ry which the poet relates i s external, 
such as the sagas of knights slaying dragons, e tc . , th i s external 
temporality i s appropriately enough concentrated i n the moment of 
triumph, but where the h i s to ry i s i n t e r n a l , where the point i s not to 
conquer but to possess more and more intensively what one already has, 
then even poetry must f a i l i n the attempt to represent i t . 
Romantic love can very well be represented i n the moment, mar-
i t a l love not , because an idealized husband i s not one who i s 
that f o r one moment i n his l i f e , but who i s that every day . . . 
a cross-bearer who every day takes up his cross cannot be rep-
resented i n ei ther poetry or a r t , because the point i s that he 
does i t every day . . . long-suf fe r ing cannot be represented 
a r t i s t i c a l l y . . . ( i b i d . , pp. 128-9) 
But the transcendence of aesthetic form by the temporality of 
existence does not mean the abo l i t i on of the aesthetic. Indeed, 
since the temporalization of the forms of a r t from architecti ire to 
poetry means the enrichment and concretization of a r t , i t fol lows 
that wi th regard to emphasis on time 
. . . the aesthetic ideal becomes r icher and f i i l l e r the more 
t h i s happens. So how does the aesthetic which has become 
incommensurable with even poetic representation achieve 
representation? Answer: by being l i v e d . . . Everything 
which I am t a lk ing about here can surely be represented 
aes the t ica l ly , only not i n poetic i m i t a t i o n , but by t h i s , 
by the f ac t that one l i ve s i t , real izes i t i n l i f e , i n the 
r ea l world. Thus the aesthetic transcends i t s e l f and i s 
reconciled wi th l i f e : f o r i f i n one sense poetry and a r t 
precisely are a r econc i l i a t ion wi th l i f e , i n another sense 
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they are at odds wi th l i f e , since they only reconcile one 
side of the soul. , 
(SV 3, p.130) 
The argument i s f a m i l i a r . The true aesthetic t ransf igura t ion 
i s the transparency of the se l f to the divine ground by which i t i s 
posited. The way i n which t h i s occurs, the way i n which the i n d i v -
idual achieves a l i f e - v i e w i n which ideal and rea l permeate each 
other i n a t r ans f igur ing harmony i s developed by the Assessor i n his 
second l e t t e r , The Balance between the Aesthetic and the Ethical i n 
the Composition of the Personality. The category around which th i s 
extremely d i f f u s e l e t t e r i s constructed i s ' choice ' . I t i s only by 
choice, and i n pa r t i cu la r by choosing one's se l f that one comes to 
have a l i f e - v i e w i n the proper sense. 
Since i n the aesthetic the manifold characters of the magic 
theatre co-exist without excluding each other as so many equally 
v a l i d p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the personali ty, since there i s here no choi-
ce i n the Assessor's sense, the aesthetic standpoint cannot, s t r i c t -
l y speaking, be said to const i tute a l i f e - v i e w . The Assessor thus 
t e l l s A ' . . . you have no view of l i f e . You have something which 
resembles a view . . . which must nevertheless not be confused with a 
secure and refreshing confidence i n l i f e . ' ( i b i d . , p.189) 
A l i f e - v i e w i s based on the act of self-choice i n which the 
se l f receives and a f f i rms i t s e l f as a t r u l y s p i r i t u a l being. A l i f e 
based on anything less than th i s i s , according to the Assessor, i n -
var iably ' aes the t i c ' , whether i t involves the pursuit of wealth, 
g lo ry , power, or the c u l t i v a t i o n of ta lent or pleasure such a l i f e 
i s based on what i s t r ans i to ry , even i n i t s most sophisticated form 
i n which i t sees not i t s own n u l l i t y , a standpoint which the Assess-
or i d e n t i f i e s wi th A. Such a l i f e i s i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n 
despair. 
The Assessor's way out of t h i s s i tua t ion i s that the se l f r e -
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nounces the fan tas t ic f l i g h t - f r o m - s e l f , faces and takes upon i t s e l f 
i t s despair, accepts i t s e l f as i t i s . I n such an act of self-choice 
the personali ty acquires r e a l i t y , i t becomes what i t r e a l l y i s , i t 
gains content i n the recognit ion of a substantial power beyond i t s e l f . 
The concept of choice i s woven in to a model of personal growth 
of a more organic k ind: the need f o r choice only emerges at a par-
ticular- stage i n the development of the s e l f , i t i s the moment of 
t r a n s i t i o n from childhood to adult r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and yet t h i s 
t r a n s i t i o n does not occur spontaneously - i t must be chosen. I f i t 
i s no t , then that which i s innocent i n the c h i l d or youth becomes 
culpable. As an example of jus t such a f a i l e d maturation the Ass-
essor c i t e s Nero. Though ageing and experienced i n depravity 'he i s 
s t i l l a c h i l d or youth. The immediacy of the S p i r i t i s unable to 
break through, and yet i t demands a break-through, i t demands an 
higher fonn of existence.'(SV 5i p.174) Man i s however object ively 
determined as S p i r i t : S p i r i t cannot simply be avoided. I f i t i s 
not l i v e d out i n i t s true form i t makes i t s presence f e l t negative-
l y 'The S p i r i t gathers i t s e l f i n him l i k e a dark cloud, i t s wrath 
broods over his soul , and i t becomes an anxiety (angst) , which does 
not even cease i n the moment of enjoyment.' ( i b i d . , p.175) 
Choice does not simply suppress the immediacy of childhood or 
youth, but acknowledges i t as i t s own and becomes responsible fo r i t . 
There i s both i d e n t i t y and dif ference i n the r e l a t i o n of se l f as Spir-
i t and the immediate se l f . Both these elements are la tent i n the 
word ' g u i l t ' (dan: Skyld) which implies both g u i l t i n the forensic 
sense and i n the sense of debt, of owing something to another. The 
se l f chooses i t s e l f as g u i l t y , both by repenting of i t s former non-
achievement of a s p i r i t u a l l i f e and by becoming responsible f o r i t -
s e l f , or answerable f o r i t s e l f , to God, by Whom the se l f i s sustain-
ed i n existence. This ambiguity applies also to the aesthetic. 
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Thus the e thical i s posited by the absolute choice; but i t 
by no means fo l lows from that that the aesthetic i s excluded. 
I n the e thical the personality has found i t s centre i n i t s -
e l f , and absolutely the aesthetic i s excluded, that i s , i t . 
i s excluded as the absolute, but r e l a t i v e l y i t s t i l l remains. 
I n that the personali ty chooses i t s e l f , i t chooses i t s e l f 
e t h i c a l l y and excludes absolutely the aesthetic, but in that 
i t nonetheless chooses i t s e l f , and by choosing i t s e l f does 
not become another being, the aesthetic thus returns i n a l l 
i t s r e l a t i v i t y . (SV3, p.167) 
I t i s on the basis of t h i s act of choice that the way to s e l f -
knowledge i s opened f o r 'he who l i ve s e th i ca l ly has seen himself, 
knows h imse l f , h is consciousness permeates h i s whole concrete s e l f -
hood. ' ( i b i d . , p.238) By choice a man becomes 'transparent' to him-
s e l f , h i s l i f e i s ' t r ans f igu red . ' ( i b i d . , p.234) But i t i s pre-
c ise ly the qua l i ty of a genuine work of a r t that i n i t the form, the 
medium becomes transparent to i t s idea, and that the r e a l , the exter-
nal form i s t ransfigured by the l i g h t of i d e a l i t y . 
The Assessor's pos i t ion consistently puts a l i m i t to the f i e l d of 
aesthetics, but i t does not negate the aesthetic, and indeed allows a 
greater v a l i d i t y to the aesthetic, to a r t , than at f i r s t sight appears. 
For, f i r s t l y , h is pos i t ion i s essential ly the same as that assiam-
ed by Kierkegaard i n the l i t e r a r y reviews, which i s to say that i t 
can be read as a statement of the grounds or pr inciples of genuine 
aesthetic production as much as i t can be read as a purely l i m i t i n g 
account of the aesthetic. 
Secondly, t h i s i s borne out by the Assessor's vocabulary, f o r he 
constantly speaks of the incapacity of the poet and of poetry to grasp 
or to portray the i n t e r i o r i t y of the r e l i g ious . But bearing i n mind 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between the poet and the author which Kierkegaard 
makes (39) t h i s means that we cannot, without q u a l i f i c a t i o n , extend 
the Assessor's negative remarks to a l l aesthetic production. I t 
wo\ild be quite i n keeping wi th th i s l i m i t a t i o n of his vocabulary f o r 
him to allow such works of a r t as r e f l e c t a l i f e - v i e w the qua l i ty of 
communicating the r e l i g ious t ransf igura t ion of r e a l i t y - although 
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although they could no more d i r e c t l y communicate the pure inward-
ness of r e l i g ious i d e a l i t y i n i t s absolute separateness from the 
external than could ' poe t ry ' . 
T h i r d l y , one has to be a t tent ive to the r e l a t i on of the l e t t e r s 
to the book as a whole. They are s p e c i f i c a l l y intended to be read as 
l e t t e r s to the young f r i e n d who. has gone astray by remaining i n aesth-
e t ic categories instead of choosing himself e t h i ca l l y . They treat the 
aesthetic not jus t as the f i e l d of the f i n e ar ts but as an existent-
i a l stance, as a f a i l e d attempt at l i f e . I t would not serve the 
Assessor's purposes i n leading his young fr iend from the inauthentic-
i t y of h i s aestheticism to give too much away concerning the posi t -
ive implicat ions of h is theory f o r aesthetic, i . e . a r t i s t i c product-
ion . The ad hominem nature of the Assessor's arguments should not 
be underrated i f we take seriously the nove l i s t i c form of the work 
as a whole. 
(C) ( i i i ) The Religious Point of View 
The negative moment i n the Assessor's comments about a r t i s how-
ever carr ied forward and developed i n the f i n a l section of the book, 
e n t i t l e d Ultimatum. This consists of a covering l e t t e r from the Ass-
essor to A together with a sermon on the theme The Ed i f i ca t ion i n the 
Thought that over against God we are always i n the Wrong. As The 
Seducer's Diary both sums up and carries to an extreme the posi t ion of 
A, so t h i s sermon carries forward and develops fu r ther the Assessor's 
p o s i t i o n , but i n par t i cu la r i t develops the negative moment. 
Taking as i t s t ex t Luke 19, w . 41-end the sermon dwells on 
Chr i s t ' s prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem, of the jus t and'K-'.;; 
the unjust together. I t asks the l i s t ener not to despair of the pur-
s u i t of righeousness on t h i s account, f o r we are not i n the pos i t -
ion to make demands of God on the merit of our own righteousness, f o r 
- 252 -
i n r e l a t i o n to God we are always i n the wrong. 
The ed i fy ing aspect of t h i s thought i s adduced by analogy with 
human love. I f we love another person and some d iv i s ion arises be-
tween us, we, i f we r e a l l y love , w i l l not seek to blame the other, 
but w i l l prove our love by taking and by wanting to take, the blame 
upon ourselves. I n r e l a t i o n to God 
This wish {] to be i n the wrong J i s a matter of love and thus 
a matter of freedom, and you were i n no way compelled to make 
the admission that you were always i n the wrong. You did not 
become sure that you were i n the wrong by thinking about i t , 
but found cer ta in ty i n t h i s thought by the f a c t that you were 
e d i f i e d by i t . (SV 3, p.320) 
The sermon concludes by asking whether we woiild have i t any other 
way. We must ask ourselves th i s question again and again f o r 
i t i s f i r s t i n the deep inner s t i r r i n g s , f i r s t i n the indes-
cribable motions of the heart , that you are convinced that 
what you have known belongs to you, that no power can take 
i t from you; f o r only the t r u t h which ed i f i es i s t r u t h 
f o r you. ( i b i d . , p.324) 
Real t r u t h i s acquired i n an absolute inwardness f o r which the 
t o t a l i t y of the external , even righteousness and,mrighteousness, 
insofar as they are • external ly manifest, i s i r re levant . The moment 
of g u i l t i n self-choice i s now dominant, f o r th i s inwardness demands 
the recognit ion of the n u l l i t y of the external , of sensuous immediacy, 
without remainder. There i s no question here of the integrat ion of 
the ideal and the r e a l , but the re l ig ious ideal had broken away from 
the anchor-hold i n r e a l i t y which the Assessor sought to give i t . 
I n the Papirer Kierkegaard noted 
the f i r s t diapsalma i s r e a l l y the task of the ent ire work, 
which i s not resolved u n t i l the l a s t words of the sermon. 
An enormous dissonance i s assumed, and then i t says: Ex-
p la in i t . A t o t a l break wi th ac tua l i ty i s assumed, which 
does not have i t s base i n f u t i l i t y but i n mental depress-
ion and i t s predominance over ac tua l i ty . ( iV A 216/5629) 
The opening diapsalma evokes the essence of A's aesthetic a t t i t -
ude, and sums up the understanding of poetry as a sublimation or 
f l i g h t from the deep pain of existence which Kierkegaard had devel-
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oped i n the early Papirer. I t asks 
What i s a poet? An unhappy man, who conceals deep agonies i n 
h is heart , but whose l i p s are so fashioned that when the sigh 
and the scream pour f o r t h , they sound l i k e sweet music. 
(SV 2, p.25) 
I n what way does the sermon resolve th i s s p l i t , th i s discord? 
Not by gently bu i ld ing a bridge back to the r e a l , external world of 
bourgeois duty as the Assessor would, but by making i t absolute. 
The s p l i t which tears the human s p i r i t i s not jus t a s p l i t between 
two aspects of man himself , but the s p l i t i n man i s a r e f l e c t i o n of 
the deeper s p l i t between man and God. What A presents as a problem 
f o r the poet, f o r the uniquely g i f t e d man, the preacher sets as a 
task f o r everyman. 
Whereas poetry seeks-to resolve the dilemma by f l i g h t i n t o , or 
by remaining i n , the h a l f - l i t world of the imagination, by cu t t ing 
out the discordant voices of the real world, the re l ig ious posits a 
s p l i t which poetry cannot resolve. For the way of poetry i s the way 
of contemplation, of the f r e e - f l o a t i n g , harmonious attmement to 
aesthetic i d e a l i t y , but the way of r e l i g i o n i s throiigh the desperate 
struggles of the heart i n which there i s no time f o r contemplation, 
no time f o r res t . Nor can there even be res t i n the achieved attune-
•\ 
ment of the ideal and the rea l such as an a r t basing i t s e l f on the 
pro jec t of the l i f e - v i e w might o f f e r . The re l ig ious ideal i s d i s -
t i n c t from the aesthetic ideal i n both i t s forms. 
With t h i s sermon from a pastor i n r u r a l Jutland we have l e f t the 
l u l l i n g and a l l u r i n g candlel ight of the fan tas t ic magic-theatre of 
the adolescent imagination, and we have passed beyond the cosy and 
comforting f i r e s i d e glow of the Assessor's bourgeois home, with i t s 
'S tor ies of Everyday L i f e ' on the family bookshelf, and we have come 
to the loneliness and barrenness of the Jutland Heath, 'where the eye 
f i n d s no other human soul , and the voice i s raised to i t s f u l l power 
to outdo the violence of the storm.' (SV 5, p.510)' Here there can 
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be no aesthetic d i s t r ac t ion from the open sky and the cold , clear 
l i g h t of ex i s t en t i a l t r u t h . 
And yet i t i s hard to assess the weight to be given to th i s 
sermon i n the context of Either-Or as a whole. I t s pos i t ion , at the 
very end of the book, means that i t i s somehow the culmination, the 
reso lu t ion of the ' idea ' of the book. I s the ' i d e § ' . of Either-Or 
then the r e l i g ious idea i n i t s u t t e r d i f ference from the aesthetic? 
Or do we read the sermon more as the rumble of dis tant thunder on 
the hor izon, such that the rea l centre of the novel i s the dialogue 
between the doyen of the l i t e r a r y coffee-houses and the pater fam-
i l i a s at the head of the family table? From the purely l i t e r a r y 
point of view, purely from an analysis of the book on i t s own meri ts , 
i t i s hard to judge. I t i s t h i s question however which must decide 
whether we are able to read Either-Or as a novel , f o r i f i t s 'idea" 
i s revealed d e f i n i t i v e l y i n the sermon then we must say that i t i s 
an idea which transcends aesthetic form of any kind; i f , on the 
other hand, the idea i s the debate between A and B, then, since B's 
pos i t ion i s compatible wi th the form of nove l i s t i c realism, i t would 
not be impossible to read the whole work as a novel. Or i s i t per-
haps precisely i n t h i s ambiguity that the nerve l i e s , precisely i n 
the debate between the aesthetic and the r e l i g i o u s , r e f l ec ted both 
i n the content and i n the form of the book? 
I f any of Kierkegaard's novels can be read as a novel i t i s t h i s . 
As we tvccn to the other novels we shall f i n d the contrast between the 
aesthetic and the r e l ig ious more s tarkly drawn, drawn i n such a way 
that a purely aesthetic reading i s no longer possible. 
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Chapter Mine; Kierkegaard's Novels (2) 
(A) Repetition 
(A) ( i ) Story and Structure 
We now turn to those novels i n which the tension between the 
r e l i g i o u s l y orientated content and the aesthetic form i s sharpen-
ed, sharpened, we might say to hreaking-point. 
Repetition contains two stories which may be read either as 
complementary to each other or as contrasting with each other. I t 
opens with the pseudonymous author, Constantine Constantius, defining 
the concept of r e p e t i t i o n (dan: Gjentagelse, l i t . a re-taking). 
He compares i t with the greek concept of recollection (dan: erin-
dring, also = memory). Repetition, he says epitomizes the essential 
standpoint of modern philosophy, as recollection epitomized greek 
philosophy. Whereas the greek doctrine of knowledge as recollection 
s i g n i f i e d the essential p r i o r i t y , both i n a temporal and an ontolog-
i c a l sense, of knowledge over the knowing subject, r e p e t i t i o n s i g n i f -
ies the p r i o r i t y of the subject, and i n place of the classical elev-
ation of the past, r e p e t i t i o n i s orientated towards the future. At 
the same time r e p e t i t i o n i s contrasted with hope. 
Hope i s a lovely lass who sli p s out of one's hands; r e c o l l -
ection i s a beautiful old woman, but yet she never serves the 
needs of the f present "J moment; re p e t i t i o n i s a beloved 
wife, one never gets t i r e d of her, for i t i s only the new 
one gets t i r e d of. (SV 5. P.116) 
The key contrast however i s that between re p e t i t i o n and r e c o l l -
ection. Whereas recollection seeks to int e r p r e t r e a l i t y by r e l a t i n g 
i t back to a given i d e a l i t y , r e p e t i t i o n interprets i d e a l i t y by taking 
a given i d e a l i t y and t r y i n g i t out i n existence, giving i t an exist-
e n t i a l form. 
Having made these introductory announcements Constantine t e l l s 
the story of a young man of his acquaintance. Remembering the 
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connection between youth and the 'hidden' personality which has not 
yet discovered i t s s p i r i t u a l i d e n t i t y , i t s freedom, which exists i n 
a world of imaginative shadows, i t i s significant that this young 
man i s said to be 'in that seductive age, when the s p i r i t ' s matur-
ation announces i t s e l f . ' (SV 5, p.H?) This youth, on the verge of 
awakening to his s p i r i t u a l freedom, now f a l l s l i n love. I t soon appe-
ars that h i s psychological make-up i s slanted towards recollection, 
that i s to say he idealizes his experiences, translating them into 
poetry rather than engaging with them i n practical ways. Because of 
t h i s very poetic disposition he i s unable to f i n d happiness with his 
beloved. He loves her, but he cannot express t h i s love to her, he 
can only transform i t into idealized, poetic dreams. Although he 
wants to f i n d a happy relationship he can do so no more than can the 
Seducer, fo r t h i s young man too i s an inhabitant of another world, 
alongside, but outside, our own. 
He realizes that such a relationship can only bring mhappiness 
to the g i r l , that i t w i l l , i f i t runs i t s course, create i n her the 
same unhappy gap between the ideal and the real i n which and by which 
he i s trapped. I t w i l l disrupt the immediate harmony of her feminine 
being. 
Seeking a way out of the situation he comes to Constantine who 
advises him to practise a pious fraud on his beloved, namely, to 
t r i c k her into thinking that he i s un f a i t h f u l to her. In t h i s way 
the a f f a i r could be concluded i n such a manner that the g i r l would be 
able to f i n d comfort i n the thought that she was i n the r i g h t and that 
she had been deceived i n a purely external way. The young man, how-
ever, lacks the nerve to carry t h i s out and i n the end simply runs 
o f f i n secret to Stockholm. 
Coming back from t h i s apparent digression into what appears to 
be j u s t a bad case of r e c o l l e c t i o n , Constantine gives an account of 
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an experiment he himself made to see whether such a thing as a re-
p e t i t i o n might be possible. This experiment consists i n r e v i s i t i n g 
B e r l i n , to f i n d out i f everything w i l l s t i l l be the same, i f he can 
'repeat' his previous enjoyable experiences there. But i t i s a 
disappointment. Nothing, not his lodgings, not the climate, not the 
theatre, i s quite the same. Everything i s , i n some degree, changed -
and not for the better. 
He returns home, convinced that a r e p e t i t i o n i s not possible. 
But now the young man reappears i n the story. Constantine receives 
a series of l e t t e r s from him from his voluntary exile i n Stockholm. 
These l e t t e r s i n fact constitute a s p i r i t u a l diary of great power i n 
which we see the young man's struggle to achieve a repe t i t i o n . 
He i s preoccupied with the figure of Job, i n whose situation he 
sees certain s i m i l a r i t i e s with his own, sJust^as 'Job:rloses -everything 
whichgis.-.dear to him through no f a u l t of his own, so the young man 
feels that he has l o s t everything dear to him, he has l o s t his belov-
ed and he has l o s t his honourable name - solely because of his honour-
able intentions towards the g i r l , because he only wanted what was best 
for her. Just as Job received back double everything which he l o s t , 
so the young man believes that his psychological make-up can be trans-
formed and that he w i l l be able to return and be a genuine lover, be 
a husband to his beloved. But as he awaits t h i s transformation he 
hears that the g i r l has i n fact married someone else. 
However, he, perhaps i r o n i c a l l y , i s prepared to put a good face 
on things, and he proclaims that precisely through t h i s disappoint-
ment of his hopes he has achieved a r e p e t i t i o n , for he i s now free 
from the need to f i n d i n himself the capacity for genuine reciproc-
al relationships, he can go back to the ideal world of poetry, go 
back to being a poet, devoted to the idea. 
Constantine, i n a concluding l e t t e r to the reader, expresses his 
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doubts about the authenticity of t h i s r e p e t i t i o n . '... he gets 
himself again, but as a poet, and the religious "geht zum Grunde", 
i.e. becomes an i n a r t i c u l a t e substratum.' (SV 5, p.193) And yet 
the poetic, according to Constantine, i s a less adequate realization 
of r e p e t i t i o n than the religious would have been. 
Aage Henriksen says that 'Repetition i s the most d i f f i c u l t of 
SK's pseudonymous writings.' ( l ) There are several reasons for the 
peculiar d i f f i c u l t y attached to t h i s text. 
I n the f i r s t place there i s the problem of the significance and 
of the exact construction to be put on the double plot: the story of 
Constantine's f a i l e d r e p e t i t i o n , and the story of the yomg man'g 
poetic r e p e t i t i o n . The r e l a t i o n of Constantine to the young man has 
various pa r a l l e l s i n other kierkegaardian works. In the foreword to 
the Andersen review, and i n the relationship between the Assessor and 
A we see other examples of t h i s twinning of an older, maturer man, 
possessed of r e f l e c t i o n and judgement with a younger, more w i s t f u l , 
more poetic figure. But the relationship here i s d i f f e r e n t from 
that between the Assessor and his young friend. Constantine i s not 
the proud possessor of a l i f e - v i e w i n the technical sense of that 
term, he i s no ethically-minded family man. The relationship i s , 
as Henriksen points out ( 2 ) , more akin to that between A and the 
Seducer i n that the separate r e a l i t y of the two figures i s ultimate-
l y questionable. In his concluding l e t t e r to the reader Constantine 
writes: 
I have introduced myself into the story; but i f dear reader, 
you look closer, you w i l l only see that I am a serviceable 
s p i r i t , and very far from being i n d i f f e r e n t to the young man, 
as he feared. This was a misunderstanding which I permitted 
i n order to lure him out. Every step I have taken has only 
been for the sake of illuminating him; I have continually had 
him i n mente, every word of mine i s either ventriloquism or 
said i n r e l a t i o n to him ... what I say one i s to understand 
obscurely of him, or by what I say one i s to understand him 
better. (,SV 5, p. 192) 
Both i n the main body of the book and i n this l e t t e r to the reader 
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Constantine i s at each moment to be understood as an i l l u s o r y and 
as a real figure. In both he i s a cipher through which we are to 
read the young man. (3) 
I t i s consistent with t h i s interpretation that Kierkegaard, s t i l l 
i n the persona of Constantine Constantius, comments i n the Papirer 
that the t r i p to Berlin was a deliberate parody of the young man's 
problem: whether a r e p e t i t i o n i s possible. Repetition i s precisely 
not a problem involving external r e a l i t i e s such as the t r i p to Berlin 
involved, but i t i s a problem concerning the inner r e a l i t y of the 
ind i v i d u a l . (IV B 117, p.283) The question of r e p e t i t i o n i s prim-
a r i l y the young man's question - not Constantine's. 
Constantine's rol e i s chi e f l y to be \mderstood by reference to 
his knowledge of the categories. He knows what a poet i s , he knows 
what r e p e t i t i o n i s , only he i s not a poet, not a religious man, he 
does not achieve a r e p e t i t i o n . He i s merely the experimenter, as he 
c a l l s himself, who sets up the framework by which these concepts are 
to acquire form before our eyes. He i s not himself r e a l l y a 'char-
acter' i n the book. 
What then of his young man and his repetition? What i s the 
nature of t h i s repetition? Can i t r e a l l y be called a r e p e t i t i o n i n 
the s t r i c t sense? 
These questions are sharpened i f we take into account evidence 
of textual amendment by Kierkegaard at a very l a t e stage i n the 
preparation of the dr a f t of Repetition. (4) The evidence shows 
that i n the o r i g i n a l d r a f t the young man f a i l e d to achieve the rep-
e t i t i o n he was seeking, the t r a n s i t i o n from poet to bridegroom, and, 
i n despair, shot himself. The f i n a l l e t t e r i n which he t e l l s of the 
g i r l ' s engagement and of his return to the 'poetic' standpoint from 
which he had begun was not a part of the o r i g i n a l draft. The reasons 
fo r t h i s change are usually linked to Kierkegaard's discovery that his 
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own former fiancee, Regine 01sen, had become engaged to another. The 
altered ending thus becomes a wry comment on his own situation. Apart 
from the biographical interest which attaches to t h i s change i t i s 
clear that the o r i g i n a l plan would have made the par a l l e l between 
Constantine and the young man far more s t r i k i n g , for we would then 
have tvio stories of f a i l e d r e p e t i t i o n s , each i n the context of a 
foreign journey, the one to B e r l i n , the other to Stockholm, 
How are we to inter p r e t the f i n a l position of the young man i n 
the text as i t stands? He claims to have had a r e p e t i t i o n , to have 
regained his p r i s t i n e i d e n t i t y . Constantine however notes that the 
re l i g i o u s p o s s i b i l i t y , the divine intervention and the Job-like res-
t o r a t i o n , did not occur, and by no means comes to f u l l expression i n 
the return to the poetic. The young man had looked for a repet i t i o n 
which would, externally, mean a return to the beloved, and i n t e r n a l l y , 
mean escape from the abstraction of poetic recollection. What he had 
been looking for was to move from a position such as A's to a posit-
ion such as the Assessor's. He had been t r y i n g to become a husband, 
reconciled to r e a l i t y , with the inward assurance of a life-view..-:But 
he has got neither the g i r l nor the life-view. He i s back where he 
started. 
Emanuel Hirsch believes that the alter a t i o n to the text has 
destroyed the very structure of the book: 
damit hat er sich das, was nach dem ursprUnglichen Plane sein 
schOnsten Dichtwerk geworden ware, unrettbar verdorben. Der 
bei a l l e r Grausigkeit asthetisch wundervolle Gegensatz zwischen 
dem ironisch-schnurrenhaften CC und dem tragisch-leidenschaft-
lichen Dichter, die beide nicht wiederholen kOnnen i s t weg. (5) 
Henriksenahowever believes that the alter a t i o n preserves the 
negativity of the o r i g i n a l ending but by i t s comic focus on the ab-
surd and ridiculous figure which the young man now cuts i t improves 
on the rather conventional melodrama of a suicide. (6) 
I t does seem from our preliminary examination of the yomg man's 
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'repetition' that i t i s quite evidently a f a i l u r e even i n the text 
as i t stands, and that the contrasting p a r a l l e l with Constantine's 
case i s preserved. Whether suicide i s too melodramatic a l i t e r a r y 
ploy f o r Kierkegaard* s purposes i s another question. Certainly 
there i s a tone of personal grievance which obtrudes i t s e l f into the 
present ending which rather disturbs the reading of i t , but thi s i s 
as much a question of execution as i t i s of aim. Whichever ending i s 
preferred the underlying point, the f a i l u r e to achieve r e p e t i t i o n , 
remains. 
What then are we to make of t h i s book? For apart from the 
double-plot and the altered ending the mixture of pure philosophy, 
narrative and other devices makes somewhat bewildering reading. One 
of i t s reviewers complained of 
t h i s motley, confused picture, where the author mixes every-
thing up together without a trace of order or connection, 
where one moment one believes that he i s occupied with un-
v e i l i n g for us the deepest mysteries of existence, but the 
next one sees him entertaining himself and wearying his 
readers with a rambling discourse on the Berlin farce. (7) 
The book does indeed make a f a i r l y chaotic f i r s t impression. 
But we should not be too hasty i n concluding that this i s a l l there 
i s . We should at least look for the reason i n the madness before 
assuming that there i s none. As Constantine says i n the Papirer 
there i s a deliberate ' d i a l e c t i c a l ambiguity' a deliberate 'j e s t -
ing' element i n the book. (iV B 111, p.270) He asserts that he has 
not wanted to present the concept i n abstract t r i a d i c formiilae but 
psychologically and aesthetically I wanted to portray and make 
manifest, i n the greek sense I wanted to l e t the concept come 
into existence i n individual form and i n a certain situation, 
working i t s way through a l l sorts of misunderstandings. 
(IV B 117, p.282) 
I t i s the concept of r e p e t i t i o n i t s e l f which gives the book i t s 
•unity; t h i s i s i t s idea. We shall therefore now turn to the elucid-
ation of t h i s idea and to the question of how far i t can be present-
ed aesthetically. 
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(A) ( i i ) The Concept of Repetition 
The proper meaning of the term r e p e t i t i o n i s spelt out i n the 
book - and i n the important Papirer notes connected with the book -
by reference to a variety of concepts and situations. We shall look 
at i t here with regard to f i v e d i f f e r e n t aspects: i n i t s r e l a t i o n 
to r e c o l l e c t i o n ; i n i t s r e l a t i o n to movement; i n r e l a t i o n to the 
di a l e c t i c of immediacy and r e f l e c t i o n ; as a specif i c a l l y humanistic 
and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c category; i n connection with the figure of Job. 
The Papirer notes referred to amount to f i f t y pages of notes provok-
ed by some passing comments made on Repetition by Heiberg i n an a r t -
i c l e on the astronomical year i n his Urania.Aarbog f o r I844. (s) 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between r e p e t i t i o n and recollection has already been 
touched upon i n general and we shall now see how t h i s contrast i s 
spelt out with regard to the young man's psychological situation. 
Constantine describes a scene from the early days of the young 
man's engagement. 
While he paced up and down across the f l o o r he repeated again 
and a^ain a verse of Poiil M i l l e r ' s : 
Then, to my easy chair, comes a dream from my youth 
A h e a r t f e l t longing comes over me for you 
0 thou sun of women. 
His eye f i l l e d with a tear, he threw himself down on a chair, 
and repeated the verse again and again. This scene made a 
shocking impression on me. Great GodJ thought I , never, i n 
a l l my practice have I come across such a case of melancholy 
(Melancholi) ... He was i n love, profoundly, inwardly i n love, 
that was quite clear, and yet he was capable, straight away, 
on one of the f i r s t days of recollecting his love ... In mak-
ing a s t a r t he had taken such a t e r r i b l e step that he had leapt 
over the whole of l i f e . I f the g i r l dies tomorrow i t w i l l 
cause no essential change, he w i l l again throw himself down, 
his eye w i l l again f i l l with a tear, he w i l l again repeat the 
poet's words. (SV 5 PP- 119-120) 
The poem which the young man recites i s i n fa c t called The Old Lover, 
and i t portrays an older man, looking back on a long-lost love, on a 
precious but vanished youth. The poem i t s e l f i s thus a recollection. 
The point i s that instead of losing himself i n the immediacy of love, 
instead of losing himself i n the beloved the young man internalizes 
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(recollects) the whole relationship into his ideal consciousness, 
where i t i s no longer something present i n time, but something at 
one step removed from time. Kierkegaard had adumbrated th i s scene i n 
the Papirer; 
Dreaming rises to ever higher powers; thus a dream within a 
dream-existence (whereby i t becomes transformed into a kind 
of a c t u a l i t y ) has an i n f i n i t e l y v o l a t i l i z i n g effect. With 
what i n f i n i t e ardour a youth can read the word of P. Mj^ller's 
poem "The Old Lover" ...[the verse cited above f o l l o w s ^ ... 
Here the dream i s i n the second power for the youth; he 
f i r s t of a l l dreams that he i s old i n order to suck i n through 
the funnel of a whole l i f e the most aromatic moment of his 
e a r l i e s t youth. ^^^^ ^ ^^/^^^^ 
This potentiation of the dream-world, the creation of a dream 
within a dream, i s a movement away from r e a l i t y , a retreat into the 
inner sanctvan of the misty scene behind the stage where the Seducer 
i s also at home. I t i s not the g i r l the young man loves, i t i s the 
idea she represents; she i s an ideal love-object, not a real person. 
She i s merely the occasion for his dream of love, and we may r e c a l l 
the comments i n the review of The F i r s t Love on the nothingness of 
the occasion. (9) 
And yet, says Constantine, t h i s condition i s not entirely 
wrong, fo r '...he, who i n his loving has not experienced t h i s pre-
cisely at the beginning, he has never loved. (SV 5, p.120) This 
mood i s a moment i n the development of the natural immediacy of the 
erotic. But, admonishes Constantine, 'there i s needed an ironic 
e l a s t i c i t y i n order to make use of i t . ' ( i b i d . ) That i s to say, 
the ideal must be grasped e t h i c a l l y and related back to r e a l i t y . 
The inwardness of recollection must be turned back towards the real 
world. The dream of love must be l a i d at the feet of the beloved. 
This, however, i s what the young man does not, cannot, do. His 
dream-existence potentiates i t s e l f into a more and more profotind 
alienation from r e a l i t y . I n opposition to t h i s inward movement of 
re c o l l e c t i o n r e p e t i t i o n represents the opposite movement: from the 
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ideal to the r e a l , the a b i l i t y to be i n relationship i n the real 
world. 
Closely connected with t h i s i s the d e f i n i t i o n of re p e t i t i o n i n 
terms of movement. Repetition opens with Constantine modelling his 
projected t r i p to Berlin on the example of Diogenes' proof of move-
ment (against the philosophers of the Eleatic school), a proof which 
consisted i n his simply walking up and down, (SV 5>-p.115) In 
Urania Heiberg had i n fact said that Kierkegaard used the term rep-
e t i t i o n to deal with the concept of movement. Movement however, 
according to Heiberg, belongs i n the realm of nature rather than i n 
the realm of s p i r i t ; Repetition however i s an attempt to deal with a 
s p i r i t u a l phenomenon; therefore the author applies a n a t u r a l i s t i c 
category to a s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y , (10) 
Kierkegaard f o r his part believes that he i s precisely concern-
ed to distinguish between natinre and the realm of s p i r i t u a l , subject-
ive existence. In the Papirer he defends himself by a sharp counter-
attack, c r i t i c i z i n g the hegelian use of the term movement i n logic 
under the term 'mediation,' Not only does he f i n d t h i s usage improp-
er i n l o g i c , but he objects to the extension of the term mediation 
into the realm of freedom, with which he charges the hegelians. He 
has, he says, only used r e p e t i t i o n i n respect of the realm of free-
dom and i t relates to movement only insofar as the realm of freedom, 
of the S p i r i t , presupposes i n general the realm of nature. 
He proceeds to distinguish between spatial and temporal concepts 
of movement. In l o g i c , movement or t r a n s i t i o n does not involve the 
temporal becoming of the concepts or relations concerned. S t r i c t l y 
speaking, i t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e to speak of t r a n s i t i o n , movement or 
becoming i n logic. 
In the sphere of freedom on the other hand p o s s i b i l i t y i s given 
and r e a l i t y issues f o r t h as something transcendent. Therefore 
when A r i s t o t l e already has said that the tran s i t i o n from 
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p o s s i b i l i t y to ac t u a l i t y i s kn/'^e'ts , then he i s not 
ta l k i n g about p o s s i b i l i t y and actuality i n lo g i c , but i n 
freedom, and therefore he r i g h t l y posits movement. 
(IV B 117, p.290) (11) 
Constantine's t r i p to Berlin i s simply a play on the idea of rep-
e t i t i o n . Such a physical, s p a t i a l , movement i s by d e f i n i t i o n incap-
able of representing r e p e t i t i o n i n the proper sense of the movement 
from p o s s i b i l i t y to ac t u a l i t y (= r e a l i t y ) . 
The question: whether a r e p e t i t i o n i s possible? therefore 
means: whether the movement from the projection of ideal possibil-
i t i e s to t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n i s possible, whether freedom i s free to 
f u l f i l i t s projects or i s merely free i n imagination. 
The notion of r e p e t i t i o n i s also developed i n the context of 
the d i a l e c t i c of immediacy and r e f l e c t i o n . I n hegelian logic repet-
i t i o n would be understood, or at any rate understandable, as the 
renewal of immediacy after r e f l e c t i o n , i n the sense i n which Heiberg 
defined the 'concept', the t h i r d part of logic ( a f t e r immediacy and 
re f l e c t i o n ) as 'the regaining of immediacy.' ( l 2 ) The t h i r d stage 
i n a sense repeats the f i r s t . 
I n Repetition t h i s d i a l e c t i c i s focussed on Constantine's r e l -
ations with women. For Constantine, as for Kierkegaard, woman re-
presents immediacy (15)» whereas he himself i s coolly r e f l e c t i v e . 
As his d i a l e c t i c a l counter-pole the young man too i s assimilated 
to the feminine. Rapturously describing the youth's appearance, 
Constantine adds ' I co\ild scarcely stop myself from stealing a 
glance at him, almost as i f I was enamoured of him; for such a 
youth i s almost as seductive as a young g i r l . ' (SV 5> P«119) 
However, the young g i r l i t i s who above a l l represents the 
charm of the immediate. Constantine t e l l s of three encounters with 
such representatives of feminine immediacy. 
The f i r s t concerns a g i r l who asks Constantine, taking a coach-
t r i p i n t o the country, f o r a l i f t back into Copenhagen. ^  He describes 
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her 'modest and yet t r u l y womanly dig n i f i e d manner' (SV 5, p.I30) 
which restrains him from abusing the situation. He contrasts such 
a g i r l with the coquette, the g i r l who has been s p o i l t by a l i t t l e 
b i t of r e f l e c t i o n , who does not maintain her immediacy but craves 
the 'interesting'. But 'a g i r l who does not crave the interesting 
believes i n r e p e t i t i o n . ' (ib ' i a , , ) : . That i s , she allows her essential 
idea, feminine immediacy, to express i t s e l f i n i t s corresponding 
form i n existence, Constantine, of coiarse, as r e f l e c t i o n incarnate, 
cannot participate i n her immediacy except as an observer. She i s 
thus 'a pleasant recollection.' ( i b i d . ) 
The other two encounters axe both described i n the context of 
the interlude on farce. Constantine describes how, on his f i r s t 
t r i p to B e r l i n , he had regularly seen a certain yoxmg g i r l at the 
theatre. 
She was not wrapped i n ssble or marten, but wrapped i n a large 
st o l e , and out of i t s folds her humble head was bowed, l i k e 
the topmost b e l l of the l i l y - o f - t h e - v a l l e y i s bowed above the 
great leaves' wrapping ... She did not suspect that she was 
seen, s t i l l less that my eye was watching over her; for i t 
would have been a sin against her, and the worse for me; be-
cause there i s an innocence, an unconsciousness, which even 
the purest thought can disrupt. ( i b i d . , pp.I46-7) 
The botanical analogy i s also s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r the realm of 
vegetable l i f e i s also taken by Kierkegaard to represent immediacy, 
the organic, hidden substratum of s p i r i t u a l l i f e . (14) 
Gonstantine i s bringing into play the contrast between his re-
f l e c t i o n and her immediacy. His assertion that the intrusion of 
t h i s r e f l e c t i o n into her immediacy would simply disrupt her exist-
ence r e f l e c t s his own pessimism concerning the p o s s i b i l i t y of a re-
p e t i t i o n : r e f l e c t i o n cannot win through to immediacy again, i t 
must keep i t s distance. Appropriately enough on his second t r i p to 
B e r l i n , i n search of r e p e t i t i o n , he goes to the theatre - but he 
cannot see her. 
Into t h i s account of the g i r l i n the theatre Constantine inserts 
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a revelatory account of one of his voyeuristic habits. From time to 
time, he t e l l s us, he takes a t r i p out from Copenhagen i n order to 
spy on a particular yoimg country-girl. 
So when my soul i s sleepless, and the sight of my bed makes me 
'imore anxious than the sight of an instrument of torture, more 
than a sick person i n the face of the operating-table, then I 
drive the whole night. Early i n the morning I l i e i n the con-
cealment of the thicket. Then when l i f e begins to s t i r , when 
the sun opens i t s eyes ...Then the young g i r l comes out, then 
she walks wonderingly about (who wonders most, the g i r l or the 
t r e e s ] ) , then she squats down and plucks f r u i t from the bushes, 
then she skips l i g h t l y about, then she stands quietly thinking. 
Does not there l i e a marvellous eloquence i n a l l t h i s ! Then 
my soul at l a s t finds rest. Happy g i r i : (SV 5, p.147) 
Constantine's r e f l e c t i v e consciousness i s one-sided. He needs 
the stimiilus, the f e r t i l i z i n g potency of such immediacy. The des-
c r i p t i o n of the country g i r l i s accompanied by a superbly l y r i c a l 
evocation of the morning-time which underlines the point. Reflection 
lacks being, i t requires rejuvenation, the repeated encounter with 
immediacy, such as the g i r l s and the young man provide - and yet i t 
i s an encounter which i s never consummated, re p e t i t i o n i s not achieved. 
I t i s the same function of restoring immediacy which he extols i n 
farce. Theatre i n general i s constantly equated with youth, with the 
budding of the youthful imagination, and farce i n particular i s the 
most immediate form of t h e a t r i c a l a r t , ( l 5 ) 
Yes, although t h i s a r t i s perhaps not s u f f i c i e n t l y serious 
for the i n d i v i d u a l , he can take pleasure i n turning back to 
t h i s f i r s t condition and absorbing himself i n i t s mood ,,, 
while therefore neither tragedy nor comedy w i l l please him, 
precisely because of t h e i r perfection, he turns to farce, 
Csy 5'» p. 158) 
Tragedy and comedy are each too r e f l e c t i v e to allow the r e l -
ease from r e f l e c t i o n and the r e p e t i t i o n of immediacy which i s re-
quired. Yet once again Constantine f a i l s to achieve r e p e t i t i o n , for 
on the second t r i p to Berlin not even the farce can please him. 
I f , by his own admission, Constantine i s to be regarded as a 
'serviceable s p i r i t ' whose sole function i s to throw l i g h t on the 
yovng man, we can apply t h i s model of r e f l e c t i o n too to the young 
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man's situation. How then does the yearning f o r a return to immed-
iacy feature i n the yomg man's story? 
The issue clearly relates to his r e l a t i o n to the young g i r l . 
Although the personality of the young man himself i s veiled i n the 
immediacy of youth, beneath t h i s v e i l he wears the masculine deter-
minations of i d e a l i t y and of S p i r i t , Because S p i r i t i s not yet man-
ifested i n i t s fulness i n him i t i s present only i n the dreaming 
i d e a l i t y of recollection. Precisely by thi s r ecollection, which i s 
a form of r e f l e c t i o n , a form of dualism, he realizes that he threat-
ens to disrupt the g i r l ' s immediacy, by drawing her into a r e l a t i o n -
ship which i s solely i d e a l , instead of a relationship which accomp-
lishes the balanced integration of immediacy and r e f l e c t i o n proper 
to the man-woman relationship. 
His attempt to lay hold of his rec o l l e c t i o n , his i d e a l i t y , and 
rel a t e i t back to r e a l i t y , his attempt to make himself serviceable 
as a husband and to enter into an affirmative r e l a t i o n to the g i r l ' s 
immediacy, i s i n fact one aspect of the r e p e t i t i o n which he attempts 
to make. 
To disturb the g i r l ' s immediacy without offering a basis on 
which that immediacy can be re-established i s i n his eyes a criminal 
act. That i s the root of the dimension of g u i l t i n his re l a t i o n to 
her. He must, having started, see the d i a l e c t i c a l process through to 
i t s conclusion. I n less abstract terms, having f a l l e n i n love, he 
i s obliged to see that love through to i t s f u l f i l m e n t i n marriage; 
the romantic attachment must be completed by an act of w i l l . 
The polemic against Heiberg, which Kierkegaard planned i n the 
Papirer, also defined the issue of re p e t i t i o n as an issue concern-
ing the i n d i v i d u a l , concerning individual freedom. This builds on 
the mderstanding that i t i s not, pace Heiberg, a n a t u r a l i s t i c but 
an essentially hvimanistic category. He t e l l s Heiberg: 
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Your observations are always on the grand scale, directed 
either to the heavens or to world-history. Let the i n d i v i d -
ual have learnt from you how to observe the heavens, credit 
where c r e d i t i s due, but as well as the heavens and world-
h i s t o r y , there i s another history which i s called individual 
history .., What significance does r e p e t i t i o n acquire i n 
th i s realm of the S p i r i t , for every individual i s nonethe-
less also as such determined as S p i r i t and his S p i r i t has 
a history. (iV B 111, pp. 262f.) 
What concerns him i s r e p e t i t i o n as a question of individual freedom. 
In the individual r e p e t i t i o n shows i t s e l f as a task for free-
dom where the question i s how he must save his personality 
from being dissipated and pawned to circumstances .,. thus the 
problem shows i t s e l f , not as a problem for the b r i l l i a n t i n -
dolence of contemplation but f o r the concerned passion of 
freedom. (IV B 117, p.296) 
This i s the significance of Constantine's d e f i n i t i o n of his task as 
psychological (SV 5» P.113): i t i s a matter of individual, subject-
ive S p i r i t . I t i s not the rec o n c i l i a t i o n of i d e a l i t y and r e a l i t y i n 
nature or history that matters, but how, or how f a r , t h i s can be 
achieved i n an individual l i f e . 
This brings us to the r e l i g i o u s dimension of the young man's 
problem. He i s displayed to us as an example of a poet. But, acc-
ording to Constantine, 'a poet's l i f e begins i n a c o n f l i c t with the 
t o t a l i t y of existence, what matters i s to f i n d rest or vindication,' 
( i b i d . , p.192) 
How does the poet seek t h i s r econciliation with existence? As 
we would expect he seeks i t i n the realm of the imagination 'his own 
consciousness raised to a higher power i s for him repe t i t i o n . ' ( i b i d . ) 
The poetic 'repetition* i s self-deliverance into the c o n f l i c t - f r e e 
realm of phantasy. Thus the yomg man of the story considers that he 
has achieved a r e p e t i t i o n by returning to his primal poetic condition, 
freed from the claims of r e a l i t y by the g i r l ' s engagement to another. 
He returns to his pact with the idea. 
But as we have seen t h i s position i s i n f a c t a mystification of 
the concept of r e p e t i t i o n . His situ a t i o n pointed towards a more pro-
found resolution. Constantine says that ' i f he had had a more profomd-
l y r e l i g i o u s backgroimd, then he would not have become a poet.' 
( i b i d . , p.193) 
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The eminent sense; of r e p e t i t i o n i s the translation of i d e a l i t y into 
r e a l i t y by a free act. The young man's 'being i s s p l i t , and the 
question i s thus not concerning the r e p e t i t i o n of anything external 
but concerning the r e p e t i t i o n of his freedom,* (IV B 11?, p,284) 
This i s -ultimately a reli g i o u s question, for r e p e t i t i o n i s 'trans-
cendent , a reli g i o u s movement, by vir t u e of the absurd, when one 
has come to the boundary of the wonderful, eternity i s the true 
r e p e t i t i o n . ' (IV B 11?, p.285) 
Repetition i s now seen to be the absolute affirmation of the 
sel f i n i t s freedom. I t i s akin to the concept of self-choice as 
that had been promulgated by the Assessor, but a greater emphasis 
i s l a i d on the negative dimension, on the g u i l t of the self which 
chooses i t s e l f , on the absurdity of the choice. 
The young man i s g u i l t y , f i r s t l y i n respect of his beloved, for 
through his relationship with her he has involved another person i n 
the s p l i t which divides his own personality, but also i n respect of 
God, f o r his f a i l i i r e to achieve the integration of the self i s a 
f a i l u r e to answer the God-given requirement which has been placed 
before him. With regard to the g i r l he has become g u i l t y through his 
own action - or rather through his f a i l u r e to act - but his g u i l t 
before god i s something more profound, i t i s revealed i n his dis-
covery of the nothingness of the world, of the nothingness which 
l i e s coiled at the heart of his own existence. 
My l i f e has been brought to the extreme l i m i t ; I am nauseated 
by existence, i t i s tasteless, without s a l t , without meaning. 
I f I were hungrier than Pierrot I would not care to eat the 
explanation people offer. One sticks one's finger into the 
earth to smell what land one i s i n , I stick my finger into 
existence - i t smells of nothing. 
(SV 5, P.171) 
His situation i s not that of the aesthete A who scorns the com-
promise with the world involved i n the Assessor's life-view. The 
young man seeks the synthesis of ideal and real embodied i n a l i f e -
view - but he cannot bring i t about. He cannot do the good he desires. 
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I t i s to th i s situation that the illumination of rep e t i t i o n 
by reference to the figure of Job i s addressed. Job, l i k e the young 
man, finds himself i n the situation of a g u i l t y man, and yet he has 
committed no intentional transgression. Job simply represents 'man's 
side i n the great debate between God and man. • (SV 5, p.179) 
Job cannot resolve his predicament himself. I t takes the thun-
derstorm of divine intervention to bring about a resolution. And i t 
i s i n t h i s encounter with the divine that his predicament i s resolved. 
Was Job proved wrong? YesJ eternally, for he can go to no 
higher court than that by which he was judged. Was Job 
proved right? Yes] eternally, because he was proved wrong 
before God. ( i b i d . , p.180) 
Job leams the lesson taught by the parson from Jutland: that 
before God we are i n the wrong, that himan existence i n i t s t o t a l i t y 
i s unable to answer the requirements of divine j u s t i c e , the external 
i s completely i n d i f f e r e n t . 
Here we have another sense of r e p e t i t i o n . I t i s not the move-
ment from the ideal to the r e a l , from recollection to future-direct-
ed action, from r e f l e c t i o n back to immediacy. I t i s the affirmation 
of the self i n i t s i n a b i l i t y to bring such a movement about, the 
affirmation of the self i n i t s bondage, i n i t s lack of freedom. I t 
i s the discovery that the r e a l i t y of the self i s located i n the com-
plete contradiction between i t s l i f e i n the world and i t s transcend-
ent destiny as a free creature. I t i s 'metaphysics' interest and 
also the interest on which metaphysics i s wrecked.' (IV B 120, p.508) 
The \anity of ideal and real which metaphysics presents as an accomp-
lished f a c t i s what r e p e t i t i o n seeks: i t s discovery of the impossib-
i l i t y of achieving t h i s synthesis negates the findings of metaphysics. 
What metaphysics says and what the individual experiences are two 
quite d i f f e r e n t things. 
This f i n a l sense of r e p e t i t i o n points us towards the encoionter 
with God i n the void where the world i n i t s t o t a l i t y has become a 
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matter of indifference, and where the self cannot establish i t s e l f 
as the basis of i t s own project, to be a free being. This means that 
the narrow way which leads to r e p e t i t i o n i s a way on which external 
form i s completely r e l a t i v i z e d , a way on which there i s an utt e r 
separation of idea and form, corresponding to the incapability of the 
sel f to be i t s e l f . This separation of idea and form i s however a 
complete inversion of the aesthetic idea of the correspondence of 
idea and form. The idea of r e p e t i t i o n cannot therefore i n i t s f u l -
ness be dealt with i n any aesthetic form, and we must conclude that 
Repetition could not, on Kierkegaard's own aesthetic principles, be 
read as a novel: i t s r e l i g i o u s concern or interest points beyond 
the disinterested fantasies of romanticism and beyond the harmonies 
of the li f e - v i e w . 
What then i s i t ? Kierkegaard himself c a l l s i t an attempt to 
bring out a concept 'in the greek sense' (iV B 117, p.282), and i t 
i s rather as a work of philosophy which employs the tools of imagin-
ation and l i t e r a r y c r a f t that i t i s to be read, than as a novel. 
Henriksen s p e c i f i c a l l y relates i t to Plato's Protaigoras on account 
of the lack of a f i r m conclusion ( l 6 ) , and whether th i s particular 
correlation i s accepted the general analogy with the platonic dia-
logue should be borne i n mind. 
As a work of philosophy i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with the 
elucidation of concepts and of the f i e l d s to which and within which 
they may be applied. The particular f r o n t i e r which Kierkegaard i s 
here setting out to discover i s the absolute f r o n t i e r between the 
aesthetic and the r e l i g i o u s , and i t s argument suggests that the neg-
ation of the external world which the young man experiences, creates 
a barrier beyond which a r t cannot penetrate, since a r t , even i n i t s 
most ideal development i s related to the forms of the real world. 
Even when we speak of the world of ar t as a Schattenspiel, a world 
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of shadows, the real world i s always obliquely s i g n i f i e d i n the 
shadow. The wilderness to which the young man comes i s however a 
place without l i g h t or shade, and consequently without shadows, for 
before God everything i s eternally the' same, and i n Him, as i t i s 
said i n one of Kierkegaard's favourite texts, i s 'no shadow of change.' 
(17) 
The place of t h i s encounter with God i n which the aesthetic has 
no place i s indicated by such words as anxiety, g u i l t , nothingness. 
I t i s to a further exploration of t h i s f r o n t i e r and of the s i g n i f i c -
ance of these terms that the 'novel' Guilty? - Not-Guilty? invites us. 
(B) Guilty? - Not-Guilty? 
(B) ( i ) I t s Place i n Stages on Life's Way 
Just as The Seducer's Diary which can be treated as a novel i n 
i t s own r i g h t i s i n fact part of a larger whole, so Guilty?- Not-
Guilty? i s Pa.rt of the larger work Stages on Life's Way. Before 
turning to an examination of Guilty? - Not-Guilty? i n i t s own r i g h t 
i t i s therefore proposed that we look f i r s t at i t s r e l a t i o n to the 
rest of the Stages. 
The Papirer make i t clear that Stages i s a composite of what 
were o r i g i n a l l y conceived of as two separate works. Wrong and Right 
and Guilty? - Not-Guilty? (18) Wrong and Right i t s e l f f a l l s into 
two parts, In Vino Veritas and a treatise on marriage by Assessor 
Wilhelm. 
In Vino Veritas i s an account of a banquet at which the p a r t i c i p -
ants deliver speeches on the themes of 'woman' and 'love'. Several 
of these participants are already familiar to us - Constantine Con-
stantius, Victor Eremita and Johannes the Seducer. The theme of the 
banquet i s taken up i n the Assessor's l e t t e r . Both the continuity of 
theme and the continuity i n the dramatis personae suggest that we are 
dealing with a 'repetition' of Either-Or - only t h i s time there i s no 
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Ultimatum. That i s l e f t for Guilty? - Not-Guilty? 
There are however several points of d i s t i n c t i o n between Either-
Or and Wrong and Right. I n the l a t t e r the exposition of the dialect-
ic of the aesthetic and ethical ideas has been stripped of the mini-
mal action lat e n t i n the construction of Either-Or. Although a cert-
ain 'epic' element survives i n the narration of the Banquet, and i n 
the account of the 'discovery' of the Assessor and his manuscript 
whichr-:se,rves-to l i n k the two sections, t h i s element i s weaker, i n the 
present writer's judgement, than the comparable elements i n Either-
Or. S i g i i l a r l y , although Kierkegaard's persons are almost invariably 
transparent to the ideas which they represent, rather than impress-
ing us as 'real' people, the ideas dominate the persons to a great-
er degree here than they do i n Either-Or 
One sign of t h i s s h i f t i s the nature of the Assessor's contrib-
ution. I n Either-Or t h i s took an epistolary form, addressed i n the 
second-person to the young f r i e n d , drawing on and revealing to us 
something of the history of th e i r acquaintance. Although the l e t t e r s 
were concerned with ideas the ideas appeared very much as ideas chos-
en by and held by the characters d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y represented. 
Here, however, the Assessor's observations take the form of a gener-
al , impersonal treatise. 
The r e a l world as the milieu i n which the ideal dialogue takes 
place has here, i n Wrong and Right, been put at a distance. I t i s 
noteworthy that I n Vino Veritas i s subtit l e d 'A Recollection.' That 
the double-meaning of memory and internalization i s very much to the 
fore i s indicated i n the foreword attached to the account of the ban-
quet. Indeed t h i s foreword i t s e l f i s called a 'Forerindring', a 
common enough term i n Danish for preface or foreword, but not usual 
i n Kierkegaard's usage. By using t h i s term he gives us a further 
echo of recolle c t i o n (erindxing). The theme of the foreword i s 
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i t s e l f r ecollection i n i t s d i s t i n c t i o n from memory (hukommelse). 
Recollection i s said to be the consciousness of the i d e a l i t y of 
what i s remembered, memory the consciousness of i t s external form. 
Recollection i s i n t h i s sense the agency by which existence i s gath-
ered in t o an ideal unity. (SV 7, p.16) I t does th i s by raising the 
epistemological subject out of the f l u x of immediacy and establish-
ing a distance between subject and object. I t i s concerned with 
essence rather than appearance. I t i s r e f l e c t i v e whereas memory i s 
immediate. I n accordance with t h i s characterization the narrator of 
the .banquet admits that he cannot 'remember' either the exact date or 
the year of the banquet, ( i b i d . p . 2 4 ) 
This atmosphere of recollection extends however not only through-
out the banquet i t s e l f but also permeates the Assessor's manuscript. 
Thus although no new element i s introduced into the debate between 
the aesthetic and ethical attitudes to love and marriage, the whole 
argument i s transposed into the dimension of ideal recollection. This 
s h i f t i n g of the scenery into the realm of inwardnesBrpreparesithev/way 
for the radical confrontation of the aesthetic and the religious as 
two modes of inward i d e a l i t y . 
(B) ( i i ) The Diary 
The text of Guilty? - Not-Guilty?" i s also divided into two 
parts. The f i r s t part consists of a long, rather peculiar diary 
by a nameless i n d i v i d u a l , the second part a commentary on the diary 
by Frater Tacitumus, the Quiet Brother, who i s responsible for f i n d -
ing and publishing the diary. 
The diary recomts the story of an unhapjjy love-affair which 
contains echoes of Repetition. There are also differences. The 
male protagonist i s no naively poetic youth, and he needs no 
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Constantine to advise him, for he himself has a mind as devious as 
a John l e Carre pl o t . He i s the young man of Repetition and Gonstant-
ine Constantius r o l l e d into one. As i n Repetition the story c\ilmin-
ated i n a c r i s i s of g u i l t , but there i s no suggestion here of a re-
p e t i t i o n , not even the iro n i c r e p e t i t i o n of a return to the poetic 
consciousness. The story i s l e f t at the point of impasse and we 
see no way out for the unhappy lover. 
The Quiet Brother's l e t t e r to the reader does however indicate 
the dir e c t i o n i n which a way out might l i e . Although this l e t t e r 
has been regarded as a 'repetition' or a recollection of Fear and 
Trembling, i n the same way that Wrong and Right i s a repet i t i o n or 
reco l l e c t i o n of Either-Or, (19) i t might be more plausible to see 
the whole of Guilty? - Not^Guilty? as a re p e t i t i o n of Repetition, 
since the formal structure of the r e l a t i o n of Constajitine to the 
young man i s paralleled i n the r e l a t i o n of the Quiet Brother to the 
d i a r i s t . (20) As we shall see the question or idea on which the 
novel as a whole turns i s also substantially the same as the idea 
of Repetition, although i t i s presented on a much larger scale, with 
a greater degree of inwardness. 
The Quiet Brother's preamble, i n which he explains how he came 
across the manuscript of the diary when boating on the overgrown 
S^borg lake, sets the scene i n the mediiim of recollection i n i t s 
double sense of memory and inte r n a l i z a t i o n . He describes the region 
of the lake as evoking a sense of the past (SV 8, p. I I ) , and l a t e r 
he t e l l s us that he considers the most l i k e l y date for the diary to 
have been 1751. ( i b i d . , p.14) As he describes how he fished the 
casket containing the manuscript up from the depths of the lake he 
t e l l s us also that he discovered i t to be locked on the inside. 
( i b i d . , pp.12-13) 
These d e t a i l s , and the atmosphere of the scene as a whole convey the 
sense of pastness and of inwardness which belong to recollection -
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but the d i a r i s t ' s problem, l i k e that of the young man i n Repetition 
w i l l be how to escape from t h i s realm of inner i d e a l i t y . 
We shall look f i r s t at the d i a r i s t ' s predicament as i t i s pre-
sented i n the diary i t s e l f , and then turn to the Q,uiet Brother's 
analysis of i t i n his l e t t e r to the reader. 
The extraordinary structure of t h i s diary was adumbrated i n the 
preceding chapter (21), where i t was shown to contain three types of 
entry: the morning entries, which describe the story of the love-
a f f a i r up to the breaking of the engagement; the midnight entries, 
which t e l l of the events and psychological sufferings consequent upon 
the breaking of the engagement; the six 'insets' which i n various 
ways evoke the underlying atmosphere of g u i l t . 
The fact that the morning and midnight entries are interspersed 
makes i t very d i f f i c u l t to get a clear picture of the story which the 
diary t e l l s . What follows i s an attempt to extrapolate t h i s story 
element, which w i l l then serve as a background against which to see 
i t s conceptual structure. Following the Quiet Brother we shall c a l l 
the d i a r i s t Quidam, a certain one. 
On January '^rd of an unspecified year Quidam becomes certain of 
his love f o r the g i r l . He i s not sure whether his melancholy dispos-
i t i o n suits him f o r marriage, although he i s s k i l l e d i n concealing 
t h i s disposition beneath a sociable exterior. Either he w i l l marry 
her or he w i l l never marry. After continuing t h i s inner debate for 
some days he screws his courage to the sticking-point and, on January 
11th, he proposes. The proposal i s accepted. But disaster strikes. 
He soon discovers that there i s a gulf fixed between them. They l i v e 
on quite d i f f e r e n t levels and cannot begin to understand each other. 
The shadows of a re l i g i o u s c r i s i s begin to gather over his head, 
a c r i s i s of which she, i n her b l i t h e immediacy, has no conception. 
Although she had previously seen him as a scoffer, someone who pours 
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contempt on everything and everyone, she now discovers a d i f f e r e n t 
side of his personality. She sees his essential humility, but, i n -
stead of understanding t h i s correctly as humility before God, she 
sees i t i n r e l a t i o n to herself - that he who scoffs at the whole 
world i s humble to her. So she becomes proud of herself at:having 
conquered t h i s wild s p i r i t . 
His fundamental conception of marriage demands that the part-
ners meet as equals, before God. Only so can t h e i r relationship be 
trxily reciprocal. Their relationship, however, see-saws to and f r o , 
with now the one andnnow the other assuming dominance. She says she 
only accepted him out of p i t y - the quarrel and he suggests breaking 
i t o f f ; he i s s l i g h t l y injured at his fencing practice - she rushes 
to the rescue and they are reconciled; she kneels down humbling her-
self before him - he i s offended and the reconciliation breaks down; 
he writes to her to break the engagement - she plays on his religious 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s and persuades him to defer; she i s w i l l i n g to be a 
slave as long as she has him - but he can see that her suffering i s 
not essentially s p i r i t u a l . F i n a l l y , on July 7th, he records that he 
has terminated the engagement. 
The following January he resumes the diary and we learn of the 
events which follow the ending of the engagement. 
She has become physically i l l - perhaps she has r e a l l y gone into 
a decline and i s r e a l l y dying? Is he then her murderer? But though 
she suffers physically he suffers too, torttired by these questions. 
How can he f i n d out more about her condition? I s his melancholy i n -
capacity f o r marriage r e a l l y religious - or i s i t a demonic obsession 
he should do something about? 
He sees her i n the street and observes her pallor. In company, 
however, he overhears that she i s i n good health. He sees her again. 
I t soon becomes evident to him that she, knowing his habits, i s con-
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t r i v i n g these meetings. He must repel her. So, by using the bush-
telegraph of social gossip, he communicates to her a picture of him-
s e l f as r e a l l y a depraved person who s t i l l has a certain sympathy 
for her. He thinks that t h i s w i l l put her o f f him altogether. The 
regular street-encounter does not occur - she has heard the gossip. 
Now he sitarts to plague himself with the thought that she might 
go o f f and bury herself i n r u r a l solitude and become (most dreadfvill) 
- a governess. As i f to confirm his suspicion he learns that her 
father has hired a carriage to drive f i f t y miles into the country -
but i t turns out only to have been a business t r i p after a l l . But 
what i f she were to become insane? commit suicide? 
They meet i n church. She nods to him. In his eyes th i s shows 
th e i r u t t e r incompatibility and destroys his wish that despite every-
thing they might somehow be reunited. This encounter i s on A p r i l 14th. 
From t h i s time t i l l the conclusion of the diary i n July less and less 
'happens'. 
She now appears to be quite well. He sees her about - with 
another man, chatting merrily to a friend. She i s over i t . He for his 
part however, sinks further and further into an abyss of meaningless-
ness, of nothingness. As he brings the diary to an end he writes, 
' I t contains nothing, but i f , as Cicero says, the easiest l e t t e r i s 
one which i s concerned with nothing, i t i s sometimes the hardest l i f e 
which i s concerned with nothing.' (SV 8, p.198) 
Such i s the action of the diary. I t i s indeed very l i t t l e when 
set against i t s great bulk. But as we might expect the real subject-
matter i s concealed below the narrative surface of the text. Indeed, 
the odd arrangement of the diary contributes to disrupting the narrat-
ive cohesion, and so to the revelation of the void over which Quidam 
walks on his s o l i t a r y path through l i f e . 
The depiction of the collapse of his consciousness into t h i s 
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void i s the r e a l , inner action of the diary. Thus the greater the 
extent to which Quidam i s submerged i n the void, the less the extern-
a l action enlivens the diary and the more the text assumes a mono-
tonous and obsessive quality. I t says more and more about less and 
less. Quidam's situation i s 'nothingness'. This i s what the diary i s 
about. 
The theme of nothingness i s introduced early i n the story of the 
engagement. Quidam writes that 'Lovers should have nothing coming be-
tween them. AlasJ AlasJ We have been together too short a time to 
have anything between us - we have nothing between us ...' (SV 8 p. 57) 
There i s no particizlar thing which divides them, there i s only 
his personality, and even here there i s no specific faiolt, no g u i l t y 
secret which holds him back, only his dispositional melancholy. 
At f i r s t , when Quidam undertakes the engagement, he treats the 
nothing as nothing, he disregards i t , considers himself i t s master. 
This i s his pride. But i n fact i t proves i t s e l f his master and hum-
bles his pride. I t becomes the t o t a l environment of his existence: 
There i s nothing new under the svn, says Solomon. Well, that 
may be so, but i t i s worse when nothing at a l l happens ... I 
am s t i l l continually about the exposition of t h i s nothing, and 
the scene i s unalterably the same. ( i b i d . , p.154) 
This consciousness of impingeing nothingness which he c a l l s his 
melancholy i s closely connected with his religiousness, for t h i s does 
not consist i n adherence to any set of tenets or practices, nor i s 
i t the r e s u l t of some positive experience of a religious nat\:ire, for 
his experience of eternity i s such that he can only figure i t as a 
void, as the annihilation of the external world. 
How i s eternity portrayed? As the wide horizon, where one sees 
nothing. That i s how i t i s portrayed i n the picture of a grave: 
the bereaved s i t s i n the foreground and says 'he departed hence, 
into the beyond.' But i n the wide horizon I see nothing at a l l . 
( i b i d . , p.192) 
An example of how he uses the 'insets' to amplify the account 
given by the diary may be given i n t h i s connection. I t i s the entry 
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for June 5 th , midnight, e n t i t l e d Nebuchadnezzar. Nebuchadnezzar's 
humiliation by the unseen, unknown power of God parallels Quidam's 
experience of humiliation by the power which he can only conceive 
of as nothingness, which has no objective place i n the world. The 
inset i s a deliberate pastiche of B i b l i c a l style. 
38. For my days are soon t o l d , and my reign i s gone 
l i k e a watch i n the night, and I do not know 
whither I am bound. 
39. Whether I shall come to the unseen place i n the 
distance where dwells the Mighty One, that I may 
f i n d grace before His eyes; 
40. Whether i t i s He who takes the breath of l i f e from 
me, so that I become as a cast-off garment, l i k e 
my predecessors, that He might f i n d pleasure i n me. 
(SV 8, p. 168) 
Like Nebuchadnezzar, Quidam i s journeying into an unknown land, 
int o an empty horizon, but whereas Nebuchadnezzar's confession pre-
sents t h i s mythologically, as a journey i n an almost external sense, 
Quidam's journey i s a journey w i t h i n , a journey to himself. 
And when the eye has gazed after nothing for a long time i t 
sees at l a s t i t s e l f or i t s own seeing: thus the emptiness 
around me again forces my thoughts back into myself. 
( i b i d . , p. 163) 
I t must, be stressed that Quidam has no direct encounter with God. 
He i s brought only to the consciousness of his own n u l l i t y over 
against E t e r n i t y , over against God, i n the experience of his i n a b i l i t y 
to shape and dire c t his own l i f e i n what concerns him most deeply. I t 
i s the moment of Job crushed by the voice of divine thimder, not the 
moment of Job receiving a l l things double. I t i s not the knowledge 
of God but the fear of God which Quidam acq\iires. 
His melancholy i s the r i s i n g damp of nothingness which permeat-
es the whole realm of f i n i t e concern; but where does th i s melancholy 
come from, what i s i t s source? The answer Quidam gives i s that i t 
i s located i n the imagination (inbildningskraft) and nourished by 
p o s s i b i l i t y , ( i b i d . , p. 193) 
A ceaseless preoccupation with p o s s i b i l i t y i s indeed one of 
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Quidam's basic t r a i t s . He dissects every small event, every b r i e f 
encounter, testing every possible interpretation which might be ap-
pli e d to i t . I t i s precisely by means of t h i s that the rather t h i n 
s t o r y - l i n e i s spun out to such great lengths. Thus we see him tor-
t u r i n g himself with every possible consequence which might b e f a l l 
his former fiance'e as a r e s u l t of his conduct; simil a r l y he consid-
ers every possible interpretation of his own position. I n particular 
he racks himself with the question of how far he i s g u i l t y i n r e l a t -
ion to her. The c e n t r a l i t y of t h i s question i s , of course, indicated 
i n the t i t l e i t s e l f . 
A comment on t h i s preoccupation with p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s provided by 
the inset e n t i t l e d A P o s s i b i l i t y . I t t e l l s the story of a shy book-
keeper who i s led astray by some o f f i c e friends, who get him drunk 
and take him to a brothel. He becomes obsessed with the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that some c h i l d somewhere whom he might not know owes i t s l i f e to him. 
This p o s s i b i l i t y develops into an 'idee f i x e ' and he becomes insane. 
Only i n death does t h i s preoccupation end, only when 'he had to tread 
the dreadful bridge of Eternity i n earnest,'(SV 8, p . 10 l ) f o r 
'Eternity takes p o s s i b i l i t y away.' ( i b i d . , p.195) 
Although p o s s i b i l i t y can dissolve any and every f i n i t e situation 
into an i n f i n i t y of p o s s i b i l i t i e s i t cannot i t s e l f resolve the d i l -
emmas which i t poses. Every p o s s i b i l i t y i s possible. A mind nourish-
ed by p o s s i b i l i t y has no fir m footing. I f p o s s i b i l i t y i s thus the 
food by which Quidam's melancholy i s nourished the seat of th i s mel-
ancholy i s the imagination. I n t h i s way we come to see the p a r a l l e l 
not only between Quidam and the young man of Repetition but also be-
tween Quidam and the Seducer. This i s anticipated by one of the Pap-
i r e r entries dealing with Either-Or. He says that the only thing he 
omitted from Either-Or was a story called Unhappy Love. 
I t was to form a contrast to the Seducer. The hero i n the story 
acted i n exactly the same way as the Seducer, but behind i t was 
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melancholy. He was not unhappy because he could not get the 
g i r l he loved ... He won her ... he was loved with a l l the 
enthusiasm a young g i r l has - then he became unhappy, went 
into a depression, pulled back; he could struggle with the 
whole world but not with himself ... 
(IV A 215/ 5628) 
Such a hero i s Quidam. Like Johannes he i s poised at the d i v i d -
ing l i n e between the realms of external r e a l i t y and of inner fantasy. 
As Johannes needs the occasional contact with the external immediacy 
of young maidens to provide material for his fantastic seductions, so 
Quidam i s t i e d to the occasions which serve as jumping-off points for 
his f antastic elaboration of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Whereas the Seducer was (at least apparently) i n control of his 
imaginings, Quidam i s out of control. His phantasy projects him i n -
to a more and more meaningless world, and he i s unable to do any-
thing about i t . Unlike Johannes he wants to l i v e e t h i c a l l y , wants 
to b u i l d bridges to the external world - but he cannot. Like Con-
stantine, only more determinedly, he sought a cure i n the psychic 
and physical immediacy of feminine youthf\ilness, and i n the b r i e f 
heyday of the engagement he thought that he had found such healing 
The f i r s t kiss - what b l i s s i A g i r l joyous i n s p i r i t , happy 
i n youthj And she i s mine. What are a l l dark thoughts and 
imaginings but cobwebs, and what i s melancholy but a fog 
which i s dispelled by t h i s r e a l i t y , a sickness which i s heal-
ed and i s being healed by the sight of t h i s health ... 
(SV 8, p.33) 
But i n fact his imagination i s too strong, i t i s the upsurge 
of a nothingness within which i s beyond his power and which forces 
on him a complete break with immediacy. He comforts himself that 
these p u l l s issuing from his melancholy are anticipations of a 
route which w i l l lead him to the Eternal ( i b i d . , p.18l), but we do 
not see him reaching t h i s unknown land. He bewails his l o t : 'my 
existence i s nothing but useless e f f o r t ; I cannot return to myself.' 
( i b i d . , p.190) For ultimately he i s divided not only from the world 
but from himself. He cannot be himself. 
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This i s Quidam's situation as i t i s portrayed i n the diary. We 
now turn to the analysis of the situation by the Quiet Brother i n his 
concluding l e t t e r to the reader. 
(B^) ( i i i ) The Quiet Brother's Letter to the Reader 
(B) ( i i i ) (a) The Dialectic of the Stages 
In t h i s l e t t e r the Quiet Brother analyzes Quidam's situation i n 
terms of a number of d i a l e c t i c a l patterns. These are: the dialect-
ic of the stages; the d i a l e c t i c of immediacy and r e f l e c t i o n ; the 
d i a l e c t i c of p o s s i b i l i t y and actuality; the di a l e c t i c of comedy 
and tragedy. I t i s to the f i r s t of these that we now turn. 
The d i a l e c t i c of the stages refers to Kierkegaard's formulat-
ion of the three stages of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical 
and the r e l i g i o u s . These are defined by the Quiet Brother i n oppos-
i t i o n to metaphysical categories. 
There are three existence-spheres: the aesthetic, the ethic-
a l , the r e l i g i o u s . The metaphysical i s the abstract, and 
there i s no human being who exists metaphysically. The meta-
physical, the ontological i s but does not e x i s t , for i f i t 
exists i t exists i n the aesthetic, the ethical or the r e l i g -
ious sphere, and i f i t i s present i t i s the abstraction of, or 
the prius for the aesthetic, the ethical or the religious. 
The ethical sphere i s only a t r a n s i t i o n a l sphere, and there-
fore i t s highest expression i s repentance as a negative action. 
(SV 8, p.266) 
Where on t h i s scale of existence-sheres does Quidam exist? 
The answer to t h i s question concerns the interpretation not only of 
Quidam's diary, but of the whole of Stages on Life's Way. For i f 
Quidam i s -understood to be a religious personality then the book as 
a whole w i l l represent the three stages, since In Vino Veritas and 
the Assessor's treatise correspond f a i r l y neatly to the aesthetic 
and the e t h i c a l . But i s Quidam a religious individual? 
N. H. S^ e argues with great cogency that t h i s i s not the case. 
(22) Referring to the analysis of the existence-spheres i n the 
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Concluding Unscientific Postscript he notes that here the religious 
i s subdivided into religiousness A and religiousness B (= Christian-
i t y ) . The former i s characterized by i t s consciousness of g u i l t , 
the l a t t e r by i t s consciousness of sin. The former can achieve 
resignation to the w i l l of God, only the l a t t e r grasps the paradox 
of the Incarnation. The former i s an ex i s t e n t i a l version of natur-
al r e l i g i o n , the l a t t e r an exi s t e n t i a l version of revealed r e l i g i o n . 
S^,e observes that Quidam's situation i s always defined with r e f -
erence to r e l i g i o n , not to Christianity; to g u i l t , not to sin. I t 
i s a f a i r l y straightforward conclusion that Quidam certainly cannot 
represent religiousness B or Christianity. But S^ e questions wheth-
er he can even be taken as a representative of religiousness A. 
Kierkegaard's ethics, S^ e observes, demand categorical and instant-
aneous judgements, demand choice: either-or. Quidam however rem-
ains ca-ught i n p o s s i b i l i t y , i n 'perhaps'. He does not decisively 
choose himself i n repentance, which would represent the f u l f i l m e n t 
of the ethical stage. Can we then say that Quidam even represents 
religiousness A, which i s more or less to be i d e n t i f i e d with the 
ethical position i n general. 
To answer th i s question we need to look more closely at the 
Quiet Brother's concepts of ethics and of repentance. 
Ethics i s defined as only a tr a n s i t i o n a l sphere which finds ex-
pression i n repentance. But althoiigh i t i s only transitional 'one 
nevertheless does not go through i t once and for a l l . ' (SV 8, p.267) 
For i t i s actual only i n the moment of choice, of repentance. Re-
pentance i s never a finished act but has constantly to be made, an 
ever to be renewed movement from outer to inner, from the aesthetic 
to the r e l i g i o u s . But although such repentance annihilates the ex-
ternal i t i s , i n i t s movement from externality to inwardness, 'sym-
pathet i c a l l y d i a l e c t i c a l . ' 
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The Quiet Brother i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s l a s t point with a story 
which spells out what he means, name^ly, that the repentant person 
does not turn away from the external world out of egoistic contempt 
for the world, but, even as he turns away from the world, he retains 
an understanding of his s o l i d a r i t y with his fellow human-beings. In 
repentance the relationship of inner and outer i s both negative and 
affirmative. I t exists only i n the acuality of the movement, i t i s 
not on one side or the other, and as such i t i s 'the most dialect-
i c a l ' moment. (SV 8, p.267) 
This illuminates Quidam's situation. The emphasis on the sym— 
pathetic nature of repentance points to his concern for the g i r l . 
He i s not eg o i s t i c a l l y casting her aside for the sake of winning 
his own soul, at least Kierkegaard does not want us to see i t l i k e 
t h i s . This sympathetic quality also serves to distinguish Quidam 
from the Seducer. For despite the parallels we have drawn Quidam 
has a quality of sympathy which Johannes, i n his cold egoism, lacks. 
Quidam's situation i s therefore that much the more f i n e l y balanced on 
the d i v i d i n g l i n e between inner and outer than i s Johannes, who re-
presents a merely one-sided rejection of the outer. 
Just as repentance i s said to be the most d i a l e c t i c a l thing so 
Quidam i s described by the Quiet Brother as standing on a 'dialect-
i c a l razor's edge', ( i b i d . , p.199) 
There i s thus a correlation between Quidam and the characteriz-
ation of repentance which the Quiet Brother makes. However we can 
qualify the situation s t i l l f u rther, because repentance i t s e l f i s 
not a simple fact i n Quidam.'.s case since, owing to the uncertainty 
concerning the actual effect of his actions on the g i r l , 'he must 
wait on r e a l i t y to c l a r i f y what i t i s he i s g u i l t y of.' ( i b i d . , p.244) 
Repentance i t s e l f has become d i a l e c t i c a l for him. 
The d i a l e c t i c a l form of repentance here i s t h i s : he cannot come 
to repentance because i t i s as i f i t i s s t i l l not decided what he 
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i s to repent of; and he cannot f i n d repose i n repentance, 
because i t i s as i f he should a l l the time be seeking to act , 
to undo everything, i f i t were possible. 
(SV 8, p.245) 
He i s thus described as ' d i a l e c t i c a l l y treading water. ' ( i b i d . , 
p.246) His posi t ion i s repentance and yet he cannot actual ly com-
plete the movement, he cannot actual ly repent, since to do t h i s , as 
the Quiet Brother observes, he would have to l e t go of the repent-
ance and accept forgiveness, ( i b i d . , p.245) He stops/half-way. 
( i b i d . , p.261) 
Half-way between what? Between a l i f e l i v e d i n the immediacy of 
the external world and the absolute inwardness of the r e l i g i o u s , be-
tween los ing the world and gaining h is •soul. But the movement i n 
which he i s stuck - although properly speaking i t i s only a trans-
i t i o n a l stage, not i t s e l f a permanent stage of existence - i s , as i t 
i s defined i n r e l a t i o n to repentance, the stage of the e th ica l . A l -
though he does not achieve religiousness B (^Christianity) he i s not -
below the e th ica l stage. He stands at the midpoint of the e th i ca l , 
a t the midpoint between the aesthetic and the r e l i g i o u s , between the 
ethics of the l i f e - v i e w which a f f i rms the world i n i t s external i ty 
and the r e l ig ious i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the e thical which breaks with the 
external . Quidam stands on the border of the aesthetic and the r e -
l i g i o u s . 
The Quiet Brother - inc iden ta l ly revealing himself as the creat-
or of Quidam and. not jus t the discoverer of the manuscript - notes 
that what he wanted to portray was 'an approximation to a re l ig ious 
persona l i ty , ' and he summarizes the stages through which Quidam goes 
on h i s progress towards th i s 'approximate' posi t ion: 
an aesthet ic-ethical l i f e - v i e w in i l l u s i o n with the dawning 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the r e l ig ious ; an e thical l i f e - v i e w , which 
judges him; he sinks back in to himself , and he i s where I 
want to have him. 
( i b i d . , p.232) 
Quidam stands at the point where he f inds that the project of 
the e th ica l l i f e - v i e w cannot be carr ied through and sustained, yet 
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he moves neither to the i l l u s o r y inwamess of the aesthetic, nor to 
A 
the rad ica l inwardness of the r e l i g ious . The f a c t that he does not 
decis ively break wi th the aesthetic i n the face of the re l ig ious de-
mand again suggests h i s proximity to the Seducer, f o r th i s i n a b i l i t y 
to act i n the moment of ac t ion, i n the proper time, means that he too 
becomes something of a demonic f i g u r e , although he i s 'a demonic f i g -
ure i n the d i rec t ion of the r e l i g i o u s . ' (SV 8, p.273) 
( B ) . ( i i i ) (b) The Dia lec t ic of Immediacy and Reflect ion 
By means of t h i s d i a l ec t i c the Quiet Brother i s able to throw 
f\arther l i g h t on Quidam's psychological s i t ua t i on , and also on his 
r e l a t i o n to the socio-cul tura l m i l i eu . Both love and f a i t h are i n 
h i s view conditioned by the working out of th i s d ia lec t i c i n the age. 
. . .Love , l i k e a l l passion has become d i a l e c t i c a l f o r the ex is t -
ing generation. One cannot grasp such an immediate passion, 
and i n our age even a grocer's boy could t e l l Romeo and J u l i e t 
astonishing t ru ths . ^ p^^O?) 
But what has been put i n the place of such passion? Instead of Romeo 
and J u l i e t we have only the 'grocer 's boy, a jejune philosopher, an 
o f f i c i a l of the government pawnbroker's or . . . another representat-
ive of common-sense.' ( i b i d . , p.208) In place of i n sp i r a t ion , en-
thusiasm, passion, we have only shrewdness and cleverness. 
I t i s the same i n p o l i t i c s . Instead of the enthusiasm which i s 
prepared to s ac r i f i ce i t s e l f f o r a cause the Quiet Brother imagines 
a t yp i ca l contemporary p o l i t i c i a n arguing thus: 
I w i l l o f f e r my l i f e , l e t no one say that I lack a hero's 
courage, but t h i s b l i n d courage i s not the highest, therefore 
I control myself - and continue to l i v e ; t he re fo re ' I control 
myself - and l e t another, someone less important f a l l i n my 
Pl^^^- ( i b i d . , p. 210) 
The task of love however i s precisely to break away from th i s 
d e b i l i t a t i n g f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n . No more than Kierkegaard himself 
i n A L i t e r a r y Review does the Quiet Brother imagine that a re turn to 
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some golden age of immediacy i s possible. The task i s not to give 
up r e f l e c t i o n but to i n f i n i t i z e i t and so to break through to a new 
immediacy. 
This ' i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n i s nothing a l i en , but i s immediacy's 
transparency to i t s e l f . ' I f love i s able to pass through th i s then 
i t a t ta ins the r e l i g i o u s . 
I n r e l a t i o n to every f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n immediacy i s essential ly 
h igher . . . But an i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n i s i n f i n i t e l y higher than 
immediacy, and i n i t inmiediacy relates i t s e l f to i t s e l f i n the 
idea. But t h i s expression " i n the idea" indicates a God-relat-
ionship i n the widest sense. (SV 8, p.215) 
I f love gets stranded on th i s i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n ; i f , that i s , 
i t reaches a l i m i t which transcends i t , then that on which i t i s 
stranded i s the r e l i g i o u s , which under the category of forgj.veness;. 
i s conceived of as a new immediacy, ( i b i d . ) In the context of th i s 
t ex t the r e l i g ious i s hinted at only as a problematic but unknown 
dimension. 
I t i s only the negative aspect of r e l i g i o n which i s grasped. 
'That which i s the d i f f i c u l t thing about the forgiveness of sins . . . 
i s to become so transparent to oneself that one knows that one at no 
point exis ts by v i r t u e of immediacy . . . ' ( i b i d . , pp. 271f.) The 
Quiet Brother however forswears both on his own behalf, and impl ic -
i t l y on behalf of h is subject, any knowledge of what th i s might mean, 
and he poses i t only as a d i f f i c u l t question'how an immediacy comes 
again . . . how such an immediacy i s d i f f e r e n t from an ear l ie r one, 
what i s l o s t , what i s gained . . . ' ( i b i d . , p.272) There i s nothing 
here of the Assessor's confidence concerning the way i n which immed-
iacy i s integrated in to the higher immediacy of the l i f e - v i e w . 
Under f i v e d i f f e r e n t headings the Quiet Brother sets out the 
basic character is t ics of Quidam and the g i r l i n such a way that we 
are each time led to see that the i r re la t ionship i s an embodiment of 
the d i a l ec t i c of immediacy and r e f l e c t i o n : she representing the imm-
ediacy, he r e f l e c t i o n , ( i b i d . , pp. 224 f f . ) The story i t s e l f can 
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thus be seen as the outworking of t h i s d i a l ec t i c . 
But there i s a fu r the r q u a l i f i c a t i o n to be made, since, even 
without taking the g i r l in to accoimt, we can see that Quidam has 
th i s d i a l ec t i c wi th in himself. 
Quidam i s described as an 'anachronism i n the nineteenth cen-
tu ry ' (SV 8, p.201) because i n t h i s age of r e f l e c t i o n he i s an en-
thusiast . But h i s enthusiasm i s not that of immediate passion, f o r 
he too i s imbued wi th the s p i r i t of the age, and can only express 
h i s enthusiasm ' i n the form of dece i t . ' ( i b i d . , p . 204) Although 
his enthusiastic personali ty protests against the low conception of 
love entertained by the age he too i s cr ippled by r e f l e c t i o n . He i s 
unable to give external form to the ideal of l oya l ty with v*iich he 
endows h is love. This i s h is deceit. His reflectiveness thus draws 
him in to c o n f l i c t not only wi th the g i r l , but in to c o n f l i c t with the 
enthusiasm i n h is own breast. 
I s Quidam able to complete the d i a l ec t i c a l movement, to win an 
i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n and regain his immediacy? Let us look again at 
the i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n . Here,esays the Quiet Brother, 
freedom i s won, whether i t be a f f i rma t ive or negative. In my 
experimenit I have chosen the protes ta t ion, so that the double 
movements show themselves most c lea r ly . At one and the same 
time he i s holding f a s t to h is love, there i s no external h i n -
drance, on the contrary everything smiles favourably . . . and 
yet despite a l l he nonetheless w i l l no t , cannot,rrealize i t - . 
The s i tua t ion i s so d i a l ec t i c a l that one must not hurry one-
s e l f , or only confusion w i l l come out of i t . But i f i t i s 
t rue that the time of immediacy i s past, then a l l that matt-
ers i s to gain the r e l i g i o u s , no inter im measures w i l l do. 
( i b i d . , pp.213-4) 
This would seem to suggest that Quidam has i n f ac t won the freedom of 
the i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n and had f r e e l y chosen the negative path, not 
to marry, to renoimce the world f o r the r e l i g ious . But we must take 
the Quiet Brother 's advice and not hurry ourselves. 
For does the i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n i t s e l f automatically lead to 
the new immediacy of f a i t h , of forgiveness? Surely we cannot say t h i s , 
because although the Quiet Brother i s able to spell out the negative 
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consequences of the i n f i n i t e r e f l e c t i o n i n terms of the t o t a l an-
n i h i l a t i o n of the f i r s t immediacy he i s self-confessedly unable to 
say what the new immediacy might be. I t i s an unknown land. 
Moreover any such automatic t r ans i t i on would contradict the 
whole general approach of the Quiet Brother, who i s wont to mock the 
'necessity ' of the t rans i t ions of hegelian logic on 'the systematic 
s l i d e . ' (SV 8, p.241 c f . pp. 2 6 9 f f . ) 
What i n any case does he mean by posi t ive and negative freedom? 
Has Quidam i n f a c t f r e e l y chosen not to marry? Does such an assert-
ion not contradict the whole s i tua t ion as i t i s depicted i n the diary? 
For i t i s the root-cause of the whole problem that he f inds himself 
unable to marry, unable to overcome his melancholy. 
The only sense i n which he might be said to a t t a in an i n f i n i t e 
r e f l e c t i o n i s i n h is r e f l e c t i o n on the t o t a l i t y of the a f f a i r as a 
Past event. Such freedom as he wins i n th i s r e f l e c t i o n , such trans-
cendence over the s i tua t ion as he achieves, he uses negatively i n the 
sense that he does not use i t to break away from the s i tuat ion in to 
the pos i t ive freedom of the r e l i g i o u s , of forgiveness, but he chooses 
himself' i n the unfreedom of h is boundness to the past, to the g i r l , 
to the nothingness of h i s o r i g i n a l p ro jec t . He does not win the 
f u t \ u : i t y of freedom. 
Once again we see Quidam balanced on the d i a l e c t i c a l razor 's 
edge, at the point of t r a n s i t i o n i n which the d i a l ec t i c of immediacy 
and r e f l e c t i o n f u l f i l s i t s e l f . But he does not actB .ally make the 
t r a n s i t i o n , as i s most obviously f igured i n h i s f a i l u r e to keep the 
g i r l . The balance of the d i a l e c t i c a l elements only serves the i r mut-
ual negation and not t he i r reso lu t ion . The age of immediacy i s past -
but he does not win the r e l ig ious ; he remains i n the meaningless void 
by which they are divided. 
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( B ) ( i i i ) (c) The Dia lec t ic of P o s s i b i l i t y and Ac tua l i ty 
Refer r ing to the inset i n the diary en t i t l e s 'A P o s s i b i l i t y ] ' 
the Quiet Brother says that t h i s represents Quidam's'decisive cat-
egory'. (sV 8, p.226) We have already seen how Quidam i s shown i n 
the diary i t s e l f to be mder the spel l of p o s s i b i l i t y , and we now 
see how the Quiet Brother spells out the signif icance of t h i s . In 
so doing he l i n k s the d i a l ec t i c of p o s s i b i l i t y - ac tua l i ty ( r e a l i t y ) 
to the d i a l ec t i c of i d e a l i t y and h i s t o r i c i t y . 
But does i t help one to believe i n a great event i f one knows 
i t i s a h i s t o r i c a l fact? No, not at a l l . . . I know i d e a l i t y 
i n myself [ ^ i . e . i n the ideal nature of my own consciousness J , 
and i f I do not know i t i n myself, then I do not know i t at a l l , 
no h i s t o r i c a l knowledge helps. 
Spel l ing out the s ignif icance of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n he argues that 
That which can be passed on to me ^ as h i s t o r i c a l knowledge] 
i s a manifold of data which i s not i d e a l i t y , and i n th i s way 
the h i s t o r i c a l i s always raw material which he who appropri-
ates knows how to resolve in to a posse and assimilate as an 
— • ( i b i d . , p.235) 
Although t h i s mention of h i s t o r i c i t y l i nks what the Quiet Brother i s 
saying to themes wi th which the theological reader w i l l be f a m i l i a r 
from the Philosophical Fragments and The Concluding Unscient i f ic 
Postscr ip t , the discussion here i s not re lated i n any way to the 
question of the s ignif icance of the h i s t o r i c a l evidence f o r the 
Incarnat ion. (23) The Quiet Brother 's concern i s with the r e l i g -
ious i n a more general sense. 
There i s therefore nothing more stupid i n the realm of the 
r e l i g i o u s than to hear the perpetual question which i s asked 
whenever something i s taught: "Did i t actual ly happen l i k e 
that? I f so, then we w i l l believe i t . " 
Nothing i s more stupid because the point of the re l ig ious i s to ac-
quire i d e a l i t y , but not however i n order to remain i n i d e a l i t y . 
For S p i r i t asks these two things: (1) I s that which i s said 
possible? (2) Can I do i t ? But i t shows lack of S p i r i t to 
ask these two things: ( I ) I s i t real? (2) Has my neigh-
bour, Christopherson, done i t , has he actually, done i t ? 
( i b i d . ) • 
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The questions which S p i r i t ( = freedom, free-selfhood) asks 
show that the appropriation of the requis i te i d e a l i t y or idea i s 
only h a l f of the equation. The other ha l f i s to put"the idea in to 
pract ice . Only when these two moments are put together can we say 
that S p i r i t i s present. This i s the standpoint of re l ig ious f a i t h , 
f o r I f a i t h i s the i d e a l i t y which resolves an esse in to i t s posse 
and now passionately draws the conclusion i n reverse order. ' (SV 8, 
p.235) Fa i th has the i d e a l i t y which penetrates an event or a state-
ment and sees i t s meaning, i t s idea. I t does not do so i n order to 
acquire material f o r contemplation but i n order to discover i t s own, 
the subjec t ' s , ex i s t en t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t f inds i n what i s given 
a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r i t s own existence. Drawing the conclusion i n re -
verse order means ac tua l iz ing t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y by action. 
The Quiet Brother also throws out a h in t concerning what the 
Concluding Unsc ien t i f i c Postscript w i l l c a l l Religiousness B. 
I f the object of f a i t h i s the absurd, then i t i s s t i l l not the 
h i s t o r i c a l which i s believed, but f a i t h i s {^nowj the i d e a l i t y 
which resolves an esse in to a non posse and now w i l l believe i t . 
( i b i d . ) 
I t i s not clear however whether th i s absurd p o s s i b i l i t y , be l i e f 
i n that which i s (apparently) impossible, r e fe rs spec i f i c a l l y to the 
Incarnat ion, or the experience of forgiveness conceived of as the 
second immediacy. The emphasis throughout Guilty?-Not-Guilty? how-
ever, i s f o r the most part on the subject rather than on the object 
of f a i t h . 
The non posse, the impossible, comes mder the general heading of 
p o s s i b i l i t y of which i t i s the negative form rather than the opposite. 
And f o r Quidam the transcendence of the sphere of p o s s i b i l i t y must 
involve the completion of the movement of f a i t h , the grasping of the 
impossible p o s s i b i l i t y of forgiveness. But we do not see him complet-
ing t h i s movement. 
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He i s 'above' ,the stage of merely taking an external interest 
i n what happens. His in teres t i n the g i r l i s not jus t cur ios i ty 
concerning what she i s doing, etc. He i s concerned to discover the 
meaning of what he observes, to discover the idea which governs her 
s i t ua t i on . I t i s the i d e a l i t y , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which the s i tua t -
ion reveals that preoccupy him. But here he remains. Poss ib i l i t y 
i s h i s decisive category. 
Part of h is d i f f i c u l t y i n discovering the i d e a l i t y i n his s i t -
uation l i e s i n the very character of the g i r l . She belongs to r e a l -
i t y , to a c t u a l i t y , he to i d e a l i t y . This i s part of the i r misrelat-
ionship. 
I n the moment . . . when he shall see her a second time, not 
i n r e a l i t y but i l luminated by h is own i d e a l i t y , she i s trans-
formed in to a gigantic f i gu re . . . I n the very moment when she 
i s about to forget him because she does not see him . . . and 
he has ceased to be important to her . . . i n that same moment 
she has become more important than ever to him, precisely be-
cause he does not see her. /_.. _ 
\ov o, pp. ^dl—li) 
He i s caught i n the web of the possible, of the ideal : he i s un-
able to work these p o s s i b i l i t i e s back in to existence so that they ac-
quire form and s ignif icance i n the rea l world. He i s unable to br ing 
h is i d e a l i t y in to harmony with the g i r l ' s sensuous r e a l i t y . 
The same d i a l e c t i c a l pattern i s , according to the Quiet Brother, 
r e f l e c t ed i n the unusual structure of the diary. 
I n the morning he r e f l e c t s ac tua l i ty £ what actual ly happened] , 
at n igh t he deals wi th the same h i s to ry , but permeated by h is 
own i d e a l i t y . This i d e a l i t y i s thus not an i l l u s o r y an t i c ip -
a t i on , which has not yet encountered r e a l i t y , but an act of 
freedom a f t e r r e a l i t y . ( i b i d . , p.220) 
I n t h i s way, Quidam's s i tua t ion i s distinguished from that of 
the aesthete whose fan tas t i c world i s the world of the shadow f i g -
ures of the hidden personal i ty , the personality which has not yet 
encountered the world. He has engaged with the world as the e th ic-
i s t , the Assessor, has, only he has been unable to bring himself 
i n to harmony with i t . The world of a r t i s closed to him, whether 
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i t takes the form of the exuberance of the romantic imagination or 
the warm c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of the bourgeois novel. 
The i d e a l i t y or p o s s i b i l i t y which he produces out of his en-
counter wi th r e a l i t y i s said to be re l ig ious but i t can scarcely be 
the fulness of the r e l i g i o u s , since th i s involves, according to the 
Quiet Brother 's own d e f i n i t i o n s , a double movement: from r e a l i t y to 
i d e a l i t y or p o s s i b i l i t y - and back. But Quidam does not real ize the 
r e l i g i o u s p o s s i b i l i t y which i s i n him. He remains p o s s i b i l i t y , and 
again we must leave him i n the d i a l ec t i c a l no-man's land. 
( B ) ( i i i ) (d) The Dia lec t ic of Tragedy and Comedy. 
The Quiet Brother pays a great .deal of a t tent ion to the question 
of whether h is Quidam i s to be construed as a t ragic or a comic f igu re . 
In accordance with Kierkegaard's own aesthetic pr inciples the Quiet 
Brother assigns to tragedy a greater involvement with the h i s t o r i c -
a l , wi th external r e a l i t y than to comedy. He assumes ' the f a c t , that 
tragedy seeks support i n the h i s t o r i c a l . ' (SV 8, p.234) I m p l i c i t l y 
t h i s i s taken to imply that tragedy i s less perfect than comedy, a 
point which i s e x p l i c i t i n the d r a f t no tes. (IV B 148, 17) 
Nevertheless he i s able to concede to A r i s t o t l e , with ' s i g n i f -
icant reserva t ion , ' that the poet as such, and therefore, the tragic 
poet too, i s more philosophical than the mere h i s t o r i an , 'because he 
shov/s us how a thing ought to be, not how i t i s . ' (SV 8, p. 233) 
Although he i s aware that i t might be used against him he ap-
peals to Lessing's discussion of tragedy i n the Hamburgische Drama-
turg ie i n order to support his view. (24) Musing on the possible 
basis f o r th i s d i s t i n c t i o n he casts a wry aspersion on human nature's 
propensity to believe i n the laughable side of human l i f e without the 
evidence i t requires i f i t i s to believe i n the noble side of man. 
Whatever the cause, comedy has 'a metaphysical lack of concern . . . 
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tragedy i s interested i n the actual , comedy has the d is in teres t -
edness of metaphysics.' (SV 8, p.240) 
Both tragedy and comedy r e l y on contradict ion. I f , as an ex-
ample of such contradic t ion , we take a misunderstnding between lov -
ers, then tragedy would ass-ume that the mismderstnding lay i n some 
external hindrance, ( i b i d . , p. 216) such as occurs i n Romeo and 
J u l i e t (although the Quiet Brother does not i n f a c t , mention th i s 
eminently suitable example). Comedy, on the other hand, would t rea t 
the love i t s e l f as a misunderstanding, as Kierkegaard had argued i n 
h is review of The F i r s t Love, and, revealing the emptiness of the 
(supposed) lovers ' pos i t ion , ca l l s down upon the i r heads the judge-
ment of laughter. 
I f however there i s a misunderstanding i n the love concerned 
such that love both exis t and does not ex i s t , such that the lovers 
are t r u l y i n love, but cannot re la te to each other i n the i r love, 
then the s i tua t ion i s both t ragic and comic. 
At the basis of the misunderstanding . . . there l i e s an under-
standing. I f i t i s impossible there i s no misunderstanding 
there i s not s u f f i c i e n t common ground f o r them to have a 
re la t ionship int imate enough f o r a misunderstanding to be 
spoken of J • With the p o s s i b i l i t y on the other hand comes 
the misunderstanding, and d i a l e c t i c a l l y seen i t i s both comic 
^^^s^^- ( i b i d . , p.215) 
Such cases, where both t ragic and comic elements are present, 
are divided by the Quiet Brother i n to the tragi-comic and the comi-
t r ag ic . The former case involves no essential passion and neither 
the t ragic nor the comic are essential ly present. He i l l u s t r a t e s 
t h i s poin t wi th the fo l lowing example: 
A deaf man enters a meeting-hall during a meeting; he does not 
want to dis turb i t and therefore opens the b ig folding-doors 
very slowly. Unluckily the doors have the property of creak-
ing . He cannot hear t h i s , he believes he i s doing so w e l l , 
but a protracted creak i s being produced by the lengthy open-
ing . The people become impatient; one turns round and hisses 
at him, he believes that he has possibly moved the door too 
suddenly, and the creaking continues. ( i b i d p 218) 
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I n the comi-tragic however both the t ragic and the comic are 
essent ia l ly present 'and the d i a l e c t i c a l l y i n f i n i t i z e d S p i r i t sees 
both elements i n the same thing at the same t ime. ' Such a s i tua t ion 
would occur where there was both understanding and misunderstanding 
between lovers . 
This i s seen to be the s i tua t ion of Quidam and his fiancee f o r 
'both of them love, and love each other, but nevertheless i t i s a 
misunderstanding.' (SV 8, p.219) This i s of course only apparent to 
Quidam, since only he has s u f f i c i e n t r e f l e c t i o n to grasp the essent-
i a l nature of the s i t ua t ion . 'The experiment's male f igure thus 
sees the comic . . . and i s thereby strengthened i n the t r a g i c ' ( i b i d . , 
p.220) that i s , he becomes convinced more deeply of the impossibi l -
i t y of t he i r union. 
The perception of t h i s comi-tragic uni ty i s said to be the c u l -
mination of heathendom - that i s of l i f e outside re l ig ious categor-
ies . 'Religiousness begins i n the higher passion which out of th i s 
•unity chooses the t r ag ic . J ( c f . i b i d . ) 
Quidam perceives the un i ty - but he does not decisively choose 
himself out of i t , although h is tendency i s towards the t r ag ic , he 
does not r e a l l y become a t ragic hero, f o r , as the Quiet Brother lam-
ents, 'my kn igh t ' s misfortune i s that although he should co l lec t him-
se l f i n rel igiousness, he becomes d i a l e c t i c a l at the uttermost p o i n t . ' 
( i b i d . ) And so the saga of Quidam ends with 'no r e s u l t . ' ( i b i d . , p,236) 
(B) ( i v ) The In te rpre ta t ion of 'Guil ty? - Not-Guilty? 
We are now i n a pos i t ion to tackle the question whether Gui l ty?-
Not-Guil ty? i s an aesthetic work, v/hether i t i s i n any sense a novel , 
and i f no t , what sort of work i s i t ? 
The answers depend on the analysis of Quidam's psychological 
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predicament and the discovery of Quidam's idea, the idea which he 
represents, which both i n the d iary , and i n the commentary on i t , 
emerges as also the idea of the book. The question i s therefore 
sharpened: what i s Quidam's idea, and i s i t commensurable with 
aesthetic form? 
The Quiet Brother 's analysis consistently points to the d e f i n i t -
ion of Quidam's idea i n terms of i t s place on the absolute d i a l ec t i c -
a l boundary between the aesthetic and the r e l i g ious : Quidam i s mov-
ing towards the r e l i g i o u s , he does not a t t a in i t . He i s , so to speak, 
scrambling over the wire as the book closes, and we never learn 
whether he gets shot i n the act or whether he makes his escape into 
the r e l i g i o u s . 
At t h i s point the components of the d i a l e c t i c a l structure i n 
terms of which Quidam i s conceived are per fec t ly balanced, but not i n 
the sense of a creative in te rac t ion . They are balanced in reciprocal 
negation. Each reduces the other to impotence. 
The Quiet Brother says that 'poetry l i e s i n the commensurability 
of the external and the i n t e r n a l , and i t therefore shows the resu l t 
as something v i s i b l e . ' (SV8 , p.236) But the experiment has no re -
s u l t . I t ends i n nothing. 
The question whether the idea of the experiment can be portray-
ed aes the t ica l ly i s taken up by the Quiet Brother. Noting that un-
happy love has ' f rom time out of mind' been a theme fo r poetry he a l -
so observes that 'poetry (Poesien) has to do with immediacy, and can-
not therefore think a d u p l i c i t y . ' Above a l l poetry has to do with the 
immediacy of passion, f o r 'wi thout passion, no poetry. ' ( i b i d . , p.206) 
As we have seen however he also believes that love has i t s e l f become 
d i a l e c t i c a l , although t h i s phenomenon can manifest i t s e l f i n ways as 
diverse as those of the grocer 's boy and the anonymous d i a r i s t . I n 
ei ther case i t fol lows that ' i n that love i t s e l f has now become 
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d i a l e c t i c a l , poetry must give i t up. ' (SV 8, p.209) 
The only contradictions which poetry can deal with are those 
that come from without. The immediacy of poetry i s hot t o t a l l y 
without r e f l e c t i o n , ' i t has a r e l a t i v e r e f l e c t i o n by having i t s 
opposition outside i t s e l f . ' ( i b i d . , p.212) Nor i s poetic immed-
iacy lacking i n ideal content, but the idea i s not actual , does not 
become rea l i n the poetic form. 'The poet sees i t , i t i s t rue , but 
i t does not ex is t f o r h i s hero. ' ( i b i d . , p.213) The poet - and the 
reader - see the idea which moves i n and which makes the work in to a 
u n i f i e d , harmonious work of a r t , but the characters of the work are 
not themselves l i v i n g , conscious subjects, they do not see the idea 
i n whose service they stand. The r ea l i za t ion of the idea i n a r t i s 
therefore l i m i t e d , i t does not achieve a form which per fec t ly corr-
esponds to the Idea i n i t s absolute existence as f ree sub jec t iv i ty . 
That i s , we see ' ideas ' but not ' the Idea' mirrored i n a r t . 
Quidam's problem however i s how to give form to h is i d e a l i t y , 
how to achieve absolute transparency to the ideal inwardness of his 
Passion, which i s essent ial ly the passion to achieve and exist i n the 
freedom of essential selfhood. The poetic hero represents an idea to 
which a corresponding external form can be matched so that ' the aes-
the t i c r e su l t i s i n the external and can be shown . . . I t can be ;L 
shown, and seen, even (wi th the help of opera glasses) by short-
sighted people, that the hero triumphs . . . ' ( i b i d . , p.237) 
But Quidam achieves no r e su l t which can be shown. Not even the 
utmost potent ia t ion of the aesthetic categories of comedy and t rag-
edy can capture h is s i tua t ion . 
Tragedy has the in teres t of a c t u a l i t y , comedy the d is in te res t -
edness of metaphysics, but the experiment l i ves i n the i n v i s -
i b l e un i ty of j es t and seriousness. The d i a l ec t i ca l tension 
between form and content and content and form prevents any im-
mediate re la t ionship to i t , and i n th is tension the experiment 
evades the honest handshake of seriousness and l ikewise the 
fe l lowship of j o l l y brothers which goes with jes t . 
H i b i d . , p.240) 
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The Quiet Brother has already ruled out the claims of specul-
a t ive comedy.' (SV 8, p .21l) No such extension of aesthetic cat-
egories can get to grips wi th the u t t e r l y i n d i v i d u a l , sub jec t iv i ty 
of Quidam's l i d e a ' . 
The stress which Kierkegaard's wr i t ings on aesthetics constant-
l y make i s that an aesthetic work i s to be judged i n the l i g h t of the 
coherence of content and form. But here the p o s s i b i l i t y of any such 
coherence i s denied. Here the tension of content and form i s a ten-
sion of contrast which disrupts the attunement of aesthetic exper-
ience and which makes an aesthetic reading impossible. 
This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important with regard to the way i n which 
the issue of su f f e r ing i s dealt with i n Guilty? - Not-Guilty? Ar t 
i n general i s , as Kierkegaard had already stated i n the early Papir-
er, a'-\sublimation or masking of su f fe r ing . (25) This does not mean 
that i t does not deal wi th s u f f e r i n g , but that i t i s r e s t r i c t ed i n 
i t s portrayal of su f f e r ing by i t s inherent ex te rna l i ty . 
When an aesthetic hero su f fe r s , as i n tragedy, his su f fe r ing i s 
re la ted to ex t e rna l i t y , and he i s shown as achieving a certain great-
ness i n h is su f f e r ing . Had Quidam been such an aesthetic hero he 
would have had to have been shown taking some sort of revenge on the 
g i r l , or on the world , to have become a Richard I I I - a ro le by which 
'he i s indeed tempted.' ( SV 8, p.159) 
On the other hand the Quiet Brother does not think that phys-
i c a l s u f f e r i n g purely as such has any aesthetic in teres t . (26) He 
agrees wi th Schlegel that i n aesthetics 'nur die Gesundheit i s t 
liebenswiirdig. ' ( SV 8 , p .25l ) What poetry and a r t achieve i s the 
reso lu t ion of the j a r r i n g discords of existence i n an ideal harmony. 
I t i s a r econc i l i a t i on i n which the external and the ideal are i n -
tegrated i n a balanced t o t a l i t y . 
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This r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , though j u s t i f i e d i n a r t , i s 'despicable' 
wi th regard to l i f e . (SV 8, p.252) I t leaves out of account the 
force of su f f e r ing i n experience, and i t can deal neither with that 
s u f f e r i n g which i s rooted i n physical vu lne rab i l i t y and contingency, 
nor wi th that su f f e r ing which has a solely s p i r i t u a l character, the 
suf fer ings of the conscience alone 'before God.' 
But though ' the aesthetic hero i s great by v i r tue of his con-
quests, the r e l i g ious hero i s great by v i r tue of his s u f f e r i n g . ' 
( i b i d . , p.248) I n the r e l i g ious the two dimensions of suf fe r ing 
which a r t must leave out of accoimt are united. Any and every suf-
f e r i n g can be reconciled i n the i d e a l i t y of re l ig ious inwardness, 
although t h i s r econc i l i a t i on does not express i t s e l f i n any extern-
a l form or any external a l t e r a t ion , ( i b i d . , p .25l) 
This d i s t i n c t i o n between the aesthetic and the re l ig ious i s also 
made i n respect of the di f ference i n e f f e c t which aesthetic and re -
l i g i o u s works have on the i r rec ip ients . Referr ing to A r i s t o t l e ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n of tragedy as achieving the p u r i f i c a t i o n of fear and p i t y 
(27) the Quiet Brother concurs that when the spectator understands 
the idea i n a tragedy 'he sees the poetic, and h i s fear and p i t y 
are p u r i f i e d from a l l basely egoistic ingredients . ' ('SY p. 253) 
But t h i s p u r i f i c a t i o n i s achieved by h is los ing himself i n the 
action as i t i s external ly portrayed. 
The aesthetic healing consists i n the ind iv idua l gazing at the 
dizzy sight provided by the aesthetic and by soidping he loses 
himself , l i k e an atom, l i k e a pa r t i c l e of dust, which i s thrown 
i n wi th the common l o t of everyman, of humanity; he loses him-
s e l f l i k e an i n f i n i t e l y small element of sound i n the spherical 
har-mony of existence. ^ .^.^^ ^ pp^ 254-5) 
Religious healing takes the reverse d i rec t ion and turns the 
' f e a r ' which i s aroused by the re l ig ious narrat ion back upon the add-
ressee: he i s to fear f o r himself , not f o r the hero; he i s to take 
h is existence in to the inner sanctuary of a God-relationship. Thus 
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he does not lose himself i n the su f fe r ing of others, but he i s not 
egois t ic , f o r he loses h is egoist ic denial of su f fe r ing by accept-
ing h is su f f e r i ng before God i n the l i g h t of the question of his 
own g u i l t and r e spons ib i l i t y . 
I n an aesthetic perspective self-induced su f fe r ing must always 
be comic, the Quiet Brother argues, because radica l inwardness l i e s 
outside i t s scope, and i t can only in te rpre t such inwardness as n u l -
l i t y , as a desertion from the external , as something laughable. 
(SV 8. p.258) (28) But r e l i g i o u s l y the whole point i s to discover 
that one i s always i n danger, to r ea l i ze , even when l i f e seems se-
cure and happy, that he i s suspended over seventy thousand fathoms 
of water. (:S,V..8 , p .26l ) 
The c e n t r a l i t y of the question of su f fe r ing f o r the idea of the 
diary i s indicated by i t s s u b t i t l e : A Passion Narrative, ( i b i d . , p . 9 ) 
V/e do not see Quidam r e l i g i o u s l y healed, we see him agonizing over 
the open lacerat ion of his su f fe r ing . 
The diary i s not then an aesthetic work. I t s idea negates the 
idea of the aesthetic. Instead of the transparency of form to idea, 
we have the tension of idea and form. What sort of work i s i t then? 
I t i s described on the t i t l e page as 'A Psychological Experiment.' 
Commenting on the diary Pierre Mesnard says that i t 'bears an aston-
ishing resemblance to the confessions which a psycho-analyst obtains 
from his c l i e n t s . ' (29) I t i s meant to . I t i s a psychological 
case-study, a pioneering work of ex i s ten t i a l psychology. (30) I t 
i s the concrete appl icat ion of the psychological categories devel-
oped more formal ly i n such works as The Concept of Angst; The 
Concluding Unsc ien t i f i c Postscript; Th'e Sickness Unto Death. 
I t i s not therefore intended as either pleasant or comforting 
reading. We are to approach i t ana ly t i ca l ly . I f th i s point i s 
f u l l y appreciated then i t w i l l be seen many (though perhaps not a l l ) 
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of the c r i t i c i s m made of th i s book are misplaced. I t i s not meant 
to be aes thet ica l ly pleasing. Nor on the other hand, i s i t primar-
i l y an oblique se l f - r eve la t ion by Kierkegaard himself. (51) I t i s 
an exposition of a pa r t i cu la r psychological stage, an idea, which 
we can indicate wi th the terms ' g u i l t ' and 'nothingness.' The pro-
vince of psychology i s described as ' the l a s t confinium between the 
aesthetic and the r e l i g i o u s . ' (SV 8, p .24l ) This i s where (^uidam 
stands, and t h i s i s how he must be approached. 
From i t s psychological vantage point on the absolute f r o n t i e r 
between the aesthetic and the re l ig ious Guilty? - Mot Guilty? pro-
vides a retrospective view of the t e r r i t o r y of the aesthetic. Only 
from th i s standpoint can the f i n a l d e f i n i t i o n of the aesthetic be 
made. Emanuel Hirsch has wr i t t en that 'Das Fertigwerden des endgi l t -
igen B e g r i f f s vom Aesthetischen bezeichnet mithin den erinnerden 
Abschluss mit dem Dichterischen als einem Sttick der Vergangenheit. ' 
(52) 
This completion of the concept does not so much mean that Kierkegaard 
has introduced any new content in to the concept. I t i s more a quest-
ion of de f in ing the boiondary between the aesthetic and the r e l i g -
ious more precisely, more painstakingly and, yes, more p a i n f u l l y than 
he had done before. I t focusses on and enlarges the negative moment 
of the e th ica l act of se l f -choice, a moment which we had encounter-
ed i n the sermon wi th which Either-Or ended, as well as i n the c r i s i s 
portrayed i n Repet i t ion. This moment i s Quidam's whole l i f e ; i t i s 
the idea wi th which Kierkegaard concludes his aesthetic authorship. 
I f Kierkegaard's theory of a r t can be found i n his c r i t i c a l 
w r i t i n g s , h is c r i t i q u e of a r t i s to be found i n his so-called novels. 
Together they const i tute h is philosophy of a r t . We shall now turn to 
see the connections between th i s philosophy of a r t and other aspects 
of h is authorship, and to discuss the questions of i t s theological 
s tructure and i t s contemporary relevance. 
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Chapter Ten; Conclusion 
( A ) Aesthetics and the Aesthetic 
We now turn to an examination of the l i nks betv/een the 'novels' 
and wider issues a r i s ing from Kierkegaard's authorship. 
Kierkegaard treated the question of the l i m i t s of the aesthetic 
i n the l i g h t of his character is t ic in teres t i n the psychological, i n 
what the hegelians cal led the realm of 'Subjective S p i r i t . ' ( l ) The 
categories which he b u i l t in to the framework of the novels are given 
a more theoret ica l treatment i n such works as The Concept of Angst, 
The Concluding Unsc ien t i f i c Postscript and The Sickness Unto Death. 
This psychological perspective can be seen i n the ambiguity of 
the term aesthetic i n Kierkegaard's work. On the one hand i t i s 
used to r e f e r to the realm of a r t and to a par t icu lar qual i ty of im-
aginat ion, both creative and receptive. On the other hand i t i s 
used to r e f e r to an ex i s t en t i a l stance equivalent to the 'inauthen-
t i c i t y ' or 'bad f a i t h ' of modern exis tent ia l ism. (2) The aim of the 
present section i s to point to the connection between these two uses 
of the term. 
Both Kierkegaard and Hegel argue f o r the ult imate inadequacy of 
a r t as a means of expressing S p i r i t i n an absolute sense. For both 
of them the inadequacy of the aesthetic l i e s i n i t s entanglement i n 
immediacy, i n ex te rna l i ty , i n sensuousness, an entanglement which 
prevents i t from r e f l e c t i n g the essential inwardness of s p i r i t u a l 
existence. But whereas Hegel traced the process of in te rna l iza t ion 
to the absolute inwardness of p\ire thought, Kierkegaard followed 
another path, which led to the encounter of the individual with an 
absolutely transcendent God, an encounter between po l a r i t i e s so 
r a d i c a l l y 'other ' that no external expression could be given to i t , 
nor any human agency resolve the dualism revealed i n i t . Such a 
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reso lu t ion or 'new immediacy' presupposes a complete break with the 
t o t a l i t y of the human subject 's existence outside th i s re la t ionship , 
and can only be achieved by the action of the d i v i n i t y . The descrip-
t i o n of t h i s divine action i s the content of Kierkegaard's Christology, 
h i s doctrine of the Paradox, such as i t i s expressed i n Philosophical 
. ^ 'I'a-gments, The Concluding Unsc ien t i f i c Postscript and Training i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . (3) 
The track followed by th i s enquiry leads only to the near side 
of t h i s abyss, to the point where the aesthetic breaks down, where the 
ex i s t en t i a l subject i s l e f t on the b r ink , poised between the aesthetic 
and the r e l i g i o u s . From th i s point we can at the most share some-
th ing of the experience of that dizzy vert igo which resul ts from the ' 
v i s ion of the void. I n th i s experience the external world i s reduced 
to ind i f fe rence and that fear of the Lord i s aroused which, i f not 
i t s e l f sa lvat ion, i s at least the beginning of wisdom. 
The Assessor of fe red us a preliminary account of th i s experience 
i n the f i g u r e of Nero. He described Nero as a man in whom the S p i r i t 
could not come to b i r t h , could not achieve the breakthrough i t r e -
quired. Not allowed to manifest i t s e l f creat ively i t manifested i t -
se l f negatively as 'a dark cloud, i t s wrath broods over h i s soul, and 
i t becomes an anxiety (angst) . . . ' (SV 3j P«175) 
The experience of the abyss separating the aesthetic and the 
r e l i g i o u s i s the experience of angst. This i s the characterization 
of the gap separating S p i r i t ( = freedom) from a l l that i s not S p i r i t 
as i t makes i t s e l f f e l t i n the subject. I t i s the determination of 
the subject as essent ia l ly f r ee yet lacking content i n i t s freedom. 
I n The Concept of Angst angst i s seen to be rooted i n the univ-
ersal structure of h\aman selfhood, f o r i t i s traced back to man's 
condit ion before the F a l l . 
I n t h i s condition there i s peace and repose; but at the same 
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time there i s something else which i s not dissension and 
s t r i f e , f o r indeed there i s nothing to s t r ive wi th . What 
i s there then? Nothing. But what e f f e c t has nothing? I t 
begets angst. I t i s the deep secret of innocence that i t 
i s at the same time: angst. I n i t s dream-state S p i r i t 
projects i t s own a c t u a l i t y , but th i s ac tua l i ty i s Nothing, 
but innocence constantly sees th i s Nothing outside i t . 
(SV 6, p.136) 
Angst i s rooted i n nothingness, f o r 'angst and nothing correspond 
at a l l times to one another.' ( i b i d . , p.183) 
Angst can be l ikened to dizziness. He whose eye comes to gaze 
down in to the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what i s the 
basis (Grund) of t h i s dizziness? I t i s as much i n his eye as 
i t i s i n the abyss (Afgrund), f o r what i f he had not stared 
down? Thus angst i s the vert igo of freedom, which occurs when 
S p i r i t would posi t the synthesis, and freedom now stares down 
in to i t s own p o t e n t i a l i t y , and then grasps f i n i t u d e to hold on 
to . I n th i s ver t igo freedom sinks down. Psychology can go no 
f \ i r the r than t h i s - nor does i t want to . I n the same moment 
everything i s al tered and when freedom stands up again i t 
sees that i t i s g u i l t y . Between these two moments l i e s the 
leap, which no science either has c l a r i f i e d or can c l a r i f y . 
He who becomes g u i l t y i n angst becomes as ambiguously g u i l t y 
as possible. ( i b i d . pp. 152-5) 
I n angst both g u i l t and freedom are present as p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
while nei ther i s able to manifest i t s e l f as such - u n t i l the leap 
has been taken in to f a i t h or in to s in . ( c f . i b i d . 5; p. 194) 
Psychology cannot deal with such concepts as f a i t h and sin 
which Kierkegaard assigns to Dogmatics. Psychology can deal only 
wi th the predisposit ion to s i n , the state out of which sin arises, 
the ' r ea l p o s s i b i l i t y ' of s in . This i s angst. ( i b i d . , pp .119ff . ) 
The condit ion of angst-,- as i t s r e l a t i o n to nothingness, to 
g u i l t and to freedom, as wel l as i t s corre la t ion with psychology, 
a l l tend to show, i s the condition we have seen exemplified i n 
Quidam. Quidam, more than any other of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous 
'heroes' i s angst incarnate. 
The theme of nothingness i s also taken up more or less e x p l i c i t -
l y i n various of Kierkegaard's Edi fy ing Discourses. In one Discourse 
i t i s stated that f o r a man ' t o know himself i n his own nothingness 
i s the condition of knowing God.' (SV 4, p.289) A description i s 
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of fe red of how God uses angst to drive self-confidence out of a man 
when the time comes f o r the man to learn his own nothingness - and 
thus to learn to know God. (SV 4, p.272) 
The f u l l e s t - although because of i t s diffuseness not necessar-
i l y the best - account of the whole scheme of psychological categ-
ories which the novels presuppose i s i n the Concluding Unscient i f ic 
Postscript where i t i s said that 
The t o t a l i t y of guilt-consciousness i s the most ed i fy ing aspect 
of religiousness A. Within the sphere of religiousness A th i s 
ed i fy ing aspect s t i l l belongs to immanence and i s the a n n i h i l -
a t ion i n which the ind iv idua l puts himself out of the way i n 
order to f i n d God, since i t i s precisely the individual him-
se l f who i s the hindrance. ^^^29) 
Since 'every human l i f e i s constructed r e l i g i o u s l y ' (SV 6, p.191) the 
t o t a l i z a t i o n of the guilt-consciousness, involving the annihi la t ion 
of the external and the anxious experience of the nothingness, as the 
moment i n which freedom announces i t s presence, are not jus t matters 
f o r eccentrics such as Quidam. They are tasks incumbent on any hum-
an being who i s to a t t a in the s p i r i t u a l freedom which human exis t -
ence i s destined to be. 
A r t can only represent th i s guilt-consciousness i n external im-
ages such as the Furies (SV 10, p .213) , t)ut i t s true expression i s i n 
the absolute inwardness of sub jec t iv i ty : i n the void , before God, 
the s e l f comes face to face only with... i t s e l f . I t i s the moment of 
t r u t h which defies f i g u r a t i o n . 
I f the r e l i g ious i s not grasped i n i t s true inwardness, then i t 
i s that a man i s said to exis t aesthet ical ly i n the sense of inauth-
e n t i c a l l y . As the aesthetic experience was given a par t icular s ig -
n i f i cance i n the l i f e of the youth as an ant ic ipa t ion of the f u l l 
development of personal i ty , we could also c a l l such aesthetic ex is t -
ence immaturity. I t i s a f a i l u r e to grow up, the f a i l u r e to achieve 
our proper freedom. 
I t i s i n th i s sense that the Assessor castigates h is young 
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f r i e n d f o r having an aesthetic view of l i f e , but whereas A manifests 
h is aesthetic personality i n a corresponding preoccupation with 
aesthetic themes, i . e . themes taken from poetry and the a r t s , the 
term'aesthetic ' also comes to be used f o r a l l those who f a i l to 
achieve ch r i s t i an f a i t h i n i t s fulness. 
I n The Point of View ' the aesthetic' thus becomes the decisive 
category i n Kierkegaard's characterization of established Chris t ian-
i t y . 
So now, i f on t h i s assimiption, most people i n Christendom 
only imagine themselves to be c h r i s t i a n , i n what categories 
do they then l ive? They l i v e i n aesthetic or aesthetic-
e th ica l categories. p^^^^ 
Even i f such people have no in teres t at a l l i n the a r t s , they 
are 'aesthet ic ' because they do not l i v e wi th s u f f i c i e n t inwardness, 
wi th the purely subjective freedom of the Christ ian man. Instead of 
l i v i n g ' i n ' themselves they are 'ou t ' of themselves, alienated, at a 
distance from themselves, a distance which can only be overcome in 
the synthesis of the new immediacy of f a i t h , grounded and sustained 
by Grace. 
This extension of the sense of the aesthetic i s connected by 
Kierkegaard wi th the way i n v/hich he has used aesthetic forms i n his 
work. Because most people most of the time l i v e aesthetical ly the 
place to meet them - working on the p r inc ip le that chr is t ian com-
munication s tar ts where people are - i s i n the aesthetic, to accept 
the aesthetic as a s t a r t ing-po in t , and then, once a bridge has been 
b u i l t , to show the hollowness of the aesthetic, to show the i l l u s i o n 
involved i n i t . Kierkegaard sees th i s both as a socratic d i sc ip l ine 
of l ay ing bare the i l l u s i o n s i n which men are snared and also as a 
way of t r i c k i n g men in to the t r u t h . (4) 
Although some commentators doubt whether Kierkegaard's author-
ship was as genuinely r e l ig ious from the s ta r t as he claims i t to 
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have been i n The Point of View (5) our analysis of the novels sup-
ports h is argument that the authorship did i n f a c t point to the i l l u s -
ory element i n the aesthetic, i n that Kierkegaard, as a wr i t e r , 
breaks the basic rules which, i n h is view, governed the realm of aes-
the t i c s . I n place of the harmony of content and form he produced a 
l i t e r a t u r e i n which form and content stood i n essential contrast. 
The aesthetic form of the novels i s jus t a ' fo rm ' and no more. 
However by cor re la t ing the aesthetic form of the pseudonymous 
authorship wi th the aesthetic ( = inauthentic) s i tua t ion of his con-
temporaries, Kierkegaard i s , at the very leas t , implying that the 
analogy by which the term aesthetic was extended from i t s use i n re -
l a t i o n to a r t i s more than an analogy, that a r t i s somehow t i ed up 
with the aestheticism of an ex i s ten t i a l f l i g h t from freedom. I s a r t 
then always a g u i l t y evasion of gu i l t ? I s a r t ever innocent? These 
questions lead to an assessment of the overal l structure of Kierke-
gaard's philosophy of a r t , and of i t s s ignif icance i n r e l a t ion to the 
r e l i g ious premisses from which and to which he i s working. 
_(B) The Theological Structure of Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Ar t 
I t i s an impl ica t ion of Kierkegaard's philosophy of a r t as i t has 
been presented i n t h i s thesis that a r t does i n f a c t have a legi t imate 
place i n the overal l ordering of human l i f e , and th i s i n a number of 
ways. 
F i r s t l y , there i s a l eve l at which the v>fork of ar t can and should 
be assessed i n the l i g h t of purely aesthetic considerations. This i s 
the l eve l of pure aesthetic c r i t i c i s m : the work of ar t i s judged sole-
l y i n terms of i t s conformity to the canons of taste, namely, whether 
or not i t answers to i t s idea. These canons are not a matter of a r b i t -
ra ry ind iv idua l f e e l i n g but are governed by the d ia lec t ic of aesthetic 
ideas. At th i s l eve l the in t rus ion of ethical or re l ig ious categories 
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i s i r r e l evan t . (6) 
Secondly there i s a l eve l at which a r t can r e f l e c t a genuine 
e th ica l in te res t which, even i f i t does involve a degree of d i s t o r t -
ion does not involve the absolute f a l s i f i c a t i o n of the ethical i n t -
erest concerned. I7) 
T h i r d l y , there i s a l eve l at which a r t i t s e l f obscurely tes t -
i f i e s to the freedom of r e l i g ious f a i t h . 
The f i r s t two points have already been developed at length i n 
previous chapters. The t h i r d point has been adumbrated with regard 
to Kierkegaard's discussion of such aesthetic border-concepts as the 
idea of the Wandering Jew ( s ) and the comi-tragic ( 9 ) j border-concepts 
i n which the aesthetic i t s e l f t e s t i f i e s to i t s own emptiness, to the 
nothingness l u r k i n g beneath i t s surface, i n which freedom i s to be 
found. Here however we are concerned wi th seeing how th i s may be so 
wi th regard to a r t simply as such. 
I t i s noteworthy that several Roman Catholic scholars who have 
given serious a t tent ion to Kierkegaard have found i n him a genuinely 
Thomist appreciation of the r e l a t i o n of Nature and Grace. (IO) Can 
something of the structure of t r a d i t i o n a l Natural Theology be read i n -
to h i s philosophy of art? I s a r t presented as a r e l a t i v e l y independ-
ent sphere of human existence which cannot a r b i t r a r i l y be subjected 
to heteronomous control and which nonetheless also witnesses to the 
re l ig ious? 
I t fo l lows from what has been said at the s ta r t of th is section 
that the answer to the f i r s t part of t h i s l a s t question has to be 
a f f i r m a t i v e . Ar t cannot be subjected to the a rb i t r a ry intrusions of 
whatever i t i s which l i e s outside the aesthetic. Does ar t also w i t -
ness to re l ig ion? I f t h i s i s so, then jus t as the works of nature 
i n t r a d i t i o n a l natural theology come to be interpreted from a double-
perspective, according to whether i t i s the i r nattiral laws or the i r 
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ul t imate ends which are subjected to scrutiny then we must look f o r 
a s imi lar double-perspective i n Kierkegaard's aesthetics. 
An appl icat ion of such Thomist pr inciples to a r t i s made by 
Jacques Mar i ta in i n A r t and Scholasticism. Mari ta in distinguishes 
between a r t as an a c t i v i t y independent of the requirements of speciil-
a t ion and of e th ical ac t ion, an a c t i v i t y which belongs to 'making' i n 
which 
A r t . . .remains outside the l i n e of human conduct, with an end, 
ru les and values, which are not those of man but of the work 
to be produced. That work i s everything f o r ar t - one law only 
governs i t - the exigencies and good of the work. ( l l ) 
On the other hand 
I f a r t i s not human i n the end i t pursues, i t i s human, essent-
i a l l y h-uman i n i t s method of working. I t involves the making 
of a man's work, stamped with the character of a man: animal 
ra t iona le . . . the work to be done i s merely a matter of a r t , 
the form of i t i s undeviating reason 
which thus, by means of the presence of beauty i n a r t , as the approp-
r i a t e form of t h i s reason, sets a r t i n the order of transcendentals, 
providing a middle term between the created material order and pure 
(contemplative) S p i r i t . Although such a dual-perspective can be seen 
i n Kierkegaard's w r i t i n g on a r t , Kierkegaard's posi t ion i s not un-
q u a l i f i e d l y Thomist. There are cer ta in emphases which dis t inguish him 
as t y p i c a l l y 'modem" rather than as 'neo-medieval'J 
The path from a r t to d i v i n i t y i s not f o r Kierkegaard simply a 
continuous l i n e which, i f we fo l low i ; i f a r enough, v ; i l l lead us to the 
goal . Just as i n Hegel's re-working of the proofs f o r divine exis t -
ence the f i n i t e witnesses to the i n f i n i t e i n d i r e c t l y , by the revelat -
ion of i t s own inadequacy, so that i t can serve only f o r a negative 
knowledge of God ( 1 3 ) , so the testimony of a r t to the re l ig ious i s , 
f o r Kierkegaard, essential ly negative. This testimony i s not there-
fore by v i r t u e of the fulness which i s i n ar t ; i t i s not by i t s 
Beauty that a r t points to the r e l i g i o u s , but by v i r tue of i t s lack, 
by v i r t u e of i t s i n a b i l i t y to resolve the d ia lec t ic of existence which 
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thus comes to be seen as requi r ing a re l ig ious resolut ion. The clue 
by which the r e l ig ious dimension i s indicated i s not to be found in 
the apparent wholeness of aesthetic experience, but by seeking out 
the need which such wholeness attempts to s a t i s fy . 
The opening Diapsalma i n Either-Or, an aphorism which, according 
to Kierkegaard, contained the problematic of the whole vrork ( c f . IV 
A 216/5629), runs 
What i s a poet? An unhappy man, who conceals deep pains i n his 
hear t , but whose l i p s are so fashioned that when the sigh and 
the cry pass out of them, they sound l i k e beau t i fu l music. His 
s i tua t ion i s l i k e that of the unfortunate person who was slow-
l y tor tured by a so f t flame i n the Ox of Phalaris, whose screams 
could not reach that tyrant and so a f f r i g h t him because they 
sounded to him l i k e a sweet music. (SV 2 p 23) 
The human s i tua t ion i s that idea and form are separated: we do not 
ex is t according to our idea, v/e are not what we should and shal l be. 
In the aesthetic work there i s a r e l a t i v e attunement of idea and form, 
yet not at such a l eve l as to resolve the more fundamental discord. 
Beneath the aesthetic synthesis, t h i s sweet music, the scream of 
agony continues unabated. 
I n t h i s v i s ion of a r t Kierkegaard shares some of the central i n -
sights of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, insights most poignant-
l y expressed by Nietzsche: ' . . . we may see the a r t i s t ' s buoyancy and 
creat ive joy as a luminous cloud shape re f l ec ted upon the dark surface 
of a lake of sorrow.' (14) 
A r t i s an answer, a lbe i t an inadequate answer, to the question 
of s u f f e r i n g . However he who has eyes to see can read the question 
i n the answer, can hear the cry of pain behind the sweet music, can 
see the dark lake of sorrow beneath the image of the luminous cloud. 
A r t does not witness to r e l i g i o n by i t s beauty, i t s joy , but by the 
f a c t that we can read i n a r t the same unexpressed question which 
1-ies at the heart of the r e l ig ious dilemma. Poetic i d e a l i t y i s , as 
Kierkegaard so of ten says, a dream-world, but the power of a dream 
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l i e s as much i n what i t represses as i n what i t reveals. 
Kierkegaard's s t r ipp ing away of the i l l u s i o n of the aesthetic 
thus leads us from the b r i l l i a n t f ireworks of young A, who has learnt 
to play the aesthetic i l l u s i o n f o r a l l i t i s worth, to the relentless 
monotony of Quidam's 'passion n a r r a t i v e ' . I t i s the revelat ion of 
the s u f f e r i n g which a r t conceals - because i t cannot cure i t - and 
which r e l i g i o n reveals - because i t has the ctire, i t can win through 
to freedom and i t can hear the note of joy i n the s t r i f e of su f f e r -
ing . (15) 
This i s not to say that the a r t i s t or the recipient of his work 
i s de l ibera te ly two-faced, that he del iberately suppresses the know-
ledge of the unhealed wound at the back of h is images of beauty. He 
i s , i n an expression from the early Papirer, an 'unconscious sac r i f -
ice" . Though the poetic consciousness can achieve a certain degree 
of self-awareness and, i n comic irony or i n such f igures as the Wander-
ing Jew, can to a cer ta in extent acknowledge i t s \ i l t imate inadequacy, 
i t does not know, i t i s by i t s very structure prevented from knowing 
the absoluteness of the s p l i t which determines human existence as a 
su f f e r i ng existence. 
This i s seen by the Assessor, who writes 
. . . a poet-existence as such l i e s i n the darkness which i s 
a consequence of the f a c t that despair i s not worked through, 
that the soul perpetually trembles i n despair and the S p i r i t 
cannot win i t s true t ransf igura t ion (= explanation). The 
poetic ideal i s always an \mtrue i dea l , f o r the true ideal i s 
always the actual . So when the S p i r i t i s not allowed to r i se 
up in to the eternal world of S p i r i t , i t stops half-way and 
re jo ices i n the images which mirror themselves i n the clouds, 
and he weeps at the i r t ransi tor iness . A poet-existence i s 
therefore as such an unhappy existence, which i s higher than 
f i n i t u d e and yet i s not i n f i n i t e . The poet sees the ideals , 
but he has to f l e e the world i n order to enjoy them, he i s 
unable to carry about these divine images wi th in him i n the 
midst of l i f e ' s confusion . . . ^ p ^^g^ 
Ar t occupies a thoroughly d i a l e c t i c a l posi t ion: higher than the 
merely physical , lower than the angels. As with Mari tain i t i s 'a 
middle term. ' At the most profound leve l a r t i s an attempt to over-
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come the agonized consciousness of mor ta l i ty which we carry wi thin us, 
agonized both because l i f e i s short and because i t i s so pa infu l 
while i t l a s t s . L i f e i s no more than the passage from the b i r t h - c ry 
to the death-cry, (XI i i A T99/729) but ar t seeks to bu i ld a l a s t -
ing kingdom on th i s absolute f l u x . 
A r t seeks to t ransf igure l i f e , to see i t as beauty, to see i t i n 
the l i g h t of i t s own aesthetic ideals , but i t must f a i l because the 
only answer to su f fe r ing mor ta l i ty i s the blessedness of e t e rn i ty , a 
g i f t which i s beyond any man's power. Kierkegaard thus joins hands 
with one of h is arch-adversaries, N. F. S. Grundtvig, who in his poem 
De Levendes Land expressed a s imilar ins ight : 
0, d e c e i t f u l dreamJ 
You shimmering bubble on the stream of time, 
I n vain does the bard, wi th mouth and with pen. 
Seek, wi th b r i l l i a n t shadows, to create you again; 
When the shadow i s most l i k e , then those few sigh 
who look upon i t 
Enchanting dream 
Of the pearl of e te rn i ty i n the stream of time. 
You t r i c k the poor wretches who i n vain seek 
What the heart desires i n images and i n a r t . 
So that they c a l l "abiding" what cer ta in ly passes 
""away 
l i k e hours and yearsJ 
(16) 
Or, as the american c r i t i c Harold Bloom puts i t , 'Following Nietzsche, 
I have suggested that the poetic w i l l i s an argument against time, 
revengeful ly seeking to substi tute " I t i s " f o r " I t was." ' ( l ? ) 
I t may be argued that Kierkegaard's expression of th i s mder-
standing of a r t was conditioned by a perception of the incompat ibi l i ty 
of human mor t a l i t y and divine e te rn i ty which was nothing short of i n -
human, that h i s v i s t a i s one of uninterrupted bleakness. In t h i s 
case the Thomist structure of his philosophy of a r t can only temporar-
i l y d i s t r ac t us from the thoroughly unthomist r e jec t ion of the world 
and i t s reduction to a mere vale of tears. To answer th is charge we 
proceed, perhaps i n d i r e c t l y , by turning to the question of the r e l a t i on 
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of Kierkegaard's philosophy of a r t to the phenomenon of n i h i l i s m . 
(C) A r t and Nih i l i sm 
When we seek to place Kierkegaard's philosophy of ar t i n r e l a t i on 
to modern developments i n a r t and aesthetics we are confronted by 
many problems. The more fo rma l i s t i c aspects of h is theory of a r t seem 
to be simply outdated. His c r i t i que of a r t on the other hand seems to 
have m i s f i r e d i n that precisely those themes which Kierkegaard regard-
ed as se t t ing a l i m i t to aesthetic presentation have been taken up by 
a r t i n the twentieth century. The irony i s tha t , at least i n l i t e r -
ature, some of the wr i te rs most responsible f o r th i s development have 
been strongly influenced by Kierkegaard. 
The themes of g u i l t , anxiety and nothingness have been taken up 
by a niomber of wr i te rs who are generally acknowledged to have owed a 
great deal to Kierkegaard, wr i t e r s such as Ibsen, Strindberg, Kafka, 
DUrrenmatt and Sartre. (18) Are v/e then simply to assme that Kierke-
gaard was blinded to the l i t e r a r y p o s s i b i l i t i e s of such themes by the 
restrictedness of h is fo rma l i s t i c pr inciples of l i t e r a r y cr i t ic ism? 
Stanley Cavell has said that 
both h i s and our concepts of aesthetics are h i s t o r i c a l l y con-
di t ioned; that the concepts of beauty and sublimity which he 
had i n mind ( i n deploring the confusion between ar t and re -
l i g i o n ) are ones which our a r t either repudiates or i s determ-
ined to win i n new ways; tha t , i n pa r t i cu la r , our serious 
a r t i s produced under conditions which Kierkegaard announces 
as those of apostleship, not those of genius. I do not i n s i s t 
that f o r us a r t has become r e l i g i o n . . . but that the a c t i v i t y 
of modern a r t , both i n production and reception, i s to be 
understood i n categories which are, or were, r e l ig ious . (19) 
I t ce r t a in ly cannot be denied that some a r t i s t s , such as Brecht, 
have del ibera te ly sought to f l o u t and to reverse precisely those as-
pects of aesthetic experience which Kierkegaard regarded as i n t r i n s i c 
to i t . (20) 
We must, however, question whether 'serious a r t ' i n the twentieth 
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century can be said to have reached a consensus as to what i t i s 
meant to be about, and we may well suspect that t h i s f a i l u r e to 
achieve consensus i s not merely a sign of plural ism i n aesthetics, 
but r e f l e c t s a deep ly - fe l t doubt concerning the ul t imate o f f i c t and 
destiny of a r t . 
The 'serious a r t i s t ' of today i s l i k e l y to know what Kierkegaard 
was t a l k i n g about i n h is bleaker moments, and he i s l i k e l y to have 
shared Kierkegaard's doubts concerning the power of ar t to r e f l e c t or 
i n any way cope wi th th i s v i s ion of the void. Just as theologians 
have expressed the twentieth-century ' loss of nerve' by ra i s ing the 
issue of the 'death of God', so ar t is t^and a r t - c r i t i c s have mooted 
the 'death of a r t ' . ( 2 l ) As Hans Ktlng has put i t , a r t today i s seen 
'against a n i h i l i s t i c background.' (22) 
The reverberations of romanticism can s t i l l be heard i n th i s s i t -
ua t ion , and betray themselves i n the conscious concern to re-animate 
the v i s ion of the f i r s t -gene ra t ion of romantics and to entrust the 
fu tu re to the shaping s p i r i t of imagination. Thus, although his ex-
i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy of a r t has many points i n common with Kierke-
gaard's aesthetics, Arturo Fa l l i co i s able to say that i t i s only i n 
a r t that we are able to f i n d the ' w i l l to r e s i s t the n i h i l i s m which 
s t e a l t h i l y destroys the very soul of modern man . . . the aesthetic a t -
t i tude i s the arch-enemy of the impersonal, the l e v e l l i n g , the non-
purposive. ' (25) 
The theologian - without necessarily subscribing to the theolog-
i c a l hubris which would see i n f a i t h or i n theology the 'answer' to 
every problematic de t a i l of human existence - must pause at such a 
statement. There i s at t h i s po in t , i n a l l comradeship, a part ing of 
the ways. 
This dilemma i s expressed by Charles Glicksberg as the choice 
between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. For Nietzsche i t i s a r t , the 
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world of i l l u s i o n , which w i l l redeem us from the void of n i h i l i s m , i t 
i s the courageous and th i s -wor ld ly a f f i rma t ion of human c r e a t i v i t y . 
The poet who has reached t h i s point of d iv i s ion w i l l recognize Kierke-
gaard as 
a f e l l o w s \ i f ferer , a companion i n adversity, a wanderer i n dark-
ness who keeps open the wound of the negative, a singer of 
doubt, a dancer over the vo id , a p i lg r im of the absolute. Yet 
the poet cannot a f f o r d to fo l low his example or his recommend-
ations. As a man he may decide to make the leap perilous and 
land on the other shore of f a i t h , but i f he does so . . . he must 
perforce renounce forever h is in teres t i n the creative l i f e . 
There i s no fu r the r need to wr i te . . . Hence the modern poet 
has no other recourse but to fo l l ow the Nietzschean way, even 
i f i t leads to the ul t imate o f x n i h i l i s m . Though he reaches 
the outposts of nothingness, he at least retains his t ragic 
d i g n i t y and creat ive freedom. (24) 
This i s powerful r h e t o r i c , but i s the conclusion as obvious as a l l 
that? The choice between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche i s also expressed 
i n the fo l l owing poem Balance by R. S. Thomas, and here we f i n d the 
outcome less clear-cut : 
No p i racy , but there i s a plank 
to walk over seventy thousand fathoms, 
as Kierkegaard would say, and f a r out 
from the land. I have abandoned 
my theories, the easier cer ta in t ies 
of b e l i e f . There are no handrails to 
grasp. I stand and on either side 
there i s the haggard gal lery 
of the dead, those who i n the i r day 
walked here and f e l l . Above and 
beyond there i s the galaxies' 
violence, the meaningless wastage 
of fo rce , the chaos the blond 
hero's leap over my head 
brings him nearer to . 
I s there a place 
here f o r the s p i r i t ? I s there time 
on th i s b r i e f platform f o r anything 
other than the mind's f a i l u r e to explain i t s e l f ? 
(25) 
Does i t fo l low that the kierkegaardian l i v i n g of the tension of 
existence 'over seventy thousand fathoms' leads to a drying-up of the 
poetic w i l l , or i s the poetic w i l l any better served by the 'blond 
hero's leap'? May i t not be that i t i s the courage of f a i t h which 
makes a breathing-space i n which the poetic word can take shape? And 
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i s i t a derogation of a r t to say that i t s roots sink down into the 
silence of acceptance and adoration i n which the tension of the void 
i s resolved in to f a i t h ? 
The bleakness of Kierkegaard's more sombre utterances concerning 
the, inescapabi l i ty of su f fe r ing i n l i f e on earth does not mean the 
denial of the humble o f f i c e of a r t to achieve some small t ransf igur -
a t ion - incomplete, broken and provisional - of the surrounding gloom. 
These traces of order and of l i g h t , which we f i n d i n a r t , make very 
s p e c i f i c , very coherent demands on our emotions and on our mder-
standing. I t fo l lows tha t , f o r Kierkegaaxd, l i f e on earth i s more 
than the u t t e r darkness of \instructtired chaos: i n the dangerous 
f r a i l t y of h i s own creative g i f t the creature bears testimony - a lbe i t 
against himself - to h is high o r i g i n and destiny. 
* •)<• * 
ch. 1, n n . 1 - 4 
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NOTES 
Chapter One; Kierkegaard and the Quest f o r Imagination 
A f u l l bibliography of the l i t e r a t u r e i n th i s f i e l d cannot be 
attempted here. The question i s not i t s e l f new, and i t s s ig -
n i f i cance f o r a previous generation can be indicated by reference 
to such names as C. S. Lewis, Charles Will iams, T. S. E l i o t and 
Austin Farrer, a l l of whom took up th i s issue i n various of the i r 
works. The fo l lowing references aim merely to indicate something 
of the range of contemporary w r i t i n g on the topic . Prom the 
pedagogical point of view, Robert E. C. Browne's The Minis t ry of 
the Word {^^^6) i s something of a minor c lass ic , especially 
chapter 2: 'Preacher and Poet' . From a devotional angle Alan 
Ecclestone's Yes to God (l975) may be mentioned. The theology 
of ' s t o ry ' i s discussed by John D. Davies, 'Fa i th as Story' i n 
John J. Vincent ( e d . ) . S t i r r ings ; Essays Christ ian and Radical 
(1976). The category of story also receives at tent ion i n Anth-
ony E. Harvey ( e d . ) , God Incarnate; Story and Bel ie f (198I) 
and indeed i n The Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, 
Bel ieving i n the Church, where i t i s stated that the d i s t i n c t -
ion between ch r i s t i an s tories and chr i s t i an doctrine i s frequent-
l y overstretched f o r 'The stories themselves, and above a l l , the 
master story of our redemption, carry a great load of doctr inal 
s ign i f i cance . ' ( i b i d . , p.3OO) The importance of story i s also 
t e s t i f i e d to by Black Theology, c f . James H. Cone, God of the 
Oppressed (1975)» PP« 102-107. The question of ' imagination' 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y emphasized i n Mary V/arnock, Imagination (1976) 
and i n her a r t i c l e 'Imagination - Aesthetic and Re l ig ious ' , 
Theology ( L X X X I I I ) (1980), 403-409. The same point was taken 
up i n John Coulson, Religion and Imagination (198I) . An h i s to r -
i c a l approach to the quest f o r imagination i s to be fo\md in 
James Engel l , The Creative Imagination, Enlightenment to Roman-
t ic i sm (198I) . The f r o n t i e r of aesthetics and r e l i g i o n has a l -
so been discussed by Roman Catholic scholars, e.g. Will iam F. 
Lynch, Christ and Apollo (1.975)» and i t i s from a Roman Cathol-
i c theologian that perhaps the most majestic fusion of theology 
and aesthetics has come, namely Hans Urs von Balthasar, Herr-
l i c h k e i t ; eine theologische Aesthetik, Bd. 1 - 2, 5i> 3 i i 
(1967-75:j; c f . J e f f r e y A. Kay, Theological Aesthetics ( l975) . 
The same concern can be seen i n studies of par t icular represent-
atives of the t r a d i t i o n which emphasize the aesthetic aspect of 
t h e i r work, e.g. Robert J . 0 'Connell . A r t and the Christ ian 
In te l l igence i n St. Augustine ( l 9 7 8 ) . 
Coulson, o p . c i t . , p .v . 
c f , Warnock, Imagination, pp. 72-I3O; Coulson, opvcit . , pp. 6-
15. Notable discussions of Coleridge's doctrine of imagination 
are to be found i n J. Robert Barth, The Symbolic Imagination 
(1977), and Ivor A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination ( 1 9 M ) » 
Such a view f inds expression i n Reinhold Nieb\ihr, The Nature and 
Destiny of Man ( I 9 4 l ) » PP. 34-45- I t i s groimded i n such 
analyses of the romantic movement as those given by Heinrich 
520 - ch. 1, nn. 4 - 28 
Heine and Georg Brandes, c f , Heinrich Heine, Die Romantische 
Schule; Georg Brandes, Den Romantiske Skole i Tyskland i n Sam-
lede S k r i f t e r , Bd. 4 ( l900) , pp. 195-482. 
5 Quoted i n Hans KUng, A r t and the Question of Meaning (1981), 
p. 28. 
6 i b i d . 
7 Herbert Read, The True Voice of Feeling (1968), p.183. 
8 c f . Martin Heidegger. Being and Time (1962), pp. 68f. Jean-
Paul Saxtre, Being and Nothingness (1958), pp. 47-70. 
9 c f . ch. 5> esp. pp. 114ff below. 
10 E. J. Raymond Cook, 'Kierkegaard's L i t e ra ry A r t ' i n The 
Listener (72) I964, 715-
11 Examples of such an approach are F. J. Bi l leskov Jansen, Sfaen 
Kierkegaards L i t t e raere Kunst and Aage Henriksen, Kierkegaards 
Romaner. 
12 Martin Thust, Soeren Kierkegaard, Der Dichter des ReligiBsen 
(1951), P.24. 
15 i b i d . , pp. 17f. 
14 c f . chs. 7 and 8 below. 
15 Louis Mackey - Kierkegaard - a Kind of Poet ( l 9 7 l ) , p.259. 
16 i b i d . , pp. 267ff . 
17 Jean-Paul Sartre, Qu'est-ce que l a Li t te ra ture? (l948)pp.11-44. 
18 Mackey, o p . c i t . , p.267. 
19 i b i d . , p.285. 
20 i b i d . , p. 267. 
21 Ne l ly Via l l ane ix , Ecoute, Kierkegaard ( l979) . 
22 i b i d . , p.10. 
25 i b i d . , p .21 . 
24 i b i d . , p.38. 
25 i b i d . , p.59. 
26 John Hick, E v i l and the God of Love (1968), pp. 197ff. 
27 Theodor Adomo, Kierkegaard ( I962) , p. 9. 
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v i s ion of man i s one of the central themes of Valter LindstrBm, 
Stadiernas Teologi . 
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3 i b i d . , p.64 
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40 Schlegel, o p . c i t . , p.107. 
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nordic cu l ture . Niko la i , F. S. Grundtvig, Steffens ' cousin, 
attempted a fus ion of elements of norse mythology with Chr is t -
i a n i t y , c f . Edgar L . A l l e n , Bishop Grundtvig; Prophet of the 
North (1950), pp. 39-53. 
66 Richard M. Summers, 'A Study of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Dev-
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